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
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THE STATE OF GERMAN NATIONALISM
FOLLOWING THE FOUNDING OF THE WEST GERMAN REPUBLIC

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INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION
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INTRODUCTION

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One dark cloud attendant to the launching of the West German Republic was an apparent renaissance of German nationalism. Some observers saw it in the heavy volume of anti-Allied criticism that marked the election campaigning. Others inferred it from what seemed to be an upsurge in anti-Semitic incidents. Still others saw it in the campaign stress upon the necessity for German unity and the demand for restoration of former German lands. Attempts to minimize Germany's responsibility and defeat in the last war - as in General Halder's book - also seemed symptomatic of a general rise in German nationalism.

To ascertain whether these campaign incidents actually reflected increased nationalistic feelings among the rank and file of the German people, the Reactions Analysis Branch, Information Services Division, HICOG, utilized opinion survey methods to assess public attitudes on the issue.

To this end in September 1949 a representative sample of approximately 3000 people in the U.S. Zone, 500 in Berlin, and 300 in Bremen were interviewed on a questionnaire designed to tap trends and present attitudes in the various kinds of sentiments that have been focused on as areas of nationalism-inspired upsurges. As usual, the interviews were conducted in the homes of the respondents by trained German interviewers under the direction of American field supervisors.

CONCLUSION IN BRIEF

In viewing the trend results as a whole - in the various areas of nationalism-related sentiments that are examined - it will become evident that the present study discloses no evidence of any recent upsurge in the extent of nationalist feeling among the German people. Whatever changes have occurred in the trends have been without exception in the opposite direction, i.e. toward less nationalism rather than more.

It must be clearly understood that the above finding does not mean that there are no nationalist sentiments in the German public. It means that the extent of such sentiments - quite appreciable in certain areas of attitudes - has not recently risen among the German people.

Possibly then, the indications of increasing German nationalism attendant to the formation of the West German Republic were simply a result of more vigorous expression of sentiments by nationalist groups with the diminution of military control. Or again, as some observers have suggested, what seems like a rise in nationalism could in large part have been the consequence of campaigning politicians beating the drums to capture nationalist votes. But whatever the complete explanation, the evidence of the present study offers no good basis for inferring any recent resurgence of nationalism among the German rank and file.

PART IATTITUDES TOWARD AMERICANS

The state of criticism of the occupying powers which occurred during last summer's pre-election campaign was interpreted by some observers as indicative of a resurgence of German nationalism.

In this section, trends in attitudes toward the Americans -- as one of the western allies -- are examined in order to ascertain whether any noticeable changes in this regard have occurred.

Four lines of inquiry were used:

1. Are the Germans and Americans similar or are they different?
2. What feelings primarily motivate Americans in their dealings with the Germans?
3. Have the Americans furthered or hindered the reconstruction of Germany?
4. What about the American troops -- are they more popular or less popular than formerly?

In September 1949, as in November 1947, majority opinion in the U.S. Zone was that Germans and Americans are alike. Assuming the correctness of psychologists' theory that such assertions of similarity are generally complimentary, it means that U.S. Zone Germans have continued to have a relatively high regard for Americans. And during this two-year period, West-Berliners came to place greater stress on similarities, and less emphasis on differences between the two peoples.

"What do you think, are Americans similar to Germans, or are there differences between the two peoples?"

	U.S. Zone		Berlin	
	Nov 1947	Sept 1949	Nov 1947	Sept 1949
Similar	61%	65%	55%	67%
Differences	30	27	43	30
No opinion, no answer	9	8	2	3
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Significant also is the fact of regional consistency in these attitudes, as is evident in the following figures from the September 1949 survey:

Americans and Germans:	Bavaria	Hesse	W. Baden	ALZON	Berlin	Bremen
Similar	63%	62%	65%	65%	67%	66%
Different	28	23	23	27	30	29
No opinion, no answer	9	9	7	8	3	5
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Then those who found differences between Americans and Germans were asked what differences they had in mind, a wide variety of answers was received. The replies were grouped into three broad categories: those construed as favorable to Americans, those involving no value judgments, and those considered uncomplimentary to Americans.

Differences noted in ALZON were about equally divided among favorable, unfavorable and neutral characteristics. Of the differences noted in Berlin, about half were favorable to Americans while a fourth could be considered unfavorable.

(If "Differences") "What differences?"

	ALZON	Berlin	Bremen
Americans more spontaneous, more generous; other favorable characteristics	9%	10%	11%
American mode of thinking and living different; other neutral characteristics	10	10	10
Americans racially mixed, money-grabbing, less industrious; other unfavorable characteristics	9	11	7
No opinion, no answer	<u>1</u> 29%	<u>1</u> 40%	<u>3</u> 31%

* Percentages add to more than the number who found differences because some people gave more than one answer.

AMERICANS MOTIVATED LARGELY BY "UNDERSTANDING" ...

Fifty U.S. Zone Germans out of every 100 selected "Understanding" as the most influential factor in American treatment of the German people, when asked in September 1949, to indicate their choice from a card listing five alternative characterizations.

Only six out of 100 chose derogatory factors ("Dislike," 4%; "Vengeance," 2%). Twenty in 100 selected "Indifference" as a motivating influence.

"What feeling do you think influences the Americans most strongly in their treatment of the Germans?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Understanding	48%	46%	57%	50%	59%	64%
Indifference	21	17	19	20	12	11
Sympathy	9	10	9	10	22	9
Dislike	4	3	4	4	1	3
Vengeance	3	3	1	2	1	2
Others	3	6	2	3	4	5
No opinion and no answer	<u>12</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>6</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Also, the per cent selecting "Understanding" increased 10 points between November 1947 and September 1949. At the same time, the proportion asserting American indifference toward Germans declined from 35 to 20% in AMZON.

"What feeling do you think influences the Americans most strongly in their treatment of the Germans?"

	AMZON	
	Nov 1947	Sept 1949
Understanding	40%	50%
Indifference	35	20
Sympathy	9	10
Dislike	4	4
Vengeance	2	2
Others	-	3
No opinion and no answer	<u>13</u>	<u>11</u>
	103%*	100%*

* Percentages add to more than 100% because some people gave more than one answer.

AMERICANS HELD TO HAVE FURTHERED THE RECONSTRUCTION OF GERMANY ...

Six out of ten AMZON respondents think the Americans have furthered the reconstruction of Germany. The proportion rises to seven out of ten in Wuerttemberg-Baden and Bremen, and more than eight out of ten in Berlin. Less than one out of ten in AMZON (fewer in Berlin and Bremen) believe Americans have hindered reconstruction. It was found that views on this question did not vary appreciably with age, sex, education or income.

"Do you think the Americans have furthered or hindered the reconstruction of Germany?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Furthered	58%	57%	71%	60%	85%	71%
Hindered	10	8	7	9	4	5
Neither/Nor	18	20	13	18	9	18
No opinion and no answer	<u>14</u> 100%	<u>15</u> 100%	<u>9</u> 100%	<u>13</u> 100%	<u>2</u> 100%	<u>6</u> 100%

The proportion believing the Americans have furthered German reconstruction has increased markedly since November 1947. Current figures represent the high point in Berlin, while the slight drop recorded in AMZON from the high point in July 1949 is not statistically significant.

	AMZON						Berlin					
	Nov 47	Aug 48	Sep 48	Jan 49	Jul 49	Sep 49	Nov 47	Aug 48	Sep 48	Jan 49	Jul 49	Sep 49
Furthered	39%	63%	58%	57%	64%	60%	64%	82%	81%	80%	84%	85%
Hindered	20	10	12	13	10	9	10	7	4	3	3	4
Neither/ Nor	31	20	23	24	16	18	23	9	13	14	8	9
No opinion, no answer	<u>10</u> 100%	<u>7</u> 100%	<u>7</u> 100%	<u>6</u> 100%	<u>10</u> 100%	<u>13</u> 100%	<u>3</u> 100%	<u>2</u> 100%	<u>2</u> 100%	<u>3</u> 100%	<u>5</u> 100%	<u>2</u> 100%

This rise in the proportion who believe Americans have furthered the reconstruction of Germany appears clearly related to the increase in U.S. economic assistance. When respondents who thought America has furthered reconstruction were asked, "In what way?" the most frequent reply was "through economic aid," or more specifically, "through the Marshall Plan."

(If "Furthered") "In what way?"

	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Economic aid, ERP, Marshall Plan	41%	71%	65%
Political aid (assistance to German authorities, freedom, moral support)	6	12	3
Furthering of building	4	3	3
Currency reform	1	2	1
Providing for work	1	1	1
Other	11	11	1
No opinion, no answer	<u>3</u> 67%*	<u>2</u> 102%*	<u>1</u> 75%*

* Percentages add to more than those saying "Furthered" because some people gave more than one answer.

Dismantling and occupation policies were most frequently mentioned by those who thought Americans had hindered the reconstruction of Germany.

(If "Hindered") "In what way?"

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	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Dismantling	3%	2%	3%
Occupation policies and regulations	3	1	1
Mistrust of Germans and desire to keep them down	1	2	-
Occupation costs	1	-	-
Exploitation	1	-	1
Others	1	-	-
No opinion, no answer	1	-	-
	<u>10%</u>	<u>5%</u>	<u>5%</u>

* Percentages add to more than those saying "Hindered" because some people gave more than one answer.

AMERICAN TROOPS MORE POPULAR THAN BEFORE ...

Over a third of the AMZON respondents think American troops have become more popular during the past year, while a third believe their popularity has remained the same, and one out of eight believe it has declined. Almost half the respondents in Bremen and two-thirds of those in Berlin feel the American troops are better liked now, while insignificant numbers believe they are less liked.

"Do you think the American occupation troops have become better liked or less liked by the German population during the past year?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Better liked	34%	33%	39%	35%	65%	47%
Same	30	44	30	33	26	42
Less liked	14	8	12	12	4	3
No opinion, no answer	22	15	19	20	5	8
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

A survey in November 1947 also shows Berliners, under four-power occupation, more inclined than AMZON residents to believe in the increasing popularity of American troops.

"Do you think the American occupation troops have become better liked or less liked by the German people during the past year?"

	AMZON Berlin November 1947		AMZON Berlin September 1949	
Better liked	32%	54%	35%	65%
Same	32	32	33	26
Less liked	22	8	12	4
No opinion, no answer	14	6	20	5
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

...in the American troops' popularity gains is probably due to the experience of the airlift, as indicated by their emphasis on "help."

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(If "Better liked") "Why?"

	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
They help us	6%	44%	10%
Their conduct has improved	10	8	24
They have adapted themselves; have more understanding	7	4	7
We are better off.. contrasts lessened	5	5	1
We are used to them by now	4	2	1
Less control and requisitioning	1	1	2
In comparison with the Russians	1	4	1
Others	-	1	-
No opinion, no answer	1	-	1
	<u>35%</u>	<u>69%</u>	<u>47%</u>

* Percentage adds to more than those saying "Better liked" because some people gave more than one answer.

Those who believe the American troops have become less popular, mention several of the same points as above -- the conduct of the troops and their attitude toward the Germans, the length of the occupation and its effect on the German economy -- but draw opposite conclusions.

(If "Less liked") "Why?"

	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Misconduct	5%	1%	3%
Length of occupation; we have our own gov't	2	1	-
Economy is hampered	1	1	-
They are arrogant	1	1	-
Others	3	1	-
No opinion, no answer	-	-	-
	<u>12%</u>	<u>4%</u>	<u>3%</u>

IN SHORT ...

From the replies to the foregoing questions, a pattern of attitudes generally favorable toward Americans emerges.* As other studies have shown, these sentiments do not necessarily imply acceptance of American ideals or approval of specific occupation policies. Nevertheless, it is significant that the proportion expressing these favorable attitudes has tended to increase, while the number manifesting neutral and unfavorable attitudes has declined. Thus the present evidence controverts the belief that there is an increasingly widespread hostility toward Americans which may be taken to signify resurgent nationalism. While hostile attitudes toward Americans may be given freer expression by those who hold them, results indicate that they have not become more generalized among the population.

* On questions directly bearing upon American prestige, allowance has to be made for a tendency on the part of some respondents to somewhat inflate their praise for Americans when talking to German interviewers in U.S. employ. However, experiments have shown that the magnitude of any such tendencies is not such as to invalidate overall conclusions.

P A R T I I

CRITICISM OF THE RUHR STATUTE

The Ruhr territory, and especially the Ruhr Statute also came in for discussion during the heat of the electoral campaign, with aspersions thrown from right and left at Western policies on the issue. Again, many observers saw this as a demagogic appeal to renascent German nationalism. Accordingly, opinions on the Ruhr Statute were measured to see if any upsurge in antagonism has occurred which would suggest rising nationalistic sentiments.

Two inquiries, originally posed in February 1949, were repeated:

1. Have people heard of the Ruhr Statute?
2. What effect will the agreement have on Western German economy?

Extent of public awareness of the Ruhr Statute -- and hence probably too of public interest -- has dropped sharply since last measured early in the year. The February and September results are contrasted below:

"Have you happened to read or hear anything about the Ruhr agreement as concluded last winter?" *

	AMZON		Berlin		Bremen	
	Feb 49	Sep 49	Feb 49	Sep 49	Feb 49	Sep 49
Yes	46%	30%	59%	33%	53%	27%
No	54	70	41	67	47	73
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Where majorities in Berlin and Bremen -- almost half in AMZON -- indicated awareness of the Ruhr Statute in February, only a relatively small minority everywhere sampled indicated such awareness in September. Clearly the Ruhr Statute has made no great impression on the German mind, and with the pressure of other events, many people have even forgotten they have ever heard or read anything about the agreement.

SHARP DROP IN NEGATIVE ATTITUDES ...

Germans who have retained their awareness of the Ruhr Statute show a sharp drop in adverse judgments as compared to the February results.

"What effect will the Ruhr agreement have on the economic condition of Western Germany -- a good, a bad, a very bad one, or will it have no effect at all?" (asked only of respondents who had indicated they had heard or read about the Ruhr agreement.)

	AMZON		Berlin		Bremen	
	Feb 49	Sep 49	Feb 49	Sep 49	Feb 49	Sep 49
Good	7%	9%	21%	19%	6%	11%
Bad	23	7	25	2	22	4
Very bad	5	1	4	1	8	1
No effect	2	1	1	1	3	-
No opinion	9	12	8	10	14	11
	<u>46%</u>	<u>30%</u>	<u>59%</u>	<u>33%</u>	<u>53%</u>	<u>27%</u>

In all three geographic areas surveyed, the above figures make apparent there has been a marked decline in the proportion of respondents who feel that the Ruhr Statute will have a bad or very bad effect on the Western German economy. So in this particular segment of German attitudes the conclusion must be that there is definitely no indication of an increase in antagonism that could be taken as symptomatic of rising nationalism.

* The question put in February 1949 went as follows:

"Have you happened to read or hear anything about the Ruhr agreement?"

P A R T III

RACIST ATTITUDES

For some observers the charge of rising nationalism over the last few months has been largely prompted by what appeared to them to be indications of increased racist feeling in Germany - primarily anti-Semitism. It is therefore important in answering the question whether or not nationalism is on the rise, to scrutinize racist sentiments among the German people.

The analysis is based on trends of opinion regarding:

1. The fitness of particular races to rule.
2. Relative inferiority of particular races.

Added questions probed such issues as:

1. Whether a third-generation German Jew is a "real" German.
2. Which nationals would people like most to work under, and least like to work under.
3. What are the relative cultural levels of various countries?

DIFFICULTIES OF MEASUREMENT ...

The difficulties of trying to measure so complex an attitude as racism are manifold. For one thing, the public, in Germany as elsewhere, is not sure of the meaning of the term "race." Its nearest approach to an anthropological definition is to speak of white, black, yellow races. Generally, however, people talk in terms of "European," "British," "German," "French," races. In other words, many persons confuse nationality and culture with race. In this respect, western Germans share the limitations and ignorance of other nations, but in larger proportions probably, because of the fanatically false teachings of the Nazis on the subject. Another factor which adds to the difficulty of measuring racist attitudes applies especially to anti-Semitism. The German public is well-aware of the stigma attached to Germany because of her past record. Thus when the term "Jew" is used in a question, the verbal reply may be guarded, and not an entirely accurate reflection of attitudes.

FITNESS TO RULE ...

If racist sentiments are on the rise, increasing proportions of Germans might be expected to espouse the belief that some races are more fit to rule than others. But in fact there has been no such increase in past years, and viewing the AMZON trend over the last year, there has been a decrease in the number of those who see some human races as more fit to rule.

"Do you think that some human races are more fit to rule than others?"

	Dec 46	Nov 47	March 48	Oct 49
Yes	48%	42%	54%	41%
No	35	42	31	37
No opinion, no answer	17	16	15	19
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

The above facts fail to support, of course, any thesis of a recent nationalistic rise in racist feeling. However, it may be seen in the current results below that except in Hesse and in Bremen, the plurality view is still that some races are more fit than others to rule.

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	AMZON	Ecrlin	Bremen
Yes	47%	35%	47%	44%	63%	36%
No	34	44	37	37	33	53
No opinion, no answer	19	21	16	19	4	11
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Persons who claimed superior ability for some races were asked to specify which races they had in mind. Replies show some confusion about the term, e.g. Allies, Protestants, and of course, various national groups are named among the races. Obviously, however, the idea of white, and especially Nordic superiority finds most favor. Combined mention of such groups, as the white race, Nordic, Germans, British, and Americans, totals more than any mentions of other groups.

"Which ones are more fit to rule?" (Asked of people who say some races are more fit to rule.)

Bavaria Hesse W-Praden A-ZON Berlin Bremen

1. <u>White Race, Europeans</u> "White," "occidental race"	27%	15%	27%	24%	21%	25%
2. <u>Germans</u> "Prussians," "North Germans"	7	5	5	6	14	2
3. <u>British</u>	4	5	3	4	12	3
4. <u>Americans</u> "Those who are in the saddle - first it was the Germans, now it is the Americans"	5	3	3	4	12	2
5. <u>Nordic Race, Teutonic Race</u>	2	6	3	3	6	3
6. <u>French</u>	1	1	1	1	2	1
7. <u>Jews</u> "Because they are eager for power," "because they have the money," "the Jewish race"	2	1	2	2	3	1
8. <u>The Asiatic Race</u> "The Asiatic race, first of all I have the Russians in mind," "the Japanese"	1	-	1	1	3	-
9. <u>Others</u> "Italians, Protestants," "all - except the Jews - are equally well fitted," "the big powers," "those more reasonable," "the black," "the Romans, the Herrenmenschen," "the Allies," "Austrians," "the pure races, not mongrels"	1	2	1	1	3	1
100. No opinion, no answer	2 52*	3 41*	4 50*	3 40*	4 83*	2 40*

* Percentages total more than the proportion asked the question because some people mentioned more than one race.

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.. corollary question - "Do you think that some races are inferior to others?" - similarly yields in its trend results no evidence of any recent increase in racist feeling - is measured by this type of inquiry. Again whatever trend changes had occurred were in the opposite direction - toward a decrease in racist sentiments.

"Do you think that some races are inferior to others?"

	..LZON			Berlin	Bremen
	March 1948	June 1948	Sept 1949	Sept- 1949	Sept 1949
Some races inferior	43%	36%	34%	30%	44%
No difference	46	53	56	66	51
No opinion, no answer	11	11	10	4	2
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

The present state of affairs, it should be noted, is that majorities in ..LZON and Bremen - two out of three in Berlin -- do not hold the belief that some human races are inferior to others.

Among the minority who do believe in racial inferiority the questioning was pursued further to discover whether these racial differences were considered to be biological - the pure racist dogma - or cultural. These people were asked if they thought that the inferior races could through education be raised to the level of the superior races.

The results reveal the proportions of unambiguous racist - those who hold that such education is impossible - to be 13% in the U.S. Zone, 12% in Bremen and 17% in Berlin.

It is noteworthy too, that the better educated and the upper social groups are more likely to feel that education would not help, thus presumably holding that racial differences are biological, not cultural. On the other hand, German men, generally better educated than German women, are less inclined to this view. An interesting finding is that refugees more than "native" ..LZON Germans take the cultural view. An explanation may be that many of them have lived in non-Germanic countries.

"Do you think it is possible to educate these inferior races up to the level of other races?" (..asked of the 34% who said some races are inferior.)

	Yes	No	No opinion	
..LZON Total	55%	37%	6%	... 100%
By Education:				
Volksschule	56	38	6	
More than Volksschule	51	45	4	
By Sex:				
Men	65	31	4	
Women	47	46	7	
By Socio-Economic Level:				
Lower	56	37	7	
Lower middle	56	41	3	
Upper middle and Upper	41	54	5	
By Derivation:				
Refugees and Expellees	62	32	6	
"Native"	53	41	6	

WHO ARE "REAL" GERMANS? ...

To measure the extent of belief in the myth of "pure" race as applied to Germany, people were queried on whether they thought a Jew, a Frenchman, and a gypsy whose parents and grandparents had been born in Germany could be considered "real" Germans. Almost seven in ten U.S. Zone Germans assert that a third-generation Jew is a "real" German, but 28% say he is not - which gives some estimation of the proportion of AMZON Germans who may be considered today to be at least latently anti-Semitic.

"In your opinion, is a Jew whose parents and grandparents were born and grew up in Germany a real German or not?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Yes	68%	71%	66%	68%	79%	72%
No	28	25	31	28	21	24
No opinion	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>4</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

For whatever light it may shed on the strength of anti-Semitism in Germany it must be noted that the Jew fares better on this question than does a Frenchman or a gypsy.

About six in ten U.S. Zone Germans feel that a "Frenchman" whose parents and grandparents were German born would be a real German. About a third take the opposite view, and the remainder have no opinion. Persons in West Berlin and Bremen are somewhat more inclined than AMZON Germans to acknowledge German nationality.

"Do you think a Frenchman whose parents and grandparents were born and grew up in Germany is a real German or not?"*

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Yes	58%	58%	57%	58%	67%	75%
No	35	33	37	35	32	22
No opinion	<u>7</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

* This question is possibly more difficult to answer than the one on a Jew or a gypsy. The term "German Jew" can be properly applied to a particular religious group, and the term gypsy to a culture group. But a French German may appear to be a contradiction in terms.

00018

Fewest West Germans feel that a third-generation German-born gypsy could be considered a "real" German. However, almost as many AMZON Germans (44%) say that a German gypsy whose father and grandfather were German-born is a "real" German as say he is not. (40%).

"As you see it, is a gypsy whose parents and grandparents were born and grew up in Germany, a "real" German or not?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Yes	47%	43%	30%	44%	41%	34%
No	47	40	55	49	57	63
No opinion and no answer	$\frac{6}{100}$	$\frac{17}{100}$	$\frac{15}{100}$	$\frac{7}{100}$	$\frac{2}{100}$	$\frac{3}{100}$

GROUP DIFFERENCES IN PREJUDICE ...

Various groups in the population were examined in order to locate focal points of anti-Jewish sentiments. Appreciable differences in attitudes occur within population groups. Most inclined to deny German nationality to third-generation German Jews are: people under 30, refugees and expellees, irregular church-goers, both Catholic and Protestant, and the less educated. Social status, and sex differences appear to have little bearing on these attitudes.

A Jew whose parents and grandparents were born in Germany is:

A real German Not a real German No opinion

AMZON Groups:

By Age:			
Under 30	50%	38%	3% ...100%
30 - 49	71	25	3
50 and over	73	22	5
By Derivation:			
Refugees, Expellees	58	37	5
"Native" Germans	72	24	4
By Religion:			
Catholic (Reg. Church-goers)	70	25	5
Protestant (Reg. Church-goers)	71	25	4
Catholic (Irregular)	64	31	5
Protestant (Irregular)	68	30	2
By Education:			
Volksschule only	63	28	4
More than Volksschule	74	25	1

In an attempt to probe further into possible extent of racist feelings among the Germans, the respondents were asked: "Which person of these groups (listed) would you most prefer to work under?"; and "Which person of these groups would you least prefer to work under?"

In the first query Germans won hands down. This result is of course to be expected. One can assume that Americans would also, in large majorities, prefer to work under Americans. Few volunteered the sensible answer that it would depend on the person.

More significant are the results of the second query. Although some people mention more than one group as the least liked superior, the group most often mentioned are the Poles with 60%. Negroes are cited by 43% and then the Jews by 19%. That antagonism toward the Poles so outweighs anti-Semitism on this particular query is certainly worth future study. It is not to be overlooked of course that many Poles whom Germans have come in contact with - from DP camps, etc. - are Jews and that hence on the part of many, the expressed dislike of Poles may in reality derive from anti-Semitic sentiments.

"Of the following, which person would you most prefer to work under? "

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
1. German	74%	63%	71%	72%	64%	68%
2. Norwegian	15	10	15	15	15	16
3. Frenchman	10	3	6	7	2	5
4. Jew	6	3	5	5	7	5
5. Negro	1	-	-	1	-	1
6. Pole	-	-	-	-	-	-
7. Depends on the individual	7	13	5	9	7	15
8. None	5	7	7	6	5	5
9. No opinion and no answer	3 121%	3 112%	3 112%	3 113%	1 101%	1 116%

"Of the following, which person would you least like to work under?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
1. Pole	63%	54%	57%	60%	54%	60%
2. Negro	43	45	43	43	29	51
3. Jew	22	13	13	19	4	8
4. Frenchman	10	8	7	9	3	3
5. Norwegian	2	2	2	2	1	-
6. German	1	1	-	1	-	1
7. Depends on the individual	6	20	6	9	6	12
8. Would like each one of them alike	1	1	1	1	2	-
9. No opinion, no answer	4 152%	5 150%	4 137%	4 148%	2 101%	1 136%

* Order in tables following is ranking by AMZON totals not card order.

** Percentages total more than 100, since some respondents mentioned more than one national.

RELATIVE CULTURAL LEVEL ...

The widespread dislike of Poles expressed in terms of working relationship also showed up in a comparative evaluation of the general cultural levels of a given list of countries. More than eight out of ten in the AMZON held that Poland had a lower cultural level than Germany, putting Poland considerably inferior to the next in line, - India.

"Do you think India is on the same cultural level as Germany, or on a higher, or on a lower one?"

"And how about England, France, Poland, Switzerland, and the United States?"

		Same	higher	Lower	No opinion	
INDIA	Berlin	23%	7%	54%	16%	... 100%
	Bremen	20	2	44	34	
	AMZON	15	4	46	35	
ENGLAND	Berlin	77	12	9	2	
	Bremen	32	5	6	7	
	AMZON	65	14	9	12	
FRANCE	Berlin	73	3	22	2	
	Bremen	75	2	13	7	
	AMZON	55	5	26	14	
POLAND	Berlin	12	-	84	4	
	Bremen	14	-	76	10	
	AMZON	6	-	81	13	
SWITZERLAND	Berlin	72	20	4	4	
	Bremen	77	14	1	7	
	AMZON	61	21	4	14	
USA	Berlin	63	30	6	1	
	Bremen	75	16	4	5	
	AMZON	55	27	7	11	

TO SUM UP ...

The available trend questions yield no evidence of any increase in racist sentiments among the German people over the past year. The recent trends are in fact in the direction of a decrease. So, as far as these questions are relevant, the case for any recent nationalism-inspired rise in racist feeling is not supported in the present inquiry.

However, while there is no evidence of increase in racist sentiments, there are clear indications that appreciable amounts of such feelings exist. Twenty-eight per cent in the U.S. Zone claim that a third-generation German Jew cannot be considered a "real" German. And 19% state they would least prefer working under a Jew. Also 13% feel that it is impossible to educate "inferior" races to a state of equality with other races.

Widespread anti-Polish feelings were also shown in the present study. It is possible that they are a consequent of historical differences and the Oder-Neisse line. On the other hand since large numbers of Polish Jews were formerly and continue to be located in DP camps, the antagonism may express in part covert anti-Semitism. More study will be necessary before any firm explanation can be offered.

P A R T IV

GERMAN UNITY

The recent election campaign was featured by numerous strong statements about the necessity for a united Germany. Shortly after the election one well known German held that the Germans were looking for "anyone" as a leader who would unify their nation again. It is not surprising that some concern has been felt about such sentiments of unity at all cost as possibly symptomatic of burgeoning nationalism. Accordingly, in the present study, the trends and present state of affairs in German attitudes on the question of unity come in for scrutiny to see if in fact any nationalistic upsurge has occurred among the German people — as sampled by survey methods.

The following lines of inquiry were pursued:

1. Are you in favor of re-uniting Germany again?
2. Do you think Germany will be re-united again?
3. Which is more important, to check the spread of communism or re-unite Germany?
4. Which territories should properly belong to Germany?
5. Would most Germans fight to regain these territories?

ALL WANT UNITY ...

Surveys have repeatedly shown that substantially all of the German people desire a united Germany. The results of the September survey follow below:

"Are you fundamentally for or against a re-union of Germany?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
For	91%	96%	94%	93%	100%	100%
Against	4	1	2	3	-	-
No opinion, no answer	5	3	4	4	-	-
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

In Berlin and Bremen support for unity is 100%. And even in Bavaria where separatist sentiments are occasionally publicized, opposition to a re-union of Germany is no more than a negligible 4%.

MAJORITY HOPEFUL OF UNITY ...

Not so large a proportion, but still a substantial majority of the people sampled, are optimistic regarding future German unity. Interviewed in July, two thirds in AMZON and larger proportions in Bremen and Berlin expressed the belief that Germany would again be unified.

"Do you believe that in the future there will be again a unified government for all Germany?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Yes	68%	71%	60%	67%	80%	70%
No	21	18	28	22	19	24
No opinion, no answer	11	11	12	11	1	6
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

NOT UNITY AT ALL COST HOWEVER ...

But despite the widespread desire for unity and hope for its eventual attainment, the findings make it entirely clear that any contention that Germans want unity at all costs is false. The large majority of Germans everywhere sampled, as may be seen in the figures below, do not want unity at the price of Communism.

"What do you think more important — to check the spread of Communism or to unite Germany in any case?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Check Communism	73%	65%	73%	71%	69%	72%
Unite Germany	23	30	24	25	30	26
No opinion	4	5	3	4	1	2
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

00023

And more to the point, in respect to the question of a rise in nationalism -- there is no evidence over the last year and a quarter of any increase in strength of desire for unity as measured against the price of Communism.

	Bavaria and W-Baden*		Berlin		Bremen	
	May 1948	Sep 1949	May 1948	Sep 1949	May 1948	Sep 1949
Check Communism	70%	73%	59%	69%	64%	72%
Unite Germany	26	23	39	30	33	26
No opinion	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Indeed, the changes which have occurred in the trend figures above are all in the direction of less rather than greater German pre-occupation with unity. In Berlin, 10% more respondents in September 1949 than in May 1948 indicate that they feel it to be more important to check Communism than to unite Germany. In Bremen there is a similar shift of 8%. In Bavaria and W-Baden the 3% shift is not large enough to be statistically reliable, but it certainly makes it quite definite that the trend has not been in the reverse direction.

- * This trend comparison is limited to Bavaria and Wuerttemberg-Baden instead of comprising the entire ABEZON, as in the May 1948 survey the Hesse results were lost in transit as a result of the removal of Branch headquarters from Berlin to Nuremberg.

The strong majority opposition to unity at all cost found in AMZON as a whole is nowhere controverted when separate AMZON population groups are examined.

"What do you think more important — to check the spread of Communism or to unite Germany in any case?"

	Check Communism	Unite Germany	No Opinion	
AMZON AVERAGE	71%	25%	4%	... 100%
Sex				
Men	72	25	3	
Women	71	24	5	
Age				
Up to 30 years	65	33	4	
30 to 50 years	74	22	4	
50 years and more	73	22	5	
Family-Income (DM/month)				
Up to 150	71	23	6	
150 - 300	71	26	3	
300 and more	74	23	3	
Education				
Elementary (Volksschule)	69	26	5	
Secondary (Mittel & Hoehere)	78	20	2	
Abitur & University	81	15	4	
Political Preference				
SPD	67	31	2	
CDU/CSU	78	18	4	
LDP/DVP/FDP	77	22	1	
BP	76	21	3	
No Preference	71	25	4	
Derivation				
"Natives"	71	25	4	
Refugees, Expellees	72	24	4	

Three indications are worthy of particular note in the above table:

1. A larger proportion of the higher educated respondents than of the lower educated feel it to be more important to check Communism than to unite Germany. This fact tends to suggest that uncritical pre-occupation with unity is less among German opinion-leaders than among the rank and file.
2. A larger proportion of the young (up to 30) than of their elders would accept unity even if it brought Communism. However, even among the young, support for such a position is still no greater than one out of three.

3. The last point of interest in these breakdowns is the absence of any difference in attitudes between "natives" and refugees. For many of the non-natives, uniting Germany means restoring their homelands to German sovereignty. Yet just as large a proportion of this group as of natives feel that German unity is less important than checking Communism. Perhaps their more intimate experience with the Communist way of life is not irrelevant in producing such results.

RESTORATION AT ALL COSTS ? ...

Unification of Germany also raises the question of restoration of territories which formerly belonged to the Reich. It is valuable in attempting to gauge the intensity of German nationalist feelings to ascertain what proportion of the German people would wish to reunite these with Germany at all cost, so to speak. The yardstick that was employed in the present connection is war -- which of Germany's former holdings do the people want to have back even at the cost of going to war for them ?

WHAT LANDS RIGHTFULLY BELONG TO GERMANY? ...

Respondents were first asked which of a list of areas Germany formerly controlled did they consider to be rightfully German soil. The largest proportion everywhere surveyed -- from three quarters in AMZON to nine out of ten in Berlin -- believe that East Russia and Silesia rightfully belong to Germany. Somewhat smaller numbers, but still a majority everywhere, feel that the Saar and Danzig rightfully belong to Germany.

"Here are listed some areas formerly forming part of Germany. Which of them do you think rightfully to be German soil ?"*

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
East Russia	71%	79%	77%	74%	90%	89%
Silesia	70	75	70	73	89	86
Saar	59	57	63	59	68	74
Danzig	51	58	59	54	77	72
Sudetenland	45	33	29	40	30	28
Alsace	25	26	25	25	28	30
Bohemia	18	23	18	19	17	14
Austria	21	13	14	17	10	4
All of them	10	11	7	9	8	5
None of them	-	-	-	-	-	-
No opinion	7	6	8	7	1	3

* Order of listing as ranking by AMZON totals -- not order as question appeared on card.

A second line of inquiry was to ask people which of these areas they thought Germans would fight to regain.

"Some of these areas will probably never be part of Germany again. Which of these areas will Germany want to have back in any case even if this could only be accomplished by a war?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Silesia	51%	45%	45%	48%	83%	60%
East Russia	45	48	51	47	82	64
Saar	28	26	31	28	34	37
Danzig	19	25	20	21	44	40
Sudetenland	28	16	11	21	11	7
Alsace	9	9	10	10	8	9
Bohemia	6	7	6	7	5	3
Austria	7	2	5	5	3	1
All of them	2	3	1	2	1	2
None, under such circumstances	20	28	22	22	10	22
No opinion, no answer	14	15	13	14	1	6

Unfortunately no trends are available on this newly designed query. But to the extent that desire for unity is related to nationalism it is clear that there are no former areas of the Reich that a clear majority of AMZON Germans would go to war to regain. This is true even though the majority in the U.S. Zone feel that East Russia, Silesia, the Saar, and Danzig rightfully belong to Germany.

At the same time, it is certainly true that fairly large proportions of the population would pay the price of war to regain some of the areas formerly ruled by Germany. This is particularly the case in Berlin and Bremen, where the strength of restorationist sentiment is appreciably greater than in AMZON. Over eight out of ten Berliners say that Germany will want to regain East Russia and Silesia even if this would mean a war. In Bremen six out of ten express the same attitude.

PART V

GERMAN VIEWS OF WORLD WAR II

Observers of the German scene also reported an apparently growing inclination to rationalize the causes of the German defeat in World War II. General Halder's book, for example, received wide publicity with its thesis that Hitler, and not the German General Staff, was largely responsible for the defeat. Similar ideas ("The Stab in the Back" idea) expressed after World War I fed German nationalistic attitudes.

In this section, the trend in German conceptions of their responsibility for the war is examined. Results of the following questions are reported:

1. Who was responsible for the war: Germany, other countries, or particular circumstances?
2. If Hitler had not interfered, could the generals have won the war?
3. If the generals had followed Hitler's plans, would Germany have won the war?

Although the proportion considering Germany chiefly to blame in the last war has never reached a majority, the findings make it evident that more Germans, rather than fewer, now think Germany was primarily responsible than thought so in 1947.

"In your opinion, who was mainly responsible for the last war - Germany, other countries, or particular circumstances?"

	Nov 1947	Jan 1949	September 1949		
	AMZON	AMZON	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Germany	26%	34%	37%	36%	38%
Other countries	4	7	9	5	8
Particular circumstances	55	41	36	54	36
No opinion, no answer	15	18	18	5	18
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

The trend runs counter to what would be expected if nationalistic feelings were increasing. However, a sizeable minority still consider "particular circumstances" rather than Germany as primarily for the war.

Asked what "particular circumstances" they thought brought about the war, the largest number (13%) placed the blame on the whole world. Almost as many people gave as their reason explanations with which the Nazis justified the war ... lack of "Lebensraum" in Germany ... fear of German economic competition ... the Versailles treaty. About three out of ten Berliners consider Hitler and the Nazi Government responsible.

Particular circumstances which brought about the war:

	September 1949		
	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Whole world is to blame; is the fault of both sides	13%	7%	10%
Nazi justifications:			
Other countries envied Germany;			
feared economic competition;	5	3	6
Lack of "Lebensraum" in Germany;	4	3	3
Peace treaty of 1918	2	5	1
Hitler and the Nazi government	4	28	3
Capitalists wanted to make profit	2	1	1
General economic situation in world	2	2	3
Lack of understanding between nations;			
suspicion and greed	2	5	5
General development of mankind;			
war was inevitable	1	-	1
Foreign countries recognized,			
protected Hitler	1	2	1
Other answers	1	1	1
No opinion, no answer	1	1	2
	38%*	58%*	37%*

* Percentages add to more than proportions asked the question as some people gave more than one answer.

little difference between men and women, people of different age, and of different economic or educational levels. However, as seen below, a striking difference appears between ex-Nazi members and those who had no affiliation. Ex-party members are much more likely to explain the war by some "particular circumstances" than are non-members. Inasmuch as this difference of attitude cannot be explained by the fact that former party members are better educated than non-party members — otherwise there would be a difference among educational levels — it does appear to be linked with their party affiliation.

Place responsibility for war on ...

	Germany	Other countries	Particular circumstances	Undecided
Ex-NSDAP members	21%	11%	56%	12%...100%
Family member in party	30	11	42	17
No affiliation	40	9	32	19

MAJORITY DISAGREE WITH GENERAL HALDER ...

The large majority of the Germans do not agree with Halder's view that if Hitler had left the war to the generals, Germany would have been victorious.

"Suppose Hitler had left winning the war up to the generals, do you think we Germans would have won then, or not ?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	WZON	Berlin	Bremen
Yes	18%	15%	18%	17%	27%	14%
No	65	63	65	66	68	74
No opinion	17	22	17	17	5	12
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

And just as a matter of interest, the opposite view — that Hitler could have won the war except for the interference of the generals — was examined. Even less confidence is evident in Hitler's leadership than in that of the generals. Only 11% of WZON respondents — fewer in Berlin and Bremen — felt that if the officers had followed Hitler's plans Germany would have won the war.

"Suppose all the officers had always followed Hitler's regulations and orders in the war, do you think we Germans would have been able to win, or not ?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	WZON	Berlin	Bremen
Yes	13%	7%	10%	11%	7%	6%
No	71	75	76	73	87	83
No opinion	16	18	14	16	6	11
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

00030

people under 40, and particularly those under 30, express considerable more faith in Hitler than do older people. More of those preferring the conservative right wing political parties, the LDP, DVP or FDP, put their faith in the generals rather than in Hitler. However, one-fourth of those favoring W.V., the Bavarian party headed by Loritz, (and almost as many of those in the Bavarian party) think that if Hitler's leadership had been unchallenged, Germany would have won the war. More ex-members of the Nazi party say the generals would have led Germany to victory than say Hitler would have. On both of the questions below, as usual more women are undecided than men.

"Suppose Hitler had left winning the war up to the generals, do you think we Germans would have won the war then, or not?"

MEZON Groups	Yes	No	Undecided	
Age				
Under 20	13%	68%	19%	... 100%
20 - 29	16	67	17	
30 - 39	19	64	17	
40 - 49	18	65	17	
50 - 59	15	66	19	
60 - 69	20	62	18	
70 - 79	20	51	29	
Political Party Preference				
SPD	16	71	13	
CDU/CSU	15	67	18	
LDP/DVP/FDP	23	69	8	
W.V.	21	70	9	
Bayernpartei	18	68	14	
NSDAP Affiliation				
Party members	23	70	7	
No affiliation	16	65	19	
Sex				
Men	19	72	9	
Women	16	59	25	

"Suppose all the officers had always followed Hitler's regulations and orders in the war, do you think we Germans would have been able to win, or not?"

MEZON Groups	Yes	No	Undecided	
Age				
Under 20	15%	69%	16%	... 100%
20 - 29	19	69	12	
30 - 39	12	73	15	
40 - 49	8	77	15	
50 - 59	7	75	18	
60 - 69	6	76	18	
70 - 79	4	69	27	
Party Preference				
SPD	10	82	8	
CDU/CSU	9	76	15	
LDP/DVP/FDP	7	86	7	
W.V.	25	63	12	
Bayernpartei	20	69	11	
NSDAP Affiliation				
Party member	9	83	8	
No affiliation	10	73	17	
Sex				
Men	10	83	7	
Women	11	66	23	

PART VI

MILITARIST SENTIMENTS

Consideration of the question of possible nationalistic trends in German conceptions of their war responsibility suggested the advisability of probing more extensively into militarist sentiments. Trend comparisons are not possible here since the questions employed are newly designed, but the results may be helpful in suggesting to what extent militaristic components are to be anticipated in German nationalism.

The questions on which the analysis is based are:

1. From what fields of endeavor have the greatest Germans come ?
2. Should military service be compulsory ?
3. In the event of a war, should conscientious objection be permitted ?

Is the career as an army officer a desirable one ?

Then asked to say from which of three fields - music, poetry and military - the greatest Germans have come, over seven out of ten in the RZON - more in Bremen and Berlin - specify music or poetry.

"From which of these fields do you think the greatest Germans have come?" (A card listing fields handed respondents)

	Bavaria	Hesse	R-Baden	RZON	Berlin	Bremen
Music	30%	35%	32%	32%	39%	43%
Poetry	32	47	46	38	42	40
Military						
(Soldatentum)	18	15	17	17	21	22
None of these	1	3	1	2	1	1
No opinion, no answer	20	18	12	18	5	14
	101%*	118%*	108%*	107%*	108%*	120%*

Though the above question does not ask people which field produces men whom they personally admired the most, it does indicate that only a small minority of the population assert that Germany's military men are greater than her poets and musicians.

Men and women, and people in the different income levels have about the same attitudes on this question. However, somewhat fewer of the people between 30 and 50 years of age regard military men as being the greatest Germans than either younger or older people. Also fewer of the better educated chose the military than those with only Volksschule education.

Greatest Germans were from fields of ...

	Military (Soldatentum)	Music	Poetry	None	Undecided
Age					
Under 20	20%	22%	45%	2%	11%
20 - 29	21	32	33	1	13
30 - 39	15	25	41	1	18
40 - 49	13	30	38	2	17
50 - 59	19	27	32	2	20
60 - 69	17	21	36	2	24
70 - 79	19	17	29	4	31
Education					
Volksschule	18	25	35	2	20
Mittelschule	11	39	46	-	4
Abitur & University	9	31	53	-	7

* Some people gave more than one answer

In the event that Germany should have an army again, six out of ten ANZON Germans feel that military service should not be compulsory. When asked if they felt military service should be obligatory in case of war, four in ten continue to believe that even under such circumstances every man should be able to decide for himself whether he will become a soldier or not. These two questions were asked.

"Suppose Germany had an army again. Do you think it should be up to every German man to decide for himself if he wants to become a soldier, or should military service be compulsory?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	ANZON	Berlin	Bremen
Everyone decide	60%	70%	61%	63%	65%	70%
Service compulsory	36	24	35	33	35	27
No opinion, no answer	<u>4</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>3</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

"And how about in case of war? In such a case, should every man be able to decide for himself if he wants to become a soldier, or should military service be obligatory?" (Asked of those answering "Everyone decide" above)

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	ANZON	Berlin	Bremen
Everyone decide	34%	45%	40%	39%	34%	39%
Service compulsory	19	17	16	18	24	27
Depends on the war	5	4	4	4	6	3
No opinion, no answer	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
	60%	70%	61%	63%	65%	70%

Younger people under 20 years old are somewhat less inclined to think that a man should have the right to decide for himself in any case whether he should be a soldier, than are their elders. Also, slightly fewer former Nazi party members than those having had no affiliation think that a man should have this right to decide. Little difference appears between the thinking of men and women on this question, or among those having different amounts of education.

	Military service should be	Service should be compulsory <u>only</u> during <u>war</u>	Man should have right to decide in war and peace	Depends on war & Undecided
Age				
Under 20	35%	30%	29%	6% ...100%
20 - 29	27	23	39	11
30 - 39	28	18	43	11
40 - 49	32	17	40	11
50 - 59	37	12	39	12
60 - 69	37	11	39	13
70 - 79	46	13	22	19
NSDAP Affiliation				
Party member	38	20	31	11
No affiliation	31	17	40	12

Traditionally the profession of a military officer in Germany has carried with it considerable prestige. It was customary for sons of aristocrats and land owners to become officers, and for the people in general to look up to them. To help gauge the extent of present day militarist sentiments the respondents were queried to find out to what extent the officer's profession is still admired. 00034

As seen below, 85% of the people in ALZON and similar proportions in Berlin and Bremen would not prefer to see a son of theirs become an officer.

"Supposing Germany had an army again, would you prefer your son to become an officer, or to get an equally good position in private life?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	Rh.-Baden	ALZON	Berlin	Bremen
Prefer him as officer	4%	2%	3%	3%	6%	2%
Prefer him in private position	83	82	92	85	87	80
No opinion, no answer	13	16	5	12	7	18
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

OBJECTIONS TO MILITARY CAREER ...

Among the objections to a military career as listed below, specifically anti-militarist arguments predominate. Other stated reasons blend anti-militarist sentiments with the personal and economic advantages of private life, or focus entirely on the latter.

Reasons for not preferring son to become an officer:

	ALZON	Berlin	Bremen
<u>Because of aversion to war; militarism;</u> War making has never been of value; we don't need the military, and neither do other countries - then there will be no more wars; am fed up with war	29%	38%	28%
<u>Private position grants freedom, independence and a quiet life;</u> "Then a man has his peace."	14	12	9
<u>Occupation of officer is too dangerous physically: in case of war, he must be first to go</u>	11	13	8
<u>Officer's profession is negative and unproductive; has bad influence on man's character; in private life a man can earn his bread honestly</u>	8	14	8
<u>Private position is more secure generally; (not specifying if physical or economic security) "Private job is more secure for the future"</u>	8	3	8
<u>Private position provides economically better life; one can earn more money</u>	5	2	5
<u>After a lost war an officer has a miserable life</u>	4	3	5
<u>Personal reasons: "We don't feel comfortable in higher circles; we have always been on the farm; my son would never be a good soldier"</u>	4	5	5
<u>An officer has no time for his family</u>	3	1	2
<u>Other answers</u>	3	1	1
<u>No opinion, no answer</u>	1	-	1
	90%*	92%*	80%*

* Percentages add up to more than proportions asked the question as some people gave more than one answer

The small proportion preferring an officer's career for their sons gave scattered reasons, such as: an officer's profession enjoys a good reputation; it provides good training toward correctness and discipline; it insures a pension; or it is a family tradition; or it is necessary to defend one's country.

Comparison of attitudes among particular population groups indicates that the groups from which most officers had come in the past -- the well educated, upper income groups -- express more antagonism to the military profession than do their counterpart groups.

Fewer youths under 20 than any other group interviewed say that they oppose an officer's career because they are against the military.

	Approve of son's becoming officer	Oppose son's becoming officer for specifically anti-military reason	Oppose son's becoming officer for other reason
Age			
Under 20	4%	15%	81% ... 100%
20 - 29	3	26	71
30 - 39	3	38	59
40 - 49	3	38	59
50 - 59	6	35	59
60 - 69	6	32	62
70 - 79	10	23	67
Sex			
Men	4%	36%	60%
Women	4	29	67
Education			
Volksschule	4%	31%	65%
Mittelschule	2	37	61
Abitur and university	2	38	60
Religion			
Regular Catholics	5%	29%	66%
Irregular Catholics	4	36	60
Regular Protestants	3	25	72
Irregular Protestants	4	35	61
Party Preference			
SPD	4%	37%	59%
CDU/CSU	5	30	65
LDP/DVP/FDP	2	35	63
WAV	6	29	65
Income			
Under 150 DM a month	6%	26%	68%
150 - 300 DM	4	34	62
300 DM and over	3	36	61

TO SUM UP ...

In interpreting the results to the three questions that have been considered thus far -- the area of greatest German achievement, right of conscientious objection and desirability of the officers profession -- it should be kept in mind that militarism in people's attitudes is far from simple thing to measure. To the extent that the three questions used validly bear upon militaristic sentiments their results suggest that the weight of present day German opinion is more anti-militaristic or non-militaristic than it is militaristic.

Evident in the results below is that a plurality of WZON respondents - majorities in Bremen and Berlin - believe Germans to be more militaristic than other people in general, and almost a majority in the WZON (50%) and again larger proportions in Berlin and Bremen, believe that Germans are more militaristic than specifically the Americans.

Bavaria Hesse W.-Baden N. ZON Berlin Bremen

Bavaria Hesse I-Baden L-ZON Berlin Bremen

So whatever is actually the present extent of German militarism, the prevailing belief among the Germans themselves is that they are more militaristic than other people in general - particularly, more militaristic than Americans.

PART VII

NATIONALISM IN THE POPULAR MIND

In concluding the present inquiry it is advantageous to see what conceptions and what reactions the German people themselves have to nationalism as a word and idea. However rational or irrational these views may be, the information can only be of value in guiding any attempts at reorientation.

This inquiry is based on replies to the following questions:

1. What do you understand by nationalism? (Nationalismus)
2. Should people have nationalistic attitudes?
3. Is there more nationalism in Germany than in the U.S.? -
than in other countries?

When asked what they understand by the term "nationalism," the majority of WZON respondents were unable to offer a definition. Among those who did answer, the prevailing conceptions were in terms which would not be considered objectionable -- "love of one's country," "national pride," "patriotism." Thus to the great bulk of Germans, nationalism is either a term they cannot define or a term which stands for sentiments quite different from those which critics of German nationalism have in mind.

"What do you understand by Nationalism?"

Bavaria Hesse W-Baden WZON Berlin Bremen

Objectionable Conceptions:

Nazism Dictatorship	3%	3%	4%	3%	4%	3%
Exaggerated estimation of own nation; desire to rule; my country right or wrong; extreme national selfishness.	9	8	9	9	12	12

Non-Objectionable Conceptions:

To stand up for the state and its interests	7	7	6	7	9	10
National Feeling	6	6	6	6	7	4
Attachment to and love of one's country	13	17	18	15	22	24
Union of a group of people into a nation	4	4	3	4	4	2
General ethical demands; justice	1	1	2	1	1	-
Others	3	4	4	3	11	3
No opinion, no answer	54	50	48	52	30	42
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

As is typical in surveys made in Germany, a larger proportion of men than women could volunteer definitions. But it is in respect to education that the widest differences in ability to define the term nationalism arise. Only a fourth as many of those with Volksschule (14 years of age) education as those with further academic training were able to give a reply. In both educational groups, however, three times as many of those replying thought nationalism simply meant patriotism, etc., as gave it chauvinistic connotations. Younger people, as noted in the figures below, also were less likely than their elders to give a definition of the term. But fewer of the definitions which were volunteered by this group were of "love of country" type.

Proportion in Various Population Groups Offering Definitions of Nationalism Embracing Connotations Which May be Considered:

00039

	Objectionable	Non-Objectionable	No Opinion	
Age				
Under 30	11%	26%	63%	... 100%
30 - 49	13	40	47	
50 and over	11	40	49	
Sex				
Men	18	49	33	
Women	7	26	67	
Education				
Volksschule	10	31	59	
Higher Academic	22	62	16	

Persons who had given a definition of nationalism were then asked if people should have such an attitude. Three-fourth of those queried answered in the affirmative. However, in view of the non-objectionable terms in which most people described the word, it is clear that this result is not a measure of attitudes which could be considered unhealthy. To obtain a true picture, it is necessary to relate people's judgment on the desirability of nationalism to what they think it means. Such a correlation reveals that most of those who say one should have a nationalistic feeling are those who define the word in terms of patriotism, love of country, etc., which cannot be considered objectionable. Thus, of those who have a conception of nationalism - it must be remembered that this is less than half of the population - only 10% give it chauvinistic connotations and indicate at the same time that it is a desirable attitude.

Definition of Nationalism Embracing Connotations Which May be Considered:

	Objectionable	Non-Objectionable	Total
Should people have a nationalistic attitude?			
Yes	10%	65%	75%
No	13	7	20
No opinion	$\frac{1}{24\%}$	$\frac{4}{76\%}$	$\frac{5}{100\%}$

Asked why they thought people should have a nationalistic attitude, about half replied that such a feeling is a symbol of one's membership in a country, that one must love his people and be proud of them, and that it is morally proper. Four in ten mentioned the practical usefulness of such an attitude, or the fact that it expresses the unity and special qualities of a people. Only 3% felt that such an attitude is commendable because it expresses a limitation against other nations and people.

On the other hand, the most often cited reasons of those who objected to nationalistic feelings are that it results in war, and that it is merely exaggerated self-interest. Others give as their reason the bad consequences of the Nazi period.

A final pair of questions had Germans compare the extent of their nationalism with what they presumed to exist in, other countries in general and the United States in particular.

It is revealing of the degree to which Germans have accepted outside criticism that a majority of respondents who define nationalism with objectionable connotations consider more of it to be present in Germany than in the United States. However, not nearly as many will concede the same in comparing Germany to other countries in general.

Among those who conceive of nationalism in non-objectionable terms, plurality sentiment in comparing Germany to America or other countries in general, is that Germany has "just as much" nationalism.

"Do you think there is more nationalism in Germany than in other countries?"

"Do you think there is more nationalism in Germany than in America?"

Definition of nationalism embracing connotations which may be considered:

	Objectionable		Non-Objectionable	
	America	Other Countries	America	Other Countries
More in Germany	51%	25%	26%	14%
Less in Germany	11	16	24	34
Just as much	22	51	34	45
No opinion	16	8	16	7
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

SOME GUIDANCE IMPLICATIONS ...

The guidance significance of these findings on German conceptions of the term nationalism should not be overlooked. The results make it clear that any reorientation campaign that might organize its themes in terms of a general attack upon "German nationalism" would be seriously misconceived. For the majority of WZON Germans the word has no concrete meaning. But more importantly, among those for whom it has meaning, the connotations are patriotism. "Vaterlandsliebe," and "Heimatgefuehl," not the chauvinistic sentiments that reorientation planners might have in mind by the term. That the correct meaning of nationalism may be is beside the point. The point is that reorientation efforts must work in and through German understandings whatever those may be. So if it is deemed desirable to launch campaigns to minimize among the German people undesirable sentiments which are generically looked upon as nationalistic, it is imperative to attack not "nationalism," but specific attitudes specifically labelled in terms the Germans understand.

READERS EVALUATION OF
THE U.S OVERT PUBLICATIONS

Classified as Restricted
by order of Colonel P. Crespi
~~SECRET~~

Report No. 2
Series No. 2
6 January 1950
REACTIONS ANALYSIS BRANCH
INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE
HICOG APO 807
Bad Nauheim Germany

R E S T R I C T E D

INTRODUCTION ...

In December 1949, the Reactions Analysis Branch, ISD, OPA, HICOG, undertook a study of the readership of the four U.S. overt publications: AMERIKANISCHE RUNDSCHAU, DER MONAT, HEUTE, and NEUE MUSLESE. A representative random sample of 3000 residents in the U.S. Zone, 500 in the three western sectors of Berlin, and 300 in Bremen, were interviewed. A special sample of subscribers of DER MONAT living in Bavarian cities and towns were also interviewed.

As in all surveys made by this Branch, interviews were conducted by trained German interviewers supervised by the American Field Staff. Analysis of the results was made by the Headquarters Staff.

GENERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...

First: A correct appraisal of the size of the reader audience of the four U.S. overt publications, should take into consideration that only 24% of the adult public in the U.S. Zone read any magazines of national circulation. The proportionate share of this total going to each of the U.S. overt publications compares favorably with that obtained by other magazines of comparable standards.

Second: All of the overt U.S. magazines are relatively expensive, even more so than most German periodicals which also tend to be highly priced for most readers. It is questionable, therefore whether many magazine readers can afford more than one or two magazines.

Third: Thus, before any programs to increase circulation are undertaken, it is well to understand that not only is the potential market for magazines more limited in Germany than in the United States, but an appreciable number of new readers could probably only be obtained at the expense of other magazines. That is, if the readership of HEUTE enjoys an increase, it probably means that the new HEUTE readers have decided in favor of it as against a magazine they now read.

Fourth: Probably no publishers of magazines will be alarmed at the idea of gaining new readers at the expense of their competitors. And this would presumably not be too difficult as the findings of this report indicate that reader loyalty is not remarkably high, either for the American sponsored periodicals or for the others. However, it may be argued that a circulation drive for the overt U.S. publications which would result in reducing readership of indigenous periodicals, defeats the aim of the Occupation authorities to encourage the development of a free, independent, German press.

Fifth: Comparison of the socio-economic characteristics of the readers of the four American publications, indicate that with the exceptions of HEUTE, all reach the same type of reader: the better educated, upper income, upper middle class, urban reader.

Sixth: The high editorial standards of the three magazines, MONAT, RUNDSCHAU and MUSLESE, which are much appreciated by the readers, also serve to limit the number of potential readers. Only 16% of the U.S. Zone population has had more than elementary schooling, and only 2% have had university training. At present the three magazines together, assuming no overlap, reach 7% of the total population.

Seventh: There is little evidence that an important reason for not reading any of the magazines is because they are published under the auspices of the U.S. government.

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RESTRICTED

Eighth: Readers of the magazines are well disposed toward them. (This appears especially true of DER MONAT.) This is to be expected because people do not tend to read magazines which they do not like. For this reason it is doubtful that questioning readers on editorial policy, format, contents, etc. is of great help in framing a program either for improvement of the magazine or increase in circulation. And non-readers cannot offer valuable suggestion because they are unfamiliar with the magazines.

Finally: Certain findings of a more obvious nature emerge from this study. The first is that the large majority of magazine readers have never heard of the three U.S. publications — MONAT, RUNDSCHAU, and AUSLESE, and a considerable fraction has also not heard of HEUTE. Any effort to gain new readers would consequently have to be preceded by an extensive information campaign. Secondly, the inclusion of serials in HEUTE appears of doubtful value, largely because so many readers of the magazine see it only occasionally and thus do not read the serials. Third, the title — AMERIKANISCHE RUNDSCHAU — is believed to lead to confusion and misunderstanding among non-readers as to the content of the magazine. Some people think the magazine deals only with articles on the U.S. Though a majority of RUNDSCHAU readers think the adjective "American" is not a limiting factor in obtaining readers, three in ten of the readers feel it to be so.

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I. READERSHIP OF THE OVERT U.S. MAGAZINES

This first section of the report contains:

1. Figures on the total claimed readership of the four magazines - AMERIKANISCHE RUNDSCHAU, DER MONAT, HEUTE, and NEUE WUSLESE - for the U.S. areas of occupation in Germany, compared with selected magazines of relatively large circulation;
2. A description of the claimed readership in terms of education, socio-economic level, income, sex, and place of residence;
3. Claimed readers' judgment of the magazines in comparison with other magazines.
4. Reasons respondents give for not reading the four magazines.

METHOD USED ...

Respondents were first asked whether they read magazines. Those who claimed to do so (30% of the sample) were then handled a card on which were listed ten magazines of national circulation in western Germany, and asked whether they read any magazines on the list. If they replied affirmatively this question was asked: "Do you read these magazines regularly, that is to say two out of every three issues, or less frequently?" ("Readers" as designated in this report are all respondents who claim to read specific magazines regularly or occasionally.) Thereafter a series of questions on the relative interest, values, and worth of the magazines were asked.*

A representative sample total of approximately 3800 were questioned in the study as well as a special sample of 78 subscribers to "Monat."

* The magazines listed were: Alles, AMERIKANISCHE RUNDSCHAU, Constance, das Beste aus Reader's Digest, DER MONAT, Der Spiegel, HEUTE, Life, NEUE WUSLESE, and Quick. The order in which the magazines were listed was altered in order to guard against biased selection resulting from the position of specific magazines in the lists.

In the U.S. occupied areas of Germany -- U.S. Zone, West Berlin (including also the British and French sectors as well as the U.S. sector) and the Bremen enclave -- 30% of the population claim to be readers of magazines. By magazines, however, many respondents mean local bulletins and like publications. Of the nationally (i.e. West Germany) circulated magazines listed on the card, 24% claim to read one or more.

The proportions claiming to read the overt U.S. Magazines are as follows:

	Per cent	Number of Cases
AMERIKANISCHE RUNDSCHAU	3%	110
DER MONAT	1%	49 *
HEUTE	12%	498
NEUE WUSLESE	3%	129

Claimed readership of other magazines on the list.**

<u>Alles</u>	1%	36
<u>Constanze</u>	9%	363
<u>Das Beste aus Reader's Digest</u>	7%	246
<u>Der Spiegel</u>	6%	214
<u>Life</u>	4%	138
<u>Quick</u>	15%	570
Size of the total sample	100%	3818

*. Because of the small number of DER MONAT readers encountered in this survey, statistical results for that periodical as reported in this section must be very cautiously interpreted. A special survey was made of available subscribers, results of which are analyzed later on in this report.

** Alles and Das Beste aus Reader's Digest are of course somewhat similar to NEUE WUSLESE in content, whereas Constanze (primarily aimed at the women's market) and Quick are picture magazines similar in nature to HEUTE. The showing made by Life is remarkable in that it is the only English-language periodical reported on here.

POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS OF READERS ...

As the figures presented below make clear, all of the overt U.S. magazines with the exception of HEUTE reach much the same kind of audience in U.S. occupied areas of Germany: proportionately more of the upper income, the better educated, urban upper socio-economic groups, and men, than of their counterpart groups. HEUTE readers, as one would expect from a more "popular" magazine, tend to share more closely the attributes of magazine readers in general. Clearly established is the fact that none of the American-sponsored periodicals reaches broad segments of the population.

(A word of caution must be inserted regarding the interpretation of the AMERIKANISCHE RUNDSCHAU readership, as reported here. In the judgment of the staff of the Reactions Analysis Branch, the apparent relatively broadly-based readership of this periodical as found in the survey is partly a function of the title of the magazine, and thus not an entirely accurate gauge of its true audience. In other words, it is believed that some genuine confusion has occurred among respondents, largely resulting from the adjective "AMERIKANISCHE" in the title. Thus, people who occasionally read any one of overt publications, or Reader's Digest or Life or the Neue Zeitung, for example, may be misled by the title "AMERIKANISCHE RUNDSCHAU" into thinking that they have indeed read this American-sponsored review. For further discussion of the title of the periodical see page 11).

Group breakdowns on readership follow:

<u>Socio-Economic Level</u>	<u>Upper middle and upper</u>	<u>Lower middle</u>	<u>Lower</u>	
AMERIKANISCHE RUNDSCHAU	14%	41%	45%	...100
DER MONAT	20	45	35	
HEUTE	11	46	43	
NEUE WISSENS	20	45	35	
Readers of other magazines	8%	43%	49%	...100
U.S. Zone population	3	29	68	...100
<u>Education</u>	<u>Elementary</u>	<u>Secondary and above</u>		
AMERIKANISCHE RUNDSCHAU	51%	49%		...100
DER MONAT	43	57		
HEUTE	57	43		
NEUE WISSENS	46	54		
Readers of other magazines	64%	36%		...100
U.S. Zone population	84	16		...100
<u>Sex</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>		
AMERIKANISCHE RUNDSCHAU	65%	35%		...100
DER MONAT	65	35		
HEUTE	49	51		
NEUE WISSENS	62	38		
Readers of other magazines	50%	50%		...100
U.S. Zone population	42	58		...100
<u>Urban-rural</u>	<u>Under</u>	<u>10,000- 99,999</u>	<u>100,000 & over</u>	
AMERIKANISCHE RUNDSCHAU	15%	30%	25%	...100
DER MONAT	37	44	19	
HEUTE	45	25	30	
NEUE WISSENS	42	29	29	
Readers of other magazines	48%	24%	28%	...100
U.S. Zone population	72	9	19	...100
<u>Monthly family income (Net)</u>	<u>Under DM 200</u>	<u>DM 200- 399</u>	<u>DM 400 & more</u>	<u>No ans. Don't know</u>
AMERIKANISCHE RUNDSCHAU	30%	46%	22%	2% ...100
DER MONAT	26	43	27	4
HEUTE	29	48	20	3
NEUE WISSENS	27	44	26	3
Readers of other magazines	34%	46%	17%	3% ...100
U.S. Zone population	50	30	16	4
<u>Age</u>	<u>Under 30 years</u>	<u>30-49 years</u>	<u>50 years & over</u>	
AMERIKANISCHE RUNDSCHAU	31%	45%	24%	...100
DER MONAT	18	45	37	
HEUTE	34	43	23	
NEUE WISSENS	28	43	29	
Readers of other magazines	32%	44%	24%	...100
U.S. Zone population	25	42	33	...100

(Figures for the U.S. Zone population are obtained from a November survey, but are identical with those usually obtained in surveys made by the Branch and conform closely to results found in the 1946 census.)

PREFERENCES AMONG READERS ...

A series of questions -- more or less closely related -- was asked in order to get a measure of reader loyalty.* As the results reported below indicate, HEUTE has greater loyalty than any of the other U.S. overt publications -- as well as having the largest claimed readership. (Results for DER MONAT should be cautiously interpreted because of the small number of readers. Nevertheless, the direction of the replies is interesting and possibly quite valid.)

By way of comparison, reader loyalty to the Reader's Digest and Quick are shown. Reader's Digest far out-distances any of the overt U.S. publications in Germany on all questions. As to Quick, it consistently falls slightly behind HEUTE. The differences between HEUTE and Quick on each question are not reliably beyond chance, but the sum total of replies suggests the interpretation that whereas Quick appears to be gaining on HEUTE in circulation, HEUTE appears better liked by its readers.

The questions and replies follow:

"Suppose you could only afford one magazine, which would you then want to read?"

- ... 12% of AMERIKANISCHE RUNDSCHAU readers would retain it
- ... 19% of DER MONAT readers would retain it
- ... 23% of HEUTE readers would retain it
- ... 9% of NEUE AUSLESE readers would retain it
- ... 49% of Reader's Digest readers would retain it
- ... 19% of Quick readers would retain it

"And which magazines do you consider the best?"

- ... 14% of AMERIKANISCHE RUNDSCHAU readers say it is the best
- ... 24% of DER MONAT readers say it is the best
- ... 20% of HEUTE readers say it is the best
- ... 15% of NEUE AUSLESE readers say it is the best
- ... 54% of Reader's Digest readers say it is the best
- ... 17% of Quick readers say it is the best

"Which magazine is the most valuable (has the most worth) to you?"

- ... 15% of AMERIKANISCHE RUNDSCHAU readers say it has the most worth
- ... 22% of DER MONAT readers say it has the most worth
- ... 20% of HEUTE readers say it has the most worth
- ... 13% of NEUE AUSLESE readers say it has the most worth
- ... 52% of Reader's Digest readers say it has the most worth
- ... 12% of Quick readers say it has the most worth

* This series of questions we asked not only to measure various dimensions of reader loyalty, but also experimentally, with a view to ascertaining the most efficient approach to this issue for future media studies.

"Which magazine do you read most thoroughly?"

- ... 15% of AMERIKANISCHE RUNDSCHAU readers read it most thoroughly
- ... 22% of DER MONAT readers read it most thoroughly
- ... 23% of HEUTE readers read it most thoroughly
- ... 10% of NEUE AUSLESE readers read it most thoroughly
- ... 47% of Reader's Digest readers read it most thoroughly
- ... 19% of Quick readers read it most thoroughly

"Which do you personally consider most interesting?"

- ... 14% of AMERIKANISCHE RUNDSCHAU readers say it is most interesting to them
- ... 16% of DER MONAT readers say it is most interesting to them
- ... 22% of HEUTE readers say it is most interesting to them
- ... 9% of NEUE AUSLESE readers say it is most interesting to them
- ... 53% of Reader's Digest readers say it is most interesting to them
- ... 18% of Quick readers say it is most interesting to them

REASONS FOR NOT READING THE FOUR MAGAZINES ...

Non-readers of the U.S. overt publications were queried regarding each magazine as to their reasons for not reading the magazine or magazines. The most frequent reply for AMERIKANISCHE RUNDSCHAU, DER MONAT, and NEUE AUSLESE was: "I never heard of it before."

Cost was the main reason given for not reading HEUTE, and was also frequently mentioned regarding the other magazines.

"Not interested" was also a prominent reply. Few people made specific criticism of the individual magazines as a reason for not reading them.

"Would you tell me why you don't read the (AMERIKANISCHE RUNDSCHAU), (DER MONAT), (HEUTE), (NEUE AUSLESE)?"

	RUNDSCHAU	MONAT	HEUTE	AUSLESE
I never heard of it	53%	70%	2%	53%
I don't have enough money to buy	30	20	45	31
I'm not interested in it; don't have time, or opportunity	18	7	22	15
Specific criticism of the magazine	1	-	7	4
No opinion, no answer	7	7	12	6
	109%*	104%*	112%*	109%*

Specific criticism of the magazines ...

AMERIKANISCHE RUNDSCHAU ... "I don't think American magazines are worth much because they don't come up to the German standard;" "Too few questions covered that answer German women's problems."

HEUTE ... "I prefer magazines with a lot of reading material;" "Not as many-sided as Constanze;" "Though it's good, it's too biased;" "Not enough variety, looks unprosperous, primitive, just as it would appear four weeks after the war was over;" "So much theoretical stuff, it doesn't interest me;" "It smells to me of too much American propaganda."

NEUE AUSLESE ... "Personally, I find the articles less interesting than in the Reader's Digest;" "It's too intellectual and boring;" "The sole guilt of Germany is emphasized too much;" "The articles seem one-sided and too intellectual;" "Too much politics in it;" "I like the Reader's Digest better."

* Percentages total more than 100 because some people gave more than one reason.

HEUTE READERS' REACTIONS TO THE MAGAZINE ...*

Asked to specify what they like about HEUTE, the readers most frequently say the pictures, or picture stories, (34%). The next largest group of mentions is of articles and stories, (19%), sometimes referred to by specific title. The variety, (13%) and realism, (13%) of the material presented in HEUTE tie for third place in number of mentions. The cosmopolitan or international character of the pictures and reports receives 7% mention. And 5% say they like everything about the magazine, and another 5% praise the entire layout and format. The same proportion (5%) claim to like no one feature especially, and 10% can't say what they like about HEUTE. Miscellaneous "likes" are given by 6%.

As a further measure of opinions on HEUTE, readers were asked: "Is there anything in the magazine HEUTE that is not to your liking?"

Eight in ten (79%) reply "No," about two in ten (17%) say "Yes," and the 4% express no opinion. The critics when asked to specify their dislikes, gave a variety of replies. "Too much on the U.S.," or "Too little about Germany," receives the largest single mention. In descending order of frequency of mention are: criticism of the pictures (one woman reader dislikes the pictures of the suffering and want); and the cost, which is mentioned by a very small group as being too high.

Most of the group mentioned specific matters, impossible to catalog. Some examples are given:

"The stories are not the right kind of reading material for us Germans. They are so childishly naive."

"The print is too compressed."

"Too much economics."

"Too much politics."

"Return to prisoners from Russia."

"The statistics."

"Too few articles."

"Too many pictures and too little to read."

* A further study of HEUTE in which comparisons with other picture magazines will be measured is now in the field. See also "Readership of HEUTE," Report # 177, Opinion Surveys Branch, ISD, CMGUS, 15 June 1949.

PICTURES PREFERRED ...

queried especially about which they liked better, the pictures or the articles, pictures received the largest vote.

"What in general interests you more in HEUTE, the pictures or the articles?"

	<u>Readers</u>
Pictures	53
Articles	31
Both equally	10
No opinion and no answer	6
	<u>100</u>

SPECIFIC OPINIONS ON HEUTE

THE COVER ...

Almost all readers say they like the covers on HEUTE. The question and replies are:

"In general do you like the covers on HEUTE?"

Yes	87
No	3
No opinion and no answer	10
	<u>100</u>

The very few who do not like the covers were asked for their criticism. They replied as follows:

- "To me the title is too crude, and obvious."
- "The cover should be better illustrated, then more people would read it, it has too little drawing power."
- "Sometimes the pictures are immoral."
- "Too many girls."
- "I find them cheap, vulgar."

CARTOONS AND JOKES ...

Plurality opinion is that the HEUTE cartoons are good, but a considerable proportion rate them only "fair," and one in ten call them poor.

"And what is your opinion about the cartoons on the last page of HEUTE? Do you consider them good or not?"

Good	41
Fair	34
Poor	11
No opinion and no answer	14
	<u>100</u>

THE SERIALS ...

Only about three in ten (28%) of HEUTE readers say they read the continued stories. Seven in ten claim not to do so.

Reasons for not reading the serials are revealing. Few specifically criticize HEUTE serials. Major reasons rest on three bases:

- 1) Non-regular readers cannot follow the serials (Many HEUTE readers do not regularly see the magazine);
- 2) the claim of "no time;" and
- 3) dislike of serials in general.

The question and replies are:

"Do you read the continued stories in HEUTE?"
(If "No") "Why not?"

Yes	28%
No	70
Read irregularly	35*
No time	37 *
Don't like serials	22 *
Don't like HEUTE serials	5 *
No answer	$\frac{2}{100\%}$

SPECIAL FEATURES ...

Mixed reactions characterize attitudes to such special features as Micky Mouse, Bambi, Pinocchio, etc. in HEUTE. Four in ten readers say they are "good," but a somewhat larger proportion rates them as "fair," "poor," or give qualified replies: e.g. Bambi is good, but Micky Mouse is not, or vice versa.

The question and replies are:

"How do you feel about the humorous features in HEUTE, such as Micky Mouse and Bambi - do you consider them good, fair or poor?"

Good	42%
Fair	26
Poor	10
qualified replies (volunteered)	8
No opinion, no answer	12

THE PRICE OF HEUTE ...

Opinions are almost evenly divided as to the price of the magazine ... 40% say the price is all right, and 45% consider it too high. A miniscule, but presumably admiring group of 1%, believe it is under-priced. Five per cent, possibly people who get the magazine without paying for it, have no opinion on the matter.

* Percentages of those giving reasons for not reading serials adds to more than proportion claiming not to read them because some people gave more than one reason.

queried on what they liked about the RUNDSCHAU, a fourth of the readers mentioned the objective, high intellectual, academic (wissenschaftlich) quality of the articles. A fifth spoke of its variety and versatility.

The question and catalogued replies are:

"What do you like about the AMERIKANISCHE RUNDSCHAU?"

Objective, intellectual, scientific articles	25%
Variety, many-sidedness	21
Articles about American life	15
International character	7
A special type of article (leading editorial, political articles, short stories)	6
Pictures, picture-articles	4
Miscellaneous	7
I don't read it often enough to be able to make a judgment	6
No opinion, no answer	13
	100%

As a counterprobe, readers were asked to specify what they do not like about the RUNDSCHAU. Six in ten readers claim to "like it all." Such criticisms as are given are scattered, and are listed in the table below.

"Is there anything about the AMERIKANISCHE RUNDSCHAU you don't like?"

Like it all	61%
Americans don't understand Germany or Europe	2
Miscellaneous	12
Tables and statistics concerning the Marshall Plan, etc; too extensive; loaded with pro-American viewpoint; they ought to write in a more popular way; too low level; tedious; too specialized; somewhat inclined toward capitalism; is written in a somewhat highbrow style, so you have to think when you read; the continued stories; the illustrations to some of the small articles are not to my liking; the illustrations and the stories aren't good; too much propaganda; the dancing stuff; the political articles	
No opinion, no answer	25
	100%

NOT TENDENTIOUS ...

Almost eight in ten, (77%) of RUNDSCHAU readers are of the opinion that the periodical does not follow a line, but presents many different points of view. But 9% feel it is tendentious and 14% withhold judgment. (The question read: "Do you find that different points of view are represented in the AMERIKANISCHE RUNDSCHAU articles, or does it seem that the AMERIKANISCHE RUNDSCHAU follows only one certain tendency?")

The minority which sees a RUNDSCHAU line is largely of the opinion that it follows the "American line." A few say it stresses the "democratic" viewpoint.

Preponderant opinion is that the format of the AMERIKANISCHE RUNDSCHAU is "good."

"What do you think about the make-up of AMERIKANISCHE RUNDSCHAU -- is it good, average or poor?"

Good	73
Average	19
Poor	1
No opinion, no answer	7
	<u>100</u>

THE TITLE ...

Three in ten readers feel that the title of the magazine is a deterrent to circulation of the magazine, when queried directly on the point. But the majority does not agree.

"Do you think the AMERIKANISCHE RUNDSCHAU would get more readers if it had a different title?"

Yes	30
No	57
No opinion, no answer	13
	<u>100</u>

Those who do feel a change in the title would increase readership stress the "American" adjective. "People think it deals only with America," and "Many people aren't interested in America," are typical comments. One respondent states: "The title is not inviting to the average German; it underlines his feeling of being influenced, politically, economically and culturally by a foreign way of thinking, and he tends to avoid such influence as far as possible."

MORE READERS ...

However, few readers suggest the title as a reason for the limited readership of the magazine when asked a general question on the matter. Leading hindrances to greater readership as volunteered by the readers are the cost and the high quality of the magazine which naturally lacks wide popular appeal. It is interesting to note that a few people mention lack of publicity and unavailability of the magazine.

"In your opinion, why doesn't the 'AMERIKANISCHE RUNDSCHAU' have a larger reading public?"

The people have no money for magazines;	
the magazine is too expensive	33
Too highbrow for most people	17
The people prefer German magazines	9
Too little known and publicized	7
The people think it's only about America	4
Too few available copies or not available	
everywhere	3
Many are not interested in America	3
Germans are not interested in external affairs	1
Miscellaneous	11
No opinion, no answer	20
	<u>108</u>

NEUE AUSLESE READERS' REACTIONS TO THE MAGAZINE ...

When readers of the NEUE AUSLESE are asked what they liked about the magazine, about one third point to the political and economic articles. The next largest group say they like the variety offered in the magazine, and others mention the objective reporting, and international news.

"What do you like about the NEUE AUSLESE?"

Political and/or economic articles	31%
It's variety and many-sidedness	19
Unbiased (objective) reports	9
Information from all parts of the world, international news	7
Style, high standard	4
Miscellaneous	
the whole make-up; everything; can't say that I like it	4
No opinion, no answer	<u>26</u>
	100%

Almost none of the NEUE AUSLESE readers dislike the appearance of the magazine. However, one in five (19%) consider it only average. This question was asked:

"What do you think of the make-up of the NEUE AUSLESE -- do you think it's good, average, or bad?"

Good	66%
Average	19
Bad	2
No opinion, no answer	<u>13</u>
	100%

Three fourths, (76%) of the NEUE AUSLESE readers say that there isn't anything about the magazine that they don't like. As few as 13% of the readers have any unfavorable criticism to offer. In this group, the most frequent complaints were leveled at the style, which they claim to be poor, or the contents, which they think are too propagandistic, with too much stress on information from abroad. A few say that the magazine is too expensive. One reader commented: "Politics are stressed too much -- even in short stories there is too much talk about another war."

Seven in ten think that the NEUE AUSLESE carries articles which present different points of view, as compared to one in ten who think that the magazine follows only one certain tendency. Of the few people who think that a certain line is followed most say the magazine has articles with an "American" or "democratic" point of view.

This question was asked:

"Is it your impression that different points of view are represented in the NEUE AUSLESE articles, or does it seem that the NEUE AUSLESE follows only one certain tendency?"

Different opinions represented	72%
Follows certain line	9
No opinion, no answer	<u>19</u>
	100%

OPINIONS OF DER MONAT SUBSCRIBERS ...

The measurement of reader reactions to DER MONAT presents some difficulties. As noted in the foregoing section of this report, a sample of readers of the magazine obtained by a field study is too small for reliable analysis. As this fact was anticipated before the survey was made, another method of getting reader reactions was indicated. Accordingly subscribers' lists were obtained, and actual subscribers were interviewed. This too posed difficulties: In December when interviewing was done, DER MONAT was just in the process of carrying on a circulation drive, and up to then had obtained a total of 100 subscribers in the U.S. Zone, all living in Bavaria.* (Most of the subscribers of the magazine live in the British Zone.) A large proportion of the Bavarian subscribers live in and around Munich, but many of them reside in widely separated cities and small towns. The interviewing staff made every effort to reach all the subscribers, but finally were able to see 78% of them, not the total of 100 as listed. This report, then, is based on 78 cases: accordingly the qualitative findings are probably of more value than the quantitative ones.

A further complication resulted from the fact that because the subscription drive was recent most of the respondents are new readers, having seen only two or three and in some cases one, issues of the magazine. And some of these new readers subscribed as a favor to friends who were making the sales - and for that reason are probably not the "typical" reader of a magazine of the level of DER MONAT.

READERS' GENERAL IMPRESSIONS OF DER MONAT ...

Subscribers were initially asked to give their over-all impressions of DER MONAT. Though the fact is clear that most of them had not had long experience with the magazine, nevertheless majority opinions are highly favorable.

Instead of attempting a quantitative summary, comments are grouped in three categories: favorable, non-committal, and critical, as follows:

"Could you please tell me your general impression of the DER MONAT magazine?"

FAVORABLE

A very good, versatile magazine, brings all angles;
I appreciate that foreign authors, who have something to say in history and politics, can be heard;
Excellent magazine, anticipate every copy, one of the best and most interesting magazine;
I think it is very progressive and represents many points of view;
Good, else I wouldn't have subscribed;
It's pleasing to see foreign authors get into print;
My impression: very good, objective attitudes;
As the magazine itself states, it tends to treat subjects from many points of view, and thus give the reader the chance to visualize a wide range of modern thought;
Very good, contents not flat, like in Reader's Digest there's something for everyone, and on a high level of style and thought;
When I look at its format (appearance, Aufmachung), I know -- the political scope attracts, I'm impelled to read every article each time;
The good style stands out, goes way above the usual magazine style. I am partial to such dissertations, it's interesting, universal, pleases me very much;
On a noticeably high plane, for discriminating readers;
A magazine offering foreign opinion, extremely well designed to broaden one's field of vision;

* It should be understood that the figure for subscribers does not represent the total MONAT readership. Almost all MONAT readers buy the magazine at newsstands. Just recently has an effort been made to obtain subscribers.

In my opinion, 'the most intellectual magazine yet to come my way.

For discriminating readers;

I like to read it very much, in every way good and of high standard; there must be at least one magazine for the intellectuals;

I am very satisfied and like to read it because it is an interesting, high-level magazine;

Have the impression that all articles are very instructive and well chosen;

On a high plane, is diversified, and that has pleased me. It is not too political nor one-sided;

In any case, of high standards, as regards articles and contributors; has a pleasing slant. Articles on misconceptions on Germany are of great value; it's time some cleaning-up is done there.

Intellectually superior, stimulating and revealing;

Very interesting, especially modern ideas and thoughts, modern literature;

A magazine of considerable stature, that reaches beyond every day life and appeals to the intellectual faculties;

I'm in agreement with it, and am glad that we've finally got a magazine of high standards;

This magazine is very impressive in appearance and contents, but it is necessary to have political maturity to understand it;

The political parts are very interesting, e.g. on Stalin's past, on the dealings between Ribbentrop and Molotov;

Very nice, very good, a little too highbrow, everyone can't follow it;

Good throughout;

I am enthusiastic, very versatile. More lucid than e.g. "Gegenwart," a magazine which the clergy doesn't dominate;

Very good impression, can't remember it too well as read hastily, in any case will keep subscription;

Stands on a considerably high level, intellectually, promotes the world view of the reader very much;

Very good impression, or I wouldn't have ordered as I'm unemployed and that is tough;

I consider the magazine of considerable scope and conscientiousness;

I have a very good impression, one can learn a lot about what's going on in the world. I am only disappointed about the constant publication of German misdeeds;

This magazine is on a very high level, and the way of reporting, particularly on politics, is very good;

Very good general impression. One finds few magazines with such standards;

Good impression, have only read one copy, am enthusiastic;

A good impression;

In my opinion the magazine is good;

An excellent impression, especially the easily understandable scientific articles;

A good magazine for an intelligent readership.

NON-COMMITAL

It is hard to say, but it is certainly very good or I would not subscribe. Have only one copy so far;

It is designed for the educated class, the broad masses will not be interested;

Is very good, but haven't read the last two issues for lack of time.

Have cancelled as of 1 Jan 50;

I've received only one issue, and can scarcely recall it;

I find it not bad;

It's on a very high plane. Haven't read anything but table of contents;

Have only riffled thru my one issue, seems interesting;

Very readable, but still can't say much from one issue;

It's not for the average man. The plane is surprisingly high; 00058
It is quite good;
The magazine is good, but requires much literary knowledge,
furthermore is slanted pro-American;

CRITICAL

The magazine is on too high a plane for me, have cancelled my subscription. It is for academicians;
A definitely slanted magazine, too much anti-Communist mongering -- three such articles in last issue --;
I am disappointed, badly. Many articles are written against us Germans. I've cancelled, no one should read DER MONAT;
The first issue was election propaganda, and that did not please me, to begin with. The second on Goethe was better, more I haven't read;
A little too much politics in it for me;
Very political and therefore uninteresting to me. After reading one issue, I cancelled;
Doesn't suit me, appears too American to me. That is, too foreign for our peculiarities;
I don't like the "pro-American," I'm more for the "relative;"
I reject the whole magazine as quite different promises were made from what's actually in it;
I'm cancelling because it does not interest me. I had imagined it to be a more popular magazine.

NO OPINION

Can't say, don't read it. We bought the magazine to help a needy artist. But we're cancelling it again.
Have only read two copies, can't say much;
Can't tell yet because haven't read the single copy I've so far received. Too little time - I'll read it in the Christmas holidays;
Haven't read my first copy yet. It's a good printing job;
I can't say since I haven't read the sample copy;
I can't say, the magazine comes in the mail and we put it away and don't get around to reading it;
I haven't read it, because I bought a sample copy only under the pressure of an agent;
Only have received two copies and can't judge. I set it out for my customers, and haven't read it myself yet;
Received the magazine just a few days ago, can't say because I haven't read it yet.
Haven't read it yet.

STANDARDS OF STYLE ...

Eight out of ten MONAT subscribers are of the opinion that the standards of the magazine are of a high order. Very few consider it "average."

The question and replies are:

"How do you rate the literary standards (Niveau) of this magazine -- very high, high or "average?"

Very high	35%
High	45
Average	5
No opinion, no answer	15

MORE READERS ...

People who say the standards of DER MONAT are high or very high, were asked if they were of the opinion that DER MONAT "should retain this standard or make an effort to meet the tastes of a larger public?" Half recommend retaining present standards, two in ten think an effort should be made to please the popular taste, and the remainder are undecided.

Approaching the same problem with another query, subscribers were asked: "Do you think that DER MONAT could increase its number of readers without lowering its literary and intellectual level -- that is, is it your opinion that there are certain groups who are potential readers?"

Half (52%) replied "Yes" -- these are potential readers, 26% said "No" and 24% either didn't know or gave no reply.

Those respondents who claimed that DER MONAT'S readership could be extended without lowering of its standards were asked to give their reasons why more people did not then read DER MONAT. Their most frequently mentioned reason was lack of money, followed closely by "inadequacy of advertising." A close third was frequent reference to the content style, and point of view of DER MONAT (an apparent contradiction to the claim that more potential readers are available). A few people mentioned its American origin, and its format as hindrances to increased readership.

Three fourths of the subscribers say they find certain sections or types of articles more interesting than others. The two most frequent mentions concern the political articles and the cultural section and articles. But eight in ten of these people also say they read all sections of the magazine. The replies of the readers who state preferences have been arranged in categories as follows:

"Which sections of the magazine do you prefer to read and are the most interesting to you?"

<u>The cultural sections and cultural articles</u> (music, art, paintings, literature) concerning American art and new music, cultural-political and cultural-philosophical articles; paintings and art; reports about the authors, reports concerning the books of foreign authors; stories	24%
<u>Political articles and social-politics</u> the political section like the articles about Mussolini and Count Ciano; political science; political affairs but they are overemphasized; the sections on politics and on the lives of the different political figures; articles considering political problems;	21
<u>The historical section and articles</u> The historical content of the magazine; historical topics;	10
<u>Philosophical articles</u> I can't say I read any section <u>less</u> than another, but I particularly welcome the philosophical articles;	10
<u>Articles about science in general</u> scientific reports; the sections on science	6
<u>Novels and stories</u> the novel written by Jaspers is wonderful and very contemporary; the modern novel; "1984;"	6
<u>Articles about foreign countries and articles written by foreign authors</u> the articles written by foreign authors about Germany; sections which bring the essence of foreign countries; the articles dealing with pan-Europe and the connections between America and Germany	5
<u>Articles on natural and physical science</u>	4
<u>Travel articles</u>	3
<u>Everything</u>	11
<u>Nothing</u>	4
<u>Other</u> The economic part; subjects related to business management; letter from East Europe; letters from the readers; the letter to MONAT	5
<u>No opinion, no answer</u>	17
	126%

*Percentages total more than 100 since some respondents mentioned more than one section.

REGULAR DEPARTMENTS ...

The regular "back of the book" sections -- book reviews, criticism and commentary on theatre, music, and films, -- are considered interesting by seven in ten readers. Here are a few typical comments:

"I find the reviews on music very good, and follow them with the greatest interest. I particularly like it that people who are criticized have a chance to reply."

"Films today are in a process of great development. Soon, the differences between the theatre and films must be composed and something new must result which will have greater significance for the present generation."

"The realistic commentaries on contemporary society have an outstanding clarity of expression. (The writers) correctly forego ironical contrasts, and customarily use unambiguous and good German which also meets the needs of the unsophisticated reader."

"They are a true mirror of the times. I'm for them."

"They are critical, and very interesting. Opinions are not forced on one, but permit a free formation of opinion."

"Even in Rheinstaedten one gets the feeling of being part of the living world."

THE MAKE-UP OF DER MONAT ...

A further question sought to get subscribers' opinion on the make-up (Zusammenstellung) of the magazine. Seven in ten expressed themselves as satisfied with it as it is now. One in ten felt there was room for improvement, and upon query, expressed themselves as follows:

More stories, humor and s--on: "I'd like some short stories and few jokes interspersed between the heavy going; a little is recommended; perhaps something on the light side, though it's not in keeping with the magazine."

More on sociology, science and technology: "I miss articles on sociological problems;" "A little more on philosophical issues;" "I'd like to read more on the progress in chemistry;" "As a technician I'd of course like more on technology."

More pictures: "There ought to be more illustrated material, not only small sketches of political figures, but reproductions of great art."

More on literature and art: "I'd like more on films, books, and literary subjects;" "I miss articles on the history of art."

More on economic affairs: "Reviews of current economic developments in America;" "though it's primarily a cultural magazine, economic affairs should not be minimized;" "I'd like more on current economic relations,"

Miscellaneous: "More articles by German writers;" "Articles on the good characteristics of Germans;" "a review of politics;" "it should have only two sections, one on cultural affairs and one on economic affairs and understandable to everyone."

About four in ten subscribers say they have discussed articles appearing in DER MONAT with friends or acquaintances. But six in ten have not done so, though one reason for this may be that so many of the respondents are very recent subscribers.

REASONS FOR SUBSCRIBING FOR DER MONAT ...

Answers to the query "Could you tell me how you happened to subscribe for DER MONAT?" make it clear that most of the subscribers interviewed did so as result of a subscription campaign. Sixty-four respondents say they subscribe through a salesman, agent, university student, artist, etc. who were seeking subscriptions. (Some respondents say they took pity on these people and signed up accordingly.) Five subscribed through friends who presumably were also acting as agents. Three say their husbands or sons subscribed. Two saw a copy by chance and became interested, one subscribed as a result of his employer's recommendation and one saw an ad in the Neue Zeitung. (two gave no reply.)

COMPOSITION OF THE SUBSCRIBERS ...

Education

University	29%
Higher school with abitur	22
Higher school without abitur	35
Elementary school only	14

Sex

Men	64%
Women	36

Socio-Economic Level

Upper middle and above	38%
Lower middle	47
Lower	15

Age

Under 30	23%
30 - 49	54
50 and over	23

RESTRICTED

00063

WEST GERMAN REPUBLIC
VS. EAST GERMAN GOVERNMENT

Some Evaluations and Comparisons

Classification cancelled
by authority of Leo P. Crespi
PUB/RAS.

Report No. 3
Series No. 2
18 January 1950
REACTION'S ANALYSIS BRANCH
INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE
HICOG APO 807
Bad Nauheim Germany

RESTRICTED

- ... However, as many people would like to see the West and East governments establish political relations with each other, as would prefer economic relations only.
- ... Majorities feel that the creation of the "Peoples Republic" has widened the German split.
- ... Notwithstanding, popular belief in a future united Germany has gone up during the past year, from 60% in AMZON in September 1948, to 73% in November 1949. But the most commonly held view is that this unification will not take place until after the withdrawal of the occupiers, when, it is believed, it will occur without resort to a war.
- ... Meanwhile, however, there is no disposition to achieve unification under the aegis of the East. Huge majorities prefer separation to that.
- ... Only a small fraction feels that the cause of Communism was benefited by the establishment of the East government.
- ... Majorities do not expect the Soviet government to withdraw its troops from Germany. Those who do, think this will result in strengthening the People's Police in East Germany.
- ... On the question of withdrawal of all the occupying troops, opinions now as formerly are divided.
- ... Majorities believe that Germany would not be secure in the event of withdrawal. However, the proportion holding this opinion has declined somewhat in the Zone and in Bremen during the past year.

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R E S T R I C T E D

INTRODUCTION ...

In November 1949, the Reactions Analysis Branch, ISD, PAO, HICOG, interviewed residents of the U.S. Zone, the three West Sectors of Berlin, and Bremen on attitudes toward the Federal Republic and toward the East German state.

Representative random samples of the population of the three areas were interviewed by German interviewers, supervised by American Surveys Officers. The analysis of the results was made in the Headquarters office of the Branch.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ...

- ... Eight in ten U.S. Zone Germans approve the establishment of the Bonn government, in principle. Approval is even higher in West Berlin (95%) and in Bremen (84%).
- ... Comparison with earlier findings shows the trend of approval is upward.
- ... But only 43% in the Zone express satisfaction with the accomplishments of the Bonn government to date. (Two-thirds of West Berliners claim to be satisfied.)
- ... Better-educated and better-informed persons are more likely than others to be critical of the new government's record so far.
- ... Two decisions which accompanied the establishment of the West government got small support from the public: Only a small fraction in the Zone approves the choice of Bonn as capital; the plurality prefers Frankfurt. (In West Berlin and Bremen, Berlin has the greatest popular appeal.) Also, very large majorities favor the inclusion of West Berlin in the Federal Republic.
- ... On the relations of the western occupying powers to the Federal government predominant opinions are that the occupiers not only have too much influence — a small fraction indeed considers the Bonn government a puppet state — but also that more authority should be transferred to the Bonn government. It should be noted that the latter recommendation was made prior to the Petersburg agreement. Supporting this point of view, majorities believe that the western powers had the leading voice in fixing the exchange rate of the D-Mark in the devaluation, and preponderant opinion is that this was not as it should have been.
- ... Majorities ranging from 58% in the Zone to 88% in Berlin know of the formation of the East German state.
- ... More than three-fourths consider that state to be a Soviet puppet. And large majorities also consider it to be more dependant on the occupying government than is the case in the West.
- ... Very few people in the West believe that the East government legally represents the East German population, largely for the reason that it was established without a popular election.

According to a poll taken in November 1949, almost eight in ten (78%) U.S. Zone Germans approve the establishment of the West German Federal Republic. In western Berlin, approval approaches unanimity (95%), and in Bremen it reaches 84%. Comparison of Laender figures shows that more people in Wuerttemberg-Baden than in Bavaria or Hesse agree in principle with the formation of the new state.

"Do you, in principle, approve or disapprove of the formation of a West German government?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Approve	74%	78%	85%	78%	95%	84%
Disapprove	6	5	5	5	5	6
No opinion, no answer	$\frac{20}{100}$	$\frac{17}{100}$	$\frac{10}{100}$	$\frac{17}{100}$	$\frac{-}{100}$	$\frac{10}{100}$

Comparison of the above results with those found before the Republic was formally established, indicate that the trend of opinion has been toward approval.

"Do you, in principle, approve or disapprove of the formation of a West German government now?"

	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
September 1948			
Approve	62%	70%	74%
Disapprove	16	22	17
No opinion, no answer	$\frac{22}{100}$	$\frac{8}{100}$	$\frac{9}{100}$
February 1949			
Approve	61%	85%	78%
Disapprove	11	11	10
No opinion, no answer	$\frac{28}{100}$	$\frac{4}{100}$	$\frac{12}{100}$
May 1949			
Approve	71%	83%	85%
Disapprove	9	10	6
No opinion, no answer	$\frac{20}{100}$	$\frac{2}{100}$	$\frac{9}{100}$
July 1949			
Approve	67%	83%	77%
Disapprove	9	9	6
No opinion, no answer	$\frac{24}{100}$	$\frac{3}{100}$	$\frac{17}{100}$

The widespread approval of the establishment of the western German government does not mean that an equally large number are satisfied with the young government's activities to date. Results to a follow-up question reveal that four in ten of the U.S. Zone Germans express satisfaction with the accomplishments of the Bonn government, with approximately the same proportion either frankly admitting they are dissatisfied, or giving non-committal answers.

Somewhat fewer Hessians say they are satisfied with the West German government, whereas considerably more of the Berliners look favorably on its progress. More of those who prefer the SPD express dissatisfaction or are non-committal than respondents with CDU leanings. It is noteworthy that people who can be designated as "informed," both on the basis of educational attainments, and ability to identify Adenauer as the Chancellor, are more likely to be skeptical of Bonn's attainments than their counterpart groups.

"In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the activities of the West German government up to now?"

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Neither Satisfied Nor Dissatisfied	Govt. has Not done Anything Yet	No opinion, No answer
AMZON	43%	15%	11%	15%	15% ... 100%
Bavaria	46	15	11	10	16
Hesse	33	20	14	17	16
W-Baden	42	15	7	22	14
Berlin	65	7	4	16	7
Bremen	47	11	9	22	11
AMZON GROUPS					
<u>Party Preference</u>					
SPD	42	21	11	19	7
CDU/CSU	50	14	10	12	14
<u>Sex</u>					
Men	44	22	9	20	5
Women	42	11	13	10	24
<u>Education</u>					
Volksschule only	45	13	11	14	17
More than Volksschule	30	32	12	20	6
<u>Identification of Adenauer as Chancellor</u>					
Can identify him	33	22	12	23	10
Cannot identify him	50	12	11	8	19

Those who stated that they were dissatisfied with the Bonn government were asked to describe "in what way?" The largest single group complained that the government follows no clear line of policy, as indicated by "bickering" and party strife. However, the major criticism was directed at the government's failure to solve various economic problems ... such as lowering taxes and prices, providing relief for the refugees, and work for the unemployed.

Government lacks clear policy; politicians don't work together; too many conferences, with no results	6%	3%
Taxes are too high; expenditures too wasteful	5	-
Prices are too high; salaries too low	4	-
Nothing is done for the refugees, bombed out, disabled veterans	2	1
No solution to unemployment problem; work possibilities should be provided instead of relief	2	1
Other answers	$\frac{1}{20\%}$	$\frac{2}{7\%}$

*Adds to more than percent dissatisfied because some people gave more than one answer.

FEW SUPPORT BONN AS CAPITAL SITE ...

Choosing the capital for the West German government was one of the decisions made by the new legislators. Their choice of Bonn appears to be a satisfactory solution to only a very small proportion of the AMZON, Berlin and Bremen populations. One in ten of the Germans in the U.S. Zone and fewer of the Berliners say that they would like to see Bonn as the capital. West Berlin receives more support than Bonn in the zone, but Frankfurt is the most popular choice.

"Where do you think the capital of the West German government should be -- in West Berlin, Bonn or Frankfurt?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
West Berlin	13%	15%	17%	14%	80%	29%
Bonn	12	3	8	9	6	19
Frankfurt	33	47	48	40	-	17
Indifferent	33	27	17	28	9	31
Undecided	$\frac{9}{100\%}$	$\frac{8}{100\%}$	$\frac{10}{100\%}$	$\frac{9}{100\%}$	$\frac{5}{100\%}$	$\frac{4}{100\%}$

BERLIN SHOULD BE INCLUDED ...

In the early days of the new government, the question of whether or not to include West Berlin as the twelfth state was under discussion. Almost all West Berliners believe that Berlin should be included, and seven in ten of the AMZON population agree.

"In your opinion, should West Berlin be included as the twelfth Land in the West German government, or not?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Yes, included	69%	65%	74%	70%	93%	81%
No, not included	7	6	5	6	5	6
Undecided	$\frac{24}{100\%}$	$\frac{29}{100\%}$	$\frac{20}{100\%}$	$\frac{24}{100\%}$	$\frac{2}{100\%}$	$\frac{13}{100\%}$

R E S T R I C T E D

ALLIES TOO INFLUENTIAL IN NEW GOVERNMENT ...

A large proportion of the population feel that the occupation powers have too much influence on the decisions of the West German government. Four out of ten in the Zone, and about half in West Berlin and Bremen make this claim. However, only 15% of the AMZON population and 9% of the Berliners go so far as to contend that the new government is but a puppet of the Western powers.

"Do you think the Western powers have too great an influence on the decisions of the West German government, or are you of the opinion that the West German Republic is sufficiently independent?"

	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Too great an influence	42%	48%	47%
Govt. is independent enough	28	38	28
Undecided	30	14	25
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

"It has been said that the West German government is a puppet government, and can only do what the Western powers prescribe. Do you agree with this or not?"

(Asked of those answering "too great an influence" above)

	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Yes, is a puppet	15%	9%	15%
No, is not a puppet	25	39	32
Undecided	2	-	-
	<u>42%</u>	<u>48%</u>	<u>47%</u>

GROUP DIFFERENCES ...

More of the people who are dissatisfied with the accomplishments of the Bonn regime - than those who are satisfied - are inclined to think that the Western powers exert too much pressure on the new government.

Of the people who are dissatisfied with the West German government ...

51% think the Western powers have too much influence on German government

35% think the West German government is independent enough

14% are undecided
100%

Of the people who are satisfied with the West German government ...

34% think the Western powers have too much influence on German government

37% think the West German government is independent enough

29% are undecided
100%

Similarly, those who are sufficiently informed about the situation to know that Adenauer is the Chancellor are much more suspicious of undue influence by the occupation powers than are those who are not so well informed.

Respondents preferring the SPD are more likely than those with CDU leanings to think that the occupation powers have too much influence. More former NSDAP members also think the Allies exert too much control. Large numbers of respondents in the lower income brackets and women (45%) have no opinion on this issue.

00070

West Govt. is puppet of occu- pation powers	Occupation has too much influ- ence on West Govt.	West Govt. Under- is indepen- dant enough
---	--	---

AMZON	14%	25%	28%	33%... 100%
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AMZON GROUPS

Identification of
Adenauer as Chancellor

Can identify him	18	32	29	21
Cannot identify him	12	19	27	42

Party Preference

SPD	22	33	28	17
CDU/CSU	14	16	34	36

NSDAP Affiliation

Former party members	28	33	17	22
No affiliation	12	23	29	36

Income Group

Under 150 DM per month	11	14	30	46
Between 150 - 300 DM	13	33	27	27
Over 300 DM	22	28	28	22

Sex

Men	20	30	31	19
Women	10	20	25	45

WESTERN POWERS DECIDED D-MARK EXCHANGE RATE ...

Not only does a sizable group of the Western German population think that in general, the occupation powers exert too much influence on the Bonn government, but when given a specific case -- who had the greatest influence in fixing the value of the D-Mark in the recent devaluation -- over half of the U.S. Zone residents, and more than six in ten in Berlin and Bremen believe the Western powers had the most voice in the decision. More of the AMZON population thought it was wrong for the West to have such an influence, than thought it was right.

"In your opinion, who had the greatest influence in fixing the new exchange between the D-Mark and the dollar -- the West German government, or the Western occupation powers?"

	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
West German government	7%	11%	6%
Western powers	57	67	62
Don't know	36	22	32
	100%	100%	100%

"In your opinion, was this right, or not?"
(Asked of those answering "Western powers" above):

	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Yes, right	19%	35%	28%
No, wrong	28	29	27
No opinion, no answer	10	3	7
	57%	67%	62%

In the light of the preceding results, it comes as no surprise that over half of the people in the ALZON, and eight out of ten of the Berliners think that the occupation powers should transfer more rights to the West German government. (This question was asked before the Petersberg Protocol was signed.)

"Do you think the western powers should transfer more rights to the West German government?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	ALZON	Berlin	Bremen
Yes	53%	53%	60%	55%	82%	70%
No	16	11	9	13	7	9
No opinion, no answer	31	36	31	32	11	21
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

MORE CONTROL OVER ECONOMIC AFFAIRS DESIRED ...

Of those who want to see the authority of the West German government extended, the largest number want to see the new government have more control over economic and financial issues. Increased control over domestic policies in general are sought after by the next largest group. A smaller proportion would like to see the Bonn government able to direct its own foreign policies, followed by a few who want the young government to have complete sovereignty. It should be noted that a few of the rights listed below were never reserved by the western powers, and some of the others have been transferred to the West German government in the Petersberg Agreement.

"Which rights should it have?" (Asked of those who say the West German government should have more rights)

ALZON Berlin Bremen

More economic and financial rights:

lifting of controls over German peace industry; independent control of Ruhr; decide on taxes, customs; etc.

18% 39% 31%

More rights over domestic matters:

right to build homes; granting hunting permits; German courts should try Germans; etc.

14 23 7

The right to control foreign policy:

have something to say in European council; enter UN; make a peace treaty; etc.

9 3 14

The right to regain our sovereignty:

West government should be completely independent; etc.

5 2 7

Control over dismantling:

3 11 9

Right to have an army:

... for protection;
to help overcome unemployment

2 - 1

Enough power to solve refugee problem:

and boundary problems

1 2 -

Other answers

1 4 2

Don't know

12 13 13
65%* 97%* 82%*

* Percentages add to more than those saying "Yes" because some people gave more than one answer.

MAJORITY SHARE OF EAST GOVERNMENT FORMATION ...

Six out of ten of the ALZON residents - and nine out of ten of the Berliners - are aware that an East German government has been formed. (As of November, 1949)

"Have you heard or read whether or not an East German government has been formed?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	ALZON	Berlin	Bremen
Yes, has been formed	55%	71%	55%	58%	88%	71%
Yes, is to be formed	1	1	5	2	1	3
No, has not been formed	7	8	6	7	3	4
Don't know	<u>37</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>22</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Considerably larger numbers of the Berlin population can identify the president of the East German government, than could name the Chancellor of the East German government. However, more of those living in ALZON can identify Adenauer than can identify Pieck.

"Could you tell me who is President of the East German government?"*

	ALZON	Berlin	Bremen
Pieck	30%	78%	58%
Grotewohl	5	1	3
Don't know	<u>23</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>10</u>
	58%	88%	71%

"Could you tell me who is Chancellor of the West German government?"

	ALZON	Berlin	Bremen
Adenauer	44%	47%	49%
Houss	13	25	21
Don't know	<u>43</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>30</u>
	100%	100%	100%

MOST CONSIDER EAST GOVERNMENT A PUPPET ...

Three fourths of the Germans in the American Zone - and nine out of ten Berliners - consider the East German government to be merely a puppet government in the hands of the Russian occupation authorities, as compared to 15% who expressed such an opinion about the West German government.

"It has been said that the East German government is a puppet government, and can only do what the Russian occupation authorities prescribe. Are you of the same opinion, or not?"

	ALZON	Berlin	Bremen
Yes, is a puppet	76%	88%	78%
No, is not a puppet	6	8	5
Don't know	<u>18</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>17</u>
	100%	100%	100%

* Asked only of those who knew an East German government had been formed.

Two-thirds of the AMZON Germans think that the East German government is more dependent on the Russians than the West German government is on the western powers. A small minority (18%) hold that the West German government is more dependent on the West, or that both governments are equally dependent.

"Which one of the two German governments do you think is more dependent on the occupation powers: The East German or the West German government?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	AMZON	Berlin	Berlin
East German gov't.	70%	56%	69%	66%	92%	75%
West German gov't.	6	7	4	6	2	5
Both equally dependent	9	18	12	12	5	11
No opinion	<u>15</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>9</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EAST GERMAN GOVERNMENT NOT REPRESENTATIVE ...

Six in ten of the AMZON residents - and nine in ten Berliner - do not consider the East German government to be representative of the Germans living in the East Zone.

As seen below, preponderant opinion among those who know an East Zone government has been established, is that it does not represent the people, whereas those who are not so informed are more likely to answer that they don't know. Reasons given for thinking that the government is not representative indicate that most are aware of the conditions under which the new republic was born ... about one-fourth of those living in AMZON mention that the government was established without elections, and almost as many say it is under Russian influence.

"Do you personally consider the East German government as the legal representative of the East Zone population, or not?"

AMZON

	Informed	Not informed	Total	Berlin	Bremen
Yes	10%	10%	10%	5%	7%
No	77	37	60	92	76
Don't know	<u>13</u>	<u>53</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>17</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

"Why not?" (asked of those answering "No" to the preceding question)

	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Established without election	23%	41%	32%
Is not working for the interest of the people	6	16	3
Under Russian influence; puppet government	17	19	21
Is a pronounced dictatorship	6	3	9
Nothing good comes from the Russians	7	6	9
It deepens the split of Germany	1	-	2
Other answers	2	6	-
No opinion, no answer	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>-</u>
	64%*	93%*	76%*

* Percentages total more than number asked this question as some respondents gave more than one answer.

Opinion is fairly evenly divided as to whether or not the Western German government should confine its relationship with the East German government to economic affairs, or if the two governments should also try to arrive at political agreements.

"Would you advocate that the West German Federal government should have only economic relations with the East German government, or should the two governments also try to come to political agreements?"

	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Only economic relations	39%	39%	42%
Political agreements also	37	50	43
Neither	2	7	5
No opinion, no answer	<u>22</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>10</u>
	100%	100%	100%

EAST-WEST SPLIT INCREASED, BUT EVENTUALLY A UNITED GERMANY ...

In considering the consequences of the establishment of the East German government, over half of those interviewed think that the creation of the new government will widen the split between East and West Germany. However, even though a majority of the people see the distance between East and West Germany as having become greater, they consider this as a temporary state of affairs. Most people think that eventually Germany will be united, and as shown below, a larger number think this now than over a year ago.

"Do you think the establishment of the East German government will widen the split of Germany between East and West, or won't it have any influence?"

	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Widen split	53%	66%	54%
No influence	25	31	29
No opinion	<u>22</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>17</u>
	100%	100%	100%

"Do you believe that in the future there will again be a unified government for all Germany?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
September 1948						
Yes	60%	60%	62%	60%	83%	73%
No	27	21	23	24	15	23
No opinion, no ans.	<u>13</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
February 1949						
Yes	68%	66%	67%	67%	85%	61%
No	24	19	20	22	13	35
No opinion, no ans.	<u>8</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
July 1949						
Yes	68%	71%	60%	67%	80%	70%
No	21	18	28	22	19	24
No opinion, no ans.	<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>6</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
November 1949						
Yes	75%	73%	65%	73%	89%	81%
No	15	12	21	15	11	12
No opinion, no ans.	<u>10</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>7</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Most of the AMZON and Bremen residents think that Germany will be united after the occupation forces leave. However, as many of the Berliners think that the unification can be accomplished during the occupation as believe it is necessary to wait. The largest number of those queried think that Germany can be united without a war. Almost all of those who foresee a war think it will be another world war and not a civil war. The following questions were asked of those who expect Germany to be united:

"Do you think the unification of Germany will take place during the occupation, or not before the occupation forces have been withdrawn?"

	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
During occupation period	17%	43%	23%
After withdrawal of occupation forces	40	40	39
No opinion, no answer	<u>16</u> 73%	<u>6</u> 89%	<u>19</u> 81%

"Do you think the unification of Germany will be possible without war?"

	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Yes, without war	42%	50%	52%
No, not without war	24	36	24
No opinion, no answer	<u>7</u> 73%	<u>3</u> 89%	<u>5</u> 81%

"Do you think this will be just a struggle between Eastern and Western Germany, or will it be another world war?"
(Asked of those who answer above that "No" the unification can not take place without a war.)

	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Struggle between Eastern and Western Germany	2%	8%	3%
New world war	21	26	21
No opinion, no answer	<u>1</u> 24%	<u>2</u> 36%	<u>-</u> 24%

XO. UNITY FOR PRICE OF COMMUNISM ...

Contrary to Pastor Niemoeller's recent statement that the Germans would prefer to see Germany united under a Communist form of government than to live in a divided land, 81% of the AMZON residents and 95% of the Berliners say that they prefer a split to Communism.

"What would you prefer - to unite Germany under the East German government, or keep the present situation with an East and West German government?"

	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Unite under East German gov't.	4%	2%	1%
Keep present situation	81	95	87
No opinion, no answer	<u>15%</u> 100%	<u>3</u> 100%	<u>12</u> 100%

FEW PREDICT SPREAD OF COMMUNISM ...

00076

Only about one in ten of all respondents think that the establishment of the East German government will result in strengthened Communist influences in Western Germany. The majority in AMZON (56%) think the situation will be unaffected, and 17% in AMZON and 33% in Berlin think that the creation of the new government will mean a decline in the Communists' power in the West.

"Do you think that, due to the establishment of the East German government the influence of Communism in Western Germany will increase, decrease, or remain unchanged?"

	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Increase	11%	11%	7%
Decrease	17	33	29
Remain unchanged	56	53	49
No opinion, no answer	<u>16</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>15</u>
	100%	100%	100%

USSIANS NOT EXPECTED TO WITHDRAW TROOPS ...

Few people in AMZON or Berlin believe that the Russians will withdraw their troops now that the East German government has been set up. And most of those who think the troops will be withdrawn feel that the People's Police would then be reinforced.

"Do you think that the Russian occupation troops will be withdrawn from the Eastern zone now that the East German government has been formed?"

A C D

	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Yes, will be withdrawn	19%	20%	20%
No, will not be withdrawn	62	79	64
No opinion, no answer	<u>19</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>16</u>
	100%	100%	100%

"Do you think that then the People's Police in the Eastern zone will be reinforced or not?"
(asked of those answering "Yes" above)

	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Yes	14%	13%	17%
No	3	6	2
No opinion, no answer	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
	19%	20%	20%

Asked the hypothetical question - in case the Russians should withdraw their troops, should the Western Allies withdraw their forces also - almost even proportions of AMZON Germans, and Berliners favor and oppose the West's leaving under such circumstances.

"Suppose the Russian occupation troops were withdrawn from the Eastern zone. Would you then favor the withdrawal of the Western occupation troops?"

	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Yes, would favor	43%	49%	34%
No, would not favor	45	50	52
No opinion, no answer	<u>12</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>14</u>
	100%	100%	100%

When a similar question was asked in June of this year, very similar results were obtained. The question asked at that time was phrased somewhat differently - "The Russians have proposed that all four occupying powers should leave Germany within the next year. Would you like to see that proposal carried out?" In AMZON, 43% answered "Yes," 46% said "No," in Berlin, 47% agreed with the proposal and 53% were against it thus indicating a rather stable split of opinion on this issue.

HOWEVER, MAJORITY UNSURE OF SECURITY IF TROOPS LEAVE ...

The desire to see the Western Allies withdraw their troops probably reflects a natural wish to have occupation troops removed from one's country, rather than a well thought out point of view. For when people are asked if they think Germany would be in a secure situation in the event that all four occupation powers should leave, the majority still answer "No" - though in AMZON and Bremen the proportion has dropped somewhat from a year ago.

"What is your opinion -- would Germany be in a politically secure situation, in case the occupation powers should withdraw from Germany?"

	AMZON			Berlin			Bremen		
	1948	1949		1948	1949		1948	1949	
	Nov.	June	Nov.	Nov.	June	Nov.	Nov.	June	Nov.
Yes	17%	21%	23%	29%	26%	28%	23%	36%	33%
No	65	57	53	66	67	68	69	55	53
No opinion, no answer	<u>18</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>14</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

OUTSIDE AND INSIDE THREATS FEARED ...

Those who think Germany would be insecure upon the withdrawal of the occupation troops fear threats both from the outside and the inside. They fear Russia, the Communists, the People's Police, internal chaos, civil war, and the inabilities of their own political leaders.

"In what way do you think Germany would be in an insecure situation?" (Asked of those who answer "No" above.)

	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Threat of Russia; Communism East zone gov't.; the People's Police would try to take over Germany	25%	24%	20%
There would be dissension; even civil war	17	27	27
Germany cannot yet guard its external and internal security	6	3	4
Germany has no central government; is split between East & West	2	8	1
Germans are politically immature; so cannot govern themselves; German government incapable	4	5	2
Other answers: The Germans need development under constraint; Nazism would come back	4	1	5
No opinion, no answer	$\frac{1}{59\%}$ *	$\frac{-}{68\%}$ *	$\frac{-}{59\%}$ *

* Percentage is greater than number of people asked the question because some respondents gave more than one answer.

Hicoq, GYW. 4

RLS AND ITS LISTENERS IN WESTERN BERLIN

In December 1949 one of the continuing series of surveys conducted by Reactions Analysis Branch in the western Sectors of Berlin included an investigation of the RLS audience requested by the Radio Branch of ISD. The population sample consisted of over 300 persons selected for representativeness by the standard random method employed by the Branch in most of its surveys, and the interviewing was accomplished by trained German workers under professional American supervision. This work plus the prior questionnaire design and subsequent data evaluation are performed by the latest methods of scientific opinion polling.

Report No. 4

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REACTIONS ANALYSIS BRANCH

INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION

PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE

HICOG

Bad Nauheim

APO 807

Germany

THE RADIO AUDIENCE COMPARES BERLIN'S STATIONS ...

That western Berlin's radio audience has reached a larger size than previously since the Occupation began is shown by the claim of 72% of the population that they are regular or occasional listeners, with another 4% stating they listen only rarely. (Corresponding figures for March 1948 were 67%, August 1948 - 61%, May 1949 - 71%.)

Among the 76% of Berlin's western population who consider themselves radio listeners, RIAS continues its leadership as the most popular station by a wide margin. Although far behind in the popularity rating, NWDR has maintained and strengthened its second place position. Soviet sponsored Radio Berlin has continued in its decline in popular esteem and is now scarcely ever mentioned as a favorite. Present and past figures to the question "What is your favorite Radio station?" show the following picture:

	% of Radio Audience					% of Population
	Sept 47	Jan 48	Feb 48	Aug 48	Dec 49	Dec 49
RIAS	38%	52%	57%	80%*	76%	58%
NWDR	14	16	11	10	19	15
Radio Berlin	47	31	31	5	**	-
Others						
(and no choice)	$\frac{1}{100\%}$	$\frac{1}{100\%}$	$\frac{1}{100\%}$	$\frac{5}{100\%}$	$\frac{5}{100\%}$	$\frac{3}{76\%}$

That variety in the radio diet correlates with popularity is indicated by comparing the preceding figures of preference with the answers to the question "Which Berlin station has, in your opinion, the most diversified program - RIAS, Radio Berlin, or NWDR?" About half (49%) of the listeners prefer RIAS in this regard, one fourth (26%) prefer NWDR, and only 3% mention Radio Berlin.

* The high mark of 80% in Aug 1948 may be attributed to RIAS pre-eminence at that time in bringing information to blockaded Berlin. Preference figures of around 90% for RIAS reported at other times referred to multiple choice questions and are not comparable here.

** Negligible, included in "others."

Radio listeners were given a chance to appraise RIAS success in fulfilling its mission to the community by the following question:

"Are you of the opinion that RIAS accomplishes its purpose as radio station for western Berlin well, fairly well, or poorly?"

% of Radio Audience

Well	75%
Fairly well	22
Poorly	1
No opinion	2
	<u>100%</u>

As reasons for their opinions, one in three of the 75% majority expressing greatest confidence in RIAS policy stressed the diversity and all-round balance of the programs, 4 in 10 mentioned the factuality, timeliness and objectivity of the presentations, and 2 in 10 emphasized their accord with RIAS ideological and social orientation.

Of the 22% minority of listeners expressing just fair satisfaction with RIAS transmissions, about 2 in 10 acknowledge their political appreciation of the programs, but have a poor opinion of the general entertainment value of RIAS offerings, and a like proportion expressly find the musical selections too heavy (especially the evening broadcasts). One in six (or about 1 in 30 of all listeners) claim to find the news presentations and political commentaries tedious or uninteresting, and a somewhat smaller proportion feel the American influence in RIAS is too strong - they "miss the feeling of Germans for Germans."

Little more than half (54%) of the radio listeners in western Berlin are aware that RIAS operates under American direction, while 28% believe it is German operated, and 22% have no opinion to offer.

However, a great majority feel that the interests of both Germans and Americans were being served by RIAS, and only a negligible few (about 3%) say they believe that primarily American interests are served:

"In general, do you think RIAS serves the interests of the Berlin population, represents interests of the Americans, or does both?"

% of Radio Listeners

Interests of Berliners	16%
Interests of Americans	3
Interests of both	79
No opinion	2
	<u>100%</u>

Finally, radio listeners were asked to express their opinion of the political reporting on RIAS. Overwhelming majorities of more than 9 in 10 expressed belief in the accuracy of RIAS political coverage of both the local and world scene.

"Do you believe that RIAS correctly portrays political happenings in Berlin (the world), or does it give a false picture?"

	<u>Berlin</u>	<u>World</u>
Correct presentation	95%	93%
False presentation	3	2
No opinion	<u>2</u>	<u>5</u>
	100%	100%

Respondents with adverse opinions were asked to explain their views. It would be disproportionate to emphasize here the comments of a 2 or 3% minority except to point out that they were not in favor of RIAS "pro-American slant."

WHAT PLEASES AND DISPLEASES ABOUT RIAS ...

To give the radio audience a chance at free criticism of RIAS programs the 76% group in the sample claiming to be radio listeners were asked "What do you like about RIAS?" and "What don't you like about RIAS?" in that order. The generally favorable attitude toward RIAS is shown by the fact that the 249 persons asked these questions contributed a total of 400 favorable mentions and but 153 unfavorable ones. Similarly, all of the 249 respondents could think of at least one favorable point, whereas 4 in 10 (41%) could offer no adverse criticism.

% of Radio Listeners

"What do you like (don't you like) about RIAS?"

<u>Like</u>		<u>Don't Like</u>	
<u>Particular Programs</u>		<u>Particular Programs</u>	
News and political reports	34%	Political reports and talks	6%
Musical entertainment and plays	33	Music, too much jazz, too heavy, shallow	36
Misc. quiz programs, sport, lectures, art	29		
Voice of America	16		
Other programs: Youth, business, school	13	Other programs: School, youth, advertising and propaganda	7
<u>General Policy</u>		<u>General Policy</u>	
Presentations are factual, timely, objective	17	Presentations are not objective, are baiting	7
Balanced schedule, all-round good	14	Programs repetitive, abrupt transitions, parallel other stations	6
The anti-communist slant	4	No particular criticism, generally pleased, no comment	41
	160%*		103%*

* Totals are over 100% because more than one mention was made by many respondents.

Most apparent about the answers expressing satisfaction with RIAS service is the fact that the responses are well distributed over a number of fields; about 3 of 10 radio listeners like the news and political reporting and a similar number volunteer appreciation for the musical program arrangement, and again about the same number voice approval of quiz, sport and lecture programs that are entertaining as well as informative. The Voice of America is specifically mentioned as pleasing by 16% of the radio listeners. The only other single program getting appreciable mention was the quiz program "Mach mit" ("Join in"). The generally objective and credible presentation of the RIAS schedule brought out by 17% of the listeners is typified by comments like "the programs are convincing without being overdone."

When radio listeners were asked what they did not like about RIAS only about 6 in 10 had criticism to offer. The principal criticism of these people related to the musical programs and outnumbered all other critical comments put together. About one in 11 listeners thought the music generally poor, somewhat more were particularly against "the exaggerated jazz and dance music," and about one in 6 claimed there was too much heavy music "especially evenings when the worker wants to relax." The comment was sometimes offered that "Radio Berlin has the nicer musical entertainment."

A small minority took an adverse view of RIAS political attitude and termed it "inciting and baiting." Small groups also criticized the general programming at RIAS, claiming the time schedule ran too much parallel in subject matter to other Berlin stations, and that certain programs had become tediously repetitive.

R E S T R I C T E D

00084

WEST BERLINERS APPRAISE PRESENT
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SITUATION

Classification cancelled
by authority of Leo P. Crespi
PUB/RAS.

Report No. 5

Series No. 2

20 February 1950

REACTIONS ANALYSIS BRANCH
INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE

HICOG
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Germany

R E S T R I C T E D

INTRODUCTION ...

During the recent blockade of Berlin, and periodically after it was lifted, the Reactions Analysis Branch of ISB made regular surveys among cross sections of the Berlin population, to find out how they were making out economically, to determine the state of their morale, and to measure their political attitudes. Although this present report comprises results of all the surveys made to date, it is based mainly on the findings of a random sample of 300 West Berliners completed just before December 25, 1949. References are also made to the results of a survey made with a quota sample of 100 cases on January 27, 1950, when the possibilities of a new blockade threatened Berlin. All interviews were conducted by trained German interviewers, under the supervision of an American surveys officer.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ...

- ... Most West Berliners claim they are having a hard time economically. Two thirds say that their family incomes don't cover their necessary expenses, with three in ten claiming that they cannot buy all the rations on their cards. Over half of the West Berlin families (as compared to 29% of those in the major American zone cities) report an income of less than 200 West Marks per month.
- ... Over three in ten of those interviewed say that someone in their family is looking for a job. The general lack of money, lack of raw materials, the double currency and disunion of the Allies are considered to be mainly responsible for the present unemployment situation in Berlin. To solve the problem, it is recommended that credit and financial help be given, that re-building be intensified, and raw materials imported.
- ... Two-thirds of the West Berliners are aware that Berlin is receiving Marshall Plan aid. Of those who know of the aid, about one fourth predict a great improvement in economic conditions.
- ... Morale of the Berliners appears to be high in spite of the critical economic situation. Eight in ten say that they are getting along better now than during the blockade, and about the same number say that the future looks hopeful. In December, as few as two in ten said they would leave Berlin if they had the chance.
- ... Most people do not expect a new blockade to be imposed on Berlin, and few think that the threat of the Russians taking over Berlin has increased in recent months.
- ... Berliners are almost unanimous in saying that the Americans will stay in Berlin as long as they stay in Germany. However, only a minority expect to see a united city government for Berlin.
- ... Although 90% say that American rather than Russian prestige has gone up in Berlin, not everyone is totally in agreement with Western policies. About one third think the West could do more to relieve distressed conditions in Berlin, and a sizeable number say they disapprove of the way the West has recently handled the Berlin situation.

FAMILY INCOMES DON'T COVER EXPENSES ...

Two-thirds of the West Berliners say that their family income cannot adequately meet all their necessary expenses -- which is a somewhat higher proportion than expressed the same opinion in April, prior to the lifting of the blockade.

"Is your family income high enough to cover all necessary expenses?"

	1949			
	Apr	Jul	Aug	Dec
Yes	44%	40%	36%	33%
No	56%	60%	64%	67%
	100%	100%	100%	100%

The above question does not in itself adequately indicate the state of people's budgets. After the lifting of the blockade, food, clothing and luxury items unavailable since before the war, were suddenly displayed in all store windows. The availability of these long inaccessible items undoubtedly made many people more aware of their limited buying power than they might have been formerly.

Better clues as to how West Berliners are making out financially can be found by determining the number who are unable to buy all the items on their ration cards, and by examining family incomes and the extent of unemployment.

ALMOST ONE-THIRD CANNOT BUY RATIONS ...

Three in ten of the West Berliners claim that they are not able to buy all the items on their ration cards. Almost all of this number say that they cannot afford meat products, with about two in ten saying that milk and foodstuffs such as rice are too expensive.

In the list of specific items below, it is to be noticed that with the exception of coal, considerably more people in December than in August say that they cannot buy all the items mentioned.

"Are you able to buy all the rations on your ration card?"

(Asked of those who said their income was not high enough to cover necessary expenses.)

	August	December
Yes	33%	31%
No	67%	69%

R E S T R I C T E D

"What are you unable to buy?" (Asked of those answering "No" above.)

	August	December
Meat; meat products, canned meat	10%	28%
Milk, milk products, milk powder	10	17
Foodstuffs, rice, noodles, grits	10	18
Coal, fuel	22	6
Fat	-	7
Sugar	7	2
Bread, meal	-	2
Other items	-	3
	52%*	83%*

* Percentages add to more than number asked the question, as many people gave more than one answer.

INCOMES ARE LOW ...

Over half of the West Berlin families report a monthly income of less than 200 West Marks, and 17% have less than 100 West Marks. These incomes appear to be disproportionately low when compared with the incomes of families living in the major cities in the American Zone ... in AMZON, 29% report incomes of less than 200 Marks. As seen below, the income picture in Berlin has not appreciably changed between the August and December surveys.

	Berlin West Marks*		Cities in AMZON over 250,000 population
	Aug	Dec	December
No income	3%	1%	1%
Less than 49 Marks	4	2	2
50 to 99 Marks	15	14	7
100 to 149 Marks	19	20	10
150 to 199 Marks	12	17	9
200 to 249 Marks	12	14	23
250 to 299 Marks	9	10	12
300 to 399 Marks	13	12	20
400 to 749 Marks	9	8	12
750 and over	1	1	2
Don't know	3	1	2
	100%	100%	100%

* A small proportion report receiving some East Marks in addition, but not enough to result in any serious deviation in the above pattern.

MONEY IS GREATEST WORRY ...

Almost all West Berliners say that their main cares and worries are economic. Over half say that their greatest problem is money, and over one third speak of personal business and professional difficulties and lack of work opportunities. Most people in the American Zone also say that their main worries are financial, but not as many refer to specific worries about their jobs or businesses as do Berlin residents.

"What are your greatest cares and worries?"

	Berlin	AMZON
Money: Prices too high; cost of living too high; taxes too high	46%)	63%
Two currencies create hardships	10)	
Business and professional worries; unemployment; worry over personal future	35	19
Need to buy clothes; furniture; repair house, etc.	12	7
Family worries; family members missing; dead, wounded; ill	11	17
Problems of the refugees	10	11
Housing worries	6	9
Political worries; worry about political future	3	2
Food	1	-
Other	-	-
No worries	7	8
	141%*	136%*

* Percentages adds to more than 100% because some gave more than one answer.

UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS GRAVE ...

Three in ten of those interviewed say that someone in their family is looking for a job. And of those who have working people in their family, 7% are working only part time. These questions were asked:

"How many (family members) are unemployed and looking for a job?"

	August	December
Family members		
1	29%	23%
2	3	3
3	1	-
None	67	69
	100%	100%

Of the unemployed in Berlin, more have only elementary schooling than do the employed, and there are more women among the group seeking work than among those who are working.

Of the unemployed ...

84% Volksschule education or less
16 attended Mittelschule
— have Abitur

33% are men
67 are women

Of the employed ...

63% Volksschule education or less
26 attended Mittelschule
11 have Abitur and more

58% are men
42 are women

WHAT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEM ...

When asked what or who they thought to be responsible for the present unemployment in Berlin, considerably more people said it was due to the general lack of money, and Berlin's peculiar situation ... the lack of raw materials, the two currencies, restraint of East-West trade ... than blamed any particular person or group. In December, the same number of people said the unemployment was due to the fact that Berlin was controlled by four powers and was divided, as put the blame exclusively on the Russians.

"Who or what, do you think, is responsible for the present unemployment in West Berlin?"

	August	December
<u>General lack of money;</u> currency reform; lack of credits and invested money	27%	37%
<u>Lack of materials and raw-materials;</u> too many manufactured goods are sent to Berlin; the factories here don't get contracts	26	20
<u>The two currencies;</u> the disparity between the two currencies; everyone tries to buy in the East Sector	12	14
<u>Disunion of the Allies;</u> the Military Government and Magistrate shut down industries; the split of Germany and the split of Berlin; because Berlin is controlled by four Allies	8	11
<u>The Russians;</u> because the Russians do not allow importation of the necessary goods; the effects of the Blockade	17	11
<u>The inadequate Berlin Magistrate;</u> politicians; the local administration divides the work badly; the disunion of the political parties is too grave	10	8
<u>Restraint of Trade with the West and the East; Berlin is an island and has no contact with the East or West; Berlin is unable to participate in trade because of difficulties in transportation</u>	11	6
<u>Dismantling policy of the Western Powers;</u>	4	9
<u>Others: Result of the lost war; loss of taxes by black market; the SED is interested in unemployment because poverty drives men to communism; unem- ployment is an integral part of capitalism; lack of interest of West Germany</u>	5	6

No opinion

6
126%

11
133%

* The percentage adds up to more than 100% because some people gave several answers.

MORE CREDIT AND INCREASED BUILDING RECOMMENDED ...

Berliners are not without suggestions as to what should be done to alleviate the unemployment crisis. Most people advise bringing credit and financial help, intensifying the building activity, and importing raw materials rather than finished products. Others believe that if Germany were re-united, ... or at least Berlin, ... or if a uniform currency were introduced, the situation would be relieved. Some specific proposals include: establishment of an army or labor corps; discharging East-Berliners working in the Western Sectors; using money expended for unemployment pensions for industrial production; forbidding purchases in the Eastern Sector; shortening everyone's working hours.

"What do you think should be done to get rid of unemployment?"

	August	December
<u>Through credits and financial help:</u>	20%	33%
long-term credits and financial help in the form of foreign investments		
<u>Intensify the building activity:</u>	19	31
re-building of Berlin and the realization of the building program would guarantee work for years; build houses and industries		
<u>Import materials and raw-materials:</u>	40	28
the importation of raw-materials rather than finished products is the best guarantee for employment; stop dismantling; the removal of factories to Western Germany should be prevented		
<u>Unite Germany and allow the free development of industry through increased trade</u>	9	11
<u>Re-unite Berlin and unite Berlin with Western Germany; the Russians should withdraw</u>	6	5
<u>Get a uniform currency</u>	7	5
<u>Army and labor corps</u>	-	2
<u>Let unemployed work for their pensions</u>	-	4
<u>Others: discharge East Berliners working in Western Sectors; the money defrayed for unemployment pay should be used for productive work; forbid buying in the East Sector; shorten everyone's working hours; don't let anyone work 43 hours, rather have everyone work 35; the firms that went to Western Germany should come back; the Federal Republic should have its office in Berlin; forbid double wage earners.</u>	7	8
<u>No opinion</u>	9 117%	7 134%

* The percentage adds up to more than 100% because several answers were given.

Most West Berliners do not feel that increased unemployment would lead to an expansion of Communism. And of those who do think that Communism might gain ground, only a small minority (7%) think the end result could be Communist control of Berlin. These two questions were asked:

"Do you think that an increase of unemployment in West Berlin would cause an expansion of Communism?"

	August	December
Yes	24%	23%
No	74	75
No opinion	2	2
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

"Then would Communism come to power in Berlin?" (Asked of those saying "Yes".)

Yes	6%	7%
No	17	15
No opinion	1	1
	<u>24%</u>	<u>23%</u>

MARSHALL AID WILL HELP ...

Two-thirds are aware of the fact that West Berlin is included in the Marshall Aid Program. Those who know of Berlin's inclusion were asked if they thought this help would improve conditions ... 23% predicted a great improvement, and 22% said they expected a satisfactory improvement.

"Do you know if West Berlin is to receive help through the Marshall Plan?"

	August	December
Yes, is provided for	63%	67%
No, is not provided for	-	1
Don't know	37	32
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

"Do you think that this help will improve the conditions in West Berlin or not?"
(Asked of those answering "Yes" above.)

	August	December
1. Great improvement	25%	23%
2. Satisfactory improvement	21	22
3. Small improvement	13	13
4. No improvement	2	1
X. No opinion	2	3
	<u>63%</u>	<u>67%</u>

II. STATE OF MORALE

THE PRESENT BETTER THAN THE PAST ...

Although the present economic situation in Berlin is critical, West Berliners compare the present favorably with the past, and express hope in the future. Eight in ten say that their own personal situation is better today than it was before the blockade was lifted. And about the same number express no disappointment or let-down at the rate of progress made in Berlin since the lifting of the blockade.

"After the lifting of the blockade, so you think your personal situation today is better or worse than it was before?"

	May	August	December
Better	89%	77%	80%
Worse	3	8	9
The same	8	10	3
No opinion	<u>—</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>8</u>
	100%	100%	100%

"After the blockade was lifted did you expect progress in Berlin to be more rapid than it actually has been?"

	August	December
Yes	19%	13%
No	81	87
No opinion	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>
	100%	100%

FEW DREAD THE WINTER ...

Almost all of the West Berliners (93%) predict that they will get over the present winter better than they did the preceding one. This feeling of confidence increased somewhat between August and December.

"Do you think you personally will get over this winter better or worse than the last one?"

	August	December
Better	84%	93%
Worse	9	4
The same	6	3
No opinion	<u>1</u>	<u>—</u>
	100%	100%

MOST OPTIMISTIC ABOUT FUTURE ...

Asked how they viewed the future shortly before Christmas almost eight in ten answered that they considered it hopeful.*

"Do you consider the Berlin situation for the near future to be hopeful, or does the future look dark?"

	1949	
	August	December
Hopeful	71%	78%
Looks dark	26	20
No opinion	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>
	100%	100%

People base their optimism largely on the hope that new credits will be granted to Berlin, that the Western Allies will continue helping, and that the reconstruction of Berlin will go ahead. Others think that closer ties with Western Germany will improve economic conditions, and some few predict that the Russians will leave. As shown in the table below, in December, considerably more of those interviewed place their hopes in promised credits than did in August.

* On January 27, as a new blockade threatened, results of a small scale survey show that despite some decline, an optimistic spirit still characterized the large majority of the Berliners - 68% said that they viewed the future hopefully.

"Why did you think so?" (Asked of those answering "Hopeful" in preceding question)

	August	December
<u>Credits will be granted:</u> Berlin is promised credits and these credits will bring about an economic improvement	6%	19%
<u>The Western Allies are helping:</u> Because the Western powers, particularly America, did yield to the danger of Communism and because they stay in Berlin; the Americans have to help us because of own political interests; through help of the Marshall Plan	21	17
<u>Reconstruction of Berlin will relieve unemployment</u>	6	11
<u>Unification with Western Germany will bring further improvements:</u> The outcome of the elections of Western Germany will influence Berlin's situation and commercial conditions; Berlin will be the 12th State	5	6
<u>More food:</u> The good food supply and the possibility to buy everything; has increased people's interest in working and re-building	4	3
<u>Expect the Russians to withdraw or to give in:</u> The Russians have seen that the Western powers are mighty and that their efforts are in vain	5	4
<u>Expect the Allies to agree</u>	2	1
<u>Expect a uniform currency</u>	1	1
<u>General answers:</u> Think that Berlin will be united again; Berlin will be the Capital again; expect a peace treaty; general improvement of living conditions during the last years does not justify pessimism	18	16
<u>Import of raw-materials:</u> The exchange of goods and raw-materials makes West-East trade possible	6	2
No opinion	<u>2</u> 76%	<u>2</u> 82%

Of the minority who are pessimistic about the future, the largest number see no possibility of reaching an agreement with the Russians, and others point to the unemployment situation, lack of money, lack of trade and the difficulties brought through the double currencies.

* The percentage adds up to more than those asked questions because some gave several answers.

"Why do you think so?" (Asked of those who think "future is dark" in preceding question.)

	August	December
<u>No possibility of agreeing with the Russians;</u> <u>mistrust the Russians;</u>	6%	7%
<u>Unemployment; increase of unemployment</u>	6	4
<u>Lack of money; lack of money as well as lack</u> <u>of credit cause stagnation of business;</u> <u>not only the people, but business men</u> <u>have no money</u>	3	1
<u>Lack of trade; the economic contact to the</u> <u>West is insufficient; no production</u> <u>because of lack of raw-materials</u>	3	-
<u>Double currencies cause economic ruin</u>	2	1
<u>Fear that the Western powers will withdraw</u>	1	-
<u>The next war can't be prevented</u>	1	1
<u>East-West conflict</u>	-	2
Others: Berlin can't rise again because of the occupation; the occupation powers' interest in Berlin is not so great as could be expected; no improvement is to be seen for the future; the Magistrate is unqualified; Berlin can't progress be- cause it's cut off from its basis; the East Zone an island	7	4

29%* 20%

* The percentage adds up to more than those asked question because some gave several answers.

One index to the state of morale among the West Berliners is the proportion who express a desire to leave the city. In the early days of the blockade, in July 1948, as many as 43% of the people said that they would like to leave Berlin should they have the chance. This percentage dropped to 30% in October, perhaps indicating confidence in the success of the air lift. In the middle of the winter, this figure went up to 39%, and then dropped to 17% in May when the blockade was lifted. In late December 1949, 20% said they would like to leave Berlin.* *

"Would you personally leave Berlin if you had the chance?"

	1948		1949				
	Jul	Oct	Jan	Mar	May	Aug	Dec
Yes	43%	30%	39%	28%	17%	23%	20%
No	57	70	61	71	83	77	80
No opinion	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

** In the limited survey made on January 27, 31% said they would like to leave Berlin if they had the chance.

III. POLITICAL PROSPECTS.

FEW EXPECT NEW BLOCKADE ...

In May 1949, shortly after the announcement that the blockade was to be lifted, only about half of the West Berliners thought it would be lifted for good. However, in late December, three-fourths said that they did not expect the blockade to be re-imposed.*

"Do you think the blockade has been lifted for good, or do you expect it to be put into effect again?"

	May	August	December
Lifted for good	52%	67%	76%
Will be re-established	44	31	20
No opinion	4	2	4
	100%	100%	100%

Most of those who expect a new blockade say they do not trust the Russians. A few think the split between the East and West is growing, and some say that the Russians cannot risk a satisfactory economic development in West Berlin.

"Why do you think so?" (Asked of those who expect a new blockade.)

	August	December
<u>You cannot trust the Russians; the Russians don't like to let us live in peace</u>	29%	13%
<u>Devision between East and West is getting bigger; no possibility of reaching agreement with the Russians</u>	-	2
<u>Satisfactory economic development in West Berlin is risk for the Russians and the East</u>	-	2
Other answers: The Allies don't agree; the Americans will lose their interest in Berlin	2	3
	31%	20%

* Indications that this belief was only slightly shaken by the recent stoppage of trucks between Berlin and the West were found in the study made January 27, at which time 65% said they did not expect a new blockade.

HAS RUSSIAN THREAT INCREASED ...

In December, over half of the West Berliners said they thought the threat of the Russians taking over all of Berlin had decreased during the last few months.*

"Do you think the threat of the Russians taking over all of Berlin has increased or decreased during the last months?"

	1949	
	Aug	Dec
Increased	8%	13%
Decreased	60	53
The same as before	24	29
No opinion	8	5
	100%	100%

Most of those who think the Russian threat is increasing, say that the Russians are getting more active, and are strengthening the East Zone police. On the other hand, the largest numbers of those who think the Russian influence is waning think that the balance of power is tipped in favor of the West, or say that the sympathies of the West Berliners lies with the West.

	August	December
<u>The Russians are more active again; getting stronger, strengthening the East Zone police</u>	4%	9%
<u>Because of the economic development in West-Berlin.</u>	3	1
Others: Berlin is surrounded by the Russians; because the Western Allies moved their offices to Western Germany; the Western Allies relax their efforts in helping Berlin; many people believe Russian propaganda	2	2
No opinion	<u>9%</u> **	<u>1</u> 13%

* In the small scale survey made in January 27, fewer (30%) thought that the Russian threat had decreased, and somewhat more said that it increased (22%) or remained the same as before (45%) - 3% had no opinion.

** The percentage adds up to more than number asked question because some gave several answers.

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Reasons people think the Russian threat has decreased:

	August	December
<u>Balance of power between the Western Powers and Russia; the Western Powers are stronger; the Russians have to give in;</u>	20%	21%
<u>Sympathy for the Western Powers; aversion to the Russians; confidence in the Western Powers; West Berliners are opposed to the Russians and Communism;</u>	21	16
<u>Readiness for agreement on both sides; general political relaxation</u>	9	5
<u>Because of the help of the Western Powers</u>	6	3
<u>Because it is going better with us</u>	-	3
<u>Because the Russians will leave</u>	-	3
<u>Others: The Russians have lost their interest in Berlin; the Russians take an interest in other countries</u>	3	1
No opinion	$\frac{2}{61\%*}$	$\frac{1}{53\%*}$

* The percentage adds up to more than those asked question because some gave several answers.

ALMOST ALL THINK AMERICANS WILL STAY ...

Berliners are almost unanimous in the belief that the Americans will stay in Berlin as long as they stay in Germany. As the table below shows, this confidence has not wavered since July, 1943.

"Do you think the Americans will stay in Berlin as long as they stay in Germany?"

	1943				1949					
	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Jan	Mar	May	Jul	Aug	De.
Yes	39%	37%	37%	35%	92%	33%	91%	88%	93%	94%
No	8	12	10	8	7	7	7	10	6	5
No opinion	3	1	3	7	1	5	2	2	1	1
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

In August, when a number of American offices were being moved from Berlin, this fact was called to the attention of those interviewed to see if they considered this cause for alarm. Nine in ten remained firm in their belief that this did not signify a American loss of interest in Berlin.

"Do you think that the removal of American offices from Berlin to Western Germany is a sign that the Americans are losing their interest in Berlin?"

August

Yes	10%
No	39
No opinion	1
	<u>100%</u>

MINORITY EXPECT A UNITED BERLIN ...

Hope that Berlin will get a united city government in the near future declined considerably between May and December. But almost all of those who expect a united government think it will be under the influence of the West Magistrate rather than the East.

"Do you think Berlin will get a united city government in the near future?"

May August December

Yes	51%	36%	33%
No	44	60	62
No opinion	5	4	5
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

"Do you think the East or West Magistrate will have the most influence on a new united city government?" (Asked of those answering "Yes" above.)

May August December

East	1%	1%	-
West	49	34	32
No opinion	1	1	1
	<u>51%</u>	<u>36%</u>	<u>33%</u>

VI AMERICAN POLICIES IN BERLIN

AMERICAN GENERAL PRESTIGE HIGH .

Questioned before recent traffic restrictions between Berlin and the West, Berliners were almost unanimous in saying that the United States, rather than Russia has gained in prestige during the last year. Since the attitude expressed in December is the same as that found in May it represents more than a burst of enthusiasm following the lifting of the blockade.

"Which country has, in your opinion, through the special situation in Berlin this last year, gained in prestige ... America or Russia?"

	May	August	December
America	98%	99%	99%
Russia	1	-	-
Undecided	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
	100%	100%	100%

MINORITY THINK WEST COULD GIVE MORE AID

The fact that American actions in Berlin win considerably more praise than the Russian's does not mean that all West Berliners are always in accord with American policies. For example, one third think that the Western powers could do more to relieve distressed conditions in Berlin.

When asked what more the Western powers could do, the largest number suggest giving more aid to Berlin production, or more money and credit in general.

"What more could they do?"

(Asked of those who think the Western powers "could do more.")

August - December

<u>The Berlin production should be helped,</u> and work possibilities made; West Germany should give contracts to Berlin	12%	8%
<u>Help Berlin with money; credits;</u> <u>investments</u>	10	8
<u>Give more freedom to the German</u> <u>administrative authorities</u>	3	4
<u>Supply more and cheaper food;</u> don't send goods that the whole world doesn't want; lower prices	3	2
<u>Western powers should act more</u> <u>decisively against the Russians</u> a corridor between Western Germany and Berlin should be built	6	3
<u>They could come to some agreement</u> <u>with the Russians</u>	-	1
<u>Berlin should be attached to the</u> West German Republic	-	1
Others: The poor and old people should be helped more; they should touch democracy by example, then we would become convinced democrats, and carry our troubles better; don't charge occupation costs; see that houses are built	4	7
No opinion	- 38%*	1 35%*

* Percentage adds to more than number asked the question, because some people gave more than one answer.

REACTIONS TO CURRENT AMERICAN MEASURES ...

On January 27, shortly after the American withdrawal from the railway headquarters building in the American Sector, a cross-section of 100 Berliners were asked if in general they approved or disapproved of the way the Western powers have been handling the situation in Berlin 51% approved, and 44% disapproved. Most of those disapproving think that the West should have pursued a firmer and more consistent policy with the Russians.

"In general, do you approve or disapprove of the way the Western powers have been handling the Berlin situation between the East and West?"

Approve	51%
Disapprove	44
No opinion	<u>5</u>
	100%

IF "Disapprove:"

"What do you think should have been done?"

Should be firmer and more consistent with the Russians	33%
Should unify all of Germany and reach agreement with the Russians	6
Should give Berlin financial help	3
Should include Berlin with the West	<u>2</u> 44%

Opinion divides on whether or not a new blockade would have been established if the Americans had remained in the railway building.

"If the Americans had not left the railway headquarters building, do you think the blockade would have been re-established, or not?"

Yes	42%
No	48
No opinion	<u>10</u>
	100%

FEW FORESEE SIDING WITH RUSSIANS ...

Nine out of ten Berliners think that even if a new blockade were put into effect, a large number of Berliners would not want to come to an agreement with the East German government. The following results are from the January 27 survey.

"If another blockade were re-established, do you think a large number of Berliners would want to come to some agreement with the East German government, or not?"

Yes	10%
No	86
No opinion	4
	<u>100%</u>

"Do you think they would want to do this even if it would mean a withdrawal of the Western powers from Berlin?"
(Asked of those answering "Yes" above)

Yes	2%
No	8
No opinion	-
	<u>10%</u>

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THE GERMAN PUBLIC VIEWS THE CONDUCT
OF THE U.S. OCCUPATION FORCES

Report No. 6

Series No. 2

6 ^{March} February 1950

REACTIONS ANALYSIS BRANCH
INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE

HICOG

Bad Nauheim

APO 807

Germany

~~RESTRICTED~~

INTRODUCTION ...

In December 1949, the Reactions Analysis Branch, Office of Public Affairs, HICOG, asked representative cross-sections of people in the U.S. Zone, the three western sectors of Berlin, and in Bremen-Bremerhaven for their views on the conduct of U.S. occupation troops.

Prior to the survey, asserted "incidents" between soldiers and the civilian population had engendered German reactions in the form of critical press comments, protests by restaurant owners, and strikes of taxi drivers. This study was undertaken to ascertain the views of the general public on the conduct of American troops and to determine whether these views had changed in response to recent developments.

The population sample consisted of 1500 persons in the Zone, 250 in West Berlin, and 160 in Bremen, selected for representativeness by the standard random method employed by the Branch. Interviewing was done by a trained German staff under professional American supervision.

SUMMARY ...

- ... Two-thirds of the Germans in the U.S. Zone say they have no American acquaintances. And six in ten claim they seldom or never even see American troops.
- ... But the troops' conduct is considered good by large majorities of the public (60% in the Zone, and 80% in Berlin). Very few in the Zone (4%) and no one in Berlin says they behave badly.
- ... Also, preponderant opinions in all areas are that the conduct of the U.S. forces has improved since the war's end. Fewest are of this opinion in Bavaria, however, especially in the Franconian area where numerous alleged incidents have recently been reported.
- ... Eight out of ten say they have never had any unpleasant experiences with the U.S. occupation troops. Among those who do report such experiences, reference is frequently made to incidents which occurred in the first stages of the occupation, or even during wartime imprisonment.
- ... The public as a whole either expresses approval of American soldiers' patronizing German cafes, or does not care one way or the other. Only one in ten claims to be opposed.

TROOPS SEEN ...

Six in ten U.S. Zone Germans claim they do not see any American troops during the course of an average day, and 53% of western Berliners state the same. In Bremen-Bremerhaven, only 35% say they seldom or never see Americans. Only a small fraction (11% in the Zone) estimate that they have seen ten or more soldiers daily.

"How many American soldiers do you see in the course of a day?"

JS

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
None	62%	55%	53%	59%	53%	35%
One or two	10	12	12	11	12	23
Three to ten	17	16	16	16	25	28
More than ten	11	11	14	11	5	13
No opinion and no answer	-	6	5	3	5	1
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

ACQUAINTANCE WITH AMERICANS ...

Over two-thirds of the AMZON respondents say they have not become acquainted with an American since the end of the war. Less than one-third say they know one or more Americans. This group is evenly divided between those who are only casually acquainted with Americans and those who know them well or very well.

"Have you become acquainted with an American since the end of the war?"

JS

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Yes	30%	36%	32%	32%	28%	33%
No	<u>70</u>	<u>64</u>	<u>68</u>	<u>68</u>	<u>72</u>	<u>67</u>
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

(If "Yes") "Are you very well, well, or only casually acquainted?"

JS

	AMZON
Very well	6%
Well	9
Casually	<u>17</u>
	<u>32%</u>

As might be expected, somewhat more Germans now claim to have met Americans than did so two years ago.

Know Americans

AMZON

	<u>November</u> 1947	<u>November</u> 1949
Yes	27%	32%
No	<u>73</u>	<u>68</u>
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

The proportion of Germans knowing Americans is naturally greater in the urban areas frequented by soldiers, rising to almost half the population in places where troops are very often encountered. Likewise, the more soldiers an individual regularly sees, the more likely he is to be acquainted with Americans. A majority of those who see more than 10 soldiers a day say they know Americans. The proportion knowing Americans also rises with education, income and social status. German men are more likely than German women to be acquainted with Americans. Acquaintance does not vary greatly with age, though young people in their twenties are somewhat more likely to know Americans.

Acquaintance with Americans - Group Differences

	Know Americans	Do not	
<u>Soldiers in area:*</u>			
Almost never	19%	81%	... 100%
Occasionally	26	74	
Often	35	65	
Very often	47	53	
<u>Soldiers seen daily:</u>			
None	22%	78%	... 100%
One or two	38	62	
Three to ten	46	54	
More than ten	55	45	
<u>Education:</u>			
Eight years or less	27%	73%	... 100%
Nine to eleven years	55	45	
Twelve years or more	62	38	
<u>Monthly family income:</u>			
Low (less than 150 DM)	25%	75%	... 100%
Middle (150 to 300 DM)	31	69	
High (300 DM or over)	47	53	
<u>Social Status:</u>			
Lower	24%	76%	... 100%
Lower middle	45	55	
Upper middle, upper	71	29	
<u>Sex:</u>			
Men	38%	62%	... 100%
Women	26	74	
<u>Age:</u>			
Under 20 years	25%	75%	... 100%
20 - 29	37	63	
30 - 39	34	66	
40 - 49	32	68	
50 - 59	30	70	
60 - 69	25	75	
70 - 79	24	76	

* Interviewers estimate

Majorities in all areas surveyed describe the conduct of American occupation troops as "good," while proportions ranging from 4% in Bavaria to 18% in Berlin consider it "very good." More than half the population in Bavaria, two-thirds in Hesse and Württemberg-Baden, three-fourths in Bremen and four-fifths in Berlin consider the troops' conduct either "good" or "very good."

Most of the people who did not find the troops' behavior good did not select either of the alternatives offered - "bad" or "very bad." Instead 18% in AMZON volunteered the reply "fair" or "partly good, partly bad." An additional 13% felt unable to express an opinion - for lack of opportunity to observe American soldiers', or for other reasons.

No one interviewed in Berlin described the troops' behavior as "bad" or "very bad," and no one in Bremen described it as "very bad." In AMZON the proportion finding the soldiers' conduct "bad" or "very bad" ranges from 2% in Hesse to 6% in Bavaria.

"Would you describe the behavior of the American occupation troops in general as good, very good, bad, or very bad?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Very good	4%	10%	5%	6%	18%	12%
Good	51	56	60	54	63	65
Fair	15	10	10	13	8	8
Partly good, partly bad	5	7	5	5	3	5
Bad	5	1	3	3	-	3
Very bad	1	1	1	1	-	-
See none	17	13	12	15	7	3
No opinion	2	2	4	3	1	4
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Those who see soldiers regularly are more likely to have definite opinions about their behavior. More of those people think American soldiers behave well or very well, but also relatively more of them think they behave badly or very badly. Of those who see over 10 soldiers a day, more than one out of ten finds their behavior bad or very bad, but two-thirds of this group believe the soldiers behave well or very well. Those who know Americans are somewhat more inclined to think the troops behave well or very well than those who do not have American acquaintances. The latter group is more apt to withhold judgment for lack of opportunity to observe soldiers.

The group considering the troop's behavior bad is naturally greater among those who have had unpleasant personal experience with Americans. Fifteen per cent of this group finds their behavior bad or very bad as against 4% of those who do not report such experience. It is more remarkable that almost half of this group find the soldiers' conduct good or very good - thus indicating that they have not generalized from their personal experiences.

Conduct of Troops

	Very good	Good	Fair	Half-half	Bad	Very bad	See none	No opinion	
<u>Soldiers Seen:</u>									
None	4%	50%	11%	3%	2%	1%	25%	4%	...100%
One or two	6	65	12	10	5	-	1	1	
Three to ten	9	58	17	7	5	1	1	2	
More than ten	5	61	14	8	8	3	-	1	
<u>Know Americans:</u>									
Yes	8%	59%	13%	8%	4%	1%	5%	2%	...100%
No	4	52	13	4	3	1	19	4	
<u>Unpleasant Experiences with Americans:</u>									
Yes	3%	46%	20%	8%	12%	3%	7%	1%	...100%
No	4	52	14	4	3	1	19	3	

Respondents who considered the troops' conduct partly bad, bad, or very bad were asked whether they thought the greater part or only a minority of the American soldiers behaved badly. Two-thirds of this group (6% of the population) ascribe bad conduct to only a minority of the troops. Only 1% of the AMAZON population believes the majority of American soldiers behave badly.

(If "Partly bad," "Bad" or "Very bad"): "In your opinion does the greater part or the smaller part of the American soldiers behave badly?"

	AMAZON
Greater part	1%
Smaller part	6
Half-half	1
No opinion	1
	<hr/> 9%

CHANGE IN TROOPS' CONDUCT ...

Half the AMZON population — a majority in every area except Bavaria — feel that the behavior of American troops has improved since the end of the war. In the areas outside of Bavaria very few people (1% to 4%) think that soldiers now conduct themselves worse than formerly. But 16% of the Bavarians hold this opinion. In the Franconian region containing the cities of Bamberg, Nuernberg, Wuerzburg and Coburg, where "incidents" are frequently reported, the proportion considering the troops' behavior worse rises to almost a fourth of the population.

"Do you find that the behavior of the American occupation troops has improved or grown worse since the end of the war?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Better	42%	58%	62%	51%	60%	67%
Same	17	14	14	16	22	17
Worse	16	4	4	10	1	2
See none	22	17	15	19	12	9
No opinion	3	5	5	4	5	5
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

	Franconia	Southern Bavaria
Better	36%	46%
Same	14	19
Worse	23	12
See none	23	21
No opinion	4	2
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

In Bavaria, the percentage noting an improvement in the troops' conduct has declined since the previous survey, and the proportion noting worse behavior has more than doubled. This represents a marked deviation from the trend in other areas, * where larger numbers now think the troops' behavior has improved, and the proportion finding their conduct worse has not changed significantly.

	Bavaria		Hesse		W-Baden		AMZON		Berlin		Bremen	
	'48	'49	'48	'49	'48	'49	'48	'49	'48	'49	'48	'49
Better	50%	42%	51%	58%	48%	62%	50%	51%	54%	60%	73%	67%
Same	26	17	33	14	27	14	28	16	33	22	22	17
Worse	6	16	3	4	5	4	5	10	4	1	1	2
No opinion	18	25	13	24	20	20	17	23	9	17	4	14
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

* Although a decline is noted in Bremen, that area still tops all others in the proportion noting improvement in the troops' behavior.

- ... The larger the number of soldiers seen regularly the greater is the tendency to find the troops' behavior worse. Although a majority of the group seeing more than 10 soldiers daily think their behavior is better, three out of ten believe it has become worse. Those who know Americans are more likely to find the troops' behavior worse, but are also more inclined to find it better, than those unacquainted with Americans. The latter group is more likely to withhold judgment.
- ... As might be expected, the proportion considering the troops' behavior worse is higher among those who have had unpleasant personal experiences with Americans. In this group more than two out of ten find the soldiers' behavior worse, as opposed to less than one in ten of the group reporting no bad experiences. That the group having had no such experiences, is also less apt to note an improvement in the troops' behavior is doubtless attributable to the higher proportion who "see none."

Conduct of Troops

	Better	Same	Worse	See none	No opinion	
<u>Soldiers Seen:</u>						
None	43%	15%	5%	32%	5%	...100%
One or two	65	16	12	4	3	
Three to ten	62	17	18	-	3	
More than ten	51	19	29	-	1	
<u>Know Americans:</u>						
Yes	58%	15%	16%	8%	3%	...100%
No	47	16	8	25	4	
<u>Unpleasant Experiences with Americans:</u>						
Yes	54%	11%	21%	11%	3%	...100%
No	50	16	9	21	4	

- ... Those who think the U.S. troops are not as well behaved as formerly (11% in the U.S. Zone) were asked their reasons for this opinion. Replies were varied and scattered as follows: poor quality of material, too youthful and undisciplined, too much freedom, lack of Marks since currency reform, entanglements with German girls, too much alcohol.

Most of the public (84% in the Zone, 91% in Berlin, 81% in Bremen) report that they have not had any unpleasant experiences with the U.S. occupation personnel since the end of the war. A fraction can recall incidents of misconduct or unfair treatment.

"Have you personally had any kind of bad or unpleasant experiences with the Americans?"

U 9

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	WZON	Berlin	Bremen
Yes	15%	15%	17%	15%	9%	19%
No	85	85	33	85	91	81
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Little change in replies to this question has occurred during the past two years: in November 1947, 13% claimed unpleasant experiences.

As is to be expected, the more Americans a person sees, the more often he is able to report the occurrence of an untoward incident.

Unpleasant Experiences:

By Number of Soldiers seen daily:	% Yes	% No	No of Cases
None	11%	89% ... 100%	879
One or two	18	82	168
Three to ten	19	81	239
More than ten	32	68	173

... Examples of misconduct on the part of Americans varied. Some claim to have been personally mistreated or insulted (6%), others (5%) say their property was damaged or requisitioned or misused (especially in the early days of the occupation). A few recall mistreatment as prisoners of war (2%) or difficulties with U.S. authorities and so on (2%).

SOLDIERS IN GERMAN RESTAURANTS ...

Half of the AMZON population approve of American soldiers' patronizing German cafes, four out of ten are indifferent, and not quite one in ten is opposed. In western Berlin almost eight out of ten are in favor, not quite two in ten are indifferent, and a negligible 3% are opposed.

Indifference to this problem declines, and both approval and disapproval grow, with greater contact with Americans. With frequency of observing soldiers, however disapproval increases at a greater rate than approval, while acquaintance with Americans brings a greater gain in approval. Those who have had unpleasant experiences with Americans are somewhat less inclined to approve, and more inclined to oppose, soldiers' visits to German restaurants than those who do not report such experiences.

"Do you approve or disapprove of American soldiers' being permitted to visit German restaurants?"

	Approve	Disapprove	Indifferent	No opinion	
AMZON	50%	9%	39%	2%	... 100%
Bavaria	49	11	38	2	
Hesse	51	7	41	1	
W-Baden	54	5	40	1	
Berlin	79	3	18	-	
Bremen	51	9	40	-	
<u>Soldiers Seen:</u>					
None	49	5	44	2	... 100%
Uncertain	33	5	62	-	
One or two	54	9	36	1	
Three to ten	56	13	30	1	
More than ten	56	20	24	-	
<u>Know Americans:</u>					
Not at all	46	7	45	2	... 100%
Casually	55	10	34	1	
Well	66	13	19	2	
<u>Bad Experiences with Americans:</u>					
Yes	45	17	37	1	... 100%
No	52	7	39	2	

Most of those opposed, when asked why, said the soldiers' presence in German establishments led to fights. (About half of these specifically pinned the blame on the soldiers, often mentioning excessive drinking, occasionally arrogant attitudes.) Next in frequency of mention was general misbehavior of the soldiers. Others merely said that Germans preferred to be by themselves, and that Americans should stick to their own clubs.

(If "disapprove") "Why are you opposed?"

	AMZON
Results in fights	5%
Soldiers misbehave	2
Soldiers unwelcome	1
Other	1
	<u>9%</u>

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R E S T R I C T E D

THE GERMAN PUBLIC VIEWS THE CARE ORGANIZATION

Report No. 7

Series No. 2

6 March 1950

REACTIONS ANALYSIS BRANCH
INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE

HICOG

Bad Nauheim

APO 807

Germany

At the request of the CARE Mission to Germany Reactions Analysis Unit, Office of Public Affairs, in January 1950 asked a representative sample of people in the U.S. Zone and the three western sectors of Berlin for their views on the distribution of CARE packages in Germany.

The population sample consisted of 1500 persons in the Zone, 250 in West Berlin, and 160 in Bremen, selected for representativeness by the standard random method employed by the Branch. Interviewing was done by a trained German staff under professional American supervision. This work, as well as the prior questionnaire design and subsequent data evaluation are performed according to scientific opinion polling methods.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ...

1. Eight out of ten people in AMZON (almost all the people in Berlin and Bremen) have heard of CARE packages, and almost all of these people are aware that the packages come from the United States.
2. Six in ten of those who have heard of CARE packages are aware that they are sent primarily or in large part by private individuals, but two in ten erroneously believe most of the packages are donated by the CARE organization itself.
3. About one person out of eleven in AMZON (one out of nine in Berlin, and one out of seven in Bremen) claims to have received a CARE package. Most of those who received packages said they were sent by relatives.
4. Three-fourths of those in AMZON who had heard of CARE packages have a good impression of the organization's work, while about one-fourth feel unable to express an opinion. Only 2% have a bad impression of CARE's work as a whole.
5. Very few people had any complaints about the CARE organization. About nine in ten of the complaints registered referred to alleged injustice in the distribution of packages.
6. An overwhelming majority of those who have heard of CARE packages believe they are sent primarily to help. Very few think the profit motive or a political reason is paramount.

Eight out of ten people in AMZON and almost all the people in Berlin and Bremen have heard of CARE packages.

"Have you ever heard anything about CARE packages?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Yes	76%	84%	86%	80%	98%	94%
No	<u>24</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>6</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Almost all those who have heard of CARE packages are aware that they are sent from the United States. A few mentioned Switzerland, Sweden or other countries as the source.

(If "Yes") "And what country sends these CARE packages?"

	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
America	94%	96%	98%
Switzerland	3	6	2
Sweden	-	2	1
Other	1	4	1
No opinion, no answer	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
	102%*	110%*	104%*

* Adds to more than 100% because some people mentioned more than one country.

Six in ten of the AMZON residents who have heard of CARE packages realize they are sent - primarily or in large part - by private individuals to their friends and relatives. But more than two in ten erroneously believe most packages are sent by the organization itself.

(If "Yes") "Do you know whether the CARE packages are sent primarily as gifts from relatives or friends - or whether most packages are donated by the CARE organization itself?"

AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
42%	49%	50%
22	26	21
17	14	21
<u>19</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>8</u>
100%	100%	100%

RECIPIENTS OF CARE PACKAGES

One person out of eleven in AMZON claims to have received a CARE package. One out of seven knows some one who has received a package. In Berlin one person out of nine, in Bremen one out of seven, has received a package. The proportion having acquaintances who received packages is also higher in these cities.

"Have you yourself or acquaintances of yours ever received a CARE package?"
(Asked of people who knew of CARE packages.)

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Yes, self	10%	6%	14%	9%	11%	15%
Yes, acquaintances	13	13	16	14	35	18
No, neither/nor	53	63	55	56	52	59
Don't know	-	2	1	1	-	2
	<u>76%</u>	<u>84%</u>	<u>86%</u>	<u>80%</u>	<u>98%</u>	<u>94</u>

Of those in AMZON who received CARE packages, eight out of 10 said the packages had been sent by relatives or friends. Two in 10 said they had received the packages from a welfare organization.

(If "Received package") "Did you receive the package from relatives or friends, from a welfare organization or from unknown donors?"

	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Relatives	59%	48%	58%
Friends	20	26	32
Welfare organization	19	13	16
Unknown donors	2	4	-
Other	2	13	-
No answer	2	-	-
	<u>104%</u> *	<u>104%</u> *	<u>106%</u> *

* Adds to more than 100% because some people mentioned more than one donor.

The greatest disparity between the recipients of CARE packages and the population as a whole is in education. Over 30% of the recipients of CARE packages are people with more than elementary schooling, who constitute less than 20% of the population. Men, city dwellers, and members of the upper income and occupational groups - who tend to be better educated than their counterparts - are also disproportionately represented among recipients of CARE packages.

	<u>Recipients</u>	<u>Total Population</u>
<u>Income:</u>		
DM monthly		
under 99	13%	14%
100 to 199	24	29
200 to 299	29	29
300 and over	32	26
No opinion	2	2
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
<u>Education:</u>		
Eight years or less	68%	81%
Nine to eleven years	22	15
Twelve or more years	10	4
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
<u>Occupation:</u>		
(recipient or family head)		
Business and professional men	13%	5%
Public servants	3	6
Shopkeepers	13	16
White-collar workers	15	11
Craftsmen	25	21
Manual workers	18	18
Farmers	8	14
No occupation	5	9
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
<u>City Size:</u>		
(Population)		
Under 5000	44%	50%
5000 to 24999	14	18
25000 to 99999	14	10
100000 to 249999	9	8
250000 and over	19	14
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
<u>Sex:</u>		
Men	53%	41%
Women	47	59
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
<u>Age:</u>		
Under 20	10%	7%
20 to 29	21	21
30 to 39	12	19
40 to 49	31	25
50 to 59	15	15
60 and over	11	13
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
<u>Religion:</u>		
Catholic	48%	50%
Protestant	47	46
Other	1	2
None	4	2
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
<u>Place of Origin:</u>		
Natives	71%	75%
Newcomers (since 1938)	9	8
Expellees and refugees	19	17
Foreigners	1	*
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

* Less than one-half of one per cent

In AMZON over three-fourths of those who have heard of CARE have a good impression of the organization's work. Somewhat less than a fourth have no opinion, while a negligible 2% have a bad impression of CARE. In Berlin and Bremen almost nine out of 10 have a good impression, about one out of 10 withholds judgment and a negligible proportion take a negative view of the organization.

"Do you have a good or a bad impression of the work of the CARE organization?"
(Asked of people who knew of CARE)

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Good	73%	76%	82%	76%	89%	86%
Bad	2	2	2	2	2	3
No opinion	25	22	16	22	9	11
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Those who had heard of CARE were then asked whether they had any complaints about the organization's work. Relatively few people said they had, as the following table shows.

"Do you have any complaints about the work of the CARE organization?"
(Asked of people who knew of CARE)

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Yes	6%	8%	5%	6%	9%	10%
No	80	73	84	79	85	80
No opinion	14	19	11	15	6	10
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

The small minority which criticized the CARE organization referred largely to alleged injustice in the distribution of packages. ("Many people receive packages who don't need them." "The needy should receive more consideration.") It was thought that these complaints about inequitable distribution might be based on the misconception that CARE itself donates most of the packages. When the assumption was tested, it was found that people who have complaints were somewhat more likely than others to hold this misconception, but the difference is not statistically significant.

(If "complaints") "What complaints?"

AMZON, Berlin and Bremen

Unjust distribution	88%
Inferior contents	5
Other	7
	<u>100%</u>

Respondents who had heard of CARE were then asked what motive prompts the sending of packages. The overwhelming majority think the desire to help is predominant.

Very few believe the profit motive or a political objective is paramount.

(If "Yes") "Do you believe that the CARE packages are sent primarily to help, to gain a profit, or to gain a political objective?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
To help	85%	87%	88%	87%	94%	91
To gain profit	2	2	1	2	3	4
To gain political good	5	5	6	5	3	3
No opinion	7	6	5	6	-	2
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

It is noteworthy that only two people had volunteered such statements when asked whether they had complaints about the organization. One said: "The organization is run solely for profit." The other comment was: "America sends the packages only to get itself talked about."

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REACTIONS TOWARD THE WÜRTTEMBERG-BADEN DENAZIFICATION AFFAIR

Report No. 8
Series No. 2
17 March 1950
REACTIONS ANALYSIS BRANCH
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE
HICOG APO 807
Bad Nauheim Germany

~~RESTRICTED~~

INTRODUCTION ...

In mid-January 1950, the problem of denazification procedures was high-lighted in Wuerttemberg-Baden with the arrest of Heinz May, the chief prosecuto of the central denazification court in Ludwigsburg, and subsequently of August Maier, head of a commercial agency which had dealt with denazification matters. Both were charged with accepting bribes in connection with denazification cases.

The incident took on more than local importance when the Minister President of Wuerttemberg-Baden, Reinhold Maier and the U.S. Land Commissioner General Gross publicly differed on the implications of the scandal and the proper role of the press in reporting it. The importance of the incident was additionally dramatized at the opening of the Amerika-Haus in Stuttgart on February 5th, when Mr. McCloy, General Gross and Reinhold Maier all alluded to the matter.

To assess urban reactions in Wuerttemberg-Baden to the issues involved, the trained German interviewers of the Reactions Analysis Branch gathered, in the first week of March, a representative urban quota sample of 368 cases from the six major cities of Wuerttemberg-Baden: Stuttgart, Karlsruhe, Mannheim, Heidelberg, Ludwigsburg, and Esslingen.

EXTENT OF AWARENESS OF INCIDENT ...

Awareness of the denazification scandal is widespread among Wuerttemberg-Baden city dwellers. Three quarters (74%) said they had heard or read something about it and almost seven out of ten (68%) could correctly name one or more of the principles in the affair.

"Have you read or heard anything about the detection of a denazification scandal in Wuerttemberg-Baden in the last few weeks?"

Yes	74%
No	25
No opinion	<u>1</u>
	100%

Those answering "Yes" were asked: "What names have been mentioned chiefly in this connection?"

Right answers (May, Meyer, Maier, Gross)	68%
Wrong answers	2
No opinion	<u>4</u>
	74%

So that all respondents could be questioned on their reactions to the issue, those who had not yet heard of the incident were apprised of it in the following terms:

"During the last few weeks serious offenses have been discovered that had been committed in the carrying out of denazification in Wuerttemberg-Baden. The persons primarily accused in this matter are the former first denazification court prosecutor May, and the chief of a commission agency, August Meyer. These persons have been accused of taking bribes, and as a consequence persons seriously charged got off with slight sentences. Minister President Maier was also blamed in this connection, as he has the chief responsibility for denazification in Wuerttemberg-Baden."

PUBLIC EVALUATION OF THE INCIDENT ...

A majority of the urban residents of Wuerttemberg-Baden feel that the present scandal merely typifies the denazification process in general. Moreover, even a larger majority asserts that the Stuttgart affair is one of many, not only in Wuerttemberg-Baden, but in Western Germany. These opinions are seen in replies to the following series of questions.

The first question poses a very strong indictment of the process of denazification and asks the respondents if they concur or disagree. It can be seen that a full majority agree to the contention that the present scandal proves the whole denazification process has been nothing but a fraud and money-making scheme.

"Many people say that this scandal proves that the whole denazification process has been nothing but a fraud and money-making scheme. Are you also of this opinion or do you believe that denazification has had a real value?"

Fraud and money-making scheme	53%
A real value	29
No opinion	<u>18</u>
	100%

The two succeeding queries show that large majorities believe that such an affair as occurred in Stuttgart is not an isolated incident, nor confined to Wuerttemberg-Baden.

"Do you regard these recently discovered offenses as single instances, or do you believe, that there are still a great many such cases that have not been detected so far?"

Single instances	17%
Many other undiscovered cases	68
No opinion	15
	<u>100%</u>

"Do you believe that such offenses have happened more frequently in Wuerttemberg-Baden than in other states and zones of Western Germany?"

Yes, more frequently	8%
No, everywhere the same	66
Elsewhere more frequently	7
No opinion	19
	<u>100%</u>

Indications are, however, that these critical attitudes do not imply a rejection of denazification in principle. A year ago when queried on the principle, two thirds of the Wuerttemberg-Baden population approved it - as did the rest of the U.S. Zone population.

"Do you consider it a good idea to hold to account - through denazification - such people as furthered National Socialism in any way?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Good idea	69%	61%	65%	66%	68%	64%
Bad idea	23	23	25	23	29	31
No opinion	8	16	10	11	3	5
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

But even then, a like number (66%) in Wuerttemberg-Baden (an equal proportion in other regions) expressed disapproval of the way in which denazification procedures were being carried out, as illustrated in results to this question:

"What is your opinion about the way denazification procedures were carried out - were they carried out the right way or not?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Right way	16%	16%	19%	17%	19%	23%
Not right way	68	56	66	65	62	59
No opinion	16	28	15	18	19	18
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

PROPER ROLE OF PRESS IN SUCH MATTERS ...

The denazification scandal raised an important question as to the proper role of the press in reporting such an incident. The American Land Commissioner General Gross defended the thesis that the German public should be kept completely informed upon developments. The Wuerttemberg-Baden Minister President Reinhold Maier maintained, on the contrary, that nothing should be reported in the press until the investigation was concluded. It is clear from the results below that a definite majority of Wuerttemberg-Baden city dwellers agree with the American point of view. This fact tends to indicate a strong interest in public dissemination of information among Wuerttemberg-Baden residents. A public apathetic about such matters could easily agree to the Minister President's view since, though it definitely abridges press activities, technically it cannot be conclusively demonstrated to constitute a violation of press freedom.

"Do you regard it as important that the public is constantly kept well informed about such occurrences, or should the press be permitted to report about things like that only after the judicial investigations have been concluded?"

Should constantly be well informed
Only after investigations concluded
No opinion

55% NS
41
4
100%

DID OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES UNJUSTIFIABLY INTERFERE? ...

In his public difference of opinion with the Wuerttemberg-Baden Land Commissioner, Minister President Maier contended that General Gross' utterances on the denazification incident constituted unjustifiable interference in German affairs. To assess extent of German agreement with this charge was the object of the query below:

"The Minister President of Wuerttemberg-Baden took the position that the American Land Commissioner General Gross exceeds his authority if he criticizes the attitude of the government on the denazification scandal. Do you think the Minister President's view is right or not?"

Right
Not right
No opinion

23%
57
20
100%

NS

Clearly the majority viewpoint (57%) is that Land Commissioner Gross was entirely within his rights in the comments he made on the conduct. Less than one out of four concur in the Minister President's charge.

In the two questions below Württemberg-Baden city-dwellers exhibit mixed reactions in their interpretations of Minister President Maier's motives and proper course of action in reference to the denazification scandal.

"Do you believe that the Minister President took this stand-point because he himself is involved in this scandal in some way, or does he only intend to defend the rights of the German Land government against the Americans?"

Involved himself	32%
To defend rights of government	44
No opinion	24
	<u>100%</u>

"Would it have been better in your opinion, if the Minister President Maier had resigned because of the criticisms directed against him or would that not have been right?"

Would have been better	36%
Would not have been right	44
No opinion	20
	<u>100%</u>

The larger proportion (44%) believed that, first Maier only intended to defend the rights of the German Land government in differing with Gross and second, that he was right in not resigning over the criticisms directed against him in connection with the whole incident. On the other hand not a very much smaller proportion (32% and 36% respectively) feel that he is involved in the scandal in some way, and should have resigned in view of the criticisms of his actions.

GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD AN ARMY AND
MILITARY TRAINING

Report No. 9
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17 March 1950
REACTIONS ANALYSIS BRANCH
INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE
HICOG
Bad Nauheim

APO 807
Germany

DEC 15 1950

Classification cancelled
by ~~Anthony P. Crespi~~
PUB/RAS.

SPK

INTRODUCTION ...

To amplify the findings of an urban "flash" survey* of December 9th, 1949, representative samples of 1500 in the AMZON, 250 in Berlin, and 150 in Bremen were queried in mid December, on their attitudes toward the establishment of a West German army. As an aid in interpreting the results similar samples were questioned in January 1950 on their general appraisal of military training for the young. As usual all interviews were conducted in the homes of respondents by trained German interviewers under the supervision of American Field Officers.

The attitudes toward West German rearmament reported in this study were gathered at a time when press and public interest in the remilitarization issue was at its height, following Chancellor Adenauer's expression of his views to a reporter from the Cleveland "Plain Dealer," on December 3, 1949.

* A 24-hour poll of urban German opinion embracing a sample of 300 respondents in U.S. Zone cities over 25,000, 100 respondents of western Berlin, and 100 respondents of Bremen.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Clearly evident from the present study is that a majority of the German people in the U.S. areas of occupation was opposed, as of the turn of the year, to the establishment of a West German army. Their reasons make it patent that most Germans, at this time, want no part of the sacrifices that a war would entail. What they do not make clear, however, is the extent to which it is safe to infer a diminution in the traditional German affinity for militarist values. Questioned about the value of military training for the young, 43 per cent in AMZON - a majority in Berlin - held it to be desirable. It is possible that this finding indicates that there is a considerable residue of militarist thinking among Germans in spite of the majority opposition to the establishment of a West German army at this time. On the other hand it must be remembered that somewhat similar views on military training are held by appreciable numbers in the United States and in the other western democracies. Hence further study is indicated before coming to any firm conclusion as to the precise extent of militarist feeling in western Germany today.

PREDOMINANT OPPOSITION TO ARMY ...

As foreshadowed in the urban flash survey results, a definite majority of the German residents of the U.S. Zone are opposed to the establishment of a West German army.

"Recently there have been frequent discussions on whether or not western Germany should establish an army. Are you for or against such an army?"

Urban Flash Results of December 9th, 1949

	U.S. Zone	Berlin	Bremen
For	25%	48%	31%
Against	71	50	67
No opinion	4	2	2
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Complete Results as of Mid-December 1949

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
For	32%	16%	22%	26%	48%	25%
Against	56	71	69	62	50	69
No opinion	12	13	9	12	2	6
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

With the inclusion of rural opinion in the regular sampling, opposition to an army drops somewhat - from 71% to 62% - but remains clearly the majority sentiment.

The regular survey bore out the preliminary high speed study in indicating that sentiment for or against a German army was fairly evenly divided in Berlin. In Bremen as in AMZON, strong majority sentiment is opposed to the establishment of an army.

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GROUP DIFFERENCES ...

The preponderant opposition to a West German army holds up in all the segments of the AMZON population. Opposition is most localized within the following groups: the better educated, the well-to-do, followers of SPD and LDP, the upper social-economic levels, and "native" Germans in contrast to refugees.

<u>German Army</u>			
<u>Education:</u>	For	Against	No opinion
Grammar School	26%	62%	12% ... 100%
Middle & High	26	65	9
University	14	78	8
<u>Monthly Family Income:</u>			
Under 149 DM	29%	52%	19%
150 - 299 DM	26	66	8
300 and over	21	73	6
<u>Party Preference:</u>			
SPD	25%	68%	7%
CDU/CSU	31	58	11
LDP/FDP/DVP	27	68	5
Bavarian Party	34	59	7
None	21	69	10
<u>Social Economic Level:</u>			
Upper Middle and Upper	23	75	2
Lower Middle	23	70	7
Upper Lower	27	63	10
Lower Lower	29	47	24
<u>Origin:</u>			
"Native" residents	25	65	10
Refugees	32	51	17

More of the men than of the women approve the idea of an army though they do not differ in extent of disapproval. Many more women have no opinion.

	For	Against	No opinion
Men	31%	64%	5% ... 100%
Women	22	61	17

Queried as to why they favored an army, the respondents gave the following pattern of replies:

"Why are you in favor of it?"	US Zone	Berlin	Bremen
<u>To train and educate young peoples:</u> Youth must learn discipline and orderliness in the army; youth is prevented from loafing; army is a good training and education for young people; etc.	7%	7%	5%
<u>Protection against Russia and Communism:</u> A big danger threatens us from the East; we must be able to defend ourselves if the Russians invade; to have an opposing power against the Russians and the Volkspolizei (East German Police); etc.	6	24	5
<u>For security; eventual defense:</u> We would be a helpless, defenseless people without an army; as security for the German people and the German frontiers; a state must have a protective force; etc.	6	9	8
<u>To decrease unemployment:</u> Would be very expedient as a solution of the unemployment problem; etc.	5	2	3
<u>To be on equal plane with other states:</u> Every country has an army; other states have armies too, and the western powers have promised us equal rights; we need military protection as all the other states; etc.	2	4	1
<u>To regain lost territories:</u> We might regain our home country then; we might return to the Sudetenland (Northern Bohemia); the Russians will be driven out of Eastern Germany; etc.	1	-	*
<u>To secure peace and order:</u> For reasons of internal security and discipline; there are not enough police; we must have a protective force when the Allies leave Germany; justice and orderliness must be backed by a strong force; etc.	2	3	-
<u>Miscellaneous:</u> As long as we had an army we were always much better off; the Germans will be much more esteemed when they have an army; would secure our independence; then occupation forces will no longer be necessary and the Americans will leave our territory at last; we want to be our own boss; everybody would stand up for his fatherland then; so we might defend ourselves without foreign aid in case of emergency; etc.	2	2	6
	31%	51%	28%

(Percentages add up to more than proportion favoring because some respondents gave more than one answer.)

* Less than one half of one per cent.

INDEPENDENT ARMY OR PART OF WESTERN POWERS ...

The minority approving of an army was also asked the question below, with the results appended. As will be noted, in all regions studied the group which favors an army for western Germany divides fairly evenly between the idea of an independent army and one integrated with the western powers.

"Should such an army be an independent German army, or should it be part of the forces of the western powers?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	AMZON	Berlin	Bremen
Independent	13%	5%	9%	10%	21%	9%
Western army	15	7	9	12	25	13
No opinion	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>
	32%	16%	22%	26%	48%	25%

REASONS FOR OPPOSING AN ARMY ...

The majority opposition to an army was supported by the reasons below. The dominant theme is obviously that the Germans, as of the present time, are quite unenthusiastic about war and the sacrifices that war exacts — which should not be surprising in view of the disastrous consequences of their most recent military enterprises.

"Why are you opposed?"

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	US Zone	Berlin	Bremen
<u>Dislike war and armies:</u>	27%	25%	31%
Fed up with it; army means war and war means hardships and distress; the experiences of the two lost world wars; military forces have never brought anything good to Germany; etc.			
<u>Army only brings war:</u>	18	13	23
Any rearmament leads to a war; there will be war again, if we have soldiers; manslaughter would begin again in this case; etc.			
<u>Fear for relatives:</u>	11	6	7
Loss of relatives in the last war; don't want to sacrifice sons and husbands; have lost too many men; because our child would be drafted too; men should stay at home; people should no longer be killed in combat; they die early enough at home; etc.			
<u>Don't want to be cannon fodder:</u>	3	2	1
We would have to pick the hot coals out of the fire; because we might fight only with the western powers and would be treated as partisans then; the other countries might use us as cannon fodder then; etc.			
<u>Nothing good comes out of it:</u>	5	5	8
Leads to ruin, destruction and economic misery and depression; costs too much money that might be used more profitably for our economy and would be too heavy a burden on Germany; it has no value any more for Germany nowadays; after two lost wars an eventual new war would bring ruin upon Germany; etc.			
<u>Might lead to a civil war:</u>			
Germans would have to fight against Germans; etc.	1	1	1
<u>Would mean loss of the sympathy of our neighbors:</u>	*	-	-
A German army would hinder friendship between France and Germany; etc.			
<u>A German army alone has no value:</u>	1	-	-
West Germany alone is too small to resist successfully; against big powers like Russia a few soldiers might not help much; etc.			
<u>The old wounds are not yet healed:</u>	1	2	2
Because that would bring us back to the same level from which we have just recovered; that would be a retrogression and relapse into misery; at first our prisoners of war should be released from captivity before thinking of that; etc.			
<u>Other remarks:</u>	4	4	3
Because the English and American armies are sufficient for peace; because they always reproach us because of our militarism; an acute nationalism might arise from that; because we have no fatherland and no independent state; etc.			
	71%	58%	76%
(Adds up to more than proportion opposing as some respondents gave more than one reason.)			
* Less than one half of one per cent.			

The reasons that were offered for the majority opposition to the present establishment of a West German army make it very evident that most Germans, at the present time, are opposed to war. But they do not make clear whether such opposition springs only from a present disinclination to undergo the additional sacrifices and discomforts that a war would entail, or derive from a more basic rejection of military traditions generally. Only in the latter case would it be safe to infer an important weakening in the traditional German affinity for militarism.

To shed more light on this situation the public was queried, in a January 1950 survey, on attitudes toward military training for the young - with results as follows:

"Do you feel that the influence of military training on young people is a desirable one or not?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	W-MZON	Berlin	Bremen
Desirable	52%	34%	31%	43%	52%	34%
Not desirable	41	56	56	48	41	56
Qualified	4	5	11	6	4	5
No opinion	<u>3</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>5</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

... Reasons given by people who favor military training demonstrate that, although the majority of Germans are at present quite unenthusiastic about an army and its concomitants, a large proportion of them can advance many arguments on behalf of military training. Their reasons are catalogued on the following page.

(If "Desirable") "In what way is the influence desirable?"

	US Zone	Berlin	Bremen
<u>Leads to order, discipline, sobriety and obedience:</u> They get accustomed to orderliness, discipline, sobriety and punctuality; they learn how to act rapidly and resolutely; etc.	17%	16%	21%
<u>Keeps young people off the streets and gives them something to do:</u> Youngsters are prevented from loafing, idleness, stealing and negligence; they would be kept off the streets and would be educated to mature virile personalities; youth would get a good training and older people would get a job; etc.	10	15	6
<u>Is generally very advantageous for young men:</u> Nowadays young people must be guided more than ever and there must be an authoritative leadership they can follow since this is lacked at home; they are made more fit intellectually and physically; they must be prepared for the struggle of life by a military training; etc.	9	9	6
<u>Is good education for young people:</u> It has positive values of education for young men; good educational influence; the bad conduct of to-day's youngsters proves how necessary a military education is for them; to favor military training and to favor war are two different things; etc.	8	7	7
<u>Will help us to defend ourselves if necessary:</u> We must have trained forces for defense; there should be a small army so that we are not entirely defenseless; without military training young people would not know how to overcome the dangers of a war and how to meet the requirements of modern warfare; because the Communists would suddenly fall upon us some day and we would have to surrender helplessly; it is a question of security for us; etc.	4	5	4
<u>Improves poise and bearing of young people:</u> It would improve poise and bearing of young men and teach them manners; etc.	2	2	1
<u>Builds character and self-confidence:</u> It builds the character of young men; they would become real characters and get some knowledge about the world; their self-confidence would be strengthened and their cooperativeness and general mentality would be developed favorably; etc.	1	2	1
	51%	56%	46%

(Adds to more than proportion who said "Desirable" as some respondents gave more than one answer.)

GROUPS DIFFERENCES ...

Support of military training of the young does not fall below a third for any of the sub-groups examined. It tends, however, to be less among the upper income, the better educated, and Protestants. No differences in attitudes show up between men and women or among various age groups. People who prefer the Bavarian Party and WAV are more inclined than adherents of other parties to consider military training desirable.

Military Training is:

	Desirable	Not Desirable	Qualified answers and no opinion
<u>By Monthly Income:</u>			
Under 149 DM	45%	42%	13% ... 100%
150 to 299,99 DM	43	50	7
300 and over	41	53	6
<u>By religious affiliation:</u>			
Protestant	40	51	9
Catholic	47	45	8
<u>By education:</u>			
Eight years or less	43	48	9
Nine to eleven years	45	47	8
Twelve years or more	39	54	7
<u>Party Preference:</u>			
SPD	43	50	7
CDU/CSU	44	47	9
LDP/DVP/FDP	41	51	8
Bavarian Party	61	34	5
WAV *	58	37	5
None	36	56	8

* Figures for WAV must be cautiously interpreted as they are based on a very small number of cases.

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GERMANS VIEW THE U.S. REORIENTATION PROGRAM

I. Extent of Receptivity to American Ideas.

Report No. 10
Series No. 2
30 March 1950

REACTIONS ANALYSIS BRANCH
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE
HICOG APO 807
Bad Nauheim Germany

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INTRODUCTION ...

In January 1950, the Reactions Analysis Branch, Office of Public Affairs, conducted a public opinion survey in the US Zone, Bremen, and in the three Western sectors of Berlin to assess German views on the American reorientation program. The present report - the first of a series of three - presents the results to background questions bearing upon the extent of German receptivity or resistance to American ideas. The succeeding report deals with German awareness and evaluations of American democratization efforts; and the final report presents German opinions on the cultural exchange program.

The sample used in these studies consists of 1,500 persons in the US Zone, 250 in Berlin, and 160 in Bremen, selected for representativeness by the standard random method employed by the Branch. Interviewing was conducted by a trained German staff under professional American supervision.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS ...

- ... The majority opinion in the US Zone - eight out of ten in Berlin - is that the Germans can learn "some good things" from the Americans. Conversely similar proportions believe that Americans can also learn from the Germans.
- ... Group comparisons in the US Zone show that it is the more educated and informed groups who more generally feel that Germans can profit from American teachings.
- ... When asked what they thought Germans might profitably learn from Americans, people focused most frequently upon character traits that would improve human relations - tolerance, trust, absence of envy and hatred, absence of war-mindedness and the like.
- ... In specifying what Americans could learn from Germans the stress is on the traditional German qualities of ability to work, discipline, orderliness and thoroughness.
- ... Questioned about specific fields, the largest proportion feel that Germans could profit from American teachings in the area of industry and technology.
- ... In the crucial area of politics, a majority in the US Zone - almost three quarters in Berlin - feel that in such matters they could profit from American teachings.
- ... Group comparisons reveal that greater political receptivity is to be found among the more educated and informed elements of the US Zone population. There is also the suggestion - about which more will be said in the report following - that German youth (16 to 19 years of age) tend to be less responsive than their elders to American political reorientation.

R E S T R I C T E D

- ... In the area of culture - music, literature, and art - less than one in five in the US Zone feel that the Germans have anything of value to learn from Americans.
- ... Significantly, the negative reactions to American cultural life tend to bulk largest not among the less educated and informed where natural prejudices might understandably have more sway, but among the more educated and informed groups.
- ... The negative reaction to American cultural values coupled with the positive reaction to American political ideas tend to suggest that acceptance of the former is not a necessary condition to acceptance of the latter - however much such receptivity to American culture might facilitate political reorientation.

DOES AMERICA HAVE SOMETHING TO TEACH? ...

Appraisal of the extent to which Germans exhibit a general receptivity to American ideas was the initial objective of the present survey. The returns to the questions that were posed indicate that the majority of Germans everywhere sampled believe that Germans can learn "some good things" from the Americans. Receptivity is greatest in Berlin where eight out of ten feel that Germans could profit from American teachings.

"In your opinion, are there some good things that we Germans might learn from the Americans - or is there only little to learn?"

The Germans can learn:

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Some things	56%	54%	63%	57%	80%	71%
Little	21	14	19	19	14	12
Undecided	<u>23</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>17</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Conversely, as indicated by a check question, respondents are not hesitant in indicating that Americans can learn from the Germans too. In fact, in the US Zone a slightly larger proportion (65% to 57%) express this opinion than hold that Germans have something to learn.

"In your opinion, are there some good things that the Americans might learn from us Germans - or is there only little to learn from us?"

The Americans can learn:

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Some things	65%	62%	66%	65%	79%	70%
Little	9	5	10	8	13	6
Undecided	<u>26</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>24</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

WELL EDUCATED MOST RECEPTIVE ...

In determining which groups in the German population possess the greatest probable responsiveness to American reorientation efforts, amount of education appears to figure most prominently. In the population breakdowns below it is the more educated and informed groups in each case which more generally feel that Germans have something to learn from America.

Germans can learn from the Americans ...

US ZONE GROUPS

	Much	Little	Undecided
<u>Education:</u>			
8 years or less	53%	20%	27% ... 100%
9 - 11	76	14	10
12 years or more	92	8	-
<u>Income (per month):</u>			
Under 100 DM	47%	19%	34%
100 - 200	53	19	28
200 - 300	59	22	19
300 or more	65	22	13
<u>Size of town:</u>			
Under 2,000 pop.	47%	21%	32%
2,000 - 25,000	61	18	21
25,000-250,000	65	20	15
250,000 and over	70	16	14
<u>Sex:</u>			
Men	53%	20%	14%
Women	51	18	31
<u>Age:</u>			
15 - 19 years	51	30	19
20 - 29	58	25	17
30 - 39	56	21	23
40 - 49	60	18	22
50 - 59	60	12	28
60 years and over	52	15	33

WHAT CAN GERMANS LEARN FROM AMERICANS? ...

When asked what they thought Germans might learn from the Americans, the largest single proportion of the respondents focus upon character traits that would improve human relations - tolerance, trust, absence of envy and hatred, absence of war-mindedness, and the like. Lessons in political affairs and in technical and scientific fields follow in frequency of mention.

"In your opinion, what might we learn from the Americans?"
(asked of those answering "Germans might learn some things" in preceding question).

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

<u>How to improve human and social relations; desirable character traits:</u> They are not so warlike; their positive and optimistic attitude towards life; there is less mutual envy and hatred than among the Germans; generosity; always willing to help; trust, whereas Germans always stand against one another; no inhibitions in talking to superior; tolerance; free thinking; etc.	21%	36%	30%
<u>Political affairs:</u> A real democracy; we should learn to be interested in politics as they are; higher respect for individual liberty; better cooperation and accord in politics; the model democracy; etc.	13	16	10
<u>Technical and scientific fields; industry and business; in agriculture:</u> Success in business; economic organization; we should think and act more freely in our economy like the "Amis"; in textile industry Americans have more practical clothing; modern architecture; technical science; medicine; etc.	23	18	18
<u>Practical things; manner of living; organization:</u> American work methods are worth imitating; good administration; less bureaucracy than in Germany; better standard of living; modern kitchens; etc.	7	14	9
<u>Religion and Education:</u> The Americans are practicing the Christian religion; they are actually realizing the Christian ideas; they are much better Christians and attend services in church; our school system is too old-fashioned; our methods are lagging far behind; a better general education of youth; etc.	2	3	2
<u>Other remarks:</u> The American soldier has much more freedom; one can always learn something; there are no officials getting exaggerated pensions; the English language; etc.	5	2	2
<u>No opinion:</u>	7	6	10
	66% *	100% *	81% *
*More than one answer was given by some of the respondents.			

...and in technical and scientific fields; industry and business; in agriculture: Success in business; economic organization; we should think and act more freely in our economy like the "Amis"; in textile industry Americans have more practical clothing; modern architecture; technical science; medicine; etc.

...Practical things; manner of living; organization: American work methods are worth imitating; good administration; less bureaucracy than in Germany; better standard of living; modern kitchens; etc.

...Religion and Education: The Americans are practicing the Christian religion; they are actually realizing the Christian ideas; they are much better Christians and attend services in church; our school system is too old-fashioned; our methods are lagging far behind; a better general education of youth; etc.

...Other remarks: The American soldier has much more freedom; one can always learn something; there are no officials getting exaggerated pensions; the English language; etc.

...No opinion:

...More than one answer was given by some of the respondents.

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WHAT CAN AMERICANS LEARN FROM GERMANS? ...

On the converse question of what Americans can learn from Germans, the traditional German qualities of ability to work, discipline, orderliness, and thoroughness receive most prominent mention. Only 1%, it should be noted, held that the Americans could learn about political affairs from the Germans.

"In your opinion, what might the Americans learn from us Germans?" (asked of those answering "Americans might learn something" in preceding question).

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

Practical things; manner of living; organization; discipline; orderliness; diligence: They can learn how to work; handicraft; our thoroughness; our administrative organization; the diligence of the German workers; a little intellectual profundity; The American thinks too little and acts too fast; etc.

24% 33% 21%

How to improve human and social relations; desirable character traits: They might learn to become a little more content; sincere; reliable; polite; tactful; modest; the general behavior is not so careless among Germans; etc.

12 13 9

Technical and scientific fields; in industry: They can learn very much from us in technical science; economic organization; some things from our industry; architecture; building houses and towns; medicine; etc.

10 21 12

Fine arts and education: The cultural ambitions and aspirations are far more developed in Germany; culture has deeper roots in Germany; they might learn very much from German music and German art; they should learn from our education system; especially in music; etc.

7 7 6

Family life; domestic life: The good family life of the Germans; women should become more domestic; learn to pay more attention to marriage and family life; etc.

5 6 10

Social achievements and welfare: Relief; improvements in social organizations; our social institutions, or social achievements; etc.

5 6 9

Political affairs: More political foresightedness; good administration in the state; etc.

11 1 1

Other remarks: All people can learn something from other people in any field; so the Americans can too; national feeling; conducting a war; etc.

5 2 3

No opinion:

8 5 11
77% * 94% * 81%

* More than one answer was given by some of the respondents.

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REASONS OF THE FEW WHO SAY LITTLE TO LEARN...

The reasons proffered by the minority which held that Germans have little to learn from Americans are listed below, followed by the reasons advanced by those who feel Americans have little to learn from the Germans. In both judgments, it may be seen, respondents principally argue in terms of relative cultural attainments.

Reasons given why Germans have little to learn from the Americans:

	US ZONE Berlin Bremen		
<u>The Germans are on a higher cultural level or at least at the same level as the Americans:</u> Because the Americans are all uneducated people; because the common American is like us and thinks as we think; because what America has to-day, Germany had first or it was invented by the Germans; most of our inventions have been bought by the Americans or have been stolen by them; etc.	10%	9%	6%
<u>American methods are not suitable for Germany:</u> we are a different type of people; Because we have different customs and usages; every people must go their own way; one can not transfer American methods to Germany; because the Americans take life easy; etc.	3	2	4
<u>American behavior has been poor up to now:</u> Because they are mean; they have disappointed me enough; the raids, (attacks on Germans) and their behavior don't make a good impression; etc.	4	2	1
<u>Other reasons:</u> Because the conditions here ought to be much better now since they have been here for a rather long time; etc.	1	1	1
<u>No opinion:</u>	$\frac{1}{19\%}$	$\frac{-}{14\%}$	$\frac{-}{12\%}$

Reasons given why Americans have little to learn from the Germans:

	US ZONE Berlin Bremen		
<u>The Americans are on a higher cultural level or at least at the same as ourselves:</u> They are as advanced as we are; because they are much better off and equipped in America; we are much behind in every respect; in politics we are a nullity and in technical science they are more advanced than we are; because we have reached a cultural low in Germany now; etc.	6%	7%	3%
<u>The Americans are entirely different from us:</u> Because the Americans have other customs and usages than we have; because the Americans have much more individual freedom; because the Americans don't want to learn anything from us - they are conceited; etc.	1	1	1
<u>The German may not be taken as a model:</u> From 1933 on we have only robbed and looted in foreign countries; the behavior of the Germans among one another is so bad; etc.	1	4	2
<u>No opinion:</u>	$\frac{-}{8\%}$	$\frac{1}{13\%}$	$\frac{-}{6\%}$

IN WHAT SPECIFIC FIELDS CAN GERMANS LEARN? ...

With general attitudes sketched in on possible American contributions to German reorientation, more detailed and specific inquiries were posed. From a list of nine fields of endeavor* each respondent was asked to indicate in which he felt that Germans could learn "much", "something," or "nothing" from the Americans. As before, for the purpose of comparison the converse question about Americans learning from Germans was also included.


As pictured in the following graph and in the complete table appended, a great deal of information emerges from this more specific analysis. A few of the more interesting facts may be listed:

1. When asked to consider specific fields more US Zone respondents on the average - 42% to 33% - held that Germans can learn "much" or "something" from Americans than vice versa. The opposite was found in the prior general questioning where the larger proportion - 65% to 57% - held that Americans could learn from the Germans. The suggestion is that the general judgments are influenced to a greater extent by considerations of German national pride, whereas the specific questions elicit more concrete evaluation. In which case, of course, the specific figures are to be taken as the more pertinent.
2. In all the areas investigated, it may be seen, the largest proportion of respondents feel that Germans may profit from American teaching in the area of industry and technology. This fact corroborates the conclusion of many observers that Germans are strongly impressed with America's technical and scientific progress. They are not so overwhelmed, however, but what large proportions feel (almost half in Berlin) that Americans can also learn from the Germans in this area.
3. Politics is of course a crucial area in American reorientation efforts. It is hence notable that a majority of Germans in the US Zone (52%) - 73% in Berlin and 61% in Bremen - feel that in such matters they have "much" or "something" to learn from Americans. Few evidence any inclination to suggest in this field, that Americans could profit from German teachings.
4. To glance now at the other end of the scale it can be seen that only a small minority of the respondents - less than one in five in the US Zone - feel that Germans can profit from American experiences in the field of fine arts - music, literature, and art. Recourse to the complete figures in the tabular summary reveals that fully half the respondents in the US Zone (50%) unequivocally contend that Germans can learn "nothing" from the Americans in the esthetic fields. And contrary to the case for any other field of endeavor listed, more Berliners (56%) rather than fewer affirm the same point of view. In Bremen almost six in ten feel America has nothing to offer Germany in the fine arts.


* as listed in the following order on a card handed to the respondent: Education; Science; Fine Arts - such as Music, Literature, and Painting; Agriculture; Industry and Technology; Social Welfare; Politics; Press; and finally Radio.

% Answering Germans can learn much or something from Americans in following fields...
 % Answering Americans can learn much or something from Germans in following fields... 00147


US ZONE



BERLIN



BREMEN



R E S T R I C T E D

IMPLICATIONS OF GERMAN REACTIONS TO AMERICAN CULTURAL LIFE ...

The importance of the German disinterest in American cultural life is underscored when breakdown comparisons are made upon US Zone population groups. Negative reactions tend to bulk largest not among the less educated and informed where natural prejudices might understandably have more sway, but among the more educated and informed. And it must be remembered in this connection, that the amount of rejection in sophisticated, cosmopolitan Berlin exceeded the US Zone average. (56% to 50%)

"In your opinion can the Germans learn much, something, or nothing from the Americans in the fine arts - such as music, literature, and painting?"

US ZONE GROUPS	Much	Something	Nothing	No opinion
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	4%	14%	47%	35% ... 100%
9 - 11	3	14	70	13
12 years or more	3	22	63	12
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
Under 100 DM	5%	13%	41%	41%
100 - 200	5	13	48	34
200 - 300	4	16	51	29
300 or more	3	16	58	23
<u>Size of town:</u>				
Under 2,000 pop.	5%	14%	42%	39%
2,000 - 25,000	3	16	50	31
25,000-250,000	3	12	60	25
250,000 and over	5	13	63	19
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	4%	15%	58%	23%
Women	4	13	43	40
<u>Age:</u>				
15 - 19 years	4%	18%	54%	24%
20 - 29	2	14	64	20
30 - 39	3	13	51	33
40 - 49	6	14	48	32
50 - 59	4	16	49	31
60 years and over	4	15	36	45

"In your opinion, can the Germans learn much, something or nothing from the Americans in the following fields?"

"In your opinion, can the Americans learn much, something or nothing from the Germans in the following fields?"

	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen		US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
<u>Industry and Technology:</u>							
much	29%	50%	52%		11%	24%	14%
something	29	25	23		29	25	18
nothing	20	15	12		36	42	47
no opinion	22	10	13		2	9	21
	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%
<u>Agriculture:</u>							
much	29%	39%	42%		5%	12%	6%
something	28	22	15		16	16	9
nothing	19	19	15		52	55	52
no opinion	24	20	28		27	17	33
	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%
<u>Politics:</u>							
much	28%	51%	49%		2%	7%	3%
something	24	22	12		8	9	3
nothing	15	9	10		49	70	58
no opinion	33	18	29		41	14	36
	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%
<u>Science:</u>							
much	12%	30%	25%		21%	32%	25%
something	34	36	29		31	35	20
nothing	28	23	29		19	19	25
no opinion	26	11	17		29	14	30
	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%
<u>Radio:</u>							
much	19%	41%	42%		3%	4%	4%
something	26	21	19		12	14	8
nothing	19	16	12		44	64	57
no opinion	36	22	27		41	18	31
	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%
<u>Press:</u>							
much	18%	44%	38%		2%	3%	3%
something	25	20	23		9	9	6
nothing	17	13	12		45	70	56
no opinion	40	23	27		44	18	35
	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%
<u>Education:</u>							
much	12%	30%	16%		12%	15%	13%
something	29	29	25		27	22	24
nothing	31	22	36		25	39	31
no opinion	28	19	23		36	24	32
	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%
<u>Social Welfare:</u>							
much	5%	16%	6%		35%	39%	47%
something	13	16	11		18	21	11
nothing	49	45	56		14	22	14
no opinion	33	23	27		33	18	28
	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%
<u>Fine Arts (Mus., Art, Lit.):</u>							
much	4%	10%	7%		38%	53%	45%
something	14	19	11		24	17	18
nothing	50	56	59		9	16	16
no opinion	32	15	23		29	14	21
	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%

It is important to consider the significance of these facts for the American reorientation program. According to an occasionally held view-point such a finding would have to be considered grave. This view holds that it is difficult, if not impossible, to persuade Germans to take over America's political institutions unless they are favorable conditioned by an appreciation of American cultural life, - music, art, letters and the like. German admiration for American technology is inadequate, it is felt, to carry along with it acceptance of democratic American political forms.

Some of the findings of the present study suggest the situation is not so serious as this. In Berlin, to illustrate, 75% of the people indicate a responsiveness to American learning in industry and technology, whereas only 29% do so in the fine arts. But fully 73% of the Berliners held that Germans can learn much or something from the Americans in politics - which is clearly in line with the high regard for American technology rather than with the low regard for American artistic development.

The above fact - which also obtains in similar form in US Zone and in Bremen - suggests that German appreciation of American arts and letters is not a necessary prerequisite for a readiness to learn democratic political forms. This is, of course, not in any sense to deny that esthetic appreciation might greatly facilitate political indoctrination. It is to be hoped that such reasoning is correct, for in view of the widespread lack of enthusiasm for American artistic life which this study has uncovered, it would augur ill for the success of democratic political reorientation if esthetic barriers had necessarily to be breached in the process.

GROUP DIFFERENCES IN POLITICAL RECEPTIVITY ...

With the many fields inquired about it is impractical to present group breakdowns for each case.* But since political reorientation is the keystone of the American educational program in Germany, it is important to consider among what segments of the population extent of political receptivity bulks the largest.

As foreshadowed in earlier findings on general receptivity to American teachings, it is the more educated and informed elements in the US Zone population who uniformly exhibit the greater potential responsiveness to American political reorientation. Judgments that Germans can learn much or something from the Americans in politics preponderate among the more schooled, the higher income groups, the urbanites, and men. The age group comparisons intimate something that will become clearer in the report following - that German youth (15 to 19 years of age) tend to be the least responsive of all the age groups to political reorientation by the Americans.

* Such breakdowns will be supplied to interested agencies upon request.

"In your opinion can the Germans learn much, something, or nothing from the Americans in the field of politics?"

US ZONE GROUPS	Much	Something	Nothing	No opinion
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	25%	23%	15%	37% ... 100%
9 - 11	42	30	12	16
12 years or more	51	33	7	9
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
Under 100 DM	19%	18%	15%	48%
100 - 200	25	23	14	38
200 - 300	30	26	16	28
300 or more	37	29	13	21
<u>Size of town:</u>				
Under 2,000 pop.	21%	21%	17%	41%
2,000 - 25,000	29	25	13	33
25,000-250,000	31	28	11	30
250,000 and over	40	27	15	18
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	37%	27%	17%	19%
Women	20	22	12	46
<u>Age:</u>				
15 - 19 years	22	25%	16%	37%
20 - 29	30	28	13	29
30 - 39	31	24	15	30
40 - 49	25	24	16	35
50 - 59	31	25	15	29
60 years and over	25	19	12	44

That the well informed are more receptive to American reorientation efforts can not only be demonstrated by population breakdowns, but through background informational questions. One such question in the present study asked the respondents to state in a few words what they understood by the term "democracy".* From the table below it can be seen that considerably more of those respondents who could offer an acceptable definition of democracy think that the Germans can learn much or something about politics from the Americans than do those who can offer no definition of the term.

Of those who can give an acceptable definition of democracy ...

Of those who can give no definition of democracy ...

39%	think the Germans can learn <u>much</u> about politics from the Americans	10%
29	think the Germans can learn <u>something</u> about politics	16
14	think the Germans can learn <u>nothing</u> about politics	14
<u>18</u> 100%	are undecided	<u>60</u> 100%

It is to be noted above that the effect of being uninformed in this particular case is not to increase the proportion who maintain that Germans have nothing to learn about politics from Americans, but only to occasion indecision as to whether or not something can be learned.

* A future report will include a detailed discussion of the results to this question.

Unclassified
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00153

GERMANS VIEW THE U.S. REORIENTATION PROGRAM

II. Reactions to American Democratization Efforts.

Report No. 11
Series No. 2
30 March 1950

REACTIONS ANALYSIS BRANCH
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE
HICOG APO 807
Bad Nauheim Germany

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INTRODUCTION ...

In January 1950, the Reactions Analysis Branch, Office of Public Affairs, surveyed a representative sample of the population in the US Zone, Bremen and the three Western sectors of Berlin on their views toward the American reorientation program. The present report - the second of a series of three - presents German reactions to American democratization efforts.

The sample employed in these studies comprises 1,500 persons in the US Zone, 250 in Berlin, and 160 in Bremen, selected for representativeness by the standard random method employed by the Branch. Interviewing was conducted by a trained German staff under professional American supervision.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS ...

- ... Awareness of a specific American program to democratize the German people is limited to a third of US Zone residents. In Berlin half the population express awareness of such a program.
- ... As is to be expected, familiarity is greater among the more educated groups in the US Zone population - the better schooled, the higher income levels, the city-dwellers, and men. German youth (from 15 - 19 years of age) appear to be the group least aware of American democratization efforts.
- ... Six out of ten US Zone Germans - three out of four in Berlin - welcome American efforts to familiarize the Germans with democratic ideas.
- ... Considerably more of the better educated, the higher income groups, the city-dwellers, and men favor American efforts to bring democracy to the Germans than do their counterpart groups.
- ... Significantly, German youth (ages 15 - 19) - a crucial target of the reorientation program - least welcome American democratization efforts.
- ... Almost half the US Zone residents and three quarters of the Berliners believe that favorable effects will result from American efforts to familiarize the Germans with democratic ideas.
- ... Of all the groups examined in the US Zone, German youth (from 15 to 19) manifest the smallest proportion (30%) who believe that the democratization program will have favorable effects.
- ... Though the best educated in the US Zone most welcome American democratization efforts, a sizeable proportion of them (40%) are not optimistic about their having much effect on the Germans.

- ... "Because America has so much to teach about the democratic way of life," is the most frequent argument advanced by those who feel democratization efforts will be effective.
- ... Those who feel democratization efforts are not likely to have much effect most frequently argue that the Germans do not want to accept any advice.
- ... Less than one out of five in the US Zone, Bremen, and Berlin support the occasionally heard charge that the American occupation authorities do not themselves follow democratic principles.
- ... Pro and con opinions both rise among the more educated groups in the US Zone, but in all groups the proportion which believes that American occupation officials follow democratic principles heavily outweighs the negative.
- ... Also, less than one out of five in the US Zone and Berlin - a few more in Bremen - supports the charge that Americans are trying not so much to democratize the Germans as "Americanize" them.
- ... The more informed elements of the population - the better educated, the higher income groups, the city-dwellers, and men - all tend in larger proportions to judge American reorientation aims as democratization rather than Americanization.

EXTENT OF AWARENESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION PROGRAM ...

Awareness of a specific American program to democratize the German people is not widespread in the US Zone. The majority (59%) say that they do not know of such a program. Only in the Western sectors of Berlin does extent of awareness rise to as much as half the population (50%).

"Do you know if the American authorities have a certain program which tries to bring the Germans closer to democratic ideas?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Yes, have program	33%	38%	30%	34%	50%	37%
No, do not	7	10	5	7	9	8
Don't know	<u>60</u> 100%	<u>52</u> 100%	<u>65</u> 100%	<u>59</u> 100%	<u>41</u> 100%	<u>55</u> 100%

Awareness is most concentrated among the typically most informed elements in the population - the better educated, the higher income groups, the city-dwellers, and the men. The finding also emerges that a prime target of American reorientation efforts - German youth - are, of all the population groups examined, the least aware of the existence of an American democratization program. This may mean no more than that most are not aware of the democratizing aim of American instigated activities with which they may be associated. But on the other hand it could indicate that reorientation efforts among a crucial group in the German population have as yet elicited limited response.

"Do you know if the American authorities have a certain program which tries to bring the Germans closer to democratic ideas?"

US ZONE GROUPS	Yes	No	Don't know
<u>Education:</u>			
8 years or less	30%	7%	63% ... 100%
9 - 11	52	11	37
12 years or more	66	-	34
<u>Income (per month):</u>			
Under 100 DM	25%	7%	68%
100 - 200	30	8	62
200 - 300	37	4	59
300 or more	42	8	50
<u>Size of town:</u>			
Under 2,000 pop.	26%	8%	66%
2,000 - 25,000	37	7	56
25,000-250,000	43	5	52
250,000 and over	40	8	52
<u>Sex:</u>			
Men	45%	7%	48%
Women	24	7	69
<u>Age:</u>			
15 - 19 years	23%	11%	66%
20 - 29	37	9	54
30 - 39	37	6	57
40 - 49	30	7	63
50 - 59	38	7	55
60 years and over	31	7	62

R E S T R I C T E D

THROUGH WHAT MEANS ARE AMERICANS DEMOCRATIZING? ...

Almost everyone who was aware of the fact that the Americans are trying to bring Germans closer to democratic ideas, could suggest one or more of the means through which the effort was being made. The largest proportion emphasized the American use of the major informational media - press, magazines, and radio.

"By what means do the Americans try to bring the Germans closer to democratic ideas?" (Asked of those answering "Yes" to previous question).

	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
<u>By press, radio and magazines:</u>	15%	20%	16%
<u>By their economic and financial aid:</u> <u>Marshall-Plan:</u> They support us in every way even though we were enemies; etc.	8	14	10
<u>By forums, lectures and public discussions:</u> <u>lectures by Americans:</u>	6	8	4
<u>By granting basic rights to Germany; by kindness; good example and understanding:</u> By freedom of the press; freedom of opinion and religious freedom; by the example of their own government which should be a model for us; in a sociable way - through friends and organizations; etc.	4	12	5
<u>By the "Voice of America":</u>	4	8	3
<u>By the establishment of the "America-Houses":</u>	4	2	5
<u>By the youth education program and GYL:</u> By the information center meetings in youth clubs; schooling youth organizations of the military government; etc.	3	6	6
<u>By the student exchange program:</u> One sends students and other people to America to get acquainted with the institutions there; etc.	1	3	2
<u>Others:</u> They dominate us; denazification; politics; propaganda; etc.	2	1	6
<u>No opinion:</u>	$\frac{4}{51\%}$ *	$\frac{2}{76\%}$ *	$\frac{4}{61\%}$ *

* More than one answer was given by some respondents.

MAJORITY WELCOME AMERICAN DEMOCRATIZATION EFFORTS ...

Six out of ten US Zone Germans (59%) - three quarters of the Berliners (74%) - welcome American efforts to familiarize the Germans with democratic ideas. Only three out of ten in the zone hold that such efforts should be left up to the Germans themselves.

"Do you welcome the Americans trying to familiarize the Germans with democratic ideas, or should that be left up to us Germans ourselves?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Welcome	57%	54%	61%	59%	74%	52%
Leave to Germans	30	31	28	30	23	38
No opinion	13	15	11	11	3	10
	100	100%	100	100	100	100%

Considerably more of the better educated, the higher income groups, the city-dwellers, and men favor American efforts to bring democracy to the Germans than do their counterpart groups. The findings for youth under 20 is again worthy of special attention. It was just previously found that this group was least aware of American efforts to democratize Germans. Now it is found additionally that they are also least sympathetic. A preponderance of them (47%), contrary to the case for any other population group examined, feel that any democratization efforts should not come from the Americans. So the fact becomes more certain that this crucial group poses a special problem for the American reorientation program.

"Do you welcome the Americans trying to familiarize the Germans with democratic ideas, or should that be left up to us Germans ourselves?"

US ZONE GROUPS	Welcome	Leave to Germans	No opinion
<u>Education:</u>			
8 years or less	54%	31%	15% ... 100%
9 - 11	69	29	2
12 years or more	76	21	3
<u>Income (per month):</u>			
Under 100 DM	48%	28%	24%
100 - 200	57	28	15
200 - 300	57	33	10
300 or more	62	32	6
<u>Size of town:</u>			
Under 2,000 pop.	51%	29%	20%
2,000 - 25,000	54	33	13
25,000-250,000	65	30	5
250,000 and over	73	24	3
<u>Sex:</u>			
Men	63	32%	5%
Women	52	28	20
<u>Age:</u>			
15 - 19 years	38%	47%	15%
20 - 29	55	36	9
30 - 39	58	30	12
40 - 49	55	31	14
50 - 59	64	22	14
60 years and over	59	22	19

* Respondents who were unaware of the program were told that such existed so all could be asked this and the following questions.

PREDOMINANT OPINION DEMOCRATIZATION EFFORTS WILL HAVE FAVORABLE EFFECT ...

Almost half the US Zone residents (45%) and three quarters of the Berliners (74%) believe that favorable effects will result from American efforts to familiarize the Germans with democratic ideas. Less than one in five everywhere sampled anticipate "not much effect", and only a negligible proportion hold that the effect would be definitely unfavorable.

"Do you believe that American efforts to familiarize the Germans with democratic ideas will have favorable effect on the German way of life - or won't this have much effect?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Favorable effect	44%	44%	49%	45%	74%	53%
Not much effect	17	15	15	16	14	19
Unfavorable effect *	2	1	2	2	-	3
No effect *	4	5	4	4	2	6
No opinion	33	35	30	33	10	19
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

* Responses were not included as alternatives in the question, but were volunteered by respondents.

Study of the group comparisons in the US Zone reveals first, that the smallest proportion of any group who believe that the democratization program will have a favorable effect are the youths under 20. This is in line with the prior findings on this group. A second interesting disclosure relates to the responses of the most educated group - those with 12 years or more of schooling. It is this group, it may be remembered, who most welcomed the American program - 76% did so. It is now evident from the figures below that it is also this group who have the largest proportion who feel that the program will have little or no effect. This combination of facts makes it apparent that though most of the best educated are responsive to American democratization efforts, a sizeable proportion of them (40%) are not at all optimistic about it having much effect on the Germans.

US ZONE GROUPS

Program will have favorable effect Program will have little or no effect No opinion

Education:

8 years or less	44%	20%	36% ...100%
9 - 11	52	29	19
12 years or more	45	40	15

Income (per month):

Under 100 DM	39%	21%	40%
100 - 200	46	18	36
200 - 300	45	27	28
300 or more	49	24	27

Size of town:

Under 2,000 pop.	42%	19%	39%
2,000 - 25,000	44	23	33
25,000-250,000	52	24	24
250,000 and over	52	26	22

Sex:

Men	54%	26%	20%
Women	38	19	43

Age:

15 - 19 years	30%	23%	47%
20 - 29	42	29	29
30 - 39	45	24	31
40 - 49	47	23	30
50 - 59	49	18	33
60 years and over	49	15	36

Asked why they think American democratization efforts will have a favorable effect on Germany, the largest proportion say because Americans have much to teach Germans about the democratic way of life. Some emphasize an improvement in economic conditions upon the introduction of the democratic way of life, and others stress American help in overcoming the totalitarian, national-socialistic tendencies in Germany.

Reasons given for thinking American reorientation program will have favorable effect on German life:

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

Since Americans have had long experience in democracy, we can learn a lot from them: Most Germans like democratic way of life; because everything that came from the Americans so far has been favorable for us; America has much more experience in democratic politics; etc.

12% 25% 24%

An improvement of economic conditions and the entire standard of life will be achieved by a democratic way of life: It is known that there is much more progress under a democratic regime, whereas the contrary was true here; etc.

9 12 4

The Americans help us to overcome totalitarian, national-socialistic and militaristic ideas: We can more easily overcome our past; gives the Germans depressed by defeat a new stability; etc.

4 7 5

This way we will learn what freedom in a democracy means: We will live more freely and be more conscious that we are human beings; a democracy creates a freer way of life than is possible in an authoritarian state; etc.

4 2 2

Through this influence we will learn to understand and respect other people again: Relations with foreign countries will be taken up again; all the German people will learn that other people must be appreciated too; etc.

2 5 2

The German people will regain their integrity: Understanding with one another and accord among the German people will improve; because we are so torn apart, we need this for recovery; the mutual hatred between the Germans will be extinguished; etc.

3 3 1

This will prevent expansion of Communism and Russian aggression: Because we must have protection against the Russians; as a result the Russian policy will fail in Germany; etc.

2 4 1

Because the German youth will be educated in a democratic way by this influence; etc.

2 - 1

Other reasons: Because the influence of the Americans is still very great; if Germany would turn against America, she would stop her economic aid; because that is in the reciprocal interest of Germany and America; etc.

6 16 13

No opinion:

$\frac{3}{47\%}$ * $\frac{5}{79\%}$ * $\frac{1}{54\%}$

* More than one answer was given by some respondents.

RESTRICTED

Of the minority who do not expect to see much effect in Germany as a result of the democratization program, most say that the Germans do not want to accept any advice, or that they have developed their own conceptions of government. A few point to asserted bad behavior of Americans as a reason for the Germans not taking their educational efforts seriously.

Reasons given for thinking American reorientation program will have little effect on German life:

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

<u>The Germans do not want to accept any advice; The Germans like to go their own ways; the Germans are too proud; the German does what he wants to anyway; etc.</u>	7%	6%	5%
<u>Our people developed other conceptions, based on the structure of the German people; Our views are quite different from American views; every country has a different opinion about democracy and in Germany there are different conditions; at best it could only be an imitation, but it can't go deeper; etc.</u>	4	4	9
<u>The Americans forfeited all sympathy by their behavior; Many Americans behave badly; America has a dictatorship in Germany and does not govern in accordance with democratic principles; America signed the Potsdam agreement and as a result the Germans were expelled from the Eastern territories; many Germans don't take the Americans and their democracy too seriously because of the dismantling; etc.</u>	3	*	1
<u>The bad economic situation in Germany hinders democratizing; The first condition for democratic thinking is economic security; etc.</u>	1	-	1
<u>Other reasons: We have no peace yet; our government has not enough capable persons; national-socialistic thinking hinders our democratization; etc.</u>	1	3	2
<u>No opinion:</u>	$\frac{*}{16\%}$	$\frac{1}{14\%}$	$\frac{1}{19\%}$

* Less than one half of one %

ARE OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES THEMSELVES DEMOCRATIC? ...

Democratization efforts on the part of the American occupation have been occasionally attacked with the charge that occupation authorities do not themselves follow democratic principles, so how can Germans be expected to, so long as their mentors fail to practice what they preach. To see if there is any widespread acceptance of such a point of view the following question was asked with the result tabulated.

"In your opinion, do the American occupation authorities
on the whole follow democratic principles or not?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Yes	55%	57%	53%	55%	77%	62%
No	16	16	17	16	14	15
No opinion	29	27	30	29	9	23
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

It is evident that a definite majority in the US Zone (55%) - over three quarters in Berlin (77%) - hold that the American occupation authorities do follow democratic principles. Less than one out of five anywhere hold that they do not - with the remainder having no opinion in the matter.

The most interesting fact in the population breakdowns below is that pro and con opinions both rise in the more informed groups - especially among individuals with 12 or more years of schooling. However, in all groups, the proportion who believe that American occupation officials follow democratic principles outweighs the negative more than two to one.

"In your opinion, do the American occupation authorities
on the whole follow democratic principles or not?"

US ZONE GROUPS	Yes	No	No opinion
<u>Education:</u>			
8 years or less	55%	14%	31% ... 100%
9 - 11	55	25	20
12 years or more	61	28	11
<u>Income (per month):</u>			
Under 100 DM	50%	10%	40%
100 - 200	56	13	31
200 - 300	57	19	24
300 or more	56	24	20
<u>Size of town:</u>			
Under 2,000 pop.	52%	12%	36%
2,000 - 25,000	52	19	29
25,000-250,000	62	20	18
250,000 and over	63	21	16
<u>Sex:</u>			
Men	62%	20%	18%
Women	49	13	38
<u>Age:</u>			
15 - 19 years	48%	14%	38%
20 - 29	55	18	27
30 - 39	53	22	25
40 - 49	54	16	30
50 - 59	62	13	25
60 years and over	54	12	34

Most of the small minority who think that the American occupation authorities are not following democratic principles, expect little or no effect from the American reorientation program:

Of those who think American occupation authorities <u>do</u> follow democratic principles ...	Of those who think American occupation authorities <u>do not</u> follow democratic principles ...
61% think American program will have favorable effect on German life	31%
17 think program will have little or no effect on German life	53
22 are undecided	16
100%	100%

The largest proportion of the minority who criticizes occupation authorities as being undemocratic, charge that they have too much control over German politics.

Reasons given by those who feel occupation authorities do not follow democratic principles:

	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
<u>The American occupation authorities exercise too much control over German politics: I think that they determine our legislation, and that is neither democratic nor a good method of democratic education; if there are tendencies or developments in Western Germany that don't suit the political and economic interests of the USA, American occupation authorities are too easily inclined to neglect democratic principles; they punish people who would not be sentenced under really democratic laws; etc.</u>	6%	8%	6%
<u>Occupation forces behave badly: They are behaving like conquerors and don't observe democratic principles very much; too many among the Americans just want to have a good time here; the many brawls should not happen under democratic leadership; they have no real democracy themselves; they have not treated the Negro problem in a democratic way; etc.</u>	4	1	2
<u>Undemocratic attitudes in foreign policy: (Saar problem, Ruhr statute, expulsion of the refugees; etc.</u>	1	2	1
<u>They have dismantled our factories and agreed to the dismantling policy: It's not democratic to dismantle our factories and cause so much unemployment; etc.</u>	1	2	1
<u>The denazification methods are contrary to democratic practice: No one can be condemned for his political opinion; etc.</u>	1	-	2
<u>They have confiscated so many houses in spite of the general housing shortage; etc.</u>	1	-	-
<u>Other remarks: They represent militaristic ideas; too high occupation costs; because they don't do anything to make the food prices go down; they charge the Nazis with everything that is disagreeable; because they would abandon us, when the Russians would come; occupation authorities always have to give orders; etc.</u>	3	2	2
<u>No opinion:</u>	1 18% *	- 15% *	1 15% *

* More than one answer was given by some respondents.

R E S T R I C T E D

DEMOCRATIZING OR AMERICANIZING? ...

It is occasionally charged that in their reorientation efforts the Americans are trying not so much to democratize the Germans as to "americanize" them, i.e. to make them over in their own images down to gum-chewing and jazz. The results to the question below clearly demonstrate that such a charge has little currency among the German people. Six out of ten in the US Zone (59%) and eight out of ten in Berlin (79%) hold that the Americans are endeavoring to democratize the Germans, not americanize them.

"Do you think that through this program the Americans want to familiarize us Germans with democratic ideas, or do they want to americanize us?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Democratize	60%	59%	57%	59%	79%	62%
Americanize	11	8	11	10	8	13
Half and half	6	14	11	9	7	11
No opinion	23	19	21	22	6	14
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

In none of the population comparisons below does appreciably more than one out of ten maintain that the object of the reorientation program is to americanize the Germans. The same limited proportions obtain for the view that American efforts are half to democratize and half to americanize. The more informed elements of the population - the better educated, the higher income groups, the city-dwellers, and men - all tend in larger proportions to judge American reorientation aims as democratization rather than americanization. And finally, whatever may be the reasons for the lesser responsiveness to the American program evidenced in this study by youth under 20, it is clearly shown here it does not derive from any widespread feeling that the Americans are trying to make Germans over in their own image.

"Do you think that through this program the Americans want to familiarize us Germans with democratic ideas, or do they want to americanize us?"

US ZONE GROUPS	Democratize	Americanize	Half and half	No opinion
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	57%	10%	9%	24% ... 100%
9 - 11	69	11	13	7
12 years or more	76	9	10	5
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
Under 100 DM	44%	11%	10%	35%
100 - 200	56	10	9	25
200 - 300	62	10	10	18
300 or more	70	12	8	10
<u>Size of town:</u>				
Under 2,000 pop.	53%	9%	10%	28%
2,000 - 25,000	55	11	12	22
25,000-250,000	71	10	6	13
250,000 and over	73	12	6	9
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	66%	12%	10%	12%
Women	53	9	9	29
<u>Age:</u>				
15 - 19 years	55%	12%	5%	28%
20 - 29	59	12	11	18
30 - 39	57	12	11	20
40 - 49	60	8	9	23
50 - 59	61	8	12	19
60 years and over	59	10	6	26

R E S T R I C T E D

It is not without interest to finally point out here that people who think the occupation authorities are trying to "americanize" the Germans do not necessarily consider this undesirable. In an August 1949 survey the following two questions were asked with the results indicated:

"Many people maintain that the Americans are trying to "americanize" the Germans. Are you also of this opinion, or not?"

	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Yes	10%	8%	8%
Half and half	6	1	6
No	71	87	80
No opinion	13	4	6
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

"Do you consider this as a good or a bad influence?"
(Asked of those answering "Yes" or "Half and half" above).

	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Good	6%	7%	2%
Bad	4	1	3
Half and half	5	1	9
No opinion	1	-	-
	<u>16%</u>	<u>9%</u>	<u>14%</u>

Unclassified

00166

GERMANS VIEW THE U.S. REORIENTATION PROGRAM

III. Opinions on the Cultural Exchange Program

Report No. 12
Series No. 2
30 March 1950

RELATIONS ANALYSIS BRANCH
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INTRODUCTION ...

In January 1950, the Reactions Analysis Branch, Office of Public Affairs, conducted a public opinion survey in the US Zone, Bremen, and the three Western sectors of Berlin to assess German views on the American reorientation program. The present report - the third and last of a series - describes the findings on German awareness and opinions on the cultural exchange program.

The sample utilized in these studies comprises 1,500 persons in the US Zone, 250 in Berlin, and 160 in Bremen, selected for representativeness by the standard random method employed by the Branch. Interviewing was conducted by a trained German staff under professional American supervision.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS ...

- ... Four people out of ten in the American Zone have heard about a German-American exchange program, but large majorities of the better educated are informed about the program. Proportionately more Berliners are aware of the exchange program than are US Zone residents.
- ... A large majority of those who have heard of the program can correctly identify one or more of its aspects. More than half mention student exchange, while smaller numbers refer to exchange of experts and professors or to interchange of ideas in general.
- ... Half of the US Zone respondents who have heard of the program know that it is financed by the United States. Others either have no opinion or believe it is financed by the U.S. and Germany jointly, by Germany alone, or by the individuals concerned.
- ... Almost eight out of ten people in the US Zone (more than nine out of ten in Berlin) believe not only the individual, but Germany as a whole benefits by the experiences of students and experts sent to the United States under an exchange program. Only 6% feel that the benefit accrues merely to the individuals chosen.
- ... A majority in the US Zone (three-fourths in Berlin) reject the view that Germans who have returned from sponsored trips to the United States are unduly subject to American influence, while one person out of ten feels that this is the case.

AWARENESS OF EXCHANGE PROGRAM ...

Four people out of ten in the American Zone as a whole say they have heard of a German-American exchange program. This proportion rises to a majority in Land Hesse. Awareness is still greater in West Berlin where six people in ten claim to have heard of such a program.

"Have you ever heard anything about a German-American exchange program?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US Zone	Berlin	Bremen
Yes	35%	51%	42%	40%	59%	45%
No	65	49	58	60	41	55
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Extent of awareness of the exchange program varies sharply among the various population groups in the American Zone. Whereas only one third (34%) of those with elementary schooling have heard anything about such a program, two thirds of those with secondary schooling (69%) and almost nine tenths of university trained persons (89%) have heard of the program. The other typically more educated groups - the higher income levels, the urbanites, and men - show substantially more awareness than their counterpart groups. Of all the US Zone groups examined German youth under 20 manifest the least awareness of a German-American exchange program.

US ZONE GROUPS	Yes	No
<u>Education:</u>		
8 years or less	34%	66% ... 100%
9 - 11	69	31
12 years or more	89	11
<u>Income (per month):</u>		
Under 100 DM	27%	73%
100 - 200	33	67
200 - 300	44	56
300 or more	57	43
<u>Size of town:</u>		
Under 2,000 pop.	30%	70%
2,000 - 25,000	38	62
25,000-250,000	54	46
250,000 and over	62	38
<u>Sex:</u>		
Men	50%	50%
Women	32	68
<u>Age:</u>		
15 - 19 years	24%	76%
20 - 29	43	57
30 - 39	47	53
40 - 49	44	56
50 - 59	41	59
60 years and over	29	71

INFORMATION ABOUT PROGRAM ...

Those who claim to have heard of the exchange program were asked what they know about it. More than eight out of ten in the US Zone (nine out of ten in Berlin) give answers indicating some measure of correct information about the program. Six out of ten (three-fourths in Berlin) mention student exchange as an aspect of the program. Exchange of experts and technicians receive next most frequent mention in the US Zone, with particular emphasis in Hesse. Exchange of professors, scholars and scientists takes second place in Berlin. Smaller numbers of people mention interchange of experiences and ideas in general ("It is an exchange of ideas in all fields." "Our people are given an opportunity to acquaint themselves with American conditions at first hand.") Many people, of course, mention more than one aspect of the program.

"What do you know about the exchange program?"
(Asked of those who said they knew of the program).

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US Zone	Berlin	Bremen
Students' Exchange	59%	63%	65%	62%	75%	63%
Experts' Exchange	32	45	27	35	20	24
Professors' Exchange	21	14	11	16	24	22
Ideas and Experiences Exchange	15	13	16	15	12	17
Incorrect answers (Made agreements, refugee settlements, etc.)	4	4	5	4	3	6
No opinion	12	5	8	9	6	5
	143%*	144%*	132%*	141%*	140%*	137%*

* Totals add to more than 100% since many people mention more than one aspect of the program.

WHO FINANCES PROGRAM? ...

More than half of those who have heard of the program know also that it is financed by the U.S. Others think the cost is divided between the United States and Germany, or that the entire cost is borne by Germany, or that each individual pays his own expenses. The rest simply admit that they do not know.

"Who, in your opinion, bears the cost of this exchange program, America or Germany - or does each individual pay his own expenses?"

	US Zone	Berlin	Bremen
The U.S.	51%	56%	54%
The U.S. and Germany	16	18	17
Germany	6	7	4
Individual	10	8	12
No opinion	17	11	13
	100%	100%	100%

REACTIONS TO EXCHANGE PROGRAM ...

Those who have not heard of the program were told: "You will be interested to learn that there is an exchange program under which German students and experts can visit America, and American experts Germany." Then all respondents were asked two questions designed to measure reactions to the program.

Almost eight out of ten people in the US Zone (more than nine out of ten in Berlin) think Germany would benefit by the experiences of experts and students sent to the United States under the exchange program. Only 6% in the US Zone and Berlin (10% in Bremen) feel these experiences would benefit merely the individuals selected. A few qualify their answers, saying it "depends on the person" etc.

"Do you believe that the majority of the German experts and students who go to America acquire experiences that are of use only to themselves, or do you believe that the experiences acquired in America can be of general value to Germany?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US Zone	Berlin	Bremen
Use to Germany	78%	78%	78%	78%	92%	78%
Use to individual only	7	4	6	6	6	10
Qualified answer	3	5	5	4	2	5
No opinion	<u>12</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>7</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Respondents were also asked whether they agreed with the allegation that many of the Germans who had visited the United States through the exchange program were under undue American influence. It was recognized that only a small proportion of the population would have had sufficient contact with returned experts or students to make an informed judgement on this issue. The question was designed instead to measure the extent of suspicion or mistrust which Germans returning from sponsored trips to the United States might encounter, and was framed in such a way as to make expression of such mistrust easy. Under the circumstances, it is noteworthy that a majority in the US Zone rejects this view, a third withholds judgement and only one out of ten agrees with the allegation. Berliners are more likely than are US Zone residents to have opinions on the matter. A much larger proportion (three-fourths) rejects the statement, while the difference in the proportion agreeing is not significant. In Bremen, however, almost two out of ten suspect American influence is too great on the returning experts and students.

"It is sometimes asserted that many of the Germans who have been in America under the exchange program are too much under American influence. Are you also of this opinion or not?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US Zone	Berlin	Bremen
Yes	11%	8	11%	10%	12%	19%
No	54	59	52	55	74	57
No opinion	<u>35</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>24</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Those who had previously heard about the program are more inclined to believe Germany will benefit by the experiences of returning experts, and that these persons are not under undue American influence. Those who have not heard of the program are more inclined to withhold judgement on both questions.

Heard of Program - Not heard of Program

Experts' Experiences

Benefit:

Individual	54	74
Germany	88	71
Qualified answer	5	3
No opinion	2	19
	100%	100%

Experts' under undue American

Influence:

Yes	11	10
No	68	46
No opinion	21	44
	100	100%

In another question in this survey people were asked if they thought American efforts to familiarize the Germans with democratic ideas would have a favorable effect on the German way of living, or not have much influence. As seen in the table below, most of the people who expect the reorientation program to have little or no effect on "democratizing" the Germans, do, however, think that Germany as a whole will profit from the exchange program. Evidently, these people are thinking of non-political benefits for Germany.

Experiences Benefit

Individual Germany Qualified No opinio
Answer

American efforts to
familiarize Germany with
democratic ideas will have...

favorable effect	54	87	4	4 ...100
not much influence	11	79	5	5
bad or no influence	11	70	8	11

C O N F I D E N T I A L

00172

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE
H-BOMB IN THE EAST-WEST STRUGGLE

A Survey of German Reactions.

Downgraded to
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
by authority of ~~Department of Defense~~
Chief, Research Staff

**Classification changed to
Restricted
by authority of Leo P. Crespi
PUB/RAS.**

Report No 13
Series No 2
1 April 1950

REACTIONS ANALYSIS UNIT
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE
HICOG APO 807
Bad Nauheim Germany

C O N F I D E N T I A L

INTRODUCTION ...

Immediately following President Truman's announcement that the United States was to embark on work on the hydrogen bomb, the Reactions Analysis Unit of the Office of Public Affairs, HICOG, queried an urban sample in a "flash" survey, on reactions to the announcement. Subsequently in the last weeks in February 1950, a regular, randomly selected sample consisting of 1,500 cases in the US Zone, 250 in eastern Berlin, and 160 in Bremen, was queried on the same matter, the results of which are reported here.

As in all regular surveys by the Reactions Analysis Unit, interviewing was done in the homes of respondents by a trained German interviewing staff, supervised by the American field staff. The questionnaire was prepared and the data analyzed by the staff in the headquarters office of the unit.

THE CLIMATE OF OPINION ...

At the time of the hydrogen bomb announcement, the climate of opinion regarding the current phase of the cold war tended to be more pessimistic or doubtful than otherwise. This is seen in replies to two general questions: The first, on the relative strength recently shown by the U.S. and the USSR in the East-West struggle, and the second, on the possibility of the outbreak of world war within ten years.

As to the first, half (49%) the US Zone public is of the impression that during the preceding months the U.S. has won the laurels in the East-West struggle. Seven in ten West Berliners hold this opinion, as do 56% in Bremen. But a fourth in the zone and large fractions in Berlin and Bremen feel Russia emerged as the stronger in the last months.

"In the East-West struggle, which side do you think proved itself to be stronger in the last few months - Russia or the United States?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US Zone	Berlin	Bremen
Russia	29%	22%	25%	26%	22%	18%
U.S.A.	51	44	46	49	71	56
Neither/Nor	7	18	10	10	6	14
No opinion	<u>13</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>12</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Group differences ...

The zonal pattern in which a plurality feels the U.S. has been the stronger in the recent phase of the cold war is reversed in two important groups: the best educated groups and the upper socio-economic levels. Among men also there is a frequent tendency to name Russia, though a plurality of them names the U.S. In no other segments of the population do opinions depart markedly from the zonal figures.

Stronger in the East-West struggle
in last months:

	Russia	USA	Neither	No opinion
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary	24%	50%	9%	17% ... 100%
Secondary	34	42	16	8
Higher	46	41	9	4
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower	23%	49%	9%	19%
Lower middle	32	47	13	8
Upper middle and upper	46	33	18	3
<u>Sex:</u>				
Women	21%	47%	10%	22%
Men	33	49	11	7

... Also noteworthy as a background factor in public consideration of the H-bomb is a rising pessimism regarding the possibility of another world war. Almost six in ten (57%) in the zone now expect another world war in ten years, a rise of ten points since November 1949. In West Berlin and Bremen, 55% hold this view. The trend of replies for the zone on this question follows:

"Do you believe a new world war will break out within the next ten years?"

	April 1949	July 1949	Nov 1949	Feb 1950
Yes	42%	44%	47%	57%
No	46	43	41	34
No opinion	12	13	12	9
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

... People who expect another war in the future tend much more than their more optimistic compatriots to believe that Russia has recently proved to be stronger than the U.S. They also are somewhat more likely to have heard of the U.S. decision on the hydrogen bomb.

	Expect war in <u>10 years</u>	Do not expect <u>war</u>
<u>In East-West struggle:</u>		
Russia stronger	34%	18%
U.S. stronger	45	57
Neither	9	11
No opinion	12	14
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Heard of H-bomb:

Yes	60	76%
No	19	22
Don't know	1	2
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

INFORMATION ABOUT THE H-BOMB ...

Three-fourths of the US Zone population claim to have heard or read something about the H-bomb.

"Have you heard or read anything about the H-bomb?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Yes	76%	78%	74%	76%	77%	79%
No	23	19	22	22	20	20
Don't know	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

... Among all groups in the population claimed awareness of the hydrogen bomb is extensive. However, as in all information questions, certain groups are more likely than others to be informed. Thus, 99% of people with higher education, 99% of the upper middle and upper socio-economic status, 88% of the men have heard or read something about the bomb.

PRODUCTION OF THE BOMB ...

Preponderant opinion among the people who have heard or read of the H-bomb is that the U.S. is now engaged in manufacturing such a bomb.

"As far as you know, is America making such a bomb, is it working on its developments, or isn't it working on it at all?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Making bomb	38%	42%	41%	39%	35%	38%
Working on development	24	23	20	23	27	28
Not working on it	1	*	*	1	1	*
No opinion	<u>13</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>13</u>
	76%	73%	74%	76%	77%	79%

Group differences ...

More likely than the counterpart members of their groups to feel that the H-bomb is beyond the developmental stage and is in process of manufacture are men, the upper socio-economic groups, and the better educated.

The United States is:

	Making H-Bomb	Working on development	Not working at all	No opinion
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary	50%	29%	1%	20% ... 100
Secondary	55	36	-	9
Higher	70	29	-	1
<u>Socio-Economic Status:</u>				
Lower	49%	29%	1%	21%
Lower middle	56	32	*	12
Upper middle and upper	62	35	3	-
<u>Sex:</u>				
Women	47%	29%	1%	23%
Men	56	32	1	11
<u>Origin:</u>				
Refugee	49%	35%	*	16%
Resident	53	28	1	18

* Less than one half of one per cent.

USSR AND H-BOMB PRODUCTION ...

Only a minority of persons who know of the announcement regarding the H-bomb think that Soviet Russia is now engaged in producing it. A plurality believes that the USSR is working on the development of such a weapon, only a few believe that Russia is doing nothing at all in this direction, and large proportions are unable to decide.

"As far as you know, is Russia making such a bomb, is she working on its development, or isn't she working on it at all?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Making H-bombs	16%	15%	16%	15%	8%	7%
Working on development	33	35	29	32	36	34
Not working at all	3	2	4	3	7	5
No opinion	<u>24</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>33</u>
	76%	78%	80%	76%	77	79%

Group differences ...

Among all groups in the population considerable doubt is expressed about the status of H-bomb development in the Soviet Union. People of various walks-of-life do not differ markedly from each other on whether or not Russia is actually making a hydrogen bomb - such differences in opinion as exist are mostly between whether or not Russia is developing such a bomb and "No opinion". The better educated and the men, more frequently than their opposites, are of the opinion that the bomb is in a developmental stage in Russia.

	Making H-bomb	Working on development	Doing nothing	No opinion
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary	19%	41%	4%	36% ... 100%
Secondary	23	43	3	31
Higher	19	65	-	16
<u>Sex:</u>				
Women	21%	36%	4%	39%
Men	18	43	4	30

... Of the people who think that the USSR is not at present manufacturing an H-bomb, twice as many feel that it would take Russia longer to produce it than believe she can manufacture it as quickly as can the U.S.

"Do you think that Russia will be able to make an H-bomb as fast as America, or will Russia need more time for it, or is it entirely impossible for Russia?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
As fast as U.S.A.	8%	9%	10%	9%	6%	10%
Somewhat longer time	21	23	16	20	20	21
Not at all	1	*	1	1	1	-
No opinion	<u>6</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>
	36%	37%	33%	35%	35%	39%

* Less than one half or one per cent.

USSR WILL COMPETE, NOT SEEK AGREEMENT ...

Except in Berlin, few people think that the Soviet Union would seek an international agreement on atomic weapons in the event that the U.S. should out-produce her in their manufacture. Large majorities feel that in that eventuality, Russia would simply redouble her efforts. In Berlin, almost three in ten hold that the Soviet Union would try for an international understanding, if out-produced by the U.S.

"If through the production of the H-bomb, the U.S... should gain the lead in an atom-weapons race, what do you think Russia will do?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Russia will call off an atom-weapons race to reach an international agreement	14%	6%	11%	11%	28%	8%
Russia will double her efforts to overcome the advantage of the U.S... in an atom-weapons race	80	79	79	80	68	76
No opinion	$\frac{6}{100\%}$	$\frac{15}{100\%}$	$\frac{10}{100\%}$	$\frac{9}{100\%}$	$\frac{4}{100\%}$	$\frac{16}{100\%}$

THE H-BOMB NO ORDINARY WEAPON ...

Predominant opinions among those persons who claim to have heard about the hydrogen bomb is that it is a new weapon with 'unimaginable destructive power.'

"From what you have heard about the H-bomb, do you think that it is just another bomb, somewhat stronger than the others; or do you think it is a new type of weapon of unimaginable destructive power which could destroy humanity?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Stronger bomb	14%	17%	12%	14%	14%	18%
Great destructive power	58	55	55	57	58	54
No opinion	$\frac{4}{76\%}$	$\frac{6}{78\%}$	$\frac{7}{74\%}$	$\frac{5}{76\%}$	$\frac{5}{77\%}$	$\frac{7}{79\%}$

Group differences ...

Better educated people tend slightly more than the poorly educated to regard the H-bomb as no ordinary weapon. But in a departure from the usual pattern, men and the upper classes who tend customarily to think as do the better educated, are less inclined than their opposite numbers to feel that the H-bomb has "unimaginable destructive powers." It is the women and people of lower socio-economic status who more frequently hold this view. More of the older than the younger people also feel this is the case.

	Just a stronger bomb	New kind of weapon	No opinion
<u>Education:</u>			
Elementary	18%	74%	8% ... 100%
Secondary	22	72	6
Higher	17	73	5
<u>Socio-Economic Level:</u>			
Lower	18%	74%	8%
Lower middle	19	76	5
Upper middle and upper	25	68	7
<u>Sex:</u>			
Women	15%	79%	6%
Men	22	70	8
<u>Age:</u>			
Under 30 years	24%	72%	4%
30 - 49	19	73	8
50 years and over	15	77	8

U.S. DECISION ON BOMB APPROVED ...

Majorities of the public in all regions say that the U.S. was correct in deciding to go ahead with the H-bomb at this time. West Berliners are particularly of this opinion. But a quarter in the zone take a contrary view - and four in ten in Bremen are of the same opinion and a fifth in Berlin.*

"In view of the present political situation, do you think the U.S... was right to have decided to make H-bombs, or do you think it would have been better if the U.S... had decided not to do it?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Was right	67%	57%	59%	63%	78%	52%
Not right	24	25	29	25	19	39
No opinion	9	18	12	12	3	9
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

* This and subsequent questions were asked of everyone regardless of whether or not they were informed of the H-bomb. Uninformed respondents were told: "It may interest you to know that the government of the U.S. has decided to go ahead with the development and production of a new type, stronger bomb, the so-called hydrogen bomb."

Group Differences ...

Majorities in all segments of the population believe that the United States was right to decide to make the H-bomb. But more inclined to this view than others, are refugees, members of the Catholic Church, the better educated, the upper classes and the men.

	US was right	US not right	No opinion
<u>Education:</u>			
Elementary	60%	27%	13% ... 100%
Secondary	77	18	5
Higher	77	20	3
<u>Socio-Economic Level:</u>			
Lower	60%	26%	14%
Lower middle	69	24	7
Upper middle and upper	83	14	3
<u>Sex:</u>			
Women	55%	28%	17%
Men	73	21	6
<u>Religion:</u>			
Catholic	68%	22%	10%
Protestant	57	28	15
<u>Origin:</u>			
Refugees	68%	20%	12%
Residents	61	27	12

U.S. WILL USE BOMB DEFENSIVELY ...

Even more frequent are opinions that American production of the H-bomb has a defensive rather than offensive purpose. Three-quarters of the zone population assert that the U.S. is making a hydrogen bomb in order to discourage aggression.

"Do you think that America is trying to make the H-bomb for aggressive purposes, or to discourage aggressors?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	N-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Aggressive	8%	8%	10%	9%	9%	11%
Discourage aggression	82	71	71	76	88	76
No opinion	10	21	19	15	3	13
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

WAR AND THE H-BOMB ...

Majority opinion in the zone also holds that the U.S. by deciding to manufacture the H-bomb has reduced the danger of a war.

"Which of the following statements comes closest to your opinion?" (Card)

Bavaria Hesse W-Baden US ZONE Berlin Bremen

Through the production of the H-bomb, the U.S. is increasing the danger of war because it will provoke an armaments race

25% 27% 26% 26 14 41

The production of the H-bomb by the U.S. decreases the danger of war because it will make the U.S. stronger

60 40 54 54 80 40

Neither/Nor

7 18 5 9 2 8

No opinion

$\frac{8}{100\%}$ $\frac{15}{100\%}$ $\frac{15}{100\%}$ $\frac{11}{100\%}$ $\frac{4}{100\%}$ $\frac{11}{100\%}$

... But opinions are almost evenly divided as to whether the U.S. or the Western powers in the event of an attack should utilize the H-bomb or await using it until weapons of similar destructive capacity have been used by the enemy. Indeed minorities ranging from 12% in Berlin, 17% in the US Zone, and 26% in Bremen feel that under no circumstances should America use the H-bomb.

"In case America or the Western powers were attacked, do you think that America should then use the H-bomb immediately, or only when other countries were to use weapons of similar destructive power, or not at all?"

Bavaria Hesse W-Baden US ZONE Berlin Bremen

Use immediately

42% 32% 34% 38% 43% 35%

Use only when others use similar destructive weapons

39 32 40 37 43 31

Use not at all

14 24 18 17 12 26

No opinion

$\frac{5}{100\%}$ $\frac{12}{100\%}$ $\frac{8}{100\%}$ $\frac{8}{100\%}$ $\frac{2}{100\%}$ $\frac{8}{100\%}$

... Among the following groups, predominant opinion is that, if attacked, the U.S. should use the H-bomb immediately:

- ... People with higher education (51%) in contrast to those with only secondary (37%) or elementary (37%) schooling;
- ... Upper middle and upper groups (44%) as compared with lower socio-economic levels (37%);
- ... Men (44%) in contrast to women (35%); and
- ... Catholics (43%) as compared with Protestants (32%).

R E S T R I C T E D

00182

READERSHIP OF HEUTE AND OTHER
ILLUSTRATED PERIODICALS

Classification cancelled
by authority of Leo P. Crespi
PUB/RAS.

Report No. 14
Series No. 2
4 April 1950

REACTIONS ANALYSIS UNIT
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE
HICOG APO 807
Bad Nauheim Germany

R E S T R I C T E D

INTRODUCTION ...

A section of a survey conducted in January 1950 by Reactions Analysis Unit of OPA, HICOG, dealt with questions of magazine readership in the US Zone of Germany, Western Berlin, and Bremen. Representative samples of the adult population (1500 in US Zone, 250 in Berlin and 160 in Bremen) were scientifically selected and interviewed by the methods of modern opinion polling used by the Unit for its surveys among the German population.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ...

1. About four in ten people in the US Zone are magazine readers; in Berlin, Bremen and other large cities the proportion is nearly six in ten.
2. About one in three people in the US Zone claim to be readers of illustrated magazines, whereas in large cities more than one in two make this claim.
3. Three-fourths of the illustrated magazine readership is essentially confined to a group of 10 periodicals at the head of which are QUICK and HEUTE.
4. Illustrated magazine readers favor diversity of subject matter, pictorial presentations, and timeliness of features, in that order, in the content of their periodicals.
5. Among readers of illustrated magazines generally, acquisition of issues by newsstand purchase predominates, followed by circulation among friends and relatives, and by subscription.
6. Non-readers of illustrated magazines accounted for their non-participation primarily by giving financial reasons, especially in Berlin and Bremen. This was followed by lack of time and lack of interest.

R E S T R I C T E D

WHO ARE MAGAZINE READERS? ...

To the question "Do you read magazines?" the population of the three areas tested replied as follows:

	US Zone	Berlin	Bremen
Yes	41%	58%	59%
No	<u>59</u> 100%	<u>42</u> 100%	<u>41</u> 100%

Previous magazine readership studies have shown that a large proportion of claimed readers specify local publications, e.g. parish journals, etc., as periodicals they read.

Comparing the answers to this question for different population groups shows that residents of large US Zone cities are as likely to be magazine readers as Berliners or Bremen residents, that proportionately more readers are found among the more educated and among the higher income groups, and that relatively more men claim to read magazines than women.

"Do you read magazines?"

	Yes	No	
<u>Size of town:</u>			
US Zone, under 10,000 pop.	34%	66%	... 100%
US Zone, 10,000 - 99,999	51	49	
US Zone, 100,000 and over	59	41	
Berlin	58	42	
Bremen	59	41	
<u>Income (per month):</u>			
Under 150 DM	32%	68%	
150 - 300 DM	47	53	
300 and over	64	36	
<u>Education:</u>			
8 years or less	39%	61%	
9 - 11	75	25	
12 years or more	79	21	
<u>Sex:</u>			
Men	50%	50%	
Women	42	58	

THE READERS OF ILLUSTRATED MAGAZINES ...

Persons who claimed to read magazines generally, were asked "Do you also read illustrated magazines?" A majority of all classes of readers answered affirmatively, and group comparisons show that readership of illustrated periodicals closely parallels magazine readership in general. Regular readers are more common than occasional readers in all categories except residents of the smallest towns, members of the lowest income and educational groups, and among women as a whole.

"Do you also read illustrated magazines?"
(Per cent of magazine readers)

	Yes Regularly	Yes Occasionally	No	
<u>Size of town:</u>				
US Zone, under 10,000 pop.	42%	41%	17%	... 10
US Zone, 10,000 - 99,999	35	42	23	
US Zone, 100,000 and over	46	37	17	
Berlin	51	43	6	
Bremen	50	42	8	
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
Under 150 DM	31%	48%	21%	
150 - 300 DM	45	43	12	
300 and over	53	35	12	
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	40%	44%	16%	
9 - 11	52	39	9	
12 years or more	59	30	11	
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	52%	33%	15%	
Women	38	48	14	

HEADERS' PREFERENCE OF SPECIFIC MAGAZINES ...

Respondents claiming to be regular or occasional readers of illustrated magazines were questioned further to ascertain their preferences. For the US Zone this sample represented 34% of the adult population, for Berlin 53%, and for Bremen 56%. The question was: "Which illustrated magazines do you read?" with multiple answers being accepted and the choices being free, i.e. without presenting the respondent with a prepared list of titles. The total of 738 persons asked this question in the combined areas mentioned a total of 1475 titles, indicating an average of about two illustrated magazines seen regularly or occasionally by each reader. These 1475 mentions were distributed over about 170 different magazines. However, 75% of all mentions were confined to ten magazines, which names are listed on next page.

"Which illustrated magazines do you read?"
(Per cent of total population)

	US Zone	Berlin	Bremen
Quick	13%	17%	16%
Heute	9	11	15
Wochenend	6	-	5
Frankfurter Illustrierte	5	4	3
Revue	5	13	6
Constanze	4	4	24
Stern	3	15	14
Stuttgarter Illustrierte	3	-	1
Schwaebische Illustrierte	2	-	1
Neue Illustrierte	2	2	13
All others	21	37	39
	73%*	103%*	137%*

* These totals exceed the magazine reading public because some readers mentioned more than one magazine.

The above table is useful for rating the relative popularity of the listed periodicals in the given areas at the present time. Some caution is required in comparing the columns, since the readership can be expected to vary with the locality of publication and the distribution of a magazine. Thus, CONSTANZE and STERN, which are more frequently read in Berlin and Bremen than in the US Zone are published in Hamburg and NEUE ILLUSTRIERTE in Cologne. The other seven periodicals are published in the US Zone. It is apparent, however, that the leaders, QUICK and HEUTE, enjoy a rather uniformly high popularity in all three areas investigated.

A list of the next most popular illustrated magazines - those getting 10 or more mentions from all polling areas - is appended below. In no case does the number of mentions amount to much more than about 2% of the population. However, since today's magazines include established publications as well as many relative newcomers, e.g. MUENCHENER ILLUSTRIERTE, appreciable changes in the popularity ratings may be expected with time as the present rather fluid state of German magazine publishing continues.

"Which illustrated magazines do you read?"

	<u>Number of mentions</u>
Telegraf Illustrierte	31
Muenchener Illustrierte	26
Berliner Illustrierte	26
Spiegel	22
Badische Illustrierte	21
Life	19
Koelner Illustrierte	19
Grueene Post	18
Filmillustrierte	14
Rheinische Illustrierte	11
SIE	11
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R E S T R I C T E D

All persons who claimed to read more than one illustrated magazine regularly or occasionally were then asked to name the one they liked best. This gives a measure of "reader opinion" on the subject and eliminates some of the effects of magazine availability and chance reading which may appear in the primary name list. The figures in the following table give the combined totals for the three areas, US Zone, Berlin, and Bremen. On this scale HEUTE and WOCHENEND retain their places near the top. CONSTANZE has risen, and QUICK has dropped appreciably. The figures are less significant for some of the other magazines (like Stuttgerter- and Schwaebische Illustrierte) whose readership is small and provided rather few cases for study.

"Which illustrated magazine do you like best?" (Asked of those who read more than one illustrated magazine.)

Wochenend	39 ⁴ / ₁₀₀
Constanze	37
Heute	31
Schwaebische Illustrierte	30
Frankfurter Illustrierte	26
Stern	25
Quick	24
Revue	18
Neue Illustrierte	16
Stuttgarter Illustrierte	14

WHAT PEOPLE LIKE ABOUT ILLUSTRATED MAGAZINES ...

People who claimed to read just one magazine and those who had expressed a preference for one among several they read were asked "What do you particularly like about this magazine?" Again the results are presented as a composite of readers from all areas polled:

"What do you particularly like about this magazine?"

Diversity of subjects and entertainment value	29 ⁴ / ₁₀₀
Pictorial presentations	22
Timeliness and news value of features	14
The articles and reports	13
Objectivity and truthfulness of representations	7
Features of interest to women	5
Nothing special; like it all	5
Other reasons, miscellaneous	11
No opinion	14
	<u>120⁴/₁₀₀*</u>

* Percentages are based on the total number of people who read illustrated magazines and add to more than 100% because some people gave more than one answer.

From the foregoing table it is apparent that about three of ten illustrated magazine readers appreciate the diversity of their favorite magazine, about two in ten (22%) emphasize the pictorial content, and fewer - 14% and 13%, respectively - favor items of news value and written matter in article form. Practically no explicit comments on preference as to physical make-up -- format, style, paper -- were volunteered.

Some differences appear in these answers when comparing the readers of the various magazines. In the following table the frequency with which the six most commonly mentioned categories were emphasized by the readers of four leading illustrated periodicals are given:

"What do you particularly like about this magazine?"

	Readers of:				
	HEUTE	QUICK	CONSTANZE	WOCHENEND	ALL OTHERS
(Per cent of the illustrated magazine readers)					
Diversity of subjects and entertainment value	36%	31%	33%	38%	30%
Pictorial presentations	25	29	18	14	22
Timeliness and news value of features	15	15	16	20	14
The articles and reports	16	15	9	22	13
Objectivity and truthfulness of representations	8	6	6	7	6
Features of interest to women	$\frac{2}{102\%}$	$\frac{4}{100\%}$	$\frac{11}{93\%}$	$\frac{1}{102\%}$	$\frac{5}{90\%}$

* These totals are, of course, exclusive of miscellaneous categories appearing in the preceding table.

It is evident that of the readers of these four periodicals, those of HEUTE and WOCHENEND place somewhat more value on variety of subject matter, those of HEUTE and QUICK emphasize illustrations, those of WOCHENEND favor written matter, and those of CONSTANZE favor items of interest to women.

HOW READERS OBTAIN THEIR MAGAZINES ...

Answers to the question "How do you obtain the magazine you read?" show some differences depending on the kind of illustrated magazine favored by the respondents as shown for the readers of four of the leading periodicals:

	All illustrated readers	Readers of:			
		HEUTE	QUICK	CONSTANZE	WOCHENEND
Subscribe	17%	12%	11%	13%	21%
At newsstands	46	43	50	30	61
Relatives or friends	23	24	21	20	12
Reading circle	11	19	20	37	4
Other: offices, waiting rooms	$\frac{4}{101\%}$	$\frac{4}{102\%}$	$\frac{1}{103\%}$	$\frac{3}{103\%}$	$\frac{2}{100\%}$

* Some percentages exceed 100 because some people gave more than one answer.

In general, about half the magazine readers buy their copies at the newsstand, and about a fourth obtain them from others like relatives or friends. Fewer subscribe or belong to a reading circle. HEUTE and QUICK belong in this general category. But CONSTANZE varies in that its readers claim relatively greater reading circle participation and fewer newsstand purchases. This may be a consequence of CONSTANZE'S greater appeal to women readers which was pointed out above. WOCHENEND shows just the opposite pattern with its readers favoring subscription and newsstand buying and relatively few obtaining it "second hand." This may relate to WOCHENEND'S differing from the other three periodicals in that it has more of a newspaper format and character.

A LOOK AT THE NON-READERS . . .

Respondents who in the earlier questions claimed they did not read magazines generally or illustrated ones in particular, were asked the following question: "Have you ever read illustrated magazines?"

US Zone Berlin Bremen
(Per cent of total population)

Yes	30%	37%	28%
No	<u>36</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>16</u>
	66%	47%	44%

These figures show the effect of the rural-urban factor for the US Zone in the high percentage of "No" answers. This is brought out in the city size breakdown below. In the case of Berlin the high percentage of "Yes" answers probably reflects the relatively greater financial difficulties in that city as compared to Western Germany, which is confirmed in the last part of this section of the report. The education and income breakdowns to this question show the expected pattern of low readership at the low group levels.

"Have you ever read illustrated magazines?" (Asked of all present non-readers)

	Yes	No	
<u>Size of town:</u>			
Under 10,000 pop.	41%	59%	... 100%
10,000 - 99,999	57	43	
99,999 and over	64	36	
Berlin	78	22	
Bremen	62	38	
<u>Income (per month):</u>			
Under 150 DM	44%	56%	
150 - 300 DM	56	44	
300 and over	57	43	
<u>Education:</u>			
8 years or less	47%	53%	
9 - 11	81	19	
12 years or more	86	14	

All present non-readers (whether former readers or not) were asked for their reasons for not now reading illustrated magazines. The leading causes given by both groups are financial in all three areas where the survey was made, but especially frequent in Berlin and Bremen. An interesting difference appears when the second most common reasons in the two groups are compared. Former readers list lack of time, whereas people who essentially never read illustrated periodicals before advance lack of interest. But still, former readers are less likely to blame lack of time than those who never were readers. To the ex-reader the greatly predominant reason for now dispensing with illustrated periodicals is that of cost.

"For what reason don't you read illustrated magazines?"
(Asked of those who never were illustrated magazine readers.)

	US Zone	Berlin	Bremen
Reasons of cost	44%	73%	69%
Lack of time	29	15	12
Lack of interest	37	27	23
Others	9	5	4
	<u>119%</u> *	<u>115%</u> *	<u>108%</u> *

"Why don't you read illustrated magazines anymore?"
(Asked of those who were ex-readers)

	US Zone	Berlin	Bremen
Reasons of cost	73%	91%	89%
Lack of time	20	12	7
Lack of interest	10	4	9
Others	9	-	4
	<u>112%</u> *	<u>107%</u> *	<u>109%</u> *

* Totals exceed 100% because some respondents gave more than one answer.

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THE GERMAN PUBLIC
ASSAYS POLITICAL DEMOCRACY

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REACTIONS ANALYSIS UNIT
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
HICOG APO 807
Bad Nauheim Germany

RESTRICTED

INTRODUCTION ...

In a survey made in February 1950, the Reactions Analysis Unit, Office of Public Affairs, HICOG, explored opinions regarding the suitability and extent of democratic government in Western Germany.

A representative, random sample of 3000 residents in the US Zone, 500 in the three western sectors of Berlin, and 250 in Bremen was interviewed by a trained German staff supervised by American surveys officers. The analysis of the results was done in the Headquarters office of the Unit. In this study a split-ballot was used, that is, half of the sample was asked one set of questions, half another set, with certain questions common to both.

An assessment by the people of the suitability and prevalence of democratic government depends of course on their understanding of the meaning of the term democracy. For this reason, the analysis reported here centers around public understanding of the term.

Some preliminary points need to be noted in this connection:

... A large minority of the German public does not venture to define democracy.

... By the same token, large minorities are also unable to say whether or not democratic government is suitable to Western Germany now, or the extent to which it may or may not exist in Western Germany today.

... However, the "No opinion" replies come largely from women respondents. On almost every question asked, approximately eight out of ten women say, "I don't know." For this reason, comparisons of replies of men and women are stressed throughout this report.

A further point requires mention:

... There is remarkably little divergence in opinions among the population in the three Laender to the queries raised here. Accordingly, Laender breakdowns are shown in the report only when important differences occur.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ...

- ... The German public in the US Zone, Western Berlin, and Bremen, offers various definitions of democracy, only very few of which indicate hostility to the principle. Though the definitions vary in specificity, they are generally pertinent.
- ... Preponderant opinions are that a democratic or analogous type of government is the most suitable form of government for a unified Germany.
- ... Pluralities in the zone and Bremen (majority in Berlin) say the Bonn government is "truly democratic," but many feel it is not "especially so."
- ... Reasons of those who think it is not "especially" democratic consist more of lively criticisms of their representatives at Bonn than of a weighing of the facts pro and con "democracy."
- ... But whatever reservations people have on the fundamental democracy of the Bonn government, when asked what they would call the West German government, majorities say a democracy, or popular government, or a republic.
- ... And, asked how many political parties should exist in West Germany, a majority favors a multi-party system with most votes going for a two-or three-party system. But a fifth favor a one-party system.
- ... As to the East German government, almost no one thinks it can be called a "people's" government. Most call it a "tyranny," "despotism," "dictatorship," and so on.
- ... In conclusion, despite the relatively large number of "no opinion" replies, a majority of the population in the US Zone, Western Berlin, and Bremen appear to be well informed on the meaning of political democracy and to favor it as a form of government suitable for Germany. Of importance is the fact that such a very large proportion of German women has no opinion or ideas on the issue studied in this report. When one recalls that German women in the US Zone out-number men nearly 3 to 2, (56% to 44%) the importance of this finding is thrown into sharper focus.

Among the German public that ventured to define the term democracy - 33% do not - the definitions tend to fall largely into two categories; one describing democracy in terms of "freedom, equality, justice," etc.; the other, in terms of people's government or popular representation. Only 2% proffer definitions which indicate antagonism to the idea -, e.g. "Rule by capitalists," etc.

Inability to state what democracy means, is of course closely related to education - almost all (96%) of the "no opinion" group consist of people with only elementary schooling. But of equal importance is the poor showing made by German women on this question, as well as on subsequent aspects of democratic government. For this reason, the replies of men and women in the US Zone are shown separately in the following table:

	US ZONE			Berlin Bremen	
	Men	Women	Total		
<u>Freedom; Equality; Justice:</u> Everyone in the state can live in such a way that he can enjoy life; everyone is free and can do what he wants provided he doesn't harm anyone; regard for dignity of man and of the individual; equal rights for the poor and the rich - that's real democracy in my opinion; everyone is free and has a chance to work up; rule according to justice; a state that advocates rights and justice; etc.	45%	31%	37%	49%	34%
<u>People's government, government elected by the people:</u> Members of the government are elected by the people and keep contact with the voters; sovereignty of the people with qualified leaders coming to the front; all powers (executive and legislative) emanate from the people; a state that cares for the opinions and interest of every citizen; a government that really does what the people want; etc.	30	11	20	24	28
<u>Economic security; just social conditions and welfare:</u> Good economic conditions, and the same chance and equal conditions for all classes, where one can get and buy everything; a form of government that provides everyone a chance at jobs; well-being for all the people; etc.	7	5	6	8	6
<u>Unity and harmony; moderation:</u> A state without party controversies and without religious quarrelling; concord of the people; men unite and hold together; a state that doesn't swerve too much to right or left; government that carries on a moderate policy; etc.	4	4	2	6	2
<u>Peace and understanding among the people:</u> People live peacefully together and help each other; a regime that works for peace; understanding among the people; etc.	*	3	1	3	1
<u>Miscellaneous:</u> Something that is good; the American form of government that doesn't squander money; what Germany had before Hitler came to power; cooperation with the Western powers; to be righteous and sincere; etc.	3	1	3	4	1
<u>Negative definitions (indicating antagonism):</u> Predominance and influence of certain classes and circles; capitalist union; similar to a dictatorship; those that have continue to have, and those that have nothing remain have-nots; many politicians who talk a lot, do little and grab big salaries; etc.	2	3	2	2	2
<u>No opinion:</u>	16	48	33	14	23
	107%	106%	104%	110%	97%

* Some people gave more than one characteristic of democracy.

Preponderant opinions are that a democratic, or analogous type of government is the most suitable for a unified Germany. About one in ten names either a monarchy or a dictatorship as the preferred form, and again the no opinion replies are frequent, particularly in the zone.

"What form of government do you regard as the most suitable for a united Germany?"

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

<u>Democracy</u> : A democratic one in the American pattern; a democratic government as we have now in West Germany; a democracy as in former times; a Western democratic one; democracy but with strong personages; etc.	45%	60%	57%
<u>A socialistic government</u> ; welfare government; people's government; A socialistic form; a government that helps the workers; a social-democratic one; one that represents first of all the interests of the masses; etc.	3	6	6
<u>A Republic</u> : republic as it was under Benes; the Weimar Republic; a parliamentary form; federal republic; etc.	3	8	4
<u>Monarchy</u> : A Kaiser; the Wilhelmian government; etc.	6	7	6
<u>Dictatorship</u> : Authoritarian; totalitarian;	3	1	4
<u>Miscellaneous</u> : A Christian government; a government not influenced by a religious group; American Dictatorship; American colony; not a federal government; no dictatorship; a form of government dependent on religion, independent of parties, that grants freedom to everyone; etc.	7	6	6
<u>No opinion</u> :	$\frac{33}{100\%}$	$\frac{12}{100\%}$	$\frac{17}{100\%}$

... Opinions regarding the most suitable government for Germany apparently are independent of ability to define the term. As will be noted in the comparative table below, the pattern of replies of the "informed" group varies little from that of the US Zone public as a whole. But the prestige value of democracy is apparent in the fact that among those who cannot proffer a definition of the term, a democratic government is most frequently proposed as the most suitable form for a united Germany. However, the large majority of this group withhold their opinions.

	Can define democracy	Cannot define democracy
<u>Best form of government for a united Germany:</u>		
Democratic government	44%	19%
Socialistic government	8	2
A republic	6	*
Monarchy	9	6
Dictatorship	5	1
Miscellaneous	10	4
No opinion	$\frac{18}{100\%}$	$\frac{68}{100\%}$

* Less than one half of one per cent

... Women follow much the same pattern as men in their views on the subject, though here as in other instances, many more of them have no opinion. Thus both men and women name a democratic government much more frequently than any other - but 61% of the men vote for it, in contrast to 31% of the women. Percentages are almost identical on all other suggestions, but only 16% of the men in contrast to 48% of the women have no opinion on the matter.

BONN GOVERNMENT TRULY DEMOCRATIC? ...

Only in West Berlin is a majority of the opinion that the federal government at Bonn is a truly democratic government. In the US Zone (except for Hesse) somewhat more feel that the Bonn government is really democratic than feel it is not especially so. However, aside from Berlin, many persons withhold judgment.

"In your opinion, is the West German federal government a truly democratic government or isn't it especially democratic?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Truly democratic	38%	30%	40%	36%	61%	38%
No especially democratic	26	33	31	29	28	22
No opinion	36	27	29	35	11	40
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

The large "No opinion" vote is partly owing to the inability of women to make up their minds on the matter, as is seen in the comparative table:

	Men	Women
Truly democratic	43%	32%
Not especially democratic	39	22
No opinion	18	46
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Among the informed group there is a marked hesitancy to call the West government truly democratic. Among the people who are able to define the term democracy, opinions are almost evenly divided pro and con, with 40% for "truly democratic," 36% "not especially so," and 24% unable to make up their minds.

R E S T R I C T E D

R E S T R I C T E D

R E S T R I C T E D

BONN GOVERNMENT FUNCTION DEMOCRATICALLY? ...

Half of the sample were asked the preceding question, the other half a question in a similar vein: "Do you have the impression that the West German federal government works according to democratic principles or not?" Replies are as follows:

	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Yes	49%	78%	53%
No	21	12	24
Don't know	30	10	23
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

The fact that more people are ready to reply affirmatively to this question than to the one discussed above may be explained in part, because the first question deals with the fundamental bases of the government ("truly democratic"), and the second deals with its approach ("works along democratic lines"); in part, because the first question posed an acceptable alternative ("not especially democratic"), whereas the second necessitated the more difficult choice of acceptance or rejection.

People who felt the Bonn government did not operate democratically, gave reasons very similar to those presented by persons who thought the government was "not especially" democratic. (See below.)

REASONS FOR SAYING BONN GOVERNMENT NOT TRULY DEMOCRATIC ...

Among the variety of reasons brought forth in support of the contention that the federal government is not truly democratic, few seem to be based on a careful weighing of the meaning of the term. Rather, the critics take the opportunity to hurl scattered brick-bats at their government, as will be noted in their comments on the following page.

"Why do you think so?"

(Asked of the group which said Bonn was not really democratic.)

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

<u>Doesn't take care of the people; not socialistic enough:</u>			
Doesn't stand up for the cause of labor; they don't help people like me; they should think more socialistically; they work without regard for poor people; etc.	8%	2%	3%
<u>Extravagant financial policies and practices:</u> It's no democracy when a federal minister pockets 100,000 marks whereas the worker doesn't earn enough for necessities; they shouldn't lead lives of luxury again; taxes are too high; everything costs too much and the common people can't afford to buy; they don't do anything for us farmers and burden us with more and more taxes; etc.	5	*	2
<u>Too much talk and quarrelling:</u> These splits in our government shouldn't occur in a democracy; they are quarrelling among themselves all the time; the Schumacher-Adenauer controversies; etc.	5	4	3
<u>Disregards will of the people; acts arbitrarily:</u> There was a secret ballot and that isn't right; the parties do what they want to after the elections are over and disregard the will of the voters; the German people have no say, the ministers decide; the authoritarian way of acting without consulting with the opposition is certainly not democratic; etc.	4	1	5
<u>Democracy cannot develop in Germany; too inexperienced in democracy:</u> Our situation is so that democracy can't develop itself here; the German federal government hasn't had enough experiences in this field; the would-be competent men have no ideas of real democracy; etc.	3	1	1
<u>Too much influenced by certain groups and interests:</u> Too much under Catholic influence; more Christian (than democratic) because they are building only churches and no houses; it's too capitalistic; SPD isn't sufficiently represented; etc.	3	9	1
<u>Too dependent on Western powers:</u> Its decisions still depend on the consent of the Western powers; in its basic characteristics it's American-like but democracy cannot assert itself because the federal government depends on the occupation authorities in many respects; it is too susceptible to Allied influence; etc.	2	6	5
<u>Still too many Nazi tendencies:</u> Still follow too many Nazi methods; too many tendencies of Hitler's regime are apparent; it is too little advanced and still in the infantile stage; etc.	1	1	-
<u>Doesn't keep its promises:</u> They say they intend to aid Berlin but never do, we cannot help ourselves alone; doesn't keep its promises; they promise much and don't keep it; etc.	*	5	1
<u>Miscellaneous:</u> It's neither democratic nor a government, it is only provisional; the federal government must prove its efficiency first; too bureaucratic; etc.	2	1	1
<u>No opinion:</u>	<u>33%**</u>	<u>30%**</u>	<u>1/23%**</u>

* Less than one half of one per cent.

**Some of the respondents gave more than one reason.

BUT WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED DEMOCRATIC IN FORM ...

But whether or not people consider the Bonn government a perfect democracy, when asked what kind of government they would call it, by far the most frequent replies mention democracy. Again, however, the number of "No opinion" replies is unusually high, and also, again, women make up the great preponderance of such replies.

This is what people say when asked: "What would you call the form of government West Germany has today?"

	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
<u>Democracy: a people's government:</u>	32%	49%	47%
<u>Democracy with limitations:</u> Democracy with limitations as some proclaimed freedoms are lacking; democratic form of government but handcuffed by the occupation authorities; democracy but not as it should be; it is not stainlessly democratic, it has a large red streak because of social-democratic influence; etc.	8	4	10
<u>Republic (Federal State, parliamentary government):</u>	9	12	4
<u>Dictatorship:</u> An allied military dictatorship; of Adenauer; etc.	5	2	3
<u>Christian-Clerical form:</u> It is very clerical; a Christian democratic government; etc.	2	2	1
<u>Capitalistic government:</u> A democratic capitalistic regime;	1	*	2
<u>Social-Democratic:</u>	*	2	1
<u>Miscellaneous:</u> A conglomeration of monarchy and democracy; an official state that regards the citizens as subjects; no democracy; an expensive one; a mess; a party government of the worst possible form; a union of old people; a 50% Nazi government; etc.	6	3	4
<u>No opinion:</u>	<u>37</u> <u>100%</u>	<u>26</u> <u>100%</u>	<u>28</u> <u>100%</u>

As already noted the preponderance of "No opinion" replies comes largely from the women. In the US Zone, the comparative figures on this score for men and women are 17% and 54%. It is also noteworthy that a large majority of men designate the West government as democratic or republican in form, thus: democracy, 41%, democracy with limitations, 13%, and republic, 13%.

Also noteworthy is the fact that the people who define democracy either in terms of "freedom, equality and justice," or in terms of "representative, popular government," tend more frequently to designate the present West German government as democratic, or as a federal republic.

* Less than one half of one per cent.

NUMBER OF POLITICAL PARTIES ...

A majority of the public in all regions advocates a multi-party system for Western Germany, though a minority would like a single-party system. There appears, however, to be little inclination among the majority to return to the pre-1933 days when splinter parties were frequent. For the most part, the public would like to have only two or three political parties.

"If you had to decide, how many different political parties would you then permit in West Germany today?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
One party	18%	15%	22%	18%	19%	16%
Two parties (at most three)	23	21	33	25	21	26
Three parties (at most four)	26	21	18	23	27	34
Four	7	7	2	6	9	8
Five to ten	5	5	3	5	10	5
Unlimited number	1	1	1	1	5	5
Indefinite replies (not to many; as few as possible)	2	3	1	2	2	1
None	3	3	5	3	2	5
No opinion	<u>15</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>-</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Group differences on this issue are not marked, though among the better educated people only 7% advocate a "one-party" system in contrast to 19% of those with elementary schooling only. Among men, 13% are of this opinion as compared with 23% of the women.

Arguments of those who would like two or more political parties run like this:

"What one party doesn't know, the other knows - there must be discussion."

"Then it won't go with us as with the Russians and their KPD."

"Then every citizen can choose the party of his own choice."

"Then one governs and the other is the opposition."

Proponents of a one-party system, argue thus:

"Too many cooks spoil the broth."

"Then the German people would unite among themselves."

"Many parties lead only to a stalemate."

"No fruitful work."

THE LAST GERMAN STATE NO "PEOPLE'S" GOVERNMENT ...

Residents of the US Zone of Western Berlin and of Bremen are agreed that whatever the government of Eastern Germany can be called it cannot be termed a democracy. Most frequently it is alluded to as a "despotism," "tyranny," "communist dictatorship." Here, too, the no opinion vote is large - except in Berlin - but not, interestingly enough, so large as it is regarding the Bonn government.

The question, and catalogued replies with representative comments follows:

"What would you call the form of government Eastern Germany has today?"

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

<u>Despotism; Dictatorship; Tyranny:</u> It is sloppy business, a mess, a totalitarian form, arbitrariness and dictatorship; as it was under our "beloved" Fuehrer; a police state and a tyranny; force everywhere, nothing that is really good; a dictatorship that ruins the people, a party dictatorship, same system as with the Nazis; totalitarian form; etc.	28%	53%	40%
<u>Communism:</u> There is a communistic form of government; dictatorship of the communist party government; etc.	24	16	19
<u>Soviet occupation-dominated government:</u> A government dependent on the Russians; occupation-obedient government; dictatorship ruled by the occupiers; that government is only forced, a puppet, can't decide anything by itself; etc.	8	16	6
<u>A people's republic:</u> A democratic form of government; etc.	2	3	2
<u>No government at all:</u> A comedy, but no government; no government, but exploitation; a feigned government; anarchy; etc.	1	3	2
<u>Indefinite replies:</u> (Rejection or approval indeterminable) More dictatorship than democratic; communistic - democratic; etc.	1	-	1
<u>Miscellaneous:</u> One that is not good; a bad one; government of criminals; I'm against it; etc.	2	*	1
<u>No opinion:</u>	<u>33</u> 100%	<u>8</u> 100%	<u>28</u> 100%

* Less than one half of one per cent

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

REACTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF WEST BERLINERS
IN FACE OF PROSPECTIVE WHITSUNTIDE MARCH

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REACTIONS ANALYSIS UNIT
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
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Bad Nauheim Germany

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IV. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT WHITSUNTIDE?

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INTRODUCTION

From April 5 to April 15 1950, the Reactions Analysis Unit, Office of Public Affairs, conducted a public opinion survey in the three Western sectors of Berlin in order to obtain German thinking and the state of their morale in respect to the prospective Whitsuntide march on Berlin.

The sample employed in the present study consists of 500 cases selected for representativeness by the standard random method employed by the Unit. Interviewing was conducted by a trained German staff under professional American supervision.

Group comparisons have been omitted throughout this report since the returns indicated that men and women, old and young, and the various educational and economic levels do not differ substantially in their opinions on the questions that were asked.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS

THE WHITSUNTIDE MEETING ...

In general, the West Berlin population appears to be maintaining its usual aplomb in the face of the projected FDJ march in Berlin. Now - as during the months of the blockade - steadfastness and absence of hysteria mark the attitudes of the large majority of West Berliners. This is borne out by the following findings:

- ... Though two-thirds say, in response to a direct question, that they are more worried by the current East-West tension than by economic problems, only one in 100 mentions the Whitsuntide meeting when asked to state the most difficult current problem of Berlin. Rather, three fourths mention various economic problems, and less than a fifth bring up political problems bearing on the East-West conflict.
- ... As to what will happen at the Whitsuntide meeting: only five in 100 see it as a serious affair accompanied by large-scale riots, much shooting, clashes with troops, etc.; forty in 100 anticipate brawls, agitation, some shooting, looting, etc. and thirty in 100 think it will go by without incident. Others anticipate border incidents. A few say the march will be confined to the East sector.
- ... Most Berliners expect considerably fewer than the announced 500,000 will actually come to Berlin to participate in the march.
- ... The largest proportion of Berliners - four out of ten - see no concern at all among their friends and associates over the prospective march. About a third see a little concern, and a quarter judge there is very great concern about Whitsuntide.
- ... Almost unanimously West Berliners feel that enough is being done to insure their safety.

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- ... Opinions are divided on whether the West Berlin magistrate or the Western powers should have primary responsibility for maintaining order.
- ... The responsibility of the city magistrate, as West Berliners see it, is to take positive measures: use augmented police forces as well as the Fire Department to close sectoral boundaries, keep police reserves in readiness for action if needed. Clearly, opinions are to keep the FDJ marchers out of the West sectors.
- ... Majority feeling is that the Western allies should be ready to assist, if needed, but should remain in the background. Only if serious developments occur should they take an active hand.
- ... As for the populace of West Berlin itself - cool heads are advocated. Most say people should stay at home and keep off the streets, and in any case maintain discipline. Only 3% advocate active resistance (throw rotten eggs, etc.).
- ... Two-thirds know that the city magistrate has forbidden the FDJ to march in the West sectors - 85% advocate such a refusal. However, 77% are of the opinion that the FDJ will make the attempt regardless of the magistrate's statement.
- ... If the FDJ makes the attempt, only 6% say "let them come." The great majority advocates various preventive measures: barricade borders, repulsion, etc. A few recommend peaceful negotiation, and a few would use guns, if necessary.
- ... West Berliners have definitely not been taken in by Eastern propaganda regarding the projected meeting. Only one in 100 claims it is to be a demonstration for peace. Propaganda and the provoking of riots and frictions are the two main purposes West Berliners assign to the meeting. The third most frequently mentioned aim is an attempt to take over all of Berlin.
- ... On the FDJ itself, 90% believe the members will be compelled to come to Berlin, and will not come voluntarily. An equally large number are of the opinion that FDJ leadership represents Russian interests rather than those of East Germany.

GENERAL CONFIDENCE IN THE FUTURE ...

- ... More West Berliners express confidence in the economic than in the political future of West Berlin. Seven in ten predict economic improvement during the coming six months, with about a fourth predicting "decisive" betterment. But fewer than four in ten foresee an improved political situation.

A solution of the unemployment problem, increased credits, ERP aid, are frequently mentioned as reasons for expecting economic improvements. Allied aid, economic betterment, a possible weakening of the Russian position and elections in Berlin are mentioned as reasons by those who predict an improved political situation.

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- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

GENERAL APPREHENSIONS ...

- ... Over half of West Berliners predict another world war within ten years. This is an increase over a year ago, but not nearly as many as in December 1948 (during the blockade) - when 80% foresaw another world war. Most of the predictors say it will break out within five years.
- ... That Russia is increasing her efforts to take over Berlin, is now the opinion of 30% of West Berliners - as compared with 13% in December 1949. Conversely, only 25% now see a decrease in Russian efforts in this direction in contrast to 53% in December.
- ... That the Americans will stay in Berlin as long as they stay in Germany, continues to be the opinion of almost all Western Berliners.
- ... Six in ten West Berliners feel that US policy toward the Soviet Union is too conciliatory. Apparently, however, this is not considered to result from weakness so much as an attempt to exhaust every possible means of peaceful settlement.
- ... Three quarters of West Berlin residents say the Western powers are doing all they can to aid Berlin's distress.

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I. GENERAL CONFIDENCE IN FUTURE

MORE OPTIMISM ABOUT ECONOMIC FUTURE THAN POLITICAL ...

West Berliners express considerably more confidence in West Berlin's economic prospects than in her political future. Seven in ten predict that in the next six months economic conditions of West Berlin will be improved - with about one fourth going so far as to say the improvements would be decisive.

Less than four in ten on the other hand expect the next six months to bring an improved political situation, and fewer than one in ten are optimistic enough to say there will be a decisive improvement.

However, only a small minority expect either economic or political conditions to get worse - people who anticipate no improvement tend to think conditions will remain unchanged.

"In your opinion, will the economic conditions of West Berlin improve decisively in the next half year, get very much worse, or not change at all?"

<u>Economic conditions will ...</u>		<u>Political situation will ...</u>	
Improve decisively	23%	Improve decisively	8%
Improve a little	49	Improve a little	28
Not change at all	21	Not change at all	42
Get a little worse	4	Get a little worse	4
Get much worse	1	Get much worse	3
Undecided	2	Undecided	15
	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>

REASONS FOR FORESEEING IMPROVEMENT ...

Most of those who foresee better economic conditions for West Berlin pin their hopes on an expected solution to the unemployment problem. They believe that the employment program and increased building activities will create jobs. Others think that the money and credit extended to Berlin will have a positive effect. A sizeable number (14%) specifically mention aid from the Americans and Western powers as reason for their optimism. The question and replies listed in order of frequency of mention follows on the next page.

"Why improve?" (Asked of those who answered the economic situation in West Berlin will "improve" within the next half year).

More work will be provided; increased building (partly for seasonal reasons): building puts an end to unemployment; job vacancies will be provided again by building and removal of ruins; I suppose we will get work; the program for work procurement will start; because it is already provided that 52,000 Berliners will get work; because I saw today for the first time in a long time that the employment bureau offered jobs; in summer everything is easier, and the economy revives automatically; at the beginning of the summer-season, road-making starts; because of more work in spring; the out-door work in summer will improve the situation a little; one can see that there is more work now - a start is made; building will be emphasized, this way the whole economy in Berlin will recover fast; etc.

27%

Berlin will be supported with raw materials, money and credits (Berlin aid): Much money will come to Berlin; we will be supported with money; Berlin will receive more credits; because of credits and raw material from the West; more capital will come to Berlin; because enough money is invested in the economy; credits from the Bonn government; Berlin aid will raise the economy; etc.

17

Berlin gets support from the American and Allies (ERP): Because the Americans help us very much; the effect of the Marshall-Plan; the ERP starts; the Americans will not go only half the way; for we get help from the western powers; the Americans themselves are interested in reconstruction; because the Western powers know that by economic aid to Berlin the political fight against Bolshovism can be turned to the good; etc.

14

General hope for an improvement of the situation: I steadily believe that it is getting on again; the newspapers always say that it is getting better; one always hopes that it will be better; etc.

7

Closer relations to the West (Western Germany): The West has more confidence in Berlin and therefore gives more orders to Berlin; by orders from the West; one hopes that Western Germany will become more interested in Berlin; I hope that the West will help us, as they have promised; by co-operation with the West German government; due to the politics of the German federal government; I think the federal offices will come to Berlin; etc.

4

Hope for removal of the conflict between East and West: The discussion after the EDJ meeting will bring clearness and improvement; because there will be no war and then Berlin will get everything; I think soon there will be an agreement with the Russians; etc.

1

Other remarks: The ability of the Berliners; etc.

1

No opinion:

$\frac{1}{72\%}$

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

Those who predict an improved political situation in West Berlin say, among other things, that the Western powers are supporting them; that improved economic conditions will have a favorable effect on the political situation; that the Russian position is weakening; and that all-city elections would unite Berlin; etc.

"Why will it improve?" (Asked of those who answered political situation in West Berlin will "improve" to preceding question).

Through the strength of the Allies (America) and their aid:
Because the Allies will put forth all their efforts for an improvement; the Western allies will side with us a little more resolutely and against the Russians; I suppose that the Americans will carry on in spite of the Unisunday meeting; because the Allies help us; etc.

10%

The economic improvements will have a favorable effect politically:
If there is work it will improve politically too; economic improvements bring about political achievements; that depends on economic development; politics go through the stomach; etc.

6

Hope for a weakening of the Russian position - and a chance of reaching an understanding (for example, withdrawal of Russian occupation forces): The political situation in the East will get worse, as a consequence West Berlin will draw advantages from that; because it will get more and more difficult for the East. the longer we hold out; because the Russians will leave; etc.

5

Hope for elections and overcoming the split of Berlin: We will have the unified elections for Berlin now; then it will get better; by now elections the magistrate will get a more favorable composition; because there will be elections for entire Berlin; I reckon there will be a better understanding with East Berlin; etc.

5

Abating of the East-West tension; calming down of the situation:
The political situation has much improved now; it will calm down more and more; there will be fewer controversies between the Big Four; etc.

3

By a closer contact with the West (West Germany): Because I assume that we will be annexed to West Germany; because the federal government will be transferred to Berlin; etc.

3

Other remarks: In summer one has more courage; etc.

1

No opinion:

3

36%

- 3 -

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

ONLY MINORITY EXPECT UNITED CITY GOVERNMENT !!!

That political optimism is limited in West Berlin today is further reflected in results to another question. Only 30% say that they think Berlin will have a united city government in the near future, - which is 20% fewer than held this opinion when the question was first asked about a year ago. Of those who expect a united government almost all assert that the West magistrate will have the greater influence.

"Do you think Berlin will get a united city government in the near future?"

	1949			1950
	May	August	December	April
Yes	51%	36%	33%	30%
No	44	60	62	65
No opinion	5	4	5	5
	100%	100%	100%	100%

"Do you think the East or West magistrate will have the most influence on a new united city government?"
(Asked of those answering "Yes" above).

	1949			1950
	May	August	December	April
East	1%	1%	-	1%
West	49	34	32	28
No opinion	1	1	1	1
	51%	36%	33%	30%

NO WIDESPREAD DESIRE TO LEAVE BERLIN ...

However inauspicious West Berliners might feel the political outlook to be, few are inclined to leave Berlin even if they had the chance. Even with the imminent prospect of the White-tide march only about a quarter of the population expressed the wish to leave - which is but little more than had such a desire in December 1949.

"Would you personally leave Berlin permanently if you had the chance?"

	1949	1950
	December	April
Yes	20%	27%
No	80	73
	100%	100%

II. GENERAL APPREHENSIONS

WORLD WAR WITHIN TEN YEARS STILL FORESEEN BY MANY ...

Over half of those interviewed think that there will be a new world war within the next ten years. However, in September 1948, during the third month of the blockade on Berlin, as many of 80% of the West Berliners said that they expected a war within ten years. From these figures one might guess that the Berliners viewed the blockade as a considerably greater threat to "peace" than the current anticipated march on "Whitsunday".

"Do you believe that there will be a new world war in the next ten years?"

	1948		1949		1950
	April	Sept	April	Nov	April
Yes	67%	80%	42%	47%	54%
No	31	18	55	50	43
No opinion	2	2	3	3	3
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Most of those who predict a new world war think it will break out in less than five years. A few (5%) think it is likely to happen within the immediate future.

"When do you think a new world war will break out?"
(Asked of those answering "Yes" above).

<u>Very soon - at once (immediately):</u> May be any day; one month later; on Whitsunday; etc.	5%
<u>Within this year</u>	3
<u>During the next year (1951-52)</u>	6
<u>Between two and five years from now(1952-55)</u>	21
<u>Between six and ten years from now(1956-60)</u>	3
<u>Ten years from now</u>	1
<u>Other remarks:</u> When the Russians think they are strong enough; when the interest of the USA subsides; when the Russians have enough Atom-bombs; when all the compromises have gone to the devil; when America and Russia are strong enough; etc.	3
<u>No opinion:</u>	12 54%

Prior to the current survey a majority of Berliners were expressing the opinion that the threat of Russians taking over all of Berlin was decreasing. Only a minority currently hold this position. The largest proportion (41%) say the threat is the "same as before," and three out of ten - a considerable rise - hold that Russian pressure has recently increased.

"Do you think the threat of the Russians taking over all of Berlin has increased or decreased during the last months?"

	1949		1950
	Aug	Dec	April
Increased	8%	13%	30%
Decreased	60	53	25
The same as before	24	29	41
No opinion	8	5	4
	100%	100%	100%

The FDJ March on Whitsunday is the most often given explanation for thinking the Russian threat has increased. Others point to a general increase of Russian pressure and activity, and the rearmament of the "Volkspolizei."

"On what grounds do you think that?" (Asked of those answering "Russian threat has increased")

Through the FDJ-March on Whitsunday: The Whitsunday-Meeting shows that it is planned to conquer Berlin; etc.

13%

Increased Russian pressure and activity; violence: In the East sector the activity is persistently increasing; because the Russians are encroaching more and more; Russia wants to rule over all and over Berlin too, where they are making especially great efforts; etc.

6

Formation of "Volkspolizei" (people's police) and rearmament in the East zone: Because the Russians are rearming more and more; by forming the "Volkspolizei"; they use many more people's police; etc.

3

Intensified propaganda; agitation against the West: You may see that by all the propaganda; because their propaganda is getting more and more impudent; by the SED propaganda; etc.

3

Increased pro-Russian and pro-Communist attitude of the population: Because the communist infection of the working population has reached a high point; because the West Berliners are inclining toward the Russians; because the German people of the East hate the West more and more; etc.

1

Economic measures; unemployment: Trying more and more to paralyze our economy and currency; unemployment is working for the Reds; because they want to abolish the Western money; etc.

1

Weakness and yieldingness of the Western powers: Because the Western powers are always too yielding; etc.

1

Other remarks: I quote this from McCloy's explanations and the Russians are saying it too; these intentions have always existed; etc.

$$\frac{3}{30\%}$$

On the other hand, those who currently believe the Russian threat has decreased think that "the Western powers are voicing a more consistent tone," or are impressed by the staunchness of the Berlin populace.

"On what grounds do you think that?" (Asked of those answering "Russian danger has grown smaller").

Firmness of American and Allied policy; counter-measures of Allies; increase of power: Union of Western powers is so firm that the Russians won't dare; because the Western powers are voicing a more consistent tone; the Western powers have become more powerful; because the Americans stay firm; the Western allies won't allow that; the permanent firmness of America provides security; etc.

10%

Firm stand of the population of Berlin against the Russian-Communist efforts: Because the SED has always fewer followers; all Berlin is against the Russian - he has no chance; the Russian will not dare use force because he knows exactly that the West Berliners reject Communism; because the Russian loses more and more sympathy; this will fail because of the firmness of the Berliners; the Russian sees that all the people are against him; because the population in the East sector has less and less confidence in Russian leadership; etc.

8

More yielding and weaker policy of Russians: The Russian has become more yielding recently; because they make no more serious preparations; the Russians have fewer soldiers here than before; all the Russian measures are political maneuvers only; because the actions and announcements of the Russians are primarily propaganda; etc.

4

General quieting and relaxing of the political situation: Because it has quieted down much more in West Berlin; it has become politically much more quiet; you hear fewer rumors; because all is quiet; etc.

1

Other remarks: Because there will be free elections in all Berlin; etc.

1

Don't know:

1
25%

LITTLE FEAR THAT AMERICANS WILL LEAVE ...

Since July 1948, West Berliners have expressed the unwavering belief that the Americans would stay in Berlin as long as they stay in Germany. When this question was asked in April of this year, interviewers checked if the respondents appeared to be very sure of their opinion, or if they were somewhat less sure - 70% answered with great assurance that the Americans would remain, and an additional 22% also said they would stay, but didn't appear to be quite so firmly convinced. The trend of opinions on this question is shown below.

"Do you think the Americans will stay in Berlin as long as they stay in Germany?"

ACD

	1948				1949						1950
	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Jan	Mar	May	Jul	Aug	Dec	Apr 51
Yes	89%	87%	87%	85%	92%	88%	91%	88%	93%	94%	92%
No	8	12	10	8	7	7	7	10	6	5	7
No opinion	3	1	3	7	1	5	2	2	1	1	1
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Even though the Americans should stay in Berlin as long as they remain in Germany, the fear might exist that their stay would still not be as long as necessary for the security of West Berlin. To see if such a fear were prevalent, the following question was asked:

"And do you believe that the Americans will stay here as long as it is necessary for the security of West Berlin, or will they leave sooner?"

✓ ACD

YES, WILL STAY*	78%
Yes, will stay	19
No, leave sooner	2
No opinion	1
	100%

* Answers recorded in this category were given with greater conviction.

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

III. CONCERN ABOUT WHITSUNTIDE

WHITSUNDAY MARCH FAR FROM MOST DIFFICULT CURRENT PROBLEM ...

Only one in a hundred West Berliners brings up the scheduled Whitsuntide march when asked to state what they consider the city's most pressing current problem. Political problems indeed received only scattered mention. Economic problems are emphasized. Thus, though West Berliners express greater assurance regarding their economic than political future (See Part I), current economic problems apparently loom larger in their minds than do the political.

"What do you think is at present the most difficult problem in West Berlin?"

Unemployment; difficult procurement of jobs: The unemployment problem; that one has work; lack of vacancies; procurement of work; unemployment of youth; etc. 52%

The double-currency: The double currency because people are going to the East to have a suit made there; all the people are buying in the Eastern sector; the fear that the bad money will ruin the good money; etc. 15

Lack of money; too high prices: The shortage of money; too little money is circulating; the population lacks money; the magistrate has too little money; the population has too small an income in relation to the high prices; credits are lacking; salaries are too low and the prices are too high; neither magistrate nor large industries have enough money to finance contracts; etc. 13

Split of Berlin: Isolation of Berlin as there is no hinterland; since Berlin is not united with the West; etc. 8

Economic difficulties and difficulties of reconstruction: The economy of Berlin; that orders will be given by the West; difficulties in market outlet; orders are lacking; the economic crisis; the bad economic state; that the economy recovers; reconstruction; housing shortage; etc. 6

Fear of the Russians: Persistent Russian threats; etc. 4

Political insecurity: East-West conflict; fear that the Americans leave Berlin; etc. 3

The FDJ - Whitsuntide march: 1

Other remarks: Problem of border-crossing; that we all find the way back to God is the primary question; youth problem; no difficulties; etc. 3

No opinion: 1
106%*

* Percentage adds up to more than 100% as some people gave more than one answer.

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

BUT POLITICAL TENSION MOST IMMEDIATELY TROUBLING ...

however, when asked specifically to weigh the present political tension in Berlin against economic difficulties, two thirds say the political tension worries them more.

"What troubles you most at the present time - the economic conditions of West Berlin or the tension between Russia and the Western powers?"

Economic conditions	27%
Tension	66
Neither / nor	6
No opinion	1
	<u>100%</u>

SCOPE OF WHITSUNTIDE MARCH ...

Getting down to more specific reference to the prospective Whitsuntide march, the respondents were first questioned about the numerical scope of the affair. The results make it plain that most of the West Berliners have not followed the news about the march closely enough to know how many youngsters are supposed to participate. Almost half don't know how many are supposed to take part. Only three in ten mention 500,000 - the announced number of participants.

When asked how many they think actually will come to Berlin, only 14% say that as many will come as had been reported - 500,000 - and 75% predict that considerably fewer will come.

"According to the reports that you have heard so far, how many youths will take part in the march?"

"How many youths, do you think, really will come to Berlin?"

	Supposed to come	Really will come
Less than 50,000	11%	17%
50,000 - 99,000	2	3
100,000 - 199,999	2	17
200,000 - 299,999	2	30
300,000 - 399,999	1	5
400,000 - 499,999	2	3
500,000 - 599,999	30	14
600,000 and more	2	1
<u>Others:</u>		
300,00, if they are forced		
125,000 voluntarily	-	1
<u>An indefinite number:</u> Some		
hundreds; several hundred;		
a few hundred; a few thousand;		
some thousands; many hundreds;		
a large number	2	2
No opinion	45	7
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

MAJORITY ANTICIPATE SOME DISTURBANCES ON WHITSUNTIDE ...

Three in ten of the West Berliners think that Whitsuntide will come and go with nothing very extraordinary happening. But the rest of the population feel that disturbances of one kind or another will occur. Four in ten foresee small-scale riots and infractions and some think there will be only border incidents. Only one in twenty believe that the riots will reach large scale proportion.

"What do you imagine will happen in Berlin on Whitsunday?"

Small-scale riots: Brawls; tumult; frictions; hostile encounters; some bloodshed; some uproar; agitation; shooting; looting; provocations; scuffling; fighting; smaller offenses; smashing of window-panes; a big mess; traffic disturbances; etc.

40%

Nothing extraordinary; nothing at all: It will remain quiet and peaceful; will not be so bad; nothing at all; nothing much will happen; as usual; no serious disturbances; all will be settled before; police will secure peace and order; not much will be done; etc.

31

Only incidents at the borders of the sectors: Conflicts and frictions at the border of the sectors; everything will be confined to the border of the sectors; minor riots at the border between the sectors; etc.

8

Marching only in Eastern Berlin: Everything will take place in the Eastern sector; marching and propaganda demonstrations in the Eastern sectors; they will stay in East Berlin; propaganda arrangements in the Eastern sector; etc.

6

Marching of the FDJ into the West sectors: Marching and demonstrations of the FDJ in the West sectors; youngsters will try to march into the Western sectors; etc.

5

Large-scale riots and incidents: Much shooting; casualties; killing; civil war; murder and man-slaughter; serious conflicts between West Berlin police forces, occupation troops and insurgents; etc.

5

Other remarks: Americans will prevent FDJ from coming in; FDJ will do shopping and window-shopping in West Berlin; much talking and music; will make themselves ridiculous; will come to see reconstructions and achievements in West Berlin; etc.

4

Don't know:

1
100%

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

ONLY MINORITY VERY MUCH CONCERNED ABOUT WHITSUNTIDE MARCH ...

To obtain some measure of how disturbed West Berliners might be about the forthcoming events on Whitsuntide, those interviewed were asked how concerned most of their friends and acquaintances appeared to be. Only about a quarter answer that the people in their circle are very much concerned, 35% say they are a little concerned and four in ten feel that they are not at all concerned about the impending march.

"Do you think that most of your friends and acquaintances are very much concerned about the planned meeting, a little concerned or not at all concerned about the meeting?"

Very much concerned	23%
Little concerned	35
Not at all concerned	41
No opinion	1
	<u>100%</u>

OVERWHELMING CONFIDENCE IN SAFETY OF WEST BERLINERS ...

Whatever concern exists about what will happen on Whitsuntide, there is a overwhelming conviction that the safety of the West Berliners will be guaranteed.

"Have you the feeling that enough will be done to insure the safety of the West Berlin population, or not?"

YES**	93%
Yes	7
No	*
Undecided	-
	<u>100%</u>

* Less than one half of one per cent.

** Answers recorded in this category were given with especial emphasis.

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

Opinion divides on who is primarily responsible for maintaining peace and order during the Whitsuntide march - the West Berlin magistrate or the Western powers.

"Who is, in your opinion, primarily responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in Berlin during the Whitsuntide march - the West Berlin magistrate or the Western powers?"

Magistrate	41%
Western powers	44
Both equally	14
No opinion	20
	<u>100%</u>

WHAT SHOULD WEST MAGISTRATE DO? ...

When asked what the West magistrate should do in regard to the FDJ meeting, the largest number of those interviewed either suggest ways of preventing the youths from marching into the West sectors - close the sector boundaries with the police and fire department - or simply state that the march should be prevented. Four in ten think the police should be mobilized and kept in readiness. Only 2% think that nothing at all should be done.

"What measures should the magistrate of West Berlin take in respect to the meeting of the FDJ?"

Close the boundaries of the sectors with police and fire department; streets and especially important points should be occupied by police; Complete closing of sectors; railway stations should be occupied; surveillance of sector boundaries by police; place fire department with water-hoses at boundaries; place police at especially important places and boundaries of sectors; etc. 38%

Reinforcement of police - have them kept in readiness; Keep police on alert; highest alert for police; mobilize everything; keep everybody on the alert; etc. 38

Forbid the coming-in of FDJ; do everything to keep them out; defend oneself; Forbid any demonstrations; forbid FDJ to come into Western sectors; plant posters saying that meeting is forbidden; don't let FDJ come in; break up crowds; should not let things go so far that they actually start marching; see to it that all men fall in to put a girle around Berlin; etc. 10

See to it that quiet and order is preserved; admonish the population to keep quiet and keep off the streets; See to it that West Berliners keep in their houses; take measures to insure safety of shops and the general public; magistrate has to see that nothing is destroyed or plundered; ask the population to pay no attention to the marching; etc. 8

Work with Western powers; Help the Western powers; guard boundaries with aid of MP's; improve security with military forces; ask the Americans for troops; etc. 5

Take precautionary measures and wait; don't take the initiative; Wait; should adopt precautionary measures; remain neutral; etc. 3

Do nothing - let them march through; Don't take any measures; let them march through; etc. 2

Try with kindness to prevent march; Ask demonstrators to remain in the Eastern sectors; try with kindness, maybe with loudspeakers to stop crowds at boundaries; take up negotiations with East zone government so that they will not march through the West sectors; etc. 1

Other remarks: Have cold water ready; have cheap foods at the disposition of FDJ; make a proclamation to Berliners to line streets and laugh at the demonstrators; etc. 3

108%

*Percentage adds up to more than 100% as some people gave more than one answer.

WHAT SHOULD WESTERN POWERS DO? ...

The majority of the West Berliners advise the Western powers not to initiate any action on "Whitsuntide". Rather, they think the Western powers should "be ready to act in case of emergency" "keep in the background and wait." However, a large minority recommend that the West take a more vigorous role - they should back up the magistrate; use troops; patrol the streets with MP's; and the like.

"And what should the Western powers do?"

Be ready to act in case of emergency; assist German forces, if they are not sufficient; Only interfere if the Russians take action; keep their troops ready; act with military force if German police of the West sectors cannot master the situation; should interfere in case of emergency; etc.

49%

They shall help us and back the magistrate: Afford good protection to the magistrate and not make only promises; they should help; assist the police; help the Germans, help the magistrate, but not shoot; etc.

14

Use military forces: Use Americans; put their soldiers at our disposal; help the magistrate with troops; offer troops; drive up with their tanks; offer forces for protection; etc.

11

Take vigorous measures to prevent march; forbid the march: Break up demonstrations taking place; arrest the visitors; defend West Berlin from any attack; shoot at the FDJ; block the sectoral borders; use truncheons and drive them out; etc.

8

Delegate military police and keep them ready: Keep MP's ready; MP's shall control the streets; motorized controls should be used on a larger scale; support the magistrate with military police; etc.

7

Keep in the background and wait: Keep themselves in the background; wait what will happen; they should keep quiet and keep themselves behind to give the other party no motive for attacks; etc.

3

Do nothing - stay out of it: Nothing at all; not interfere; they have nothing to say about Berlin and should stay out of Berlin; it is not the business of the Western powers; it is a demonstration for peace; etc.

4

Negotiate with the Russians: Speak their mind with the Russians in this respect; come to an agreement with the Russians to prevent march; etc.

1

Other remarks: Issue ordinances that the police will be used in the right way; give good food to every single person that comes along and then send them home; the High Commissioners should be in Berlin then; care for quiet; maintain communication with the magistrate's police; encourage the people not to notice; etc.

3

No opinion:

3
103%

* Percentage adds up to more than 100% as some people gave more than one answer.

PASSIVE ROLE ADVISED FOR WEST BERLINERS ...

Almost all West Berliners think that they themselves should play a completely passive role on Whitsuntide. Four in ten suggest that the people remain in their houses. A similar proportion recommend that they remain neutral, peaceful, quiet. A few think that the people should pursue their normal Whitsuntide pleasures and a negligible three per cent advise some form of resistance.

"In your opinion, how should the population of Western Berlin behave on Whitsuntide?"

<u>Remain at home; don't go out on the streets:</u>	39%
<u>Remain neutral; disciplined: Quiet, peaceful, passive; retain composure; don't get excited; avoid crowding; no counter demonstration; don't even notice it; prevent provocations; police will take care of it; etc.</u>	37
<u>As usual on Whitsuntide: As ever on holidays; behave normally; follow their pleasures; go out as usual; as usual on Whitsuntide; everybody should follow his own plans; etc.</u>	15
<u>Don't go into the East sector; don't cross borders: People living near borders should stay at home; etc.</u>	3
<u>Put up resistance and prevent march: Show passive resistance; use energetic means against it; throw rotten eggs; take part of Americans in incidents; be ready for everything; shouldn't stand anything; interfere with it; defend themselves; prevent marching through; etc.</u>	3
<u>Other remarks: Enlighten FDJ on conditions here; tell FDJ that we are better off; West Berliners should invite FDJ-people so that they see that we are better off; etc.</u>	3
	<u>100%</u>

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HIGH SUPPORT FOR MAYOR'S BAN ON MARCH ...

Results to the preceding questions indicate that there is little sympathy for the idea of the FDJ marching into the Western sectors. A direct inquiry discloses that as many as 85% think that the magistrate should forbid the march into West Berlin. Two thirds of those interviewed are also aware of the fact that the march has been forbidden.

"In your opinion, should the West Berlin magistrate permit or forbid a march through West Berlin?"

Permit	12%
Forbid	85
Others	2
No opinion	1
	<u>100%</u>

"And do you know whether the West Berlin magistrate has permitted or forbidden the march in West Berlin?"

Permitted	1%
Forbidden	66
No opinion	33
	<u>100%</u>

Before leaders of the FDJ announced that they no longer planned to march through West Berlin, over three fourths of the West Berlin residents expected them to try to march in spite of the mayor's prohibition.

"Do you suppose the FDJ will attempt to march through West Berlin in spite of the prohibition?"

Yes	77%
No	23
No opinion	-
	<u>100%</u>

ALMOST ALL WOULD PREVENT FDJ FROM ENTERING WEST ...

In the event that the FDJ should attempt to march into the Western sectors, almost all of the West Berliners say that they should be prevented.. Some describe the measures they think should be taken - "use police, troops and fire brigades armed with tear-gas and hoses" - block the borders between the sectors - arrest the rioters. A few recommend using guns if nothing else can stop the march. A small minority would let the FDJ enter the Western sectors as long as they behave themselves. One recommends that they be allowed to buy in certain shops for an exchange of one East Mark to one West Mark.

"What should the magistrate and the Western powers do if the FDJ should try to march into West Berlin?"

Should not let in the demonstrators - push them back and drive them out;
Should halt them; disperse their meetings; force them away; beat them
back if they cross the border; drive them back in any case; force them
to return; carry out preventive measures; disperse them somehow; force
them back to their boundaries; etc. 49%

Should use police, troops and fire brigades armed with tear-gas and
hoses; Should push back FDJ with the aid of troops; police must prevent
it; Western powers will help in case of emergency; then they must
protect us by police and troops; drive them back with tear-gas; would
be the best to put fire-brigades into action; prevent them from
marching in by water and tear-gas; etc. 14

Should block the border between the sectors and the approaches;
Occupy border between sectors to prevent marching; block approaches;
secure border of sectors by police forces and troops; etc. 9

Arrest rioters: Arrest them immediately; arrest people and punish them
as they have been warned for weeks; arrest the rioters; find out the
gang-leaders and punish them severely; arrest them and inform them
about the truth; etc. 8

Should try to prevent march by peaceful means and apply force only in
case of emergency: Should ask them to go back and if that doesn't
help apply force; push them back into the Eastern sector peacefully;
try to explain the youngsters why it is forbidden, then nothing will
happen; try to negotiate; etc. 8

Use guns in case of emergency: Shoot back immediately if they fire; at
first use hoses and if that doesn't help shoot with guns; if it cannot
be settled peacefully police must use guns; etc. 4

Prevent them from marching by force but without shooting; etc. 2

Let the FDJ march - expel them only in case of rioting and if they
march in large units: Let them alone if they conduct themselves
peacefully and sing; let them through if they come in small groups
and behave well, but push them back otherwise; etc. 4

Don't do anything - let them march: Nothing for they march only through
our sector; let them come in, it will not do any harm; etc. 2

Other remarks: Permit them to buy in certain shops for an exchange of
one to one (1 West Mark - 1 East Mark); keep calm and avoid provocations;
they should provide for peace and order; etc. 2

102%

* Percentage adds up to more than 100% as some people gave more than one answer.

V. AWARENESS OF POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF WHITSUNTIDE

WHAT IS PURPOSE OF MEETING? ...

In spite of the frequency with which the Eastern press and radio claimed the peaceful purposes of the FDJ meeting, only a miniscule 1% of the West Berliners consider the meeting to be a demonstration for peace and unity. Rather, four in ten think the meeting is being held for propaganda purposes - 32% say it is to provoke riots-18% regard it as an attempt to incorporate all of Berlin into the East zone,

"In your opinion, what is the purpose of the Whitsunday Meeting in Berlin?"

For reasons of propaganda and prestige; a demonstration of power; to accomplish political aims and propagate their ideas: The East wants to demonstrate its power; to show the power of the SED for propaganda purposes; to maintain their prestige; to prove to the world the power of Communism; to draw West Berliners to the East; to woo West Berlin to their aims; to make West Berlin obedient to the SED; etc.

37%

To provoke riots; provocations; to cause quarrels and frictions: To carry out violent measures; to instigate rebellion; to provoke uproar and revolt; to cause discord; to make difficulties for the magistrate; to incite West Berlin to rebellion; etc.

32

To incorporate Berlin into the East zone; attempt a revolutionary outbreak: Signal for a conquest of Berlin; Russians want to have all of Berlin; to provoke revolutionary outbreaks; to conquer us; to bring about a revolution; to incorporate West Berlin to the East zone; etc.

18

To influence youth: To win the youth of West Berlin; to incite youth to rebellion; Russians intend to draw the youth to their side; to direct attention of West Berlin youngsters to the paradise of the East; to strengthen adherence of youth to Bolshevism; and to show how well off the youth in the Eastern sector are; etc.

5

As political pressure on the West; provocation toward the West: To create political disharmonies between the East and the West; to initiate quarrels with the Western powers; Russians don't want to give way; to quarrel with America; to expel the occupation forces; etc.

4

To test reactions of West Berliners; final rehearsal for an attempted revolution: A kite to investigate reactions; a barometer for the mood of West Berliners; to find out how much the opposition can defend itself; prelude for a test of strength; they want to find out about the reactions of the West Berlin population; etc.

2

To create a unified Germany; demonstration for peace and unity: Manifestation of peace-mindedness; demonstration against war and war-mongers; to create a unified Germany; to bring about a change for better; etc.

1

Other remarks: To bring about the acceptance of the FDJ in West Berlin; to see the reconstruction of West Berlin; to show the distress of West Berlin to the youth of the East zone; to start civil war; to demonstrate in favor of the East magistrate; to show Berlin to the youngsters; as a declaration of war; etc.

2

Don't know:

5
105%

* Percentage adds up to more than 100% as some people gave more than one answer.

YOUTH FORCED TO PARTICIPATE ...

From results to the preceding question and the following, there appear to be few illusions among West Berliners as to the purposes and nature of the FDJ Meeting. Nine in ten think that most of the youths are forced to participate, and a similar overwhelming proportion are convinced that in general the leadership of the FDJ represents more the interests of Russia than those of the youth in Eastern Germany.

"Do you think most of the participants who actually come, will come voluntarily, or are forced to come?"

Most come voluntarily	8%
Most are forced	90
Don't know	2
	<u>100%</u>

"Are you of the opinion that the leadership of the East-Zone-FDJ represents more the interests of the youth of Eastern Germany, or more the interests of Russia?"

Interests of German youth	9%
Interests of Russia	87
Don't know	4
	<u>100%</u>

VI. ATTITUDES TOWARD AMERICAN POLICY

MAJORITY CONSIDER AMERICAN POLICY TOO CONCILIATORY ...

Almost six in ten West Berliners believe that recent American policy toward Russia has been too conciliatory. However, most of those who make such a criticism, credit the US with what might be considered as good motives for having such a policy. One quarter believes that US policy is not firm because she seeks to solve the world crisis in a peaceful way. Another 8% sees diplomatic tactics in the US policy. A minority think that such a conciliatory policy is inherent in a democratic form of government.

"Are you of the opinion, that the American policy toward Russia recently has been as firm as it could be under the circumstances, or do you think that it has been too conciliatory?"

Firm enough	36%
Too conciliatory	58
No opinion	6
	<u>100%</u>

A C D

"What do you think is the reason for that?"

America wants to eliminate tensions in a peaceful way; avoid application of force, violence and war; So as not to drive the tensions to the breaking-point, they always yield; to avoid a new war and its casualties; to secure peace; to give the Russians no chance to provoke a war; they don't want to increase the differences; they want to settle everything peacefully; to avoid a conflict; etc.

26%

American policy is cautious for tactical reasons: That is high diplomacy; Americas foreign policy is purposely not so rigidly conducted for tactical reasons; they give Russia enough rope, so they will be able to overcome her; they want to force their partner to show his colors; they don't want to make the stone roll; to win the Russian satellites to their side; to show the world how far the Russians will go; etc.

8

America is not yet strong enough for a firmer policy at the present time: Because they are not yet ready to engage (in a war) with Russia; the Americans don't feel strong enough yet; the time is not yet ripe; the re-armament is not yet completed; to gain time; the Americans need time for getting ready to start a war; they have not enough forces and arms in Germany; etc.

5

Because of America's democratic principles: That lies in America's democratic politics - it is on the whole too conciliatory for democratic reasons; their democratic attitude; they are too democratic and not totalitarian enough; etc.

4

Fear of Russia (new blockade and so on): Fear of the power of Russia; they are afraid that the Russians will overrun them with their masses; fear of the difficulties with Russia; etc.

3

America underestimates the power (danger) of Russia: The Americans have not seen through the tricks of Russia; because they still underestimate the Russians; etc.

2

Because of America's basically fair attitude: It stems from the American fairness; the Americans can not stir up as much strife as the Russians; etc.

2

Other remarks: Because the Americans have not insisted from the beginning on maintaining a free access to Berlin; and so have forfeited everything; they are businessmen; isolationism in America is still too great; because they don't get along with the Englishmen and the French; etc.

3

No opinion:

5
58%

In the latest survey almost three fourths of the West Berliners (73%) expressed the view that the Western powers are doing their utmost to relieve distressed conditions in Berlin. This figure clearly indicates that the difficulties of the prospective White-tide March have not intensified any feeling among West Berliners that the Western powers are not doing all they can to help.

"Do you think that the Western powers are doing their utmost to relieve distressed conditions in Berlin or could they do more?"

	1948			1949					1950
	July	Aug	Sep	Jan	Mar	May	Aug	Dec	April
Are doing their utmost	77%	69%	66%	69%	46%	78%	64%	67%	73%
Could do more	22	29	32	31	54	22	35	32	27
No opinion	1	2	2	-	-	-	1	1	-
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Most of those who think the Western powers could do more are thinking in terms of economic aid - the bringing in of more money and credit which would help solve the unemployment problem.

"What could they do more for instance? (Asked of those who answered "they could do more" in previous question).

Special economic support of Berlin by procurement of work and money; (also credits ERP, and so on); enlivening commerce: They could provide for more work in Berlin, so we not only get loans but are able to pay for them; abolish unemployment; give more orders to Berlin; fight against unemployment; by giving more credits; invest more money, so the economy is propped up and unemployment disappears; to make exports easier and adapt our prices to those in the USA; allow us to participate in international trade; etc. 15%

The Western powers should be more firm toward the Russians: They should not put up with everything the Russians are doing; they should not give way to the Russians so often and should not make any compromises; should be more firm with the Russians in carrying out our interests, I am thinking for instance of the rail-road traffic; etc. 4

They should better supervise German offices: They should exert more pressure upon the magistrate and Federal government; they should see to it that the salaries are paid more punctually by the magistrate; exert more pressure on the Federal government to help us more, for they are not doing anything but talking over there; they should be interested to see that the administration is conducted by not only party big shots but by experts too; etc. 3

They should come to terms with the East: They should get us a peaceful reconciliation finally; etc. 1

The three Western powers should agree among themselves and help equally: Only the Americans aid needy Berlin by generous measures; all three Big Powers would succeed in helping Germany if they agreed among themselves; etc. 1

Equal rights for Berlin: Give Berlin the same rights as Western Germany; - for instance pensions and revenues; that West Berlin is integrated into the Federal government (Western Germany); etc. 1

The Western powers should give us a freer hand: Give us more freedom of action; etc. 1

Other remarks: 1
27%

RESTRICTED

00227

ATTITUDES OF STUDENTS
AT ERLANGEN AND MUNICH UNIVERSITIES

**Classification cancelled
by authority of Leo P. Crespi
PUB/RAS.**

Report No. 17
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30 April, 1950

REACTIONS ANALYSIS UNIT
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
HICOG APC 807
Bad Nauheim Germany

RESTRICTED

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- a -

R E S T R I C T E D

INTRODUCTION...

Some observers of present-day student bodies in Western German universities have claimed that they are strongholds of conservatism and nationalism, not to say reaction and nazism. Others have asserted the contrary, saying that today's German students appear quite promising.

In an initial effort to measure the direction of opinions of West German students, the Munich office of the Reactions Analysis Unit, OPuB, HICOG undertook a survey in February 1950, among students at Erlangen and Munich universities. They were queried on a variety of social and political issues. As many of the questions used have been frequently asked the U.S. Zone public, the latter's opinions on the issues reported here are also included wherever comparable findings are available.

Using U.S. Zone opinions as a frame of reference, there is little basis - in this initial study - to consider students more conservative, and certainly not more politically apathetic than their elders. As a rule, the contrary is the case. However, as this study is only a preliminary one, a more considered judgment must wait on a larger, more detailed survey.

In the present inquiry a representative, random sample consisting of 300 students at Munich and 260 at Erlangen was interviewed at home by trained German interviewers under professional American supervisors.

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R E S T R I C T E D

I. POLITICAL AFFAIRS

INTEREST IN POLITICS ...

Eight in ten Munich and Erlangen students claim to be interested in politics. This is in very sharp contrast to expressed attitudes of the U.S. Zone public which consistently since 1946 has registered majority disinterest. Replies of students as compared with the most recent (November 1949) showing of the U.S. Zone public are detailed below.

"Are you yourself interested in politics,
or do you prefer to leave that to others?"

	Munich	Erlangen	US ZONE
Interested in politics	80%	82%	35%
Leave it to others	<u>20</u> 100%	<u>18</u> 100%	<u>65</u> 100%

... Women students in both universities are less likely than men students to claim to be interested in politics.

	Munich		Erlangen	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
Interested in politics	87%	54%	87%	61%
Leave it to others	<u>13</u> 100%	<u>46</u> 100%	<u>13</u> 100%	<u>39</u> 100%

As will be noted in the catalogued replies of the minority expressing disinterest in politics, the reasons advanced tend to be rationalizations rather than basically critical judgments.

Reasons given for "Leaving it to others":

	Munich	Erlangen
Have had bad experiences in the past	19%	16%
No time	17	23
As a woman has not interest	15	19
Don't understand anything about politics	12	8
There is no use, situation is hopeless	12	4
Too many personal troubles	6	4
Too young	2	2
Other reasons	<u>17</u> 100%	<u>27</u> 103%

* Adds up to more than 100 per cent because
some people gave more than one answer.

PREFERENCE IN TYPES OF GOVERNMENT : : :

If faced with a need for a choice, most students would select a government assuring civil liberties over one guaranteeing economic security. In this, their opinions are in marked contrast to US Zone respondents who when asked to choose between the same alternative have voted consistently (six out of ten) for security.

"Which of these types of government would you, personally, choose as better?"

	Munich	Erlangen	US ZONE
A government which offers the people economic security and the possibilities of a good income	22%	25%	61%
A government which guarantees free elections, freedom of speech, a free press and religious freedom	71	65	30
No opinion	<u>7</u> 100%	<u>10</u> 100%	<u>9</u> 100%

However, most students apparently do not believe such a choice is a real or necessary one. They feel a government can offer both bread and freedom. In this they again are proportionately more optimistic than US Zone respondents, though among the latter also preponderant opinions are that a government can provide for both freedom and security.

"Do you think that a government would be able to offer the people both political freedom and economic security?"

	Munich	Erlangen	US ZONE
Yes	84%	86%	70%
No	10	8	22
No opinion	<u>6</u> 100%	<u>6</u> 100%	<u>8</u> 100%

CAN GERMANS GOVERN THEMSELVES DEMOCRATICALLY? ...

Approximately half of the Munich and Erlangen students are of the opinion that Germans today are not capable of democratic government. Comparison of these figures with those obtained in the U.S. Zone may suggest that when people make up their minds on this issue, they tend to vote negatively rather than affirmatively.

"Do you believe that the Germans today could actually govern themselves democratically?"

	Munich	Erlangen	US ZONE
Yes	44%	45%	49%
No	51	54	33
No opinion	5	1	18
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Most of the students who answered negatively, gave as their reasons: first, that the Germans today do not have enough experience in democratic procedures, and second, that the time to learn has been too short since the Hitler fiasco.

APPRAISAL OF POLITICAL PARTIES ...

Almost two-thirds of the students feel that present political parties are doing constructive work, though almost three in ten take an opposite view. *

"Do you think that the present-day political parties are doing constructive work, or not?"

	Munich	Erlangen
Constructive work	63%	65%
Not doing constructive work	31	27
No opinion	6	8
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

... But majority approval of party activities should not be taken to mean a blanket vote of confidence in present-day political parties, as is indicated in results of the question reported on the following page.

*This question has not been asked the US Zone public.

Seven out of ten students are rather dubious about the good intentions of the political parties, asserting that if a choice between general welfare and party advantage were necessary, the parties would look to their own interests. On this issue, students and the general public are largely in agreement.

"Does it seem to you that present-day political parties are primarily concerned with the good of the country, or if it came to a choice, would they decide in favor of their own interest?"

	Munich	Erlangen	US ZONE
Good of the country	24%	25%	20%
Own interest	71	68	62
No opinion	5	7	18
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

As some students phrased it, "the politicians will always do what they want anyway." Many of the students also say that Germany's current political parties are like those which seventeen years ago were too inept to ward off National Socialism.

PREFERENCE FOR THE MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM ...

Very few of the students queried believe in the desirability of having a single party system in the government; practically all of them prefer the multi-party system.*

"What form of government do you prefer:
A one-party system or a multi-party system?"

	Munich	Erlangen
One-party system	7%	4%
Multi-party system	92	94
No opinion	1	2
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

PARTICIPATION IN BUNDESTAG ELECTION ...

Proportionately fewer students than US Zone adults participated in last summer's Bundestag elections. Reasons for this discrepancy are not immediately evident, and are worthy of further study.

"Did you vote in the Bundestag election?"

	Munich	Erlangen	US ZONE
Yes	64%	59%	74%
No	25	30	16
Too young	11	11	10
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

* A question of similar intent was put to the US Zone public in February 1950: "If you had to decide, how many different political parties would you permit in Western Germany today?" Results were: 18% for one party, 65% for two or more, and 17% undecided.

II. GERMANY AND WAR

CAUSES OF THE WAR ...

The student respondents are more inclined than the German public as a whole to give "particular circumstances" as a cause of the war. However, as will be noted in the summary of particularized replies, almost half refer to Germany.

"Who do you really believe was mainly responsible for the last war, - Germany, other countries, or particular circumstances?"

	Munich	Erlangen	US ZONE
Germany	27%	25%	37%
Other nations	4	5	9
Particular circumstances	65	67	36
No opinion	4	3	18
	100%	100%	100%

Answers to "What particular circumstances?" *

	Munich	Erlangen
Hitler alone, his policy of expansion	16%	11%
Germany became too powerful	14	19
Versailles treaty	12	12
Economic crises throughout the world	11	6
Not enough living space for our people, recovery of our colonies	8	5
All participating nations were guilty	6	15
Fight between world ideologies	4	5
Support given to Hitler by foreign countries	3	2
Other reasons	7	6
	81%	81%

(Adds to more than 65, 67 per cent respectively as several answers were given)

CAUSES OF DEFEAT ...

Most students feel that Germany was defeated in the war because of the superiority of the opponent, rather than because of any treachery at home. In this their opinions are markedly more one-sided than those of the US Zone public. Among the latter almost as many ascribe treachery as a reason for defeat as say that superior strength was the cause.

"Are you of the opinion that Germany's defeat in the last war was due to the military superiority of her enemies or rather due to the treachery of a certain group of people within Germany?"

	Munich	Erlangen	US ZONE
Military superiority	81%	75%	45%
Treachery	12	17	38
Both	-	-	5
No opinion	7	8	12
	100%	100%	100%

* A comparison with replies of US Zone respondents is not possible because the specificity of students replies necessitated a more detailed cataloguing than was required in general surveys.

More students than the US Zone residents claim lack of confidence in Germany's war-time high command. But large majorities of both groups assert that even though Hitler had not interfered with the generals, Germany still would have lost the war.

"Suppose Hitler had left the conduct of the war up to the generals, do you think Germany would have won then, or not?"

	Munich	Erlangen	US ZONE
Yes	15%	19%	18%
No	80	75	65
No opinion	5	6	17
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

MILITARISM ...

Opinions are almost evenly divided among students on whether the German people tend to be more militaristic-minded than other people. In Munich 47% say Germans do not differ from other people in this respect; in Erlangen 52% are of this opinion.

"Do you think the Germans generally tend to be more militaristic than other people - or less?"

	Munich	Erlangen
More than other people	46%	43%
Less than other people	4	3
Just the same	47	52
No opinion	3	2
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

WAR IN TEN YEARS ? ...

Students are more or less evenly divided as to whether or not there will be another world war within the next ten years. In this respect their opinions resemble those of the general public.

"Do you believe that there will be another world war within the next ten years?"

	Munich	Erlangen	US ZONE
Yes	46%	42%	47%
No	45	52	41
No opinion	9	6	12
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE FORMATION OF A GERMAN ARMY ...

It seems very clear from the following results that practically no students are anxious to shoulder a rifle again, even if they were offered an officer's commission

"Suppose Germany had an army again -
would you want to become a soldier?"

ACD

	Munich	Erlangen
Yes	4%	9%
No	<u>96</u>	<u>91</u>
	100%	100%

Students who said "No" were further asked:

"And if you had the opportunity to become an officer, -
would you want to become an officer?"

ACD

	Munich	Erlangen
Yes	3%	3%
No	<u>93</u>	<u>88</u>
	96%	91%

PREVIOUS ARMY SERVICE ...

Only three out of ten of today's students were not members of the German army.

"Have you been a member of the German army?"

	Munich	Erlangen
Yes, as a soldier	54%	51%
Yes, as an officer	17	17
No	<u>29</u>	<u>32</u>
	100%	100%

ATTITUDES TOWARD NATIONAL SOCIALISM ...

A majority of students (51% in Munich and 59% in Erlangen) agree with the US Zone public in regarding National Socialism as a good idea, badly carried out. It is noteworthy, however, that inspection of the comments by students indicates there is not much difference between arguments of those who consider National Socialism "bad," and those who think it was a good idea, but "badly carried out."

"Was National Socialism a bad idea, or a good idea badly carried out?"

	Munich	Erlangen	US ZONE
Bad idea	43%	32%	30%
Good idea, badly carried out	51	59	59
No opinion	6	9	11
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Students who regarded National Socialism as a good idea, badly carried out, were further asked, why they thought it was badly carried out:

	Munich	Erlangen
Race theory; persecution of Jews; KZ;	24%	36%
Exaggeration of party program; intensified militarism; policy which led to war	36	18
Coercion; restriction of personal liberty and legal rights;	16	29
Too many fanatic party leaders; party functionaries enriching themselves;	18	21
Adoration of the Fuehrer; dictatorship; totalitarianism;	16	13
Excessive nationalism; delusion of grandeur; superman complex;	16	10
No respect for other nations	16	2
Intolerance	8	2
Other reasons (persecution of the Church)	8	23
	<u>158%</u> *	<u>154%</u> *

Students who regarded National Socialism as a bad idea were asked further: "Why?"

	Munich	Erlangen
Race theory; persecution of Jews; KZ;	47%	42%
Restriction of personal liberty; no freedom of thought;	41	26
Totalitarianism; dictatorship;	28	27
Objectionable nationalism;	25	12
Persecution of Church	16	13
Intolerance	15	11
Superman attitude	10	10
Politics which led to war	9	7
Hitler's delusion of grandeur	7	5
Other reasons (enslavement of peoples, etc.);	10	14
	<u>208%</u> *	<u>167%</u> *

* Adds to more than 100 per cent because some people gave more than one answer.

More students than US Zone people in general assert that war was an inevitable concomitant of National Socialism.

"Do you think that Germany could have had a National Socialist government without going to war, or are you of the opinion that with a National Socialist regime sooner or later there had to be war?"

	Munich	Erlangen	US ZONE
National Socialist regime without war	29%	32%	31%
Had to come to war	70	65	54
No opinion	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>15</u>
	100%	100%	100%

A notable finding is that students who see some good in National Socialism tend much more frequently than those who think it was a bad idea to feel that a National Socialist regime did not make war inevitable.

National Socialism was a:

	<u>Bad idea</u>		<u>Good idea, badly carried out</u>	
	M	E	M	E
National Socialist regime without war	11%	10%	45%	46%
Had to come to war	89	88	54	53
No opinion	<u>-</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%

The majority who thought war was inevitable were asked the further question "Why in your opinion did it result in a war?" with the following answers:

	Munich	Erlangen
Hitler's delusion of grandeur	35%	27%
Insanity of party leaders, egotistical attitude, power-hungry party officials	15	27
Jealousy and hatred of the world toward Germany	14	18
General world economic crisis	13	5
Extreme radicalism	7	19
Recognition and support of the National Socialist regime by foreign nations	3	1
Other reasons	<u>24</u>	<u>28</u>
	111%*	125%*

* Adds to more than 100 per cent because some people gave more than one answer.

NATIONALISM IN THE STUDENTS' MIND

As will be seen in the definitions as catalogued in the table below, almost half the students in both universities defined nationalism in terms such as "exaggerated pride in one own's country, extreme national selfishness," etc. A smaller proportion spoke of it as "love of country," "patriotism," etc. Clearly the first and larger group considers nationalism in terms which many people have in mind when they speak of nationalism as dangerous. Further analysis shows, in fact, that few in the group which define nationalism in terms of exaggerated national pride etc., think nationalism is a good thing; on the other hand, those who associate nationalism with patriotism feel in large numbers that people should be nationalistic.

"What do you understand by nationalism?"

Munich Erlangen US ZONE

Nationalism defined as being egotistic and exaggerated

Exaggerated estimation of own nation; extreme national selfishness; narrowminded nationalism; inflated ego; nobody has any rights but us; etc.

49% 48% 12%

Nationalism defined as patriotism

Love of one's country
Union of a group of people who speak and think the same way
General ethical demands, abilities and talents of one's people
Recognition of language frontiers as national boundaries
Others
No opinion

36 36 13
9 8 17
4 6 1
1 - -
1 2 3
- - 54
100% 100% 100%

"Do you feel that people should have a nationalistic attitude?"

	Nationalism defined as being egotistic		Nationalism defined as patriotism		Total	
	Munich	Erlangen	Munich	Erlangen	Munich	Erlangen
Yes	6%	7%	45%	45%	51%	52%
No	43	40	4	6	47	46
No opinion	-	1	2	1	2	2
	49%	48%	51%	52%	100%	100%

APPROVAL OF WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT ...

The accomplishments to date of the West German government appear satisfactory to a majority of students. In this respect they differ from the US Zone public as a whole, fewer of whom express satisfaction with the work of Bonn.

"In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the activities of the West German government up to now?"

	Munich	Erlangen	US Zone
Satisfied	66%	70%	36%
Dissatisfied	18	13	30
Neither/Nor	6	6	11
No opinion	10	11	23
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Typical reasons for the pro and con opinions were the following:

By those who express satisfaction:

1. The government does what is possible under the circumstances (Occupation Statute); several successes have been achieved.
2. Economic recovery throughout Western Germany.

The ones who are dissatisfied mentioned the following shortcomings:

1. The government has not really accomplished anything up to this date.
2. Too many officials there spend a lot of money on themselves.

DEPENDENCY OF BONN ON ALLIES ...

Students are much more likely than the US Zone public to say that the occupation powers have too much influence on decisions taken by the West German government.

"Do you think the Western powers have too great an influence on the decisions of the West German government, or are you of the opinion that the West German republic is sufficiently independent?"

	Munich	Erlangen	US ZONE
Too great an influence	73%	83%	41%
Sufficiently independent	23	14	31
No opinion	4	3	28
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

... But like the public as a whole, only a fraction consider Bonn to be a puppet of the occupiers.

"It has been said that the West German government is a puppet government, and can only do what the Western powers prescribe. Do you agree with this or not?" (Asked of those who said "Too great an influence")

	Munich	Erlangen	US ZONE
Yes, is a puppet	14%	12%	14%
No, is not a puppet	56	67	24
No opinion	3	4	3
	<u>73%</u>	<u>83%</u>	<u>41%</u>

EAST GERMAN GOVERNMENT A PUPPET ...

Nine out of ten students clearly regard the East German government as being a puppet in the hands of the Russian authorities. In addition practically all of the students think that the East German government is more dependent on the Russians than the West German government is on the Western powers.

On both issues the direction of opinions is the same for students and public, though the students, again, are more certain numerically considered.

"It has been said that the East German government is a puppet government, and can only do what the Russian occupation authorities prescribe. Are you of the same opinion, or not?"

	Munich	Erlangen	US ZONE
Yes, is a puppet	87%	86%	74%
No, is not a puppet	6	9	6
No opinion	7	5	20
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

"Which one of the two German governments do you think is more dependent on the occupation powers: The East German or the West German government?"

	Munich	Erlangen	US ZONE
East German government	95%	96%	73%
West German government	-	-	5
Both the same	2	3	6
No opinion	3	1	16
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Although large numbers of the students express satisfaction with the activities of the Bonn government, the same cannot be said about the Bavarian government. Only 35% in Munich and 21% in Erlangen judge the work of the Bavarian government satisfactory. The larger percentage of students in Munich who voice their satisfaction may result from the fact that most of these students belong to the Catholic faith, while in Erlangen a Protestant majority is in evidence.* Of the Munich students, who are Catholics and regular church-goers, 54% have no complaints about their state government.

"Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the activities of the present Bavarian government?"

	Munich	Erlangen
Satisfied	35%	21%
Dissatisfied	49	65
No opinion	16	14
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

MINISTER OF EDUCATION NOT POPULAR WITH STUDENTS ...

The Bavarian Minister of Education, Dr. Hundhammer in his capacity as minister has the power to decide all matters affecting the universities. As such, he has insisted that a list of candidates be presented to him prior to any student election, and has exerted considerable control over financial affairs of the student government. Only 28% of the students in Munich and 10% in Erlangen approve of his activities.

"In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the activities of the present Bavarian Minister of Education?"

Munich Erlangen

	Munich	Erlangen
Satisfied	28%	10%
Dissatisfied	66	82
Dissatisfied	6	8
No opinion	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

* Per cent Catholic and Protestant in both universities.

	Catholic regular church-goers	Catholic non-regular	Protestant regular church-goers	Protestant non-regular	Non-affiliates
Munich	36%	28%	7%	26%	3%
Erlangen	22	15	21	40	2

Reasons given by students, who are dissatisfied with the Minister of Education:

1. Too much influence by the Catholic Church.
2. Intolerant, exerts too much influence over the universities, his dictatorial attitude, bound too much by party politics.

... And only a few students think that the working relations between the Education Ministry and their university is good. In Erlangen a majority say it is bad.

"Do you believe that working relations between the (Bavarian) Ministry of Education and the (Munich) (Erlangen) university are good, fair, or bad?"

	Munich	Erlangen
Good	10%	3%
Fair	46	22
Bad	30	59
No opinion	<u>14</u>	<u>16</u>
	100%	100%

Two main reasons as voiced by students dissatisfied with this relationship were:

1. Too little interest in furthering the university, lack of appropriation for the university.
2. Not enough understanding about the problems which the university faces.

A plurality in Munich thinks that the Ministry of Education exerts too great an influence over the university. In Erlangen a plurality feels the university has sufficient independence.

"Do you think the university is sufficiently independent, or are you of the opinion that the Ministry of Education exercises too great an influence?"

	Munich	Erlangen
Independent enough	37%	48%
Too, great an influence	47	32
No opinion	<u>16</u>	<u>20</u>
	100%	100%

UNITED GERMANY ...

Most of the students believe that Germany will be united again, but only after departure of the occupation forces. In this and related issues they are in substantial agreement with the US Zone public. The largest number of respondents think that Germany can be united without a war. Practically all who predict a conflict think it will be another world war and not a civil war.

"Do you believe that in the future there will again be a unified government for all Germany?"

	Munich	Erlangen	US Zone
Yes	74%	76%	73%
No	22	22	15
No opinion	4	2	12
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Those who answered "Yes" were asked the following two questions:

"Do you think the unification of Germany will take place during the occupation, or not before the Occupation Forces have been withdrawn?"

	Munich	Erlangen	US Zone
During the occupation	11%	19%	17%
After departure of occupation troops	55	53	40
No opinion	8	4	16
	<u>74%</u>	<u>76%</u>	<u>73%</u>

"Do you think the unification of Germany will be possible without war?"

	Munich	Erlangen	US Zone
Yes	54%	62%	42%
No	16	14	24
No opinion	4	-	7
	<u>74%</u>	<u>76%</u>	<u>73%</u>

Asked of those who said "No":

"Do you think this will be just a struggle between Eastern and Western Germany, or will it be another world war?"

	Munich	Erlangen	US Zone
Struggle between Eastern and Western Germany	1%	1%	2%
Another world war	15	13	21
No opinion	-	-	1
	<u>16%</u>	<u>14%</u>	<u>24%</u>

ALLIES SHOULD REMAIN IN GERMANY ...

Most students do not favor an early departure of occupation troops from Germany. A possible explanation as to why Erlangen students are more in favor of the departure of US troops might result from the fact that during the last few months, troop "incidents" in the Franconian region have been frequently reported.*

"The Russians at one time proposed that all four occupying powers should leave Germany within the next year. Would you like to see that proposal carried out?"

	Munich	Erlangen	US Zone
Yes	26%	40%	44%
No	72	58	44
No opinion	2	2	12
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

ACD

* E.g. "The German public views the conduct of the Occupation Forces." Report No. 6, Series 2, Reactions Analysis Unit.

THE MARSHALL PLAN ...

Large majorities of the students (67% in Munich, 68% in Erlangen) see Marshall Plan aid as mainly intended to curb Communism. Prevention of Communism as a motive has always been the most widely picked choice. Comparison with US Zone results shows, however, that students are much more inclined than the zone public to ascribe what may be called mercenary motives on the part of the US as the reasons for American aid. Thus, the second most frequently selected reason by students is that the US wishes to dump her goods on Europe. This is a poor fourth among the US Zone public. And proportionately more than twice as many students as US Zone people see the Marshall Plan as a desire to break into the European market. In contrast many fewer students than zone residents as a whole consider the plan primarily humanitarian in purpose. These results suggest that the students, by and large, are more cynical than the public about the Marshall Plan.

"There are different views on what America hopes to gain for herself through the Marshall Plan. Here are some possible reasons why she might want to carry out such a program of aid. Which in your opinion are two of America's main reasons?" **

	Munich	Erlangen	US Zone
Wishes to prevent Western Europe from becoming communist	67%	68%	63%
Wants to use the plan to dump surplus goods	32	34	18
Wants to win friends in Western Europe in order to have allies in case of war with Russia	32	32	48
Is earnestly anxious to help homeless and starving people	28	30	45
Wants to penetrate the European market through the plan	19	14	6
Uses the plan to achieve dominance over Western Europe	9	8	7
Other reasons	5	6	-
Wishes to force its capitalistic system on Europe with the plan	-	2	3
No opinion	4	4	5
	196%	196%	195%

* More than 100% because usually two answers were given.

** Table is arranged in order of frequency of mentions, not in order in which statements were presented on a card handed to respondents.

AMERICANS HAVE FURTHERED THE RECONSTRUCTION OF GERMANY ...

But the students more frequently than the US Zone public say that the US has furthered the reconstruction of Germany.

"Do you believe that the Americans have furthered or hindered the reconstruction of Germany?"

	Munich	Erlangen	US Zone
Furthered	69%	65%	58%
Hindered	11	15	10
Neither - nor	14	18	18
No opinion	6	2	14
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

IX WESTERN UNION

MAJORITY FOR FEDERATION OF EUROPEAN STATES ...

Students much more frequently than the general public prefer German participation in a European federation to a strong independent Germany.

"What do you believe would be more advantageous for Germany's future: If it would become an independent strong state or if it would join a federation of European States?"

	Munich	Erlangen	US ZONE
Independent strong state	12%	19%	30%
Join federation	88	80	56
No opinion	-	1	14
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

X MISCELLANEOUS

CONFIDENCE IN NEWS REPORTING ...

Students in much greater numbers than the public say that the news they are now getting is more trustworthy than that which they received during the war.

"Does the news today in Germany appear to you more trustworthy, or less trustworthy, than that published in Germany during the war?"

	Munich	Erlangen	US ZONE
More trustworthy	85%	89%	57%
Less trustworthy	-	-	2
Just as trustworthy	1	3	4
Just as untrustworthy	9	6	21
No opinion	5	2	16
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

AMERIKA HAUSE ...

About 40% of the students at both universities visit the AMERIKA HAUS at one time or another. This is a relatively larger proportion than has been found to be the case with university educated people generally in previous studies of America House patronage.

"Do you visit the AMERIKA HAUS in Munich (Erlangen)?"

	Munich	Erlangen
Frequently	11%	14%
Occasionally	26	25
Seldom	16	9
Never	47	52
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

"Why do you visit the AMERIKA HAUS?"

	Munich	Erlangen
To read scientific books	45%	53%
Attend concerts	23	6
Because of interesting lectures	10	6
To augment knowledge of English	8	6
Interest in American conditions	6	6
Furthering studies	4	11
Because of foreign magazines	4	8
Use of comfortable chairs, nice rooms	3	18
Because of American literature	2	6
Other reasons	15	14
	<u>120% *</u>	<u>134% *</u>

* Some students gave more than one answer.

STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS ...

The student council at both universities generally known as ASTA (Allgemeiner Studentenausschuss) enjoys marked popularity. 95% in Munich and 93% in Erlangen of the students approve of its work and program. Student societies (Verbindungen) have always taken a prominent place in every German university, especially those where dueling was practiced. The fact that dueling societies find little acceptance among the students, shows that their reactionary influence is on the decline.

"As you perhaps know, students societies which engage in dueling practices (Schlagende Verbindungen) have been considered undesirable. Would you be in favor of their re-establishment, or not?"


	Munich	Erlangen
In favor	9%	18%
Don't care	11	9
Not in favor	78	73
No opinion	2	-
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

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TRENDS IN GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION

1946 THRU 1949



OFFICE OF THE U.S. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR GERMANY
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF

940.9343
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INTRODUCTION

Since 1947, major trends in opinions of the German public in the U. S. Zone of Occupation have been reported annually in graphic form. This report is the fourth in the series, as recorded and reported by the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs, HICOG (formerly the Opinion Surveys Branch, Information Services Division, OMGUS). Some of the trends date back to early 1946; others have been measured only for a brief time. The last recorded point for all trends reported here is either November or December 1949.

Establishment of the Federal German Republic, the change from Military Government to the High Commission, and developments in Western Europe and in the East-West situation have required the measurement of new areas of opinion, especially during the last half of 1949. At the same time, many of the problems and issues incident to the first years of the occupation ceased to be as pertinent as formerly. For these reasons, as will be noted, a number of the trends reported here are derived from questions asked only two or three times, either because new topics are involved, or because it was found necessary to alter questions previously used to conform to changed conditions. In other instances some trends which had been measured since 1945 were dropped entirely during 1949 as being no longer of pressing interest.

From October 1945 to December 1949, eighty full-scale, scientifically designed surveys were made in the U. S. Zone. Many other surveys, covering special groups and more limited geographical areas, have also been carried out. The last study reported here, December 1949, is based on a stratified, probability sample of 4000 cases, representing a miniature of the U. S. Zone as a whole, as well as of the populations in Bavaria, Hesse, Wuerttemberg-Baden, the three Western sectors of Berlin, and Bremen-Bremerhaven. (See Appendix I for a detailed description of the sample.)

All interviewing in the surveys is done by a staff of 120 trained German interviewers, supervised by four American Surveys Officers. Personnel of the headquarters staff at Bad Nauheim prepare and standardize the questionnaires, supervise the coding and processing of the material to punch cards when questionnaires are returned from the field, analyze the data and report the results.

The Reactions Analysis Staff has issued 206 mimeographed reports, and a number of memoranda and special reports. Listed in Appendix II are unclassified reports currently available.

SOME BACKGROUND ATTITUDES

1. Are you yourself interested in political affairs or do you prefer to leave that to others?
2. Are you sufficiently well informed about current affairs?
3. Do you believe that the Germans today could actually govern themselves democratically?
4. Was National Socialism a bad idea, or a good idea badly carried out?
5. Do you think some races are inferior to others?
6. What do you really believe was mainly responsible for the last war Germany, other countries, or particular circumstances?
7. Which of these types of government would you, personally, choose as better:
 - a. A government which offers the people economic security and the possibility of a good income,
 - b. A government which guarantees free elections, freedom of speech, a free press and religious freedom?
8. Are there any of these rights that you would give up if the State would thereby promise you economic security? If so, which rights would you give up?

SOME BACKGROUND ATTITUDES


In this section, results of a series of questions dealing with a variety of attitudes and opinions are reported. Some concern broad current issues, others weigh the prevalence of German traditionalism. As might be expected, the results as reported are somewhat at variance and not open to simple interpretation.

1. "Leave politics to others" has consistently been the attitude of the U. S. Zone public from 1946. Prior to last summer's West German elections and also during the first autumn of the Bonn government's career, less than two-fifths of the people claimed to have any interest in politics.
2. Majorities have also claimed since 1946 to be insufficiently informed on political matters. That this reflects political apathy rather than intellectual modesty is seen in the fact that when a follow-up query has been made on whether these people would like more information negative replies have predominated. However, as the chart indicates, from February to November 1949, the proportion claiming not to know enough about politics dropped ten points — 63 % to 53 %.
3. Clearly, a large proportion of U. S. Zone Germans lack confidence in their ability to manage their affairs in a democratic way. The number of people who feel that West Germans are now capable of democratic government has averaged less than half the U. S. Zone adult population. A third have taken an outright negative view and about a fifth have customarily withheld judgment on the problem.
4. "Was National Socialism a bad idea, or a good idea badly carried out?" has not only been one of the questions most frequently put to the public, but one whose results are most provocative. The trend of opinion is definitely toward "a good idea badly carried out." At the last recorded point, 59 % were of this opinion in contrast to the 1947 average of about 52 %. Conversely, only 30 % called the idea bad compared with the previous average of about 38 %. The trend lends itself to no easy interpretation. At a minimum, the upward trend suggests that as the years pass more and more Germans are emphasizing in their own minds the more attractive aspects of National Socialism and minimizing its odious features. The results clearly indicate that the term, National Socialism, has not come into disrepute to a majority of Germans. On the other hand, there is little reason to believe that the tendency to see good in National Socialism necessarily means that this group is Nazi or ultra-nationalistic. More detailed studies show that much the same reasons are advanced to support their arguments by those who think National Socialism was a bad idea as by those who say it was a good idea, badly carried out. Both cite as its bad features the persecution of the Jews and other peoples, force, brutality, concentration camps, aggressive war, genocide, etc. Full employment, public works, worker's vacations, etc., are invariably adduced as its good aspects — that is, the stress is on the "socialist" features of National Socialism. The fact, however, that a majority of U. S. Zone Germans are still unaware of, or choose to avoid analysing, the intrinsic character of National Socialism should not be ignored.
5. The view that "some races are inferior" to others decreased from March 1948 to September 1949. In 1948, 43 % held this opinion; in 1949, only 34 % did so. Meanwhile, the proportion thinking the contrary rose accordingly — from 46 % to 56 %.
6. The trend of opinions on responsibility for World War II appears to be shifting. More people are coming to name Germany as responsible, and fewer to cite "particular circumstances" as the cause. Thus in November 1947, 26 % mentioned Germany, and 55 % "circumstances." In September 1949, 37 % said Germany,


and 36 % "circumstances." Noteworthy also is the fact that many of the statements grouped in the "circumstances" category of replies have blamed the war on Hitler and the Nazis, Germany and other countries. Hitler and other countries, etc.

7. Consistently, six in ten U. S. Zone residents have indicated they would prefer a government offering economic security to one guaranteeing civil liberties — if they had to make a choice. Though such a choice may be considered arbitrary and harsh, it is worth noting that when the same question was put to the American public, opinions were completely reversed. It would appear from this that whereas the American public is conditioned to vote for freedom, the German public is conditioned to vote for security.
8. The contrast of this trend to the preceding one is marked. Here, a six in ten majority says it would not give up certain specified rights for economic security. Indications are that when liberties are brought down to the level of every day living, they are regarded more highly by the U. S. Zone public. As to the specific rights, it will be noted that the right to vote for the political party of one's choice has been the one most people would yield, and freedom of the press has been next most frequently mentioned, which would be surrendered.

ARE YOU YOURSELF INTERESTED IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS OR DO YOU PREFER TO LEAVE THAT TO OTHERS ? 00258




ARE YOU SUFFICIENTLY WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT POLITICAL AFFAIRS ?





DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE GERMANS TODAY COULD
ACTUALLY GOVERN THEMSELVES DEMOCRATICALLY ?

00259




WAS NATIONAL SOCIALISM A BAD IDEA, OR A GOOD IDEA
BADLY CARRIED OUT ?




DO YOU THINK SOME RACES ARE INFERIOR TO OTHERS ?

00260



WHAT DO YOU REALLY BELIEVE WAS MAINLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LAST WAR — GERMANY, OTHER COUNTRIES, OR PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES ?




WHICH OF THESE TYPES OF GOVERNMENT WOULD YOU, 00261
PERSONALLY, CHOOSE AS BETTER:


A. A GOVERNMENT WHICH OFFERS THE PEOPLE ECONOMIC SECURITY
AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A GOOD INCOME.

B. A GOVERNMENT WHICH GUARANTEES FREE ELECTIONS, FREEDOM
OF SPEECH, A FREE PRESS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ?

U.S.ZONE



ARE THERE ANY OF THESE RIGHTS THAT YOU WOULD GIVE UP IF THE STATE WOULD THEREBY PROMISE ECONOMIC SECURITY ? IF SO, WHICH RIGHTS WOULD YOU GIVE UP ?




THE RIGHT

- A. TO VOTE FOR THE POLITICAL PARTY YOU LIKE.

B. TO READ ALL THE BOOKS AND MAGAZINES YOU WISH TO READ.

C. TO WORK IN THE PLACE YOU LIKE.
- D. TO EXPRESS YOUR OPINION FREELY.

E. TO BRING UP YOUR CHILDREN ACCORDING TO YOUR VIEW.



ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

1. Do you believe that most prices will stay where they are today, or do you think that prices will go up, or go down?
2. Do you think that economic conditions in the American Zone within the next six months will get better or worse?
3. Do you believe that the German mark will be worth as much in a year as it is worth now, or will it be worth more, or less?
4. Is the total income of your family high enough today to cover necessary expenses?
5. Are you getting enough food to enable you to do your work efficiently?
6. If you think back to your situation a year ago, do you feel that today things are better, or worse for you, or just the same?


ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

In general, the optimism which ensued following currency reform in June 1948 continues to characterize US Zone thinking on economic matters. In contrast to the pre-currency reform period, prices — not shortages — are now the major complaint.


1. Opinions on a possible future rise or fall of prices apparently are not so much related to the actual price situation as to more generalized attitudes on economic affairs. In this respect, opinions on this issue may be considered a fair measure of the general trend of optimism-pessimism regarding economic conditions. Thus, following currency reform, as more goods became available and the economic situation in general improved, an increasing number of persons expressed the opinion that prices would fall. The proportion feeling prices would go up dropped to 4% (January 1949). Until the fall of 1949 there was little change in the trend. But from July to November 1949, the number thinking prices would decline, dropped from 72% to 49%, and the proportion which foresaw higher prices increased from 7% to 21%, despite the fact that no important increase in prices had occurred during the period. What had occurred was that the strains and stress on the Germany economy, including unemployment, were more apparent.
2. Fluctuations have always marked the trend of opinion on what economic conditions in the US Zone will possibly be within the near future. In general, however, optimism has been the predominant note. This was especially true in the half year following currency reform. The last two points registered indicate that a leveling-off of the trend may be in progress. A bare majority then foresaw "better conditions," a fifth predicted worsened conditions, and another fifth thought they would stay the same.
3. Confidence in the Deutsche Mark remained high throughout 1949. Predominant opinion was that it would either retain its current value or gain in value. As the mark actually gained, fewer people saw increased worth for it, and more predicted it would retain its current value. (From June 1948 to January 1949, a question "Do you think the new German mark will be worth as much a year from now as it is now?" was asked. In February 1949, the phrasing was changed to provide for the categories, "worth more," and "worth less.")
4. Prior to the currency reform of June 1948, majorities had held that their family incomes were sufficient to cover necessary expenses. Following the reform, opinion completely reversed, with the majority saying their incomes were not large enough. The explanation of this reversal undoubtedly is that money not only had a real value after the reform which it had lacked before, but also more goods were on sale. During 1949, there were minor fluctuations in the trend, with opinions almost evenly divided between affirmative and negative views.
5. The chart graphically describes what has occurred in West Germany in the past year and a half. From March 1946 to June 1948 large proportions claimed their food was inadequate for efficient work. By January 1949, opinions that food was sufficient started an upward trend with 61% making the assertion. By November of that year, 85% said so.
6. Between February 1948 and January 1949 there was a diametric shift in attitudes regarding improvement of individual living conditions. In 1948, 54% claimed they were "worse off" than they had been the year previously. By January 1949, 52% said they were "better off" than the year before. That picture remained substantially unchanged throughout 1949.

00265

DO YOU BELIEVE THAT MOST PRICES WILL STAY
WHERE THEY ARE TODAY, OR DO YOU THINK THAT
PRICES WILL GO UP OR GO DOWN?




DO YOU THINK THAT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THE
AMERICAN ZONE WITHIN THE NEXT SIX MONTHS WILL
GET BETTER OR WORSE?




DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE GERMAN MARK WILL BE
WORTH AS MUCH IN A YEAR AS IT IS WORTH NOW,
OR WILL IT BE WORTH MORE OR LESS ?

00266




IS THE TOTAL INCOME OF YOUR FAMILY TODAY HIGH
ENOUGH TO COVER NECESSARY EXPENSES ?




ARE YOU GETTING ENOUGH FOOD TO ENABLE
YOU TO DO YOUR WORK EFFICIENTLY ?

00267



IF YOU THINK BACK TO YOUR SITUATION A YEAR AGO,
DO YOU FEEL THAT TODAY THINGS ARE BETTER FOR
YOU, OR WORSE, OR JUST THE SAME ?



AMERICAN AID

1. Do you happen to have heard or read about the American plan for aid to Europe, the so-called Marshall Plan? (If Yes) From what you know about it are you, in general, for or against it, or haven't you made up your mind yet?
2. Do you know whether there is any plan by which America aids Europe with money and food? (If Yes) What is it called?
3. What will America do in the next years — will she give Europe all the aid it really needs, give Europe some aid but not enough, or will America stop aid entirely?
4. People are not all agreed on what America hopes to gain for herself out of the Marshall Plan. Here are some possible reasons why she might want to carry out such a program of aid to Europe. Which two on the list seem to you to describe best why she wants to do it?
 - a. America is anxious to prevent Western Europe from becoming communistic.
 - b. America is sincerely anxious to help people who do not have enough to eat or who are homeless.
 - c. America wants to make friends in Western Europe so as to have allies in case of a war with Russia.
 - d. America is using the Marshall Plan as a way of getting rid of surplus products that result from overproduction at home.
 - e. America is using the Marshall Plan as a means of forcing its way into European markets.
 - f. America is using the Marshall Plan to try to extend its kind of capitalistic system into Europe.
5. From what you know of the Marshall Plan, would you say it is favorable or unfavorable for Western Germany?
6. How great a part of the rationed food in Western Germany do you believe America supplies.
7. Do you believe that the Americans have furthered or hindered the reconstruction of Germany?


AMERICAN AID

From the inception of Marshall Plan aid, the trends in opinion regarding it and related issues have been charted. As will be noted, knowledge of the plan is relatively extensive. Appreciation of US aid appears likewise to be widespread


1. At the last trend point (November 1949) six in ten said they had heard of the Marshall Plan and approved of it, as compared with five in ten in February 1948. Only a miniscule minority has ever expressed disapproval of the plan.
2. As a check on knowledge of the Marshall Plan, a more rigorous form of query was instituted in August 1949 and repeated in November. This required that part of the public which knew there was an American aid plan to identify it by name. Approximately two-thirds of US Zone residents said there was a plan and more than half could attach a correct name to it: Marshall Plan, ERP, or ECA. "Marshall Plan" was the name by which the plan was most frequently designated by the public.
3. On the question of the sufficiency of American aid to Europe the overall picture is that of a downward trend on "give help, but not enough" and a correspondingly upward trend on "all help necessary." In February 1948, 30 % said all help; in November 1949, the proportion was 39 %. At the same dates, 53 % and 44 %, respectively, said "not enough help."
4. The trend in opinions on the motives of the US in giving aid to Europe has been remarkably steady. Prevention of the spread of Communism has always held first place, followed in declining sequence by a desire to help the hungry and homeless, to gain allies in case of a war, and to get rid of surplus goods. To win the European market or to force Capitalism on Europe remains unchanged as the choice of very few people. (It should be noted that the alternative statements are presented in the charts in order of frequency of mention, and not in the order in which the question is asked. For example, the alternative regarding Communism is in fifth place on the card which is handed to respondents.)
5. The overwhelming opinion has been that the Marshall Plan is favorable to Western Germany. Both in August and November 1949, 34 % of the US Zone public expressed this opinion.
6. A majority of about six in ten held throughout 1949 that the US supplies half or more of the rationed food in West Germany. Indeed a fourth of the population said that "almost all" German food was supplied by the US. Another fourth felt, however, that the US contributed very little food to Germany.
7. As to whether the US has furthered or hindered the reconstruction of Germany, the trend has been toward "furthered" and away from "hindered." The low point occurred in November 1947, when only 39 % said "furthered," 20 % said "hindered," and 31 % said "neither/nor." By November 1949, 68 % felt the US had furthered German reconstruction and only 9 % took the contrary view, with 16 % voting "neither/nor."

DO YOU HAPPEN TO HAVE HEARD OR READ ABOUT THE AMERICAN PLAN FOR AID TO EUROPE, THE SO-CALLED MARSHALL PLAN? IF YES, FROM WHAT YOU KNOW ABOUT IT ARE YOU, IN GENERAL, FOR OR AGAINST IT OR HAVEN'T YOU MADE UP YOUR MIND YET?


00270



DO YOU KNOW WHETHER THERE IS ANY PLAN BY WHICH AMERICA AIDS EUROPE WITH MONEY AND FOOD? IF YES, WHAT IS IT CALLED?




WHAT WILL AMERICA DO IN THE NEXT YEARS - WILL SHE 00271
GIVE EUROPE ALL THE AID IT REALLY NEEDS, GIVE
EUROPE SOME AID BUT NOT ENOUGH, OR WILL AMERICA
STOP THE AID ENTIRELY ?




00272

PEOPLE ARE NOT ALL AGREED ON WHAT AMERICA HOPES TO GAIN FOR HERSELF OUT OF THE MARSHALL PLAN. HERE ARE SOME POSSIBLE REASONS WHY SHE MIGHT WANT TO CARRY OUT SUCH A PROGRAM OF AID TO EUROPE. WHICH TWO ON THE LIST SEEM TO YOU TO BEST DESCRIBE WHY SHE WANTS TO DO IT ?


- A AMERICA IS ANXIOUS TO PREVENT WESTERN EUROPE FROM BECOMING COMMUNISTIC.
- B AMERICA IS SINCERELY ANXIOUS TO HELP PEOPLE WHO DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH TO EAT OR WHO ARE HOMELESS.
- C AMERICA WANTS TO MAKE FRIENDS IN WESTERN EUROPE SO AS TO HAVE ALLIES IN CASE OF A WAR WITH RUSSIA.
- D AMERICA IS USING THE MARSHALL PLAN AS A WAY OF GETTING RID OF SURPLUS PRODUCTS THAT RESULT FROM OVERPRODUCTION AT HOME.
- E AMERICA IS USING THE MARSHALL PLAN AS A MEANS OF FORCING ITS WAY INTO EUROPEAN MARKETS.
- F AMERICA IS USING THE MARSHALL PLAN TO TRY AND EXTEND ITS KIND OF CAPITALISTIC SYSTEM INTO EUROPE.




FROM WHAT YOU KNOW OF THE MARSHALL PLAN, WOULD YOU SAY IT IS FAVORABLE OR UNFAVORABLE FOR WESTERN GERMANY ? 00273



HOW GREAT A PART OF THE RATIONED FOOD IN WESTERN GERMANY DO YOU BELIEVE AMERICA SUPPLIES ?



DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE FURTHERED OR HINDERED THE RECONSTRUCTION OF GERMANY ?



GOVERNMENT

1. In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the activities of the West German government up to now?
2. Do you think the Western powers have too great an influence on the decisions of the West German government, or are you of the opinion that the West German republic is sufficiently independent?
3. Which one of the two German governments do you think is more dependent on the occupation powers: The East German or the West German government?
4. It has been said that the East German government is a puppet government, and can only do what the Russian occupation authorities prescribe. Do you agree with this or not?
5. It has been said that the West German government is a puppet government, and can only do what the Western powers prescribe. Do you agree with this or not? (Asked of those who, in reply to Question 2 above, said the Western powers had too great an influence.)
6. In general, do officials in the local German government work for the good of the community or are they primarily self-interested?
7. In your opinion, how well do the German officials in this city (community) do their job?


GOVERNMENT

Subsequent to the formation of the West government at Bonn, a series of questions measuring attitudes and opinions toward it were inaugurated. In order to provide a measure of comparison, queries on the East German government were also put to the US Zone public.

1. The two points in the chart indicate that US Zone opinions on the activities of the Bonn government are not crystallized. Thus, though the proportion satisfied with the government's activities to date declined from October to November, there was no increase in the "dissatisfied" category. Rather, the number withholding judgment went up.
2. Preponderant opinions, as recorded so far, are that the Western powers exercise too much influence on the West German government, but, again a large proportion are unable to express an opinion.
3. As to the relative dependency of the West and East German governments on occupation authorities, the large majority considers that the East German government is the more dependent.
4. Three-quarters of the US Zone public is of the opinion that the East German government is merely a puppet of the USSR.
5. Not charted is the fact that only about one-seventh of the US Zone population believes that the Bonn government is the puppet of the Western occupiers. This was found when the group claiming undue Western influence was further queried on the point.
6. Not related directly to the activities of the Bonn government is the trend of opinions on the motives of officials in local governments. The tendency to ascribe self-interest as the factor motivating their work, which rose from 12 % in December 1945 to a high point of 43 % in August 1946, appeared on the decline up to July 1949, when only 32 % said "self-interest" and 57 % claimed officials worked primarily for the common good. However, in November 1949, when the proportion thinking officials were out to get what they could for themselves rose again to 36 %, conversely only 51 % ascribed more generous motives to them.
7. On the performance of local officials, however, the trend of opinion is toward feeling they do their work well or very well. In the summer of 1946, 42 % were of this opinion, and three years later, 55 % thought so. Concomitantly, there was a downward trend in the proportion saying they did their jobs poorly.


IN GENERAL, ARE YOU SATISFIED OR DISSATISFIED WITH
THE ACTIVITIES OF THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT UP TO NOW ? 00276

U.S. ZONE



DO YOU THINK THE WESTERN POWERS HAVE TOO GREAT
AN INFLUENCE ON THE DECISIONS OF THE WEST GERMAN
GOVERNMENT, OR ARE YOU OF THE OPINION THAT THE
WEST GERMAN REPUBLIC IS SUFFICIENTLY INDEPENDENT ?


U. S. ZONE



WHICH ONE OF THE TWO GERMAN GOVERNMENTS DO YOU
THINK IS MORE DEPENDENT ON THE OCCUPATION POWERS;
THE EAST GERMAN OR THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT?


00277

U.S. ZONE




IT HAS BEEN SAID THAT THE EAST GERMAN GOVERNMENT
IS A PUPPET GOVERNMENT, AND CAN ONLY DO WHAT THE
RUSSIAN OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES PRESCRIBE. DO YOU
AGREE WITH THIS OR NOT ?

U.S. ZONE




IN GENERAL, DO OFFICIALS IN THE LOCAL GERMAN GOVERN- 00278
MENT WORK FOR THE GOOD OF THE COMMUNITY OR ARE
THEY PRIMARILY SELF-INTERESTED ?

U.S. ZONE



IN YOUR OPINION HOW WELL DO THE GERMAN OFFICIALS 00279
IN THIS CITY (COMMUNITY) DO THEIR JOB ?

U.S. ZONE



GERMAN UNITY

1. Do you believe in the future there will again be a unified government for all of Germany?
2. Do you think the establishment of the East German government will widen the split of Germany between East and West, or won't it have any influence?
3. Which do you think more important — to check the spread of Communism or to unite Germany in any case?
4. Do you think the unification of Germany will take place during the occupation, or not before the occupation forces have withdrawn?

GERMAN UNITY

Following the establishment of the German Federal Republic and of the East German government, trends of opinion on various aspects of the issue of future German unity were begun with one exception, therefore, only two-point charts are presented here, and the results accordingly only suggest the direction of the trends of opinion on the issues involved. Western Berlin opinions, as well as those of the US Zone population, are charted.

1. Queried first in September 1948, when the Berlin blockade was in progress and its outcome dubious to some, 60 % of the US Zone public believed that Germany would one day have a unified government again. Since then, on the average, two-thirds have held this view. It is to be noted that the establishment of the Bonn government did not affect the trend adversely. West Berliners, have generally been more optimistic than the US Zone population on this issue. The low point there was reached in February 1949 when only 61 % foresaw future unity, but the trend rose sharply in the summer following the lifting of the blockade. By November, 90 % held that Germany would again be unified.
2. Predominant opinions appear to be that the establishment of the East German government will widen the split of Germany between East and West. More Berliners than zonal residents held this view, but both in West Berlin and in the zone, fewer persons thought so in December than in November.*
3. Checking the spread of Communism was preferred to unification of Germany by seven in ten persons both in the US Zone and West Berlin in September 1949. It is noteworthy that from May to September there was a ten point rise in Berlin for "check communism" and a corresponding decline in the "unite Germany" figure.
4. A majority in the Zone has felt that German unification will not occur until after the occupation, the two times the query has been made. In West Berlin, however, a majority (58 %) thought in November that unification would take place during the occupation. A month earlier Berlin opinion had been almost evenly divided with 48 % saying "during the occupation," and 45 % "after the withdrawal of the occupation forces."


* Beginning in August 1948, the following question was put to the US Zone public: "Do you think the split between East and West Germany would be widened by setting up a provisional Western government, or wouldn't it have any influence?" Though the query was repeated following the establishment of the Federal German republic it was decided not to chart the trend because the phrasing of the question seemed no longer to conform to the actual situation: e. g. the use of the conditional subjunctive, and the term "a provisional Western government."

The results however, are as follows:


	August 1948	Sept 1948	Feb 1949	Jul 1949	Nov 1949
Widen split	47 %	51 %	43 %	35 %	27 %
No influence	33	25	28	34	46
No opinion	20	24	29	31	27
	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %

DO YOU BELIEVE THAT IN THE FUTURE THERE WILL AGAIN BE A UNIFIED GOVERNMENT FOR ALL GERMANY ? 00282

U.S.ZONE




BERLIN




DO YOU THINK THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EAST GERMAN GOVERNMENT WILL WIDEN THE SPLIT OF GERMANY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, OR WON'T IT HAVE ANY INFLUENCE ?

U.S.ZONE





BERLIN





00283

WHAT DO YOU THINK MORE IMPORTANT - TO CHECK THE SPREAD OF COMMUNISM OR TO UNITE GERMANY IN ANY CASE ?



DO YOU THINK THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY WILL TAKE PLACE DURING THE OCCUPATION, OR NOT BEFORE THE OCCUPATION FORCES HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN ?



INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS



1. Generally speaking, are you for the idea of a union of West European States, are you against it, or haven't you formed any opinion on it yet?
2. If a union of West European States were formed, would it increase or decrease the chances of war?
3. Have you heard or read about the Atlantic Pact? If so; generally speaking, are you in favor of the Atlantic Pact or against it?
4. Do you think the danger of a new world-war is increased or decreased by the Atlantic Pact?
5. In your opinion, should West Germany join the Atlantic Pact or not?
6. Which country will have the greatest influence on world affairs in the next ten years?
7. Do you believe a new world-war will break out within the next ten years?

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

As indicated in the questions listed on the preceding page, this section deals largely with the issue of German integration with the West. The predominant trend of opinions in this regard, it will be noted, is favorable. Whether this is only a manifestation of a desire to become a part of the family of nations or reflects a truly Western orientation cannot be demonstrated by these findings.


1. On the issue of a union of Western Europe, over the last two years majorities have favored the idea — the averaged affirmative vote is six out of ten. But the undecided vote has always run about four in ten. Very few have ever expressed outright disapproval of the idea. In Western Berlin, approval has consistently increased. By November 1949, 86 % approved.
2. Preponderant US Zone opinion has consistently been that a Western union would decrease the chances of war, but a large fraction has always reserved judgment on the question. The small proportion thinking such a union would encourage a war appears to be declining.
3. A two-point trend shows that six in ten of the US Zone public claims to have heard of the Atlantic Pact, and five in ten approve of it.
4. Two thirds of the persons who know of the pact think it will decrease the chances of a new world war.
5. And about three-fourths of them feel that West Germany should become a participant in the pact.
6. That the US will have the greatest influence on world affairs during the coming decade has been the majority opinion since early 1946. It is noteworthy, however, that beginning in July 1949, the fraction saying "both the US and USSR" increased. (This is included in "other" in the chart.) Invariably the group which named the US has stated that the US would exert its influence for peace, while the fraction naming Russia has always said that Russian dominance would imply war.
7. Popular opinions on a possible outbreak of another world war within ten years have fluctuated, which is to be expected. In general, almost as many have foreseen a war as have not.

GENERALLY SPEAKING, ARE YOU FOR THE IDEA OF A UNION OF WEST EUROPEAN STATES, ARE YOU AGAINST IT, OR HAVEN'T YOU FORMED ANY OPINION ON IT YET ? 00286




0028

IF A UNION OF WEST EUROPEAN STATES WERE FORMED,
WOULD IT INCREASE OR DECREASE THE CHANCES OF
WAR ?




HAVE YOU HEARD OR READ ABOUT THE ATLANTIC PACT ?
IF SO, GENERALLY SPEAKING, ARE YOU IN FAVOR OF THE
ATLANTIC PACT OR AGAINST IT ?




00288

DO YOU THINK THE DANGER OF A NEW WORLD WAR IS
INCREASED OR DECREASED BY THE ATLANTIC PACT ?




IN YOUR OPINION, SHOULD WEST GERMANY JOIN THE
ATLANTIC PACT OR NOT ?




0028

WHICH COUNTRY WILL HAVE THE GREATEST INFLUENCE
ON WORLD AFFAIRS IN THE NEXT TEN YEARS ?



DO YOU BELIEVE A NEW WORLD WAR WILL BREAK OUT
WITHIN THE NEXT TEN YEARS ?



EXPELLEES


1. Do you consider the expulsions from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and other Eastern countries to be just or unjust?
2. Do you think that the expellees from Czechoslovakia and Hungary will get along well with the people here? (Native Germans only)
3. In general are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the reception and treatment given you by the people here? (Expellees only)
4. Do you think the expellees will stay here, or that they will return to their homeland, if they are permitted to? (Native Germans only)
5. Would you go back to your homeland if you should be permitted to sometime in the future? (Expellees only)

EXPELLEES


Since the fall of 1946, both native Germans and expellees (people expelled from their homelands as a result of the Potsdam agreement) have been queried on the expellee situation.

1. The expulsions from the East are almost unanimously considered unjust. During 1949, 96 % were consistently of this opinion which was a rise over the previous period when about 90 %, on the average, called them unjust.
2. Majority opinion of native Germans is that the expellees will get along well with the German people. Some fluctuations have appeared in the trend of thinking on the matter, but its direction has been definitely toward the affirmative viewpoint.
3. Expellees' opinions on their reception in Germany have fluctuated. From late 1946 until early 1949, the trend was downward, away from satisfaction with their reception toward dissatisfaction. During 1949, the trend appeared to shift again in favor of satisfaction, but even then there were fluctuations in opinions, seemingly unrelated to actual changes in conditions.
4. That the expellees would return to their homelands, if given the opportunity has always been the prevailing opinion of native Germans. However, in November 1949, 82 % were of this opinion, a drop of about ten points from the averaged figure for the preceding period.
5. Expellees themselves have been proportionately somewhat more hesitant about saying they would return home if they could do so, though better than eight in ten have always been of this opinion. However, many expellees volunteer the comment when queried on the issue that their return is contingent on a change in the political situation in the East.


DO YOU CONSIDER THE EXPULSION FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA,
HUNGARY AND OTHER EASTERN COUNTRIES TO BE JUST
OR UNJUST ?




DO YOU THINK THAT THE EXPELLEES FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA
AND HUNGARY WILL GET ALONG WELL WITH THE PEOPLE
HERE? (NATIVE GERMANS ONLY)



IN GENERAL, ARE YOU SATISFIED OR DISSATISFIED
WITH THE RECEPTION AND TREATMENT GIVEN YOU
BY THE PEOPLE HERE? (EXPELLEES ONLY)




DO YOU THINK THE EXPELLEES WILL STAY HERE, OR THAT
THEY WILL RETURN TO THEIR HOMELAND, IF THEY ARE
PERMITTED TO? (NATIVE GERMANS ONLY)



00294

WOULD YOU GO BACK TO YOUR HOMELAND IF
YOU SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO SOMETIME IN
THE FUTURE ? (EXPellees ONLY)



MEDIA

1. Do you read a newspaper?
2. Do you listen to the radio?
3. Do you read magazines?
4. Does the news today in Germany appear to you more trustworthy, or less trustworthy, than that published in Germany during the war?

MEDIA

Since the first years of the occupation, trends of opinion on two aspects of media reactions have been kept. The first is the size of the audience of different media: newspapers, magazines, radio; the second, opinions on the accuracy of present news sources as compared with pre-1945 German news. (Studies are also frequently made of the coverage of specific media, but the results are not charted here.)

1. On the average since 1947 three quarters of the US Zone public have claimed to read newspapers regularly or occasionally. (Prior to 1947, replies were recorded only as Yes or No, which was considered to inflate the actual proportion of readers.

In Western Berlin, the proportion of newspaper readers dropped in the summer and fall of 1949 to eight out of ten from the previous nine out of ten. Possibly this was a reflection of the economic situation in the city.

2. The proportion of the US Zone public which listens to the radio regularly or occasionally appears to be increasing slightly. Up to 1949, a little better than half could be considered a part of the radio audience. In November 1949, 63 % claimed to listen.

In Berlin, the radio audience has averaged seven out of ten of the West Berlin population. The fact that the German radio audience is relatively so much smaller than the US listenership is probably due to the high cost of receiving sets in Germany rather than to lack of interest in the medium.


Most frequently heard stations in the US Zone are the metropolitan stations of the respective states, e. g. Munich in Bavaria, Frankfurt in Hesse, and Stuttgart in Wuerttemberg-Baden. RIAS has by far the largest audience of the Berlin stations. Few US Zone listeners claim to tune in on East Zone stations, but among those who do, Radio Leipzig is the station most frequently heard.

3. The magazine audience has increased, particularly during 1949, a reflection probably of the greater number of magazines being published. In February 1948, 24 % claimed they read magazines. By November 1949, 36 % made the claim. However, included in these figures are the readers of parish journals, local bulletins, and so on, which tends to inflate the actual extent of magazine readership. Not charted is the fact that the overt US publications — Heute, Der Monat, Amerikanische Rundschau, and Neue Auslese — have continued to maintain their positions despite increased competition.
4. The present German press appears to be gaining confidence with the public. From January 1948 to November 1949, there was a 10 point rise in the number saying the news is now "more trustworthy" than it was prior to 1945. But a fourth continue to feel there has been little improvement over the war-time German press.


DO YOU READ A NEWSPAPER ?

00297

U.S. Z ONE




BERLIN




DO YOU LISTEN TO THE RADIO?

00298

U.S. ZONE




BERLIN




DO YOU READ MAGAZINES ?

00299

U. S. ZONE




BERLIN



DOES THE NEWS TODAY IN GERMANY APPEAR TO YOU MORE TRUSTWORTHY, OR LESS TRUSTWORTHY, THAN THAT PUBLISHED IN GERMANY DURING THE WAR ?

U.S.ZONE



APPENDIX I

TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION

ON THE SAMPLE DESIGN OF THE OPINION SURVEYS OPERATION IN GERMANY

The sample design employed by the Surveys Operation is of the stratified probability type. With such a mode of sampling the population to be sampled is first subdivided into groups or "strata," then within these strata respondents are chosen by some random method. The number of cases selected from each stratum or population group is in proportion to the size of that group in the total population.

As this sampling method has been applied to the US Zone, stratification has been introduced by Laender (States), by Regierungsbezirke (Districts), and by size of community. That is to say, on the basis of the latest population statistics (early 1949 for Sample K) a proportional number of cases are assigned in the sample for each Land of the American Zone. Next within each Land these cases are allocated in proportion to population figures to each Regierungsbezirk. Finally within each Regierungsbezirk the cases are allocated proportionately to each of seven categories of community sizes. Following a few general considerations this procedure will be concretely illustrated with actual figures.

The overall size of the zonal sample has been chosen to be 3000 cases. This choice is not arbitrary, but represents a judgment as to the minimum number necessary to make, when desirable, breakdowns of the results within each of the three constituent Laender of the US Zone. Where breakdowns are anticipated only on the zonal sample as a whole 3000 cases are more than absolutely necessary for a workable reliability. In such inquiries a split-ballot technique is utilized. This is to say, a random half of the sample is interviewed on one set of questions, and the other random half upon another set. This procedure yields a 1500 case representative sample for each question — which is, generally speaking, an adequate number when breakdowns within Laender are not contemplated. In emergency inquiries wherein speed is essential a 500 case zonal sample is employed. This sample yields useful overall results, but of course imposes limitations on the extent of breakdown analysis that is safely applicable to the data.

The population sampled by the Reactions Analysis Staff at the present time is comprised of all individuals between 15 and 79 years of age whose names are included on the food ration card list. This must be recognized as a very comprehensive sampling, but of course excludes all young children and individuals in the zone who, for whatever reason, do not have ration cards. This latter excluded group comprises less than one per cent of the German population of the US Zone. Since DP's are not Germans they are of course excluded as far as possible from the sample.

With reference to the appropriate population tables which are appended, a quantitative illustration can now be carried out to demonstrate how the 3000 case zonal sample is proportionately allocated to the various population groups or strata in terms of which the US Zone sample has been stratified.

Table 1 shows the distribution of the US Zone population within the three Laender — Bavaria, Hesse, and Wuerttemberg-Baden. Since Wuerttemberg-Baden, for example, contains 22.2 per cent of the US Zone population, in the 3000 case sample it is allocated $3000 \times .222$ or 666 cases. This then is the number of people interviewed in Wuerttemberg-Baden on each survey.

In Table 2, for each Land the distribution of population among the constituent Regierungsbezirke is shown. To continue with Wuerttemberg-Baden for purposes of illustration, one can now see that the Wuerttemberg Regierungsbezirk contains 62.0 per cent of the Wuerttemberg-Baden population. Consequently it receives that percentage of the total Wuerttemberg-Baden samples cases, i. e. 414 cases ($666 \times .620$). This then is the number of interviews in Regierungsbezirk Wuerttemberg on each survey.

By reference to tables 3A and 3B one can next allocate the 414 cases for Wuerttemberg among the seven categories of community sizes that are indicated — from 250,000 and larger down to 25,000 among the city group, and from less than 25,000 down to less than 2,000 among the rural group. Since table 3A shows that 20.3 per cent of the residents of Wuerttemberg live in communities of 250,000 or greater, it follows that 20.3 per cent of the 414 Wuerttemberg cases must be drawn from such a community or communities. Table 3B shows that there is only one such community in Wuerttemberg, Stuttgart, so the entire 84 cases ($.203 \times 414$) must be drawn from that locale. Nobody in Wuerttemberg lives in a community of from 100,000 to 249,000 since there are none of such a size in Wuerttemberg. Hence, obviously, no sample cases in this instance can be allocated to this category. Table 3A shows that 15.1 per cent of the residents of Wuerttemberg live in communities of the size 25,000—99,000. Hence $.151 \times 414$ or 62 cases must be assigned in the sample to such communities. But, the problem now emerges, there are seven communities in this size category in Wuerttemberg. How are the 62 cases to be allocated? Again proportionately. Table 3B shows how the 62 cases are broken down into the proper number for each of the seven small cities — 12 for Esslingen, 12 for Ulm, etc. — in proportion to their population.

As Table 3A demonstrates 42 cases in Wuerttemberg should be apportioned to communities in the size category 10,000 to 24,999. There are 15 towns of this size range in Wuerttemberg. Shall the 42 cases be broken down and assigned to each according to population size? This would be ideal. But now sheer physical limitations force modifications of procedure. The improvement in the sample gained by distributing these 42 cases among all the towns is far outweighed by the expense of sending interviewers to so many widely separated locales. Very little reliability is lost, but much money and time is saved if the 42 cases are distributed among some rather than all of these 15 towns. In selecting the some, they can be chosen at random or again stratification can be employed. The Reactions Analysis Staff has chosen the latter course to provide some control over the fact that religion — an important determinant of many opinions — is not evenly distributed throughout the US Zone. Communities tend to have either a large proportion of Catholics or a small proportion. Relatively few are found between these two extremes. Consequently it has been decided that a better representation of the religious variable can be secured if the towns included in the sample are systematically selected to cover the range of Catholic concentrations rather than if they are selected at random.

Table 15 shows how the 15 towns under discussion have been ordered or "stratified" in terms of the proportion of Catholics residing in the community. The judgment was made in this instance that it would be practicable to interview in four of the 15 towns. Following the stratification procedure these four towns are not chosen at random but are chosen to cover the range of the stratified variable. With this in mind every fourth town, exclusive of recently worked towns from prior samplings, is included in the current sample.

Table 16 shows the allocation of the 42 cases in the four selected towns. Once the towns are selected it may be seen that, as usual, the allocation is performed in proportion to population.

The modification in procedure involving the use of a per cent Catholic stratification and a reduction of number of communities to be visited has been applied to all communities in the US Zone under 25,000 in size. It has not been applied, however, to larger communities. On every survey every city in the US Zone 25,000 or larger contributes its quota of interviews to the sample. In our example four towns were made to do for 15. In general the number of towns of these smaller size categories included for interviewing is set so that in Wuerttemberg-Baden and in Hesse no more than 12 interviews will be gathered in any one town. Since Bavaria is so spread out a somewhat larger limit is allowed, but still small enough so that the number of towns included approaches 100. The limit of approximately 12 interviews in any one town derives from the fact that this is about the number that can be conveniently gathered in one working day by a group of 2 or 3 interviewers traveling to and returning from a target town.

A further modification in procedure — also dictated by convenience — is that no towns are visited having fewer than 500 respondents. If a selected town in the per cent Catholic listing proves to be such a case the preceding or succeeding town in the list is substituted.

When the 3000 cases have been proportionately allocated down to communities of various sizes the final stage of sampling arises. This is the selection of respondents within each community which the stratification procedure has singled out. The procedure employed by the Reactions Analysis Staff at this stage is a **strictly random method**. Briefly it involves the random selection of every *n*th individual from the community ration card lists. Then postcards are sent to these selected individuals indicating that the Office of the High Commissioner would greatly appreciate it if they would find it possible to be home at such and such a time in order to obtain the benefit of their opinions on significant problems of the day. At the indicated time the German interviewer arrives and obtains the interview — clearly explaining beforehand the strict anonymity of the replies. If, as infrequently happens, the respondent is not at home, as many as two or three callbacks are utilized if necessary. If these prove insufficient for contact then an additional name is utilized from a number of extra names that are always drawn above the quota for a "reserve list."

Comparisons of the sample with Census figures where available have shown a very close correspondence, keeping in mind the chance deviations to be expected with a sample of the size employed.* This fact leads to confidence in the representativeness of the sample and suggests that problems of non-response are at the present time not a serious source of sample bias.

When most of the reservoir of respondents has been interviewed in a town in the sample, the town must be replaced since the Reactions Analysis Unit follows the usual polling practice of avoiding interviewing the same person twice. The procedure for this replacement is to select a town of the same per cent Catholic within the same community size group within the same Regierungsbezirk. If the per cent Catholic is a unique case, then a town as similar as possible is chosen for a replacement.

The entire list of sample towns below 25,000 in population is completely revised about every 5 or 6 months since by such a time the frequency of replacement of small communities becomes excessively high. New towns are selected by the method already described, with the provision that if a "worked" town crops up in the new list, it is passed up and replaced by the nearest suitable one in the religious stratification sequence.

Besides its US Zone operation the Surveys Staff also regularly samples German opinions in the western sectors of Berlin and in Bremen-Bremerhaven. To date it has been the practice to gather 500 cases in Berlin and 300 in Bremen. In the latest research sampling (Sample K) the number of cases will be increased to 700 and 500 respectively so that a somewhat higher level of reliability can be assured for split-ballot studies on these two important cities. The allocation of the cases precisely parallels the procedure for the larger cities in the zone. In all larger cities there are a number of ration card lists covering the various sectors of the city. So the sampling procedure follow the usual principle of allocating the city's quota of interviews to the various ration card districts strictly in proportion to their population sizes.

* For examples of such comparisons see Reactions Analysis Unit report No. 124 (1 June 1948) entitled: Social Characteristics of the German People in the American Zone and in Berlin (British and American Sectors).

Table 1
STRATIFICATION OF US ZONE BY LAENDER

Land	Population	Percent	Cases in Sample
U. S. Zone	17,267,383	100.0 %	3.000
Bavaria	9,186,868	53.1	1.593
Hesse	4,258,441	24.7	741
W.-Baden	3,822,074	22.2	666

Table 2

**STRATIFICATION OF LAENDER
BY REGIERUNGSBEZIRKE**

Regierungsbezirke	Population	Percent	Cases in Sample
W.-Baden	3,822,074	100.0 %	666
Wurttemberg	2,368,492	62.0	414
Baden,	1,453,582	38.0	252
Hesse	4,258,441	100.0 %	741
Darmstadt	1,317,563	30.9	228
Kassel	1,267,931	29.8	222
Wiesbaden	1,672,947	39.3	291
Bavaria	9,186,868	100.0 %	1,593
Oberbayern	2,459,374	26.7	426
Niederbayern	1,118,953	12.2	192
Oberpfalz	918,136	10.0	159
Oberfranken	1,099,301	12.0	192
Mittelfranken	1,276,877	13.9	222
Unterfranken	1,045,786	11.4	183
Schwaben	1,268,441	13.8	219

Table 3A
LAND WUERTTEMBERG-BADEN

Stratification of Regierungsbezirk Wuerttemberg by size of community.

Rural-Urban	Population	Percent	Cases in Sample
Wuerttemberg	2,368,492	100.0 %	414
250,000 and larger	481,374	20.3	84
210,000—249,999	—	—	—
25,000— 99,999	358,115	15.1	62
10,000— 24,999	240,870	10.2	42
5,000— 9,999	199,632	8.4	35
2,000— 4,999	402,256	17.0	71
Less than 2,000	686,245	29.0	120

Table 3B

Stratification of community size categories by communities*

250,000 and larger			
Stuttgart	481,374	100.0 %	84
100,000—249,999	—	—	—
25,000— 99,999			
Total	358,115	100.0 %	62
Esslingen	67,795	18.9	12
Ulm	66,627	18.6	12
Heilbronn	59,194	16.6	10
Ludwigsburg	54,687	15.2	9
Goeppingen	40,448	11.3	7
Heidenheim	38,648	10.8	6
Schwaeb. Gmuend	30,724	8.6	6

* This stratification is only done for cities, i. e. communities 25,000 or more in population.

Table 4

LAND WUERTTEMBERG-BADEN

Stratification of towns* im Regierungsbezirk Wuerttemberg by per cent Catholic

Town	Population	Catholic
Aalen	24,420	54
Eislingen	13,135	44
Geislingen	22,820	30
Nuertingen	16,549	29
Kornwestheim	18,096	27
Sindelfingen	10,627	23
Waiblingen	15,272	23
Boeblingen	11,633	22
Kirchheim U. Teck	19,032	22
Schorndorf	13,238	21
Schwaeb. Hall	17,498	20
Fellbach	18,589	18
Backnang	16,473	17
Bietigheim	11,944	16
Leonberg	11,544	15

* Communities 10,000 to 24,999 in size.

Table 5
LAND WUERTTEMBERG-BADEN

Allocation of sample cases to selected towns in Regierungsbezirk Wuerttemberg

Town	Population	Percent	Cases in Sample
10,000—24,999 (4 towns)	73,597	100.0 %	42
Geislingen	22,820	31.0	12
Kirchheim/Teck	19,032	25.9	11
Backnang	16,473	22.4	10
Waiblingen	15,272	20.7	9

CONFIDENTIAL

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WEST GERMANS VIEW THE EAST-WEST STRUGGLE.

I. General Evaluations and Extent of Allegiance to the West.

Classification cancelled
by authority of Leo P. Crespi
PUB-RAS.

Report No. 18
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19 May 1950

RELATIONS ANALYSIS UNIT
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE
HICOG APO 807
3rd Neuhoim Germany

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INTRODUCTION

In April 1950, the Reactions Analysis Unit, Office of Public Affairs, conducted a public opinion survey in the US Zone, Bremen and in the three Western sectors of Berlin to obtain in detail German thinking on the current East-West struggle. The present report - the first of a series of three - presents the West German appraisal of the relative strength of the East and West, and an indication of where they stand in the struggle. The succeeding report examines present German attitudes on whether or not the occupying powers should get out of Germany; and the final report presents some German views on the problem of defending Western Germany.

The sample employed in these studies consists of 1,500 persons in the US Zone, 250 in Berlin, and 160 in Bremen, selected for representativeness by the standard random method employed by the Unit. Interviewing was conducted by a trained German staff under professional American supervision.

On questions as politically sensitive as some of those posed in the present study, readers should be aware of the fact that respondents in some cases may be influenced by the American sponsorship of these surveys to give replies somewhat different than they might otherwise. Studies thus far conducted on this point indicate that such sponsorship effects, when they arise at all, rarely affect a figure by as much as 10 percentage points. Further studies are in progress, but in the opinion of the Reactions Analysis Unit the possibility of sponsorship effects in the present survey - while they may shift somewhat the results to particular specific questions - are not such as to seriously challenge the general picture that is presented.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS

1. On the issue of West German neutrality in the East-West struggle, preferences for siding with the West rise as implications are made more explicit.
 - ... Though the majority (54%) state that they personally prefer to side with the West in the immediate phase of the cold war, four out of ten indicate a preference for neutrality.
 - ... Seven in ten say that most West Germans prefer siding with the West to neutrality in the East-West struggle.
 - ... Few think it would be possible for West Germany to remain neutral in a European war.
 - ... And when the proximity of Russia to Germany and the possibility of a Russian invasion is mentioned, then 86% state that West Germany would prefer to fight Russia rather than to side with her.
 - ... Antipathy toward Russia and Communism generally is the most frequently stated reason of those who personally want to side with the West. War weariness and an attitude of a plague on both your houses lead as reasons for wishing to be neutral.

2. The trend of opinion also favors the West on the question of the relative strength of the Western and Eastern powers. Again it accelerates as the issue is viewed in broader perspective:
- ... Predominant opinions are that the Western powers proved to be stronger than the communist countries during the past few months. Large minorities, however, give the laurels to the East.
 - ... Leading arguments of the pro and con groups are the economic gains exhibited by the West, and the victories achieved by the communists in the Far East.
 - ... Majorities claim the West is currently the stronger - 57% in the Zone, 77% in West Berlin, and 55% in Bremen are of this opinion.
 - ... And larger majorities express the opinion that the West will eventually win out in the East-West struggle.
 - ... The higher industrial and armament potentials of the West as well as Western unity are stressed as reasons for Western superiority. The strength and power of the Soviet Union is the major argument advanced by those who think the communist powers are the stronger.
 - ... Majority approval of U.S. policy toward Russia is expressed. About two in ten are dissatisfied with it. "Lack of firmness" is frequently cited by the dissatisfied fraction.
3. Communism is generally regarded as not being a powerful force in Western Germany, and it is also seen as declining in the East Zone.
- ... The power of Communism - which the public preponderantly defines in adverse terms - has its roots in propaganda, agitation, economic distress and dictatorship according to most of the US Zone public.
 - ... The communist party in Germany is considered a Russian tool by the majority. But about a quarter in the US Zone and Bremen and 16% in West Berlin are of the opinion that the party is not working primarily for purely Russian aims.
 - ... But Communism is thought by the majority to have little influence in Western Germany, although 18% of the US Zone population feel that the communist threat increased during the past six months.
 - ... Preponderant opinions are that the number of convinced communists in the East Zone has decreased. Similar opinions are held regarding the number of convinced communists in Western Germany. Disillusionment with the fruits of Communism is the main reason advanced for this opinion.
4. It appears that opinions on the East-West struggle, particularly as they pertain to Communism, are fairly generalized among the entire US Zone population - the educated tend to have opinions similar to the uneducated as do men compared with women, city people contrasted with rural people, etc. For this reason group breakdowns are omitted in the present report.

- o -

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

I. SHOULD GERMANS BE NEUTRAL IN THE EAST-WEST STRUGGLE?

NEUTRALITY IN THE CURRENT PHASE ...

It is the personal desire of four in ten US Zone Germans not to take sides in the immediate phase of the East-West struggle. But a majority personally prefers to side with the West. In Berlin 86% express this preference. Almost no one wants to side with the East now.

"What would you personally prefer to do in the immediate (augenblicklichen) East-West struggle: Side with the East or with the West or stay out of it entirely?"

Bavaria Hesse W-Baden US ZONE Berlin Bremen

Side with East	-	1%	-	*	-	-
Side with West	56	48	55	54	86	57
Stay out	40	46	41	42	13	38
No opinion	4	5	4	4	1	5
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

* Less than one half of one per cent.

Then, however, the issue of neutrality is put in broader terms - "preferences of most Germans" in contrast to personal preferences, and the current (gegenwaertigen) in contrast to immediate (augenblicklichen) East-West situation - many more people vote for the West and fewer for neutrality.

Thus in the US Zone and Bremen, seven in ten hold that most Germans prefer to take sides with the West. In Berlin, nine in ten are of this opinion. Only a quarter in the Zone and Bremen say most Germans would like to stay out of it altogether - as do a tenth in West Berlin.

"What do you believe - what would most Germans prefer in the present East-West struggle: to remain completely out of it, to side with the Western powers, or to side with Russia?"

Bavaria Hesse W-Baden US ZONE Berlin Bremen

Stay out	26%	27%	23%	25%	11%	26%
Side with West	71	68	74	71	87	72
Side with Russia	1	-	-	1	-	-
No opinion	2	5	3	3	2	2
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

But few of those who feel that most Germans prefer not to take sides believe that neutrality is possible at present.

(If "Stay out of it") "Do you believe that it is really possible for Western Germany to stay completely out of the East-West struggle?"

Bavaria Hesse W-Baden US ZONE Berlin Bremen

Yes	5%	5%	2%	4%	2%	4%
No	19	19	20	19	9	20
No opinion	2	3	1	2	-	2
	26%	27%	23%	25%	11%	26%

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

NEUTRALITY IN A WAR ...

In the event of a war fought in Europe, three fourths are of the opinion that neutrality for West Germany would be impossible.

"Would it be possible in your opinion for West Germany to stay out of a war which was fought in Europe?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Yes	16%	12%	13%	14%	19%	12%
No	75	77	76	76	76	81
Other	1	1	2	1	-	1
No opinion	8	10	8	9	5	6
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

The proportion thinking neutrality would be possible has declined since September 1949. Then the US Zone figures were: Yes - 23%, No - 64% and No opinion - 13%. Corresponding changes also occurred in Berlin and Bremen.

WOULD FIGHT AGAINST RUSSIA ...

It is noteworthy that the US Zone public, and to a greater degree West Berlin residents, show their preferences for the West in larger number when possible adverse developments are more frankly stated. Thus, reminded of the geographical proximity of Russia to Germany and the consequent possibility of invasion - a condition of war being implied - more people see the Germans backing the West than do so in the current phase of the cold war.

"In view of the nearness of Russia and the possibility of a Russian invasion, do you think most Germans would prefer to side with Russia, or to fight against Russia?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
With Russia	1%	*	1%	1%	-	*
Fight Russia	89	77	87	86	96	86
Do neither	7	17	0	10	2	6
No opinion	3	6	3	3	2	8
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

* Less than one half of one per cent.

In this connection it is interesting to note that opinions have remained almost unchanged since last September when the same question was asked. Then 87% of the US Zone public, 98% of West Berlin, and 92% of Bremen respondents held that most Germans preferred to resist Russia.

REASONS FOR PREFERRING TO SIDE WITH THE WEST ...

General antipathy to the Soviet Union and to Communism is most frequently cited as the reason for personally preferring to side with the West at this time in the East-West struggle. The table with comments follows.

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

"Why would you prefer to side with the West?" (Asked of those who stated a personal preference for siding with the West.)

General antipathy against the East and rejection of their form of government, economy and culture: Nothing good comes from the East; I completely despise the East; we do not want to have any contact with the Russians; one must hear what the prisoners of war tell; I have a complete antipathy toward the Russians; because the East is a dictatorship I shall never favor; the East has a low standard of living; I refuse the system of force of the East; the East is economically unhealthy; we can not expect any progress from the East; I do not expect any betterment from the East; the Eastern culture does not appeal to me; etc.

US
ZONE Berlin Bremer.

264 334 234

Sympathy for the democratic ideas and practices of the West: Everything is much freer (more liberal) and more magnanimous there; I appreciate the freedom which we enjoy with the Americans; with the Western powers one lives as a free man; we are granted our rights here; I have more freedom politically; the West advocates freedom and religion; we want to be a free German people; the personal rights are more respected by the Americans; I detest the radical and prefer the democratic life; it corresponds to my entire political and general opinion; my conceptions and ideals are backed only by the Western side; I like freedom and want to be allowed to say what is right and what is wrong; we have learned the good sides of the West; etc.

10 21 10

Obligation toward the West for their aid and guaranty of a better standard of living: We owe gratitude to the West for their aid; the Americans have helped us so much all the time; the West is putting forth so many efforts for Berlin; they alone can help us; because the West does much more for Europe than the East; etc.

6 14 10

More advantageous and guaranty of protection and independence: We Germans have much more advantages from the West; they give us the guaranty of independence for later on; Germany has much more chance for a decent living than with the East; the Western powers can protect us in Western Germany; alone we can not defend ourselves; as long as we have no peace treaty we are better protected with the Americans; etc.

5 5 10

A more humane treatment of the population by the West: I see a great difference between the East and the West in the treatment of the population; we live here as human beings; here it is at least humane in comparison with the East; etc.

1 2 2

Resentment against the East out of personal experience: I was in Yugo-Slav captivity four four years and in Russia for 3 years during the war and I am fed up with the East; the East expelled us from our house and farm; my son starved to death in Russia; because I have become acquainted with Communism; etc.

4 4 *

Confidence in the policy of the Western powers: The Western powers have good intentions toward us; one can trust the Western powers, whereas the Russians never keep their word; etc.

1 2 -

Other remarks: Because that alone may help us refugees; to contribute to regaining the Eastern provinces in a peaceful way; the West consists of cultured countries; I am an European and no Asiatic; if we stay out of it we shall not get lesser evil; everybody must support the Western democracies; Western culture is more like ours; we are entirely dependent on the West; etc.

1 2 1

No opinion:

1 1 *
55% 84% 56%

* Less than one half of one per cent.

** Some people gave more than one answer

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

REASONS FOR PREFERRING NEUTRALITY....

"War-weariness and a "plague on both your houses," are the two most often stated reasons advanced by the group which wishes to stay completely out of the East-West question for the present.

"Why would you prefer to stay out of it? (Asked of those who expressed a personal preference to "stay out of it entirely.")

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

General war fatigue (Weariness of war) and to avoid a new conflict: I am against any new war; to avoid new hostilities; then we won't get involved in a conflict with anybody; I don't take part in quarrels as a principle; I have no longer any kind of desire to become a soldier; we are still tired from the last time; I have twice felt the consequences of war; there are no possible advantages from a war; we don't want to offer our heads as targets any longer; etc.

10% 3% 12%

Antipathy and distrust toward both sides: I don't want to have to deal with either of them; I don't care either for the East or for the West; both sides exploit us; because Germany is only an object for both sides; I should like to avoid both sides; both are to blame for the present situation; they are swindlers on both sides; both sides want to impose their pattern upon us; etc.

9 3 2

Neutrality is more advantageous for Germany: Neutrality is the best; we would be the most afflicted part of this conflict; to remain neutral is better, because we should become the field of battle then; we should not have any profit from it in any case; to be neutral is always to be clean; it is pointless for afterwards we should be even worse off; etc.

6 2 3

Fear of future consequences, recrimination: In order to safeguard my future existence; one never knows how it will be later on; in the case that things will change, impartiality is the best; then it would happen to me as it did to the Nazi party members who were denazified after the war; because I don't know what is right I prefer to keep in the background; one would be punished again afterwards; etc.

5 3 1

No German affair: I am a German and it is not my business; I am not guilty of this conflict and also not interested in it as a German; they shall settle things among themselves; I don't want to pick the chestnuts out of the fire for the others; I am a German and want to conduct a German policy therefore, and not a Western or an Eastern policy; etc.

5 1 11

General personal lack of interest: Why should I care for it; It is not my business; I live only for my God; etc.

3 2 5

Impossibility of personally influencing the situation: I can not change the situation; I can not influence developments anyhow; I did not make the partition between East and West; etc.

2 * 1

Other remarks:

2 * -

No opinion:

1 - 3
43% 14% 38%

* Less than one half of one per cent.

** Some people gave more than one answer.

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

POSSIBILITY OF WAR ...

Almost six in ten think that there will be another world war within ten years.

"Do you believe that a new world war will break out within the next ten years?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Yes	69%	58%	60%	65%	58%	57%
No	27	27	28	27	38	37
No opinion	4	15	12	8	4	6
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Anticipation of another world war has increased sharply in the US Zone during the past months. In November, in the US Zone, 47% foresaw a war, by February, the proportion had risen to 57%, and as noted above, in April, 65% were of this opinion.

Asked more specifically whether they thought the danger of war had increased during the past months about four in ten persons in all regions replied affirmatively. Few think it has decreased, but many feel the situation has remained unchanged.

"Has the danger of war, in your opinion, increased during recent months, decreased, or remained the same?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Increased	41%	31%	34%	37%	44%	42%
Decreased	5	7	6	6	8	4
Same	47	51	50	49	46	47
No opinion	7	11	10	8	2	7
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Two groups in the population - men and younger persons - are more inclined than their opposites to feel that danger of war has recently increased.

During last months danger of war has:

Increased Decreased Stayed same No opinion

<u>By Age:</u>					
19 and under	44%	7%	40%	9%	... 100%
20 - 29	37	5	54	4	
30 - 39	37	4	51	8	
40 and over	36	7	47	10	
<u>By Sex:</u>					
Men	43%	6%	48%	3%	
Women	33	6	49	12	

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

Predominant opinions are that the Western powers have scored greater success than the East throughout the world during the last half year. But large minorities disagree - and feel that the communists have shown themselves the stronger on the world scene.

"If you look at the political situation in the world as a whole, which side has had more success in the past six months: the Communist powers or the Western powers?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W. Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Communist	31%	30%	32%	31%	23%	37%
West	45	34	47	43	68	44
Both same	6	13	11	9	6	12
No opinion	18	23	10	17	3	7
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Persons who give the laurels to the Western powers in the latest phase of the cold war, most frequently mention the economic gains achieved in the West. Gains achieved in the far East are most often cited by the group which feels the Communist powers have had greater success during the past six months. The replies of both groups are catalogued in order of frequency of mention on the following pages.

Reasons for thinking Western powers scored greater successes:

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

<u>Economic gains (ERP, their economy is stronger - more powerful -):</u> They supplied all the world with food; they have renewed wealth and a normal life in those countries, which they are yet influencing; economic recovery in Europe; by the ERP and by raising the standard of life; they have a more powerful economy than the East; etc.	16%	26%	21%
<u>The majority of the nations are for freedom and democracy:</u> Because: most peoples acknowledge democracy; each single man feels a desire for freedom; they are refusing compulsion; they are more honest and democratic and allow every people to have its own opinion; etc.	6	10	4
<u>The majority of the nations are against Communism (Russians):</u> One speaks of Communism with horror everywhere; most people refuse Communism now as before; since nobody wants to know anything of the East; only very few countries side with the Russians yet; many communist statesmen and other residents of communist countries are fleeing to the Western countries, that is a success of the Western powers; etc.	6	8	5
<u>By the Atlantic Pact:</u>	2	5	-
<u>The West has united:</u> The Western powers have united; because together they have found a better way; etc.	2	2	2
<u>The West is spiritually/culturally superior to the East:</u>	2	4	2
<u>They have avoided a war and advocated peace:</u>	2	*	2
<u>Greater technical and military gains:</u> The Western powers have proved their technical superiority to the Russians by their progress in the production of atomic weapons; air forces; a-bomb; etc.	1	*	-
<u>Russia has been forced to yield (air lift, Berlin):</u> The Western powers have it, I am referring to the air lift; Russia was always forced to yield, for instance in case of the blockade; since the blockade of Berlin was lifted the Russians have not achieved any more prestige in Europe; etc.	1	4	3
<u>No opinion:</u>	6 44%*	8 67%*	5 44%*

* Less than one half of one per cent.

** Some people gave more than one answer.

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

Reasons for thinking Communist powers scored greater successes:

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

Success in China (Asia): In China and Indonesia they have succeeded; by the conquest of China; the example of China and the states of Asia which are dominated by Communism now; Communism has gained victory in China in spite of America; all China is lost; China turned red; in the Far East; etc.

25% 21% 34%

Success in Europe: Success in Czechoslovakia, in the Balkans; Communism has also advanced very much in the Western countries; see France and Italy; etc.

3 4 2

Spreading of Communism (in general): The Communist powers are advancing everywhere; half the world is under their influence; one state after another has slipped into their hands; etc.

3 1 1

Their policy is more aggressive and quicker: The Russian acts more quickly; the opposition is too slow; because the East exerts more pressure; by their aggressive policy; etc.

2 1 1
33% 27% 28%

* Some people gave more than one answer.

WESTERN POWERS STRONGER ...

Regardless of attitudes on recent successes, majorities hold that the Western powers are at present stronger than the Communist powers. Few consider the Communist powers as the stronger.

"And which appears to you, all things considered, to be stronger at present - the Communist powers or the Western powers?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W. Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Communist	14%	11%	16%	14%	12%	8%
West	61	48	57	57	77	55
Equal	13	18	11	14	8	18
No opinion	12	23	15	15	3	19
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Three reasons are most frequently cited by the group which thinks the West is stronger than the East: industrial superiority, better arms and equipment, and the unity of the West. The table of reasons follows.

- 8 -

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

Reasons for thinking Western powers are stronger:

	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
<u>Higher industrial potential:</u> Superior, as far as machines and technics are concerned; to a much greater extent science, technics and progress exists here; because of the high standard of production and industrial potential; technical progress and greater efficiency of industry; the Western powers have more raw materials and are technically superior to the Russians; America has the greatest resources; in their economy, production and the output of the qualified worker they are superior; etc.	18%	27%	25%
<u>Higher armament potential:</u> America has an advantage in the atom weapon; military strength is greater; the Western powers have better equipment than the Russians; they have more modern weapons; they have more atom bombs and are ahead in technics; atom bomb and more raw materials in the West; dispose of a great air fleet and are also very strong by sea; etc.	16	15	6
<u>Greater unity:</u> The Western powers have a united policy; in reality the Russians stand alone while the Western powers united are stronger; the allies will remain faithful to the United States in contrast to the satellites of Russia; they are much more backed by the whole world; they have more friends everywhere; Atlantic Pact; etc.	10	23	6
<u>Superior intellectually and culturally:</u> They stand on a higher cultural standard; their intellectual superiority is their strength; all people are on a higher intellectual plane; people in the West are much more intelligent; they are more intellectual and diplomatic; etc.	5	12	3
<u>Greater population and area:</u> They have more people and countries; the Western powers are numerically stronger; it is the majority; etc.	4	4	3
<u>Better ideals:</u> On the side of the Western powers there is a sounder basis (democracy); the Western powers have higher ideals; because they want the good things and Communism the bad ones; etc.	4	4	6
<u>Communism is disliked:</u> Because not many people believe in the Communists; in general one hears that people ignore the Russians; a dictatorship is worn away because the people can not stand it; etc.	3	3	2
<u>Other remarks:</u>	1	1	5
<u>No opinion:</u>	4	3	6
	65*	92*	62*

* Some people gave more than one answer.

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

Soviet superiority in population, territory, and weapons explain the greater strength of the Communist powers in the opinion of the small minority which holds this view.

Reasons for thinking Communist powers are stronger:

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

Superior force of Russia (of Communism): Half the world already stands under their influence; in Europe and in China Communism has increased; the communistic power is immense; the East in its present forms and proportions should not be underestimated; they outnumber the others and have more territory under their control; I believe that the Russians are stronger because they have more manpower on their side; Russia is a larger country and has a larger population; by the accession to their orbit of China they are much stronger in numbers now; the Russians have the superior force; etc.

6% 6% 3%

Superior military strength: They are better armed; the Russians have rearmed more than the Americans; they have rearmed ever since; the army of the Russians is stronger; etc.

4 2 1

Policy of the East more energetic: Russia does what she wants and America can not do so; they elbow themselves forward by force in the entire world; etc.

3 2 2

Other remarks:

2 2 2
15% 12% 8%

* Some people gave more than one answer.

WESTERN POWERS WILL FINALLY WIN OUT ...

Large majorities believe that the Western powers will finally win out in the East-West struggle.

"According to your view, who has the better chance to finally win the upper hand in the East-West struggle, the Communist powers or the Western powers?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Communist	8%	4%	5%	6%	2%	6%
West	73	59	69	69	81	56
Equal	5	10	9	7	1	8
No opinion	14	27	17	18	6	30
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

The few who think the East will finally win also cite similar reasons: e.g. superior strength of Russia in numbers, armaments, and vigor. Much the same reasons are given for thinking the West will eventually triumph in the cold war as for thinking it is currently the stronger: industrial superiority, greater capacity to produce armaments, and the unity of the West as is indicated in the following table.

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

Reasons for thinking the West will win in the end:

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

Higher industrial potentiality: They are superior technologically; I mean in general the Western powers are stronger and more modernly equipped; the Western powers are far ahead in technology; the Western powers are far ahead of the Russians as to material; etc.

19% 30% 17%

Higher rearmament potentiality:

19 17 10

The West maintains a united front and has more people: Because so many people side with them; the world sides rather with the Western powers than with the Russians; every intelligent person will side with them finally; the Western powers hold together; I believe America has more allies on her side; I hope that the Western powers stand together in the Atlantic Pact; etc.

13 19 12

Freedom, democracy and other political ideals dominate in the West: Moral superiority; their conduct is more humane and wins all to their side; they follow high ideals; individual freedom is guaranteed there; they have the right on their side; they are stronger morally; they advocate more the aims of a real democracy; they are better Christians; etc.

9 12 6

The West is culturally and spiritually superior to the East: They are more intelligent than the Russians; culture and technology will succeed; I hope that the Western powers will keep the upper hand by a better concentration of intelligence and under American leadership; etc.

6 10 7

Communism, the Russians and dictatorship are despised: Most people despise a dictatorship; Communism can give us nothing; the suppressive tactics of the Russian; the population in the Eastern countries disagrees with the communistic leadership; force as it is applied under the communists does not achieve anything in the long run; because the majority of all people are anti-Russian in their attitude; etc.

5 12 4

Because dictatorships have a shorter duration of life: Dictatorships have a shorter duration of life than democracies; dictators have always perished; etc.

1 2 1

Other remarks:

1 1 3

No opinion:

4 3 5
77% 106% 65%

* Some people gave more than one answer.

- 11 -

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

MAJORITY SATISFIED WITH U.S. POLICY ...

Majorities express satisfaction with American policy toward the Soviet Union, but a fairly large fraction either are not entirely satisfied or withhold judgment.

"Are you in general satisfied or dissatisfied with the American policy toward Russia?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W. Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Satisfied	60%	53%	56%	57%	56%	59%
Dissatisfied	22	15	21	20	30	24
Partly (Volunteered)	3	9	5	5	9	7
No opinion	<u>15</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>10</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

"Lack of firmness" is the chief criticism made by those dissatisfied with U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union.

"Why are you of the opinion?" (Asked of those who say they are dissatisfied).

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

The Americans are not acting firm enough:
They are too indifferent, too yielding, too humane; they wait too long; they should have hit hard long ago; momentarily their attitude toward Russia is too lax; I have the feeling the Americans could handle the Russians a little more sharply; America is too decent and democratic toward the Russians; America - too yielding - should act more firmly; as it looks from Berlin view point they have made too many concessions; etc.

14% 28% 18%

They allowed the Russians to become too powerful: They have allowed them to enter (Germany) too far; as far back as 1945 American policy had made great errors; Russia grew as firm as it is today only by that stupid diplomacy; they have waited too long and they have conceded Russia too much power in the four-power council; obligingness toward the Russian is too great; it (American policy) is too unsteady; the Americans should have taken up their present attitude earlier; etc.

3 2 3

The American diplomacy has made too many errors (in general): They should be a little more affable toward Russia; the Russian mistrust is not unfounded; they don't agree with the Russians and do not yield; America does not yet understand the true situation in the East; America has not quite apprehended danger of Communism; etc.

2 1 2

Other remarks:

1 - 1
20% * 31% * 24% *

* Some people gave more than one answer.

III. WHAT IS COMMUNIST STRENGTH IN GERMANY?

MEANING OF COMMUNISM ...

About half the definitions of Communism advanced by US Zone residents are what may be considered adverse in implication. This is also the case with West Berliners definitions. In Bremen, about four in ten fall in this category. Fifteen per cent of the people in the zone - about a quarter in Berlin and Bremen - cite definitions which possibly bear favorable connotations to those who hold them - equality, security, democracy. Finally, a fraction - 21% in the zone - define Communism in more non-committal terms as the socialization or nationalization of industry and wealth. The definitions catalogued and arranged in order of frequency of mention in the US Zone follow:

"Would you tell me, please, in a few words what you understand by Communism?"

	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
<u>Dictatorship (totalitarianism, government by force):</u> Government by force, no freedom; dictatorship in a more severe way; mastering the masses; dictatorship with horror; raping freedom; brutality, force; red dictatorship; an idea which has no respect for man and knows power only; etc.	23%	20%	24%
<u>Nationalization, socialization, state control of trade and agriculture (doing away with private property):</u> Nationalization of all the means and material of production and the factories; state-capitalism; they want to divide all; equal income, those having more have to give to the others; they tolerate no private property; expropriation of private property; state control of trade and agriculture; etc.	21	16	18
<u>Radicalism:</u> Radical and anti-religious ideology; by that I understand something very radical; the communists are people who want to seize all the power; etc.	14	7	2
<u>Doctrine of equality; equality of classes of people:</u> Everyone has equal rights; coordination between the poor and the rich; one should not have any more than the other; equality of rights, but it is not proved yet; the theory of equality of all; etc.	11	15	12
<u>Spoliation, suppression, slavery of people:</u> The spoliation of men; suppression of humanity; suppression and spoliation of masses; the attempt to turn all the people into slaves; etc.	9	14	6
<u>Democracy - security and welfare of workers:</u> A democracy; security and labor for the workers; union of workers who come together because of class-war; etc.	4	9	15
<u>World imperialism:</u> A political system that strains at world imperialism; communist empire of the world; the communists want to yoke the whole world by force if it is necessary; etc.	3	5	6
<u>Communism is a tool of Russia:</u> Export plan of Russia to conquer the whole world; a Russian affair which is to be imposed on all the nations by force; etc.	2	4	2
<u>Pure propaganda:</u> Only propaganda for the worker, without any results; etc.	1	2	-
<u>Other remarks:</u> They are a very mean people and have mean ideas; I was a victim of the Russian conquest, I shall never forget the experiences drawn from this; etc.	6	5	2
<u>No opinion:</u>	17 111%	6 103%	22 109%

* Some people gave more than one definition.

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

BASIS FOR COMMUNIST STRENGTH ...

Propaganda, economic distress and the use of force are the three leading reasons given as the source of Communist strength. Few persons ascribe the communists hold to humanitarian or ideological considerations.

"In your opinion, in what does the strength of Communism lie?"

In its propaganda, promises, agitation: Promises to US ZONE Berlin Bremen the working classes; deceiving desperate people by false hopes for the future; propaganda and staging strikes; they have a big mouth, that's all, promise much and do not keep anything; in their smart tactics; their wily propaganda; the communists promise riches to the people; etc.

24% 25% 18%

Low living standard (distress, unemployment, economic misery, dismantling) are a fertile soil for communistic ideas: Low level of living standard; dissatisfaction of the working people of all nations; only the pauperization of large classes of people nourishes Communism; people become radical because of misery and unemployment; misery is pushing many a person to Communism; etc.

21 7 20

In dictatorship (compulsion, force, terror, fear): In exertion of force in every form; by inspiring people with fear and terrorizing them; their boldness in elimination of absolutely every adversary; in the relentlessness of its policy; it need not make any concessions; etc.

12 29 12

Nationalization, socialization (expropriation, political coordination, equality of all classes): In this, that no difference exists among the people, they are all equal; Communism offers to every worker wealth which can not be reached; that they expropriate everything, nationalize everything; in the socialization of all the public and civic things; in saying the "big shots" should not have anything more than the worker; etc.

6 3 2

Support by Russia (the East): In the very great supplies they get from Russia; the Russians are backing them; etc.

5 10 6

Activities of party members: In the fanaticism of functionaries; it succeeds in organizing the people but not in the people's interest; etc.

2 3 6

In the weakness and blunders of its adversaries:

2 - 2

In the communist ideology (in general): The strength lies in its ideology; etc.

1 3 1

No strength, decreasing strength: It has no strength; I do not see any actual strength in Communism; the communists are not powerful and will never obtain real strength; strength is decreasing in Communism; etc.

1 3 1

No opinion:

$\frac{30}{104\%}$ * $\frac{17}{100\%}$ * $\frac{34}{102\%}$ *

* Some people gave more than one answer.

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

DEGREE OF INDEPENDENCE OF KPD/SED ...

Majorities ranging from 62% in the US Zone, 72% in Bremen to 88% in West Berlin say that KPD/SED is strongly under Soviet influence. Only a few persons consider it independent.

And most of those who think it is influenced by Russia say it works mainly for Russian, not German, advantage.

"Do you think that KPD/SED is strongly under Russian influence, or is it independent of Russia?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Strong influence	61%	64%	60%	62%	88%	72%
Some influence	14	12	16	14	6	12
Independent	11	6	12	10	4	4
No opinion	14	18	12	14	2	12
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

"Do you think the KPD/SED works mainly for the good of Germany or for the good of Russia?" (Asked of those who said strong or some Russian influence).

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Good of Germany	7%	4%	10%	7%	5%	7%
Good of Russia	62	65	55	60	82	67
Other (Both, Germany and Russia, workers)	3	4	7	6	5	6
No opinion	3	3	4	3	2	4
	<u>75%</u>	<u>76%</u>	<u>76%</u>	<u>76%</u>	<u>94%</u>	<u>84%</u>

Recapitulation of these figures indicates that at most about a quarter of the US Zone and Bremen population and almost a seventh of the West Berlin public, consider the German Communist Party not basically a tool of the Soviets, but working for non-Soviet aims. Thus:

	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
KPD/SED - Independent	10%	6%	12%
Dependent, but works for good of Germany	7	5	7
Other - non-Russian aims	6	5	6
	<u>23%</u>	<u>16%</u>	<u>25%</u>

Comparison with figures obtained in February 1948 shows that increasing numbers now say the German Communist Party is strongly under Soviet influence - e.g. in the zone 62% compared with 41% two years ago, in Bremen 72% compared with 56%, and in Berlin 88% as against 74%. However, there is less difference - except in Berlin - on the question of the purposes of the Communist Party, as will be noted in the following tabulation of replies:

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	1948	1950	1948	1950	1948	1950
KPD/SED - Independent	15%	10%	8%	6%	13%	12%
Dependent, but works for good of Germany	8	7	15	5	15	7
Other - non-Russian aims	4	6	4	5	4	6
	<u>27%</u>	<u>23%</u>	<u>27%</u>	<u>16%</u>	<u>32%</u>	<u>25%</u>

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

COMMUNISM NOT STRONG IN WEST GERMANY ...

Preponderant opinions are that Communism has little strength in Western Germany. Very few say it is strong at all.

"How great do you think is the strength of Communism in Germany?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Very great	1%	-	-	1%	-	1%
Great	5	3	4	4	2	2
Moderate	27	16	30	25	17	22
Little	46	48	50	47	54	51
Very little	15	17	6	14	21	16
No opinion	6	16	10	9	6	8
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

FEW SEE INCREASED COMMUNIST DANGER IN WEST GERMANY ...

The possibility of Communist control of West Germany increased during the last six months according to 18% of the US Zone population. But 26% say Communist prospects diminished during the same period, and 38% see no change in the situation.

"Do you think the possibility of West Germany's coming under Communist rule increased in the last six months or decreased?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Increased	22%	12%	17%	18%	13%	18%
Decreased	28	22	24	26	48	26
Stayed same	35	41	43	38	31	44
No opinion	15	25	16	18	8	12
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

REASONS FOR THINKING COMMUNIST THREAT DECREASED ...

The main reason advanced by those who note a drop in the communist threat to West Germany is that communist prestige has declined as a result of information coming out of the East.

"Why do you think so?" (Asked of those who said communist threat decreased).

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

Decline of communist prestige: It is losing its adherents; so many people move from the Eastern to the Western area; people have become more informed; the conditions in the Eastern zone; all people see that Communism is bad; the refugees and returning prisoners of war tell enough; here one does not hear anything about Communism; that has already been demonstrated through the last elections; they are always losing; the communists constantly lose esteem and adherents; Communism has lost sympathy; we have just gone through a dictatorship; people see that Communism is nothing; etc.

17% 26% 16%

Improvement of political and economic situation in the Western area: The people in Western Germany are well off; the economy is operating well and more work is available; our conditions are so good that there is no thought of Communism; they see the economic progress although the unemployment is still great; the standard of living has improved; the bad development in the East zone which has not been overlooked; the better conditions in Western Germany make the difference from the Eastern area obvious; the economic and political freedom; the formation of the Western German government has strengthened the power (of the public); etc.

4 13 5

Strength of and support from the Western powers: The policy of the Western powers is not willing to put up with anything; because the Western powers mount better guns on the other side; the Western powers make their support obvious; etc.

2 4 4

No one likes Communism or the Russians: All is connected with the Russian mongering and who should be for it today; nobody is for the Russians today; a large number of communists see that the Russians don't mean well toward Germany; etc.

1 3 1

Decrease of communist pressure: The communistic pressure here is weaker than in the Eastern zone; etc.

1 - -

No opinion:

2 12 1
27% 58% 27%

* Some people gave more than one answer.

REASONS FOR THINKING DANGER OF COMMUNISM INCREASED ...

Various reasons are given by those who feel that the threat of Communism has recently grown. Among them are increased unemployment in the West, growing activity by the communists, distressed conditions in the West, dismantling and the weakness of the Western powers.

"Why do you think so?" (Asked of those who answered "Increased" to previous question).

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

Increasing unemployment: Unemployment has increased; etc.

7% 15 44

Activity and the power of the communists: The East will try to overrun the Western area; because Communism is now trying to weaken Western Germany by all means; the conditions in the Eastern zone of Germany; by the "Nationale Front" in the East; the police of the Eastern zone grows stronger and threatens our zone seriously; etc.

5 8 6

Distressed economic conditions in Western Germany and the dissatisfaction of the population: The distressed economic conditions force people to incline to the other side which may bring them some hope; increasing dissatisfaction; poor people have lost all their savings by the currency reform and the standard of living of the working people and pensioners is too low; etc.

14 1 5

Dismantling: Because of the dismantling by British authorities; the continued dismantling in the Ruhr area; etc.

3 2 5

Weakness of the Western powers: The Western powers did not do any step forward against Russia; etc.

2 1 1

No opinion:

$\frac{1}{22\%}$ ** $\frac{*}{13\%}$ ** $\frac{1}{22\%}$ **

** Less than one half of one per cent.

***Some people gave more than one answer.

PREPONDERANCE SEES DECREASE OF CONVINCED COMMUNISTS IN EAST ZONE ...

Only a fraction appears to think that Communism has been winning sincere converts in Eastern Germany during the past year. Indeed, a decline in the number of convinced party members there is the preponderant opinion, especially in Berlin.

"Do you believe that the number of really convinced communists in the East zone has increased or declined during the past year?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W. Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Increased	16%	8%	19%	15%	7%	10%
Decreased	49	48	50	49	84	42
No change	13	15	12	13	5	23
No opinion	<u>22</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>25</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Only two reasons obtain any frequency of mention by those who say there has been an increase in the number of convinced East zone communists: Self-interest combined with pressure, and East-inspired propaganda.

Dissatisfaction with the fruits of communist control in the East zone is the most frequently advanced reason for saying that the number of convinced communists there has declined. Second most often cited cause is the poor economic condition of Eastern Germany. Other reasons are less frequently stated, as will be noted in the following table.

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

"Why do you think so?" (Asked of those who say the number of convinced communists in the East zone has declined).

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

Dissatisfaction with Communism: They have seen and heard enough about Communism; the number of the adherents has decreased, that of the adversaries has increased; the facts are different from the promises; they are disappointed because of the SED-policy; they see that Communism is different from their expectations and hopes; they have lost voters at every election; Russian Communism, the actual thing they see today, has cured them; etc.

20% 43% 13%

Because of the worsened economic conditions in the Eastern zone: The difference between West and East is already obvious in food and currency; they see that the economic conditions in the Western zones are better; they are disappointed by the living conditions in the Eastern zone; the standard of living in the Eastern zone did not improve; the people of the Eastern zone live worse than the people of the Western zone; the distressed conditions changed their minds; etc.

12 16 12

Because of the Russians: The Russians did not keep their promises; the experiences with the Russians are too bad; they have made the acquaintance of the Russians and don't like them; they have seen what Russian rule means; etc.

8 10 6

Because of the pressure, political insecurity and terrorism: Because their own adherents get displaced; they don't believe any more in the system; the only thing they still know is pressure; the pressure disgusts the Germans; they are forced to betray their own ideals; they can not trust each other because of political insecurity and continuous arrests; etc.

7 7 8

Because so many people want to move to the West: By the increasing number of emigrations; because a lot of them can not continue to live in the Eastern zone and flee; the communists of the Eastern zone are not satisfied, there is more food in the Western zone; etc.

3 10 4

You can read it and hear it: It is said in the radio speeches of Mr. Boerner; one can read it in the "Neue Zeitung"; etc.

 $\frac{1}{51\%}$ $\frac{1}{87\%}$ $\frac{1}{43\%}$

* Some people gave more than one reason.

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

PREPONDERANCE ALSO SEES DECREASE OF CONVINCED COMMUNISTS IN WEST ZONE ...

Estimates on the increase or decrease of "convinced" communists in Western Germany are similar to those regarding the East zone. A fraction sees an increase in the last year, but predominant opinions are that the number has declined.

"And do you believe that the number of really convinced communists in West Germany has increased or decreased during the last year?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Increased	14%	7%	14%	12%	6%	10%
Decreased	47	43	46	46	65	47
Remained same	28	27	25	27	16	32
No opinion	11	23	15	15	13	11
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Unemployment has caused a rise in communist membership, is the opinion of 6% in the US Zone, 5% in Bremen, and 1% in West Berlin. Poverty and general distress is cited by 4%, 2% and 1% respectively. Other reasons mentioned less frequently are: dismantling, good Russian propaganda, and a sense of bitterness.

Dissatisfaction with results of Communism, is the leading argument of the persons who feel that there are now fewer convinced communists in the West. Second reason is the improvement in economic conditions. Their comments in order of frequency of mention are given on the following page.

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

"For what reason do you think has the number of the really convinced communists decreased?"

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

Dissatisfaction with Communism; one has heard and seen enough about Communism, people have been deceived, the number of the adherents has decreased, those of the adversaries increased: They have made the acquaintance of Communism through the Russians; the conditions in the Eastern zone; they see the bad conditions in which the people of the Eastern area live; the practice in the Eastern zone and the experiences of the returning prisoners of war speak another language; they have seen that Communism has not brought as many improvements as they had expected; they have seen that there is much swindling; they have come to know they were incorrectly informed; they have an aversion to fighting and perhaps are fickle too; when they compare the program of the communistic party and the reality; everyone is able to imagine what would occur if Communism should come to power; the prisoners of war have taken care to inform people; etc.

29% 28% 32%

Because of the better economic conditions in the Western zones: They come to know that life is better on the Western side; they see that the West is giving them more advantages; the standard of living has increased in Western Germany in contrast to the East; they see the difference between West and East; etc.

8 24 7

Because of the Russians: They all read newspapers and know what would happen if the Russians should come to power; because they all are against the Russians; a Christian being does not like the Russian; danger of a new world war by Russia; lose their interest in Russia because she is using pressure; etc.

3 1 5

In the Western area one has the possibility for a free life: They mainly see that one has the possibility for a free life in the Western area in contrast to the Eastern area; etc.

2 4 -

Because Communism is going to be overcome: America is fighting against the expansion of Communism; etc.

2 * 1

One can hear and read it: The press has done that by the Eastern zonal propaganda; etc.

1 2 *

Because so many people want to go to the Western area: Many people had to flee from the Eastern to the Western area; daily they see that prominent people flee and leave the Eastern zone; etc.

* 3 -

No opinion:

2 1 2
47%* 63%* 47%*

* Less than one half of one per cent.

**Some people gave more than one answer.

WEST GERMANS VIEW THE EAST-WEST STRUGGLE

II. Trends and Current Attitudes on Withdrawal of
the Occupying Powers.

Classification cancelled
by authority of Leo P. Crespi
PUB/RAS.

Report No. 19
Series No. 2
22 May 1950

REACTIONS ANALYSIS UNIT
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE
HICOG APO 807
Bad Nauheim Germany

INTRODUCTION ...

In April 1950, the Reactions Analysis Unit, Office of Public Affairs, surveyed a representative sample of the population in the US Zone, Bremen, and the three Western sectors of Berlin as to their views on the current East-West struggle. This report - the second of a series of three - presents German feelings about the withdrawal of the occupying powers. Trends and current opinions in this matter are of particular importance since a constant theme of Eastern propaganda has been that the occupying powers should get out of Germany.

The sample employed in the present study consists of 1,500 persons in the US Zone, 250 in Berlin and 160 in Bremen, selected for representativeness by the standard random method employed by the Unit. Interviewing was conducted by a trained German staff under professional American supervision.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS ...

- ... As of April of 1950, three out of four in the US Zone - 86% in Berlin - hold that it would be unwise for the Western occupation powers to accept the Russian proposal for four-power withdrawal.
- ... These current results are in line with indications in a related question of steadily decreasing German support of the withdrawal proposal from a high point in June (during the period of optimism engendered by the prior lifting of the Berlin blockade).
- ... The more informed elements of the US Zone population - the men, the better educated, and the economically better situated - tend more often than do their counterparts to consider withdrawal unwise at this time.
- ... The likelihood of a communist take-over was the major emphasis in the reasons advanced for not considering four-power withdrawal wise at the present time.
- ... The small minority who favored the withdrawal proposal cited arguments like the freer development of Germany and the elimination of occupation costs.
- ... On an additional question - would Germany be politically secure if the occupying powers withdraw - seven out of ten say "No" in the Zone - three quarters in Berlin. Again the more informed groups, rather than the less, have the greater apprehensions about withdrawal.
- ... Confidence that the Americans will remain as long as necessary for the security of Western Germany is widespread in the US Zone where three out of four feel so. In Berlin a full 94% express the conviction that the Americans will remain as long as necessary for the security of West Berlin.
- ... On an open question as to how long should the Americans remain the majority everywhere sampled indicated a desire to have them remain until peace and order can be established in Germany.

SHOULD THE OCCUPIERS WITHDRAW? ...

At the present time three out of four in the US Zone - 86% in Berlin - hold that it would be unwise for the Western powers to accept the Russian proposal for a withdrawal of all four occupying powers from Germany.

"The East has repeatedly suggested that all four occupying powers should leave Germany. Would you consider it to be wise or unwise if the Western occupation powers would now agree to the proposal that all four occupying powers leave Germany?"

ACD

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Wise	16%	18%	15%	16%	11%	15%
Unwise	77	70	78	76	86	71
No opinion	7	12	7	8	3	14
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

These results are in line with indications in a related question of steadily decreasing German support of the withdrawal proposal, from a high point in June of 1949 - shortly after the lifting of the Berlin blockade.

"The Russians have proposed that all four occupying powers should leave Germany within the next year. Would you like to see that proposal carried out?"

ACD

	US ZONE				Berlin				Bremen			
	Nov 1948	June 1949	Sep 1949	Nov 1949	Nov 1948	June 1949	Sep 1949	Nov 1949	Nov 1948	June 1949	Sep 1949	Nov 1949
Yes	34%	43%	41%	34%	48%	47%	47%	39%	40%	49%	35%	36%
No	57	46	50	58	50	53	51	61	54	45	58	58
No opinion	9	11	9	8	2	-	2	-	6	6	7	6
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Attitudes in the current survey toward withdrawal were approached in terms of the wisdom or lack of wisdom of such a course because it has become apparent that the wording of the former question - "would you like to see the proposal carried out" did not in every case obtain the respondents serious judgment. Rather the wording tended to encourage an admixture of wishful thinking in that some respondents would say "Yes" when it was evident from follow-up questions that they did not really feel that the Russians should be trusted to carry out the proposal, but only that they wish such a proposal could be carried out.

Comparison of US Zone groups reveals that the more informed elements in the population - the men, the better educated, and the economically better situated - tend more often than do their counterparts to consider withdrawal unwise at this time. A point for thought lies in the fact that German youth more often than their elders believe that it would be the part of wisdom to accept the Russian proposal for four-power withdrawal.

"The East has repeatedly suggested that all four occupying powers should leave Germany. Would you hold it to be wise or unwise if the Western occupation powers would now agree to the proposal that all four occupying powers leave Germany?"

	Wise	Unwise	No opinion	
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	18%	79%	3%	...
Women	15	73	12	100%
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	17%	74%	9%	
9 - 11	15	81	4	
12 years or more	14	86	-	
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
Under 100 DM	17%	68%	15%	
100 - 200	15	76	9	
200 - 300	19	75	6	
300 or more	14	82	4	
<u>Age:</u>				
15 - 24 years	24%	69%	7%	
25 - 59	15	77	8	
60 years and over	16	74	10	

Queries on why four-power withdrawal would be unwise at this time elicited no dearth of answers, with the emphasis resting on the likelihood of a communist take-over.

"Why do you regard that as unwise?" (Asked of those who answered "unwise" to previous question).

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

Occupation and Bolshevization of all Germany by the Russians: The Russians would attack us then suddenly in Western Germany; Russia will at once occupy all Germany; Russians will march immediately into Western Germany; because we should be taken by surprise then; then Russia would have an opportunity to bolshevize Germany; when they are away the Russians will come; the Russians would have the courage to come in if they all left; because the Russian dictatorship would smash everything then; the Russians would try to seize the power here; Russians want to bring Germany under their power; etc.

28%

12%

24%

Rise of Communism and strengthening of the Russian influence: The communists would become strong here then; the danger of Communism would become greater; Communism would come to power then; the Russian influence would be more apparent here; the communists would become more insolent; Russians might succeed in influencing the West (of Germany); then we should be absorbed by Communism; the East would run over us politically; because Russia would send too many agents to Germany; etc.

14

12

12

Untrustworthiness of the Russians; possibility of their breaking the treaty: Because Russians prove every day that they don't keep their treaties; Russians don't keep their word, that they have proved so often; the Russians may not be trusted; because the Russians don't keep what they promise; because one cannot trust the Russian; etc.

10

14

12

Too great helplessness and insecurity of Germany without America (politically or economically): We are stronger when the Americans stay here; we cannot undertake anything alone; we need the Americans as backers; because we are entirely helpless against the Russians; we need American aid; the East would begin to agitate here; we cannot get by alone in regard to politics and economics yet; we must get our food and clothing from the West; etc.

8

8

7

Discord and civil war in Germany: Because then a civil war would break out here; a civil war would come as the Eastern zone is too strongly influenced by the East; the Germans hate one another too much and would engage in quarrels; because there is still too much disorder in Germany; because so many things are not yet settled here; there will be a revolt perhaps; we need the Americans to maintain our security and order; a government for all Germany ought to be created before that in order to counteract revolts; etc.

6

19

9

(continued on next page)

<u>Too close proximity of Russia to Germany a permanent danger:</u> Because Russia is too close in contrary to America; because the Russians don't go so far; the Russians will remain anyhow only 150 km behind Berlin; because Russians will stand behind the Oder-Neisse line and the Americans in the USA; Russians have the shorter way; Russians would stand before the gates of Berlin anyhow; even if the Russians leave, they might be back faster (than the Americans); etc.	5%	7%	3%
<u>The menace and eventual marching in of the people's police:</u> The people's police that is kept ready by the Russians would march in; the Eastern power has an armed force in East Germany for which we are no match; because the people's police has become so strong in the meantime that they might pocket Germany; if the occupation forces (all four) left Germany the people's police would march into Western Germany upon order by the Russians; etc.	2	9	2
<u>Revival of Militarism, Nazism, or other anti-democratic currents (besides Communism):</u> A certain kind of elements would arise once more in Germany; then soon they would rattle the sabres again here; etc.	1	1	1
<u>Too early:</u> It is still too early; I am of the opinion that it is too early, because Germany is still split into two parts; in consideration of the general tense political situation by far too early; no sooner than after the peace treaty; etc.	1	3	1
<u>Other remarks:</u> Because the Americans will then have lost any chance of winning a war; the situation between East and West is not yet settled; I believe that the Russians will proceed in a similar manner as in China; the Russians have the advantages then; etc.	1	1	1
<u>No opinion:</u>	$\frac{1}{77\%}$ *	$\frac{1}{87\%}$ *	$\frac{-}{72\%}$ *

* Some people gave more than one answer.

REASONS FOR CONSIDERING WITHDRAWAL WISE ...

The small minority who felt that it would be wise to accept at this time the Russian proposal for four-power withdrawal, reasoned in the following vein.

"Why would you regard it as wise?" (Asked of those who answered "wise" to previous question).

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

Independence and freer development of Germany: Then we should have a government of our own and might help ourselves; because Germany can make herself independent then; then Germany would be left alone; because I am convinced that we should get by without the occupation authorities; because we shall no longer be hindered in our development by any side then; if all the four occupation forces left the Germans might recover again; then the Germans might get back to prosperity faster; because it would be the best to leave us alone; there would be at once orderly conditions again; the German will get by alone; etc.

7¹7¹8⁵

Elimination of occupation costs: Because the occupation costs would be abolished by that measure; the occupation costs too much money; because the occupation costs for Germany would be cancelled then; etc.

4

1

1

Development without restraint our economy and decrease of unemployment: As we are left alone our economy might better develop; industry would not be braked so sharply because of fear of competition; the German government might foster our economy, without the guardianship (of the occupation authorities); the German people can not develop itself in its work procedures by the presence of the occupation forces; because Germany might work more freely then; etc.

2

2

1

Elimination of the partition of Germany: Because the zonal borders will fall; the Eastern zone would certainly like to reunite with us and that would be possible if they leave; because Germany would be reunited then; etc.

2

1

1

Brings about withdrawal of the Russian occupation: Because the Russians would have to leave Germany too then; etc.

1

-

1

Other remarks: But the Russians should not be allowed to exert any influence on Germany any longer; that would contribute to an improvement of the relations; etc.

2

1

2

No opinion:

18²12²15²

* Some people gave more than one answer.

WOULD WITHDRAWAL LEAVE GERMANY POLITICALLY SECURE? ...

That there has been a steady growth in apprehensions as to the wisdom of accepting the reiterated Russian suggestion of four-power withdrawal is additionally indicated by the trend of results to the question below.

"What is your view - would Germany be in a politically secure position, in case the occupying powers withdraw from Germany?"

ACD.

	US ZONE				Berlin				Bremen			
	Nov 1948	June 1949	Nov 1949	Apr 1950	Nov 1948	June 1949	Nov 1949	Apr 1950	Nov 1948	June 1949	Nov 1949	Apr 1950
Yes	17%	21%	22%	19%	29%	26%	23%	24%	23%	36%	33%	21%
No	65	57	60	69	66	67	73	75	69	55	60	66
No opinion	18	22	18	12	5	7	4	1	8	9	7	13
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Again, it is important to note that among US Zone population groups it is the more informed elements, rather than the less informed, who more widely hold that withdrawal of the occupiers would leave Germany in a politically insecure state. Age differences are less than in the prior question, but still in a direction that suggests a lesser awareness among German youth of the possible dangers attendant to a withdrawal of the occupying powers at this time.

"What is your view - would Germany be in a politically secure position, in case the occupying powers withdraw from Germany?"

	Yes	No	No opinion
<u>Sex:</u>			
Men	20%	76%	4%
Women	17	64	19
<u>Education:</u>			
8 years or less	19%	67%	14%
9 - 11	15	79	6
12 years or more	6	92	2
<u>Income (per month):</u>			
Under 100 DM	17%	61%	22%
100 - 200	18	68	14
200 - 300	20	71	9
300 or more	17	77	6
<u>Age:</u>			
15 - 24 years	23%	64%	13%
25 - 59	18	71	11
60 years and over	18	64	18

WILL AMERICANS REMAIN AS LONG AS NECESSARY? ...

Confidence that the Americans will remain as long as necessary for the security of Western Germany is widespread in the US Zone where three out of four feel so. In Berlin a full 94% express the conviction that the Americans will remain as long as necessary for the security of West Berlin.

ACD
"Do you believe that the Americans will remain here as long as is necessary for the security of Western Germany, (West-Berlin), or will they leave sooner?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
YES*	41%)	51%)	40%)	43%)	79%)	44%)
Yes	32) 73%	29) 80%	36) 76%	32) 75%	15) 94%	37) 81%
NO*	10%)	4%)	7%)	8%)	2%)	4%)
No	10) 20%	6) 10%	8) 15%	9) 17%	3) 5%	8) 12%
No opinion	$\frac{7}{100\%}$	$\frac{10}{100\%}$	$\frac{9}{100\%}$	$\frac{8}{100\%}$	$\frac{1}{100\%}$	$\frac{7}{100\%}$

* These answers were given with greater emphasis.

HOW LONG SHOULD AMERICANS REMAIN? ...

Additional light on German thinking as to how long the Americans should remain in Germany is available from a question in a survey of January 1950. The question was an open one and some respondents answered in terms of periods of time, others in terms of the realization of certain states of affairs. It is evident, however, that the majority everywhere sampled would have the Americans remain until peace and order is established in Germany.

"If you had it to decide, how long should the Americans remain in Germany?"

	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
<u>Until the East-West issue is settled; Russian danger is removed; Until East-West is clarified; until the danger of Communism has passed; three years longer than the Russians; until the Russians have agreed to limit the power of the people's police; etc.</u>	20%	45%	10%
<u>Should stay for ever - as long as they want to: By me, 100 years; they don't bother me, can stay for ever; as far as I am concerned they can stay as long as they want to; etc.</u>	17	11	28
<u>Until order, unity are guaranteed; Until the federal government is firmly established; until Germany is unified; until our problems are solved - about four years; etc.</u>	13	16	11
<u>Should leave at once: Not an hour longer; best thing would be to have them go tomorrow - all the occupiers should go; etc.</u>	12	7	23
<u>One to ten years:</u>	10	9	9
<u>Until peace is really established: At least until we have peace; after a peace treaty; etc.</u>	8	5	4
<u>Indefinite periods: Not so much longer; should go some time soon; stay as long as seems necessary; etc.</u>	6	2	4
<u>Until all four occupiers go: Should stay as long as all the others; until all four occupiers have reached agreement on when to leave; etc.</u>	1	6	-
<u>Other replies: Either the Americans should leave at once, or occupation should be reduced; should go as soon as possible but should have an alliance with Germany; I don't know whether things would be better in Germany if the Americans left; not much longer; until we can return to our homeland; etc.</u>	7	2	2
<u>No opinion:</u>	8 102%**	* 103%**	8 99%**

* Less than one half of one per cent.

** Some people gave more than one answer.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

GERMANS VIEW THE EAST-WEST STRUGGLE

III. Defense of Western Germany

NOTE: Through an oversight this report has not yet been distributed to the Resident Officers. Because of its general interest it is being distributed now. It must be kept in mind that the findings represent German opinions prior to the Korean crisis.

Classification cancelled
by authority of Leo P. Crespi
PUB/RAS.

Report No. 20
Series No. 2
25 May 1950

REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
HICOG APO 807
Bad Nauheim Germany

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

INTRODUCTION

In April 1950, the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs, surveyed a representative sample of the population in the US Zone, Bremen, and the three Western sectors of Berlin as to their views on the current East-West struggle. The present report - the third and last of a series - presents German opinions on matters relating to the defense of Western Germany.

The sample employed in the present study consists of 1500 persons in the US Zone, 250 in Berlin and 160 in Bremen, selected for representativeness by the standard random method employed in the survey operation. Interviewing was conducted by a trained German staff under professional American supervision.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS

I. General Attitudes

- ... Seven out of ten in the US Zone believe that in the event of a war the Western powers would endeavor to defend West Germany. However, a quarter feel that under such circumstances West Germany would be left to her fate.
- ... The better educated and the higher income levels are somewhat more skeptical than their counterparts of Western power defense of West Germany.
- ... Only about a quarter in the US Zone - 43% in Berlin - believe that the Western powers would be able to defend West Germany without German help - with the need for German assistance voiced slightly less often by the more informed groups - men, better educated and economically better situated.
- ... From November 1949 to April 1950 - concurrently with an intensification of the East-West struggle - a sharp rise has occurred in the proportion of Germans in the US Zone who favor the establishment of a West German army. Now, though majority opinion continues to be opposed, almost four in ten favor such an army.
- ... Among those who favor such an army the larger proportion lean toward one integrated with the forces of the Western powers, rather than an independent German army.
- ... There is little difference between men and women on proportions for or against the establishment of a German army. Among educational and income groups, however, the higher levels exhibit a somewhat greater proportion who are opposed to the formation of such an army.
- ... Further questioning of those disapproving of a West German army reveals about a third in the US Zone to be uncompromisingly opposed. Those who would compromise under certain conditions most often say in the event of a Russian aggression or some such direct threat to German security.
- ... Opinions divide on the possible influence of the formation of a West German army on Russian actions. The larger proportion in the zone feel that the consequence would be increased danger of a Russian attack. In Berlin the larger proportion judge the contrary.

- b -

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

II. West Germany's Relation to the Atlantic Pact

- ... Over the past year extent of awareness of the Atlantic Pact has remained approximately constant at six out of ten in the US Zone and eight out of ten in Berlin - with the usual pattern of wider awareness among the men, the better educated, and the higher income groups.
- ... Approval of joining the pact has also remained steady with seven out of ten in favor in the zone and 86% in Berlin.
- ... Of the people who are aware of the Atlantic Pact two out of three in the US Zone would be in favor - in connection with the Pact - of West German participation in a general army for the defense of West Europe.
- ... In the three Western sectors of Berlin the proportion who favor such a course is 88% of the people who are aware of the Atlantic Pact.
- ... The strong German affinity for European integration even in matters military, is sharply pointed up by the fact that 48% - or almost half - of the US Zone respondents who express themselves in favor of German participation in an Atlantic Pact army, were against the formation of a West German army when that issue was earlier raised with them.
- ... Among the US Zone Germans who are aware of the Atlantic Pact, group differences in approval or disapproval of German participation are not marked.
- ... But among the US Zone population as a whole, i.e. inclusive of those who had not heard of the Atlantic Pact, group breakdowns are highly revealing.
- ... A definite majority of the men in the US Zone (58%) - who are the individuals principally concerned in the matter - express themselves in favor of German participation in an Atlantic Pact army for the defense of Western Europe. One quarter are opposed, and 16% have had no opportunity to come to a decision since they are not yet familiar with the Atlantic Pact.
- ... Also notable is the fact that support for German participation in a pact army is strongest among the upper educational and economic levels - which are precisely the groups which were revealed to be most opposed to the formation of a West German army.

III. Reactions to East Zone "Police"

- ... Six out of ten in the US Zone - over eight out of ten in Berlin - are convinced that German military forces are being established in the East zone.
- ... Extent of such belief is appreciably greater among the more informed elements of the US Zone population - the men, the better educated, and the higher income groups.
- ... The preponderant opinion among those with this belief is that such a state of affairs poses some to very great danger for West Germany. However, an appreciable proportion see little to no danger in this particular matter.
- ... Those who felt that East zone military forces of dangerous character were being established most often suggested formation of a counter army as their recommendation in coping with the threat. However, numerous other suggestions were also made.

- c -

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

GENERAL ATTITUDES

WILL WEST GERMANY BE DEFENDED? ...

Seven out of ten in the US Zone (69%) feel that in the event of a war the Western powers would endeavor to defend West Germany. However, a far from insignificant minority - 23% - feel that under such circumstances West Germany would be left to her fate.

Western Berliners are much more widely convinced that the Western powers would try to defend West Germany in the event of a war. An almost unanimous 94% take this view - a result which undoubtedly derives in large part from the continued refusal of the Western powers to budge from Berlin in spite of the blockade and other Russian pressures.

"Do you believe that in case of a war the Western powers would try to defend West Germany or leave West Germany to itself?"

Bavaria Hesse W-Baden US ZONE Berlin Bremen

Will try to defend West Germany	69%	71%	69%	69%	94%	72%
Will leave West Germany to itself	25	18	22	23	4	18
No opinion	6	11	9	8	2	10
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Group comparisons in the US Zone show that there is some tendency for the better educated and the higher income groups to be more skeptical than their counterpart groups of Western power defense of West Germany.

"Do you believe that in case of war the Western powers would try to defend West Germany or leave West Germany to itself?"

	Will try to defend West Germany	Will abandon West Germany	No opinion
<u>Sex:</u>			
Men	71%	24%	5%
Women	68	22	10
<u>Education:</u>			
8 years or less	70%	21%	9%
9 - 11	67	28	5
12 years or more	50	46	4
<u>Income (per month):</u>			
Less than 100 DM	71%	18%	11%
100 - 200	73	20	7
200 - 300	70	24	6
300 or more	65	28	7
<u>Age:</u>			
15 - 24 years	65%	29%	6%
25 - 59	69	23	8
60 years and over	72	17	11
<u>Party Preferences:</u>			
SPD	76%	19%	5%
CDU/CSU	73	20	7
FDP/LDP/DVP/ADP	74	22	4
BP	65	28	7
No parties	58	31	11
No opinion	65	17	18
<u>Origin:</u>			
Native	68%	24%	8%
Refugee	72	20	8

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

IS GERMAN HELP NEEDED? ...

Only about a quarter in the US Zone - 43% in Berlin - believe that the Western powers would be able to defend West Germany without German help. The majority in all regions are convinced that German assistance would be needed.

"If the Western powers should try to defend West Germany, do you believe that the Western powers are able to defend West Germany without German help or will they need German help?" (Asked of those who said "Will try to defend West Germany" in prior question.)

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Without German help	28%	24%	28%	27%	43%	28%
Will need German help	68	68	66	67	54	63
Undecided	4	8	6	6	3	9
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

In US Zone comparisons, need for German assistance for Western Germany defense is voiced slightly less often by the more informed groups - the men, the better educated, and the economically better situated.

"If the Western powers should try to defend West Germany, do you believe that the Western powers are able to defend West Germany without German help or will they need German help?"

	Without German help	Will need German help	Undecided
<u>Sex:</u>			
Men	31%	64%	5%...100%
Women	24	69	7
<u>Education:</u>			
8 years or less	27%	67%	6%
9-11	28	69	3
12 years or more	36	56	8
<u>Income (per month):</u>			
Under 100 DM	22%	67%	11%
100 - 200	26	70	4
200 - 300	29	65	6
300 or more	30	66	4
<u>Age:</u>			
15 - 24 years	31%	66%	3%
25 - 59	27	67	6
60 years and over	23	60	8
<u>Party Preference:</u>			
SPD	32%	63%	5%
CDU/CSU	26	70	4
FDP/LDP/DVP/EDV	24	69	7
EP	26	70	4
No parties	25	67	8
No opinion	24	63	13
<u>Origin:</u>			
Native	26%	68%	6%
Refugee	30	65	5

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

SHOULD A WEST GERMAN ARMY BE ESTABLISHED? ...

A key question relating to the defense of West Germany is, of course, whether or not a Western German army should be established. Public thinking on this issue - which has been widely discussed in the German press - has been followed since November of 1949 with the trend indicated below.

"There has been considerable talk recently about whether or not Western Germany should have an army. Are you for it or against it?"

	Bavaria		Hesse		W-Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Nov 1949	Apr 1950	Nov 1949	Apr 1950	Nov 1949	Apr 1950	Nov 1949	Apr 1950	Nov 1949	Apr 1950	Nov 1949	Apr 1950
For	32%	47%	16%	29%	22%	29%	26%	39%	43%	51%	25%	35%
Against	56	49	71	65	69	66	62	56	50	48	69	59
No opinion	12	4	13	6	9	5	12	5	2	1	6	6
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

It is evident that from November to April, - concurrently with an intensification of the East-West struggle - a sharp rise occurred in the proportion of Germans in the US Zone who favor the establishment of a West German army. Now, though majority opinion continues to be opposed, almost four in ten (39%) favor such an army.*

Among those who favor an army, the larger proportion lean toward one integrated with the forces of the Western powers, rather than an independent German army. (Support for such an integrated force is examined in more detail in Part II of this report.)

"Should such an army be an independent German army or should it be part of the forces of the Western powers?"
(Asked of those who were for a West German army.)

	Bavaria		Hesse		W-Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Nov 1949	Apr 1950	Nov 1949	Apr 1950	Nov 1949	Apr 1950	Nov 1949	Apr 1950	Nov 1949	Apr 1950	Nov 1949	Apr 1950
Independent army	13%	17%	5%	14%	9%	12%	10%	15%	21%	15%	9%	17%
Part of forces of Western powers	15	26	7	12	9	16	12	21	25	33	13	14
No opinion	4	4	4	3	4	1	4	3	2	3	3	4
	32%	47%	16%	29%	22%	29%	26%	39%	48%	51%	25%	35%

* Addition of the term "voluntary" does not materially affect these percentages as indicated in the returns from a comparable sample tabulated below.

"There has been considerable talk recently about whether or not West Germany should have a voluntary army; are you for such a voluntary army or are you against it?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
For	54%	28%	30%	42%	62%	35%
Against	41	63	64	52	38	58
No opinion	5	9	6	6	-	7
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

GROUP DIFFERENCES IN EXTENT OF APPROVAL OF GERMAN ARMY ...

There is little difference between men and women on proportions for or against the establishment of a German army. Among educational and income groups, however, the higher levels exhibit a somewhat greater proportion who are opposed to the formation of such an army.

Among the political parties listed below, adherents of the SPD manifest the least support for a German army - which fact may be related to the strong opposition that their political head - Dr. Schumacher - has voiced on the issue. It is not without interest that of all the population groups examined in the US Zone, the Bavarian party emerges as the only one wherein sentiment in favor of a German army exceeds opposition. This finding must not be taken too firmly as the number of cases of BP members are too limited for statistical conclusiveness.

A final point of note in the following tabulations is that natives and refugees do not differ in their pattern of opinions on the army issue.

"There has been considerable talk recently about whether or not Western Germany should have an army or not? Are you for it or against it?"

	For	Against	No opinion
<u>Sex:</u>			
Men	41%	58%	1% ... 100%
Women	37	55	8
<u>Education:</u>			
8 years or less	40%	55%	5%
9 - 11	35	62	3
12 years or more	30	70	-
<u>Income (per month):</u>			
Under 100 DM	41%	49%	10%
100 - 200	42	54	4
200 - 300	37	59	4
300 or more	37	59	4
<u>Age:</u>			
15 - 24 years	38%	59%	3%
25 - 59	38	58	4
60 years and over	42	50	8
<u>Party Preference:</u>			
SPD	34%	63%	3%
CDU/CSU	42	53	5
FDP/LDP/DVP/BDV	46	52	2
BP	56	42	2
No parties	31	63	6
No opinion	33	52	15
<u>Origin:</u>			
Native	39%	57%	4%
Refugee	39	55	6

EXTENT OF UNCOMPROMISING OPPOSITION TO A GERMAN ARMY ...

Respondents who indicated disapproval of the idea of establishing a West German army were further questioned on whether or not they could conceive of any circumstances under which they would reverse their stand. The results reveal that 36% in the US Zone - or about a third - state that they are against a West German army under any circumstances. Fewer in Berlin (22%) take such a position. Those who indicate a willingness to compromise under certain conditions most often speak of relinquishing their opposition in the event of Russian aggression or some such direct threat to German security.

ACD

"Are there, in your opinion, any circumstances that might induce you to agree after all to the formation of a West German army, or are you against it in any case?" (Asked of those who were against a West German army.)

	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
In any case against it:	36%	22%	39%
<u>Russian aggression:</u> In the case of a war as a defense against the Russians; if the East attacks; in the case of a war to defend Western Europe; Russian invasion; only in a war against Russia; in case of emergency as a protection against Russia; against the Russians; if a war between the Western powers and the Russians breaks out; etc.	7	10	8
<u>Generally if security of Germany is threatened and endangered:</u> If the security of Germany demands it; if it is for the protection of the country; for the defense of our own; in the case of a direct menace; if it is getting tough and Germany is abandoned by everybody; in the case of a danger of war; etc.	5	6	6
<u>Equal rights for Germany and a just peace treaty:</u> If Germany will be awarded equal rights; in the case of a just peace treaty with equal rights for Germany I should not be against it; if Germany would be admitted to the Council of Europe with equal rights; etc.	2	3	2
<u>Withdrawal of the occupation forces:</u> If the occupation forces should withdraw their troops; when the occupation forces leave; etc.	1	1	-
<u>Other remarks:</u> Only under German command; to overcome our unemployment; as long as our soldiers are detained in foreign countries and are punished there, no; if everybody who had a leading position under the Nazis would be excluded; if I knew that it would be actually help to repel the Russians; etc.	2	6	2
<u>No opinion:</u>	3 56%	1 49%	2 59%

* Some people gave more than one answer.

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

POSSIBLE EFFECT OF GERMAN REARMAMENT ON RUSSIANS ...

Opinions split on the influence that the formation of a West German army would be likely to have upon Russian actions. The larger proportion in the US Zone (38%) feel that the consequence would be an increased danger of a Russian attack. The preponderant opinion in Berlin however - almost a majority - is that such an army would deter Russian aggression.

ACD "Suppose a German army should be established in West Germany, would that, in your opinion, increase or decrease the danger of a Russian attack?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Increase	39%	32%	45%	38%	28%	35%
Decrease	31	22	22	27	50	25
No influence	18	22	18	19	18	16
No opinion	12	24	15	16	4	24
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

US Zone comparisons indicate that a somewhat larger proportion of men than of women feel that the effect of a West German army would be to decrease the Russian threat. The only apparent trend among educational groups is that the higher levels tend more often to indicate no influence one way or another by virtue of establishing an army. There is a suggestion among age groups - not large enough to be conclusive - that youths see slightly more provocation of the Russian in the establishment of an army than do their elders.

"Suppose a German army would be established in West Germany, would that, in your opinion, increase or decrease the danger of a Russian attack?"

	Increase	Decrease	No influence	No opinion
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	37%	34%	20%	9%..100%
Women	40	21	17	22
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	38%	27%	17%	18%
9 - 11	43	25	26	6
12 years or more	34	24	36	6
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
Under 100 DM	36%	24%	18%	22%
100 - 200	35	29	17	19
200 - 300	40	27	19	14
300 or more	42	24	23	11
<u>Age:</u>				
15 - 24 years	47%	27%	13%	13%
25 - 59	38	27	20	15
60 years and over	35	26	19	20
<u>Party Preference:</u>				
SPD	42%	26%	21%	11%
CDU/CSU	38	30	15	17
FDP/LDP/DVP/BDV	38	30	25	7
BP	34	32	23	11
No parties	40	21	20	19
No opinion	34	18	15	33
<u>Origin:</u>				
Native	40%	26%	18%	16%
Refugee	33	29	22	16

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

REASONS FOR BELIEVING ARMY WOULD INCREASE RUSSIAN DANGER ...

Respondents who felt that the establishment of a West German army would increase the danger of Russian aggression argue that the Russians would feel threatened under such circumstances, and would be provoked to rigid counter-measures.

"Suppose that a German army would be created in Western Germany, would that, in your opinion, increase or decrease the danger of Russian aggression?"

"Why do you think so?" (Asked of those who answered "increase" to previous question.)

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

Russia would feel threatened: The Russian would think that one rearms against him; because the Russian is afraid that the Western powers might become too strong; because the Russian knows then that it is intended against him; then they will see an enemy more in this world; the Russian would be irritated by that; etc.

15% 10% 12%

The Russians would have a motive for more rigid counter-measures: The Russians would have a motive to attack; the Russians would be exasperated about that and undertake something disagreeable; then the Russian would have a pretext to proceed against Germany; etc.

10 5 8

Russia would mobilize an army too and not wait: If the Russians see that one rearms here they will rearm too; because the Russians would increase their armed forces too then; because Russia would bring up an army twice as big in Eastern Germany then; the Russians would not wait until Western Germany becomes so strong; etc.

7 8 8

That would lead to a war: Rearmament means war and a menace; then there will be a war; as long as there will be no army the Russians won't think of a war either; then the gulf between East and West would be a hundred per cent one and the desire for a war would be strengthened correspondingly; because Germany is not united and it would lead primarily to a civil war; etc.

4 3 6

Other remarks: Because no one trusts the other; because one encroaches upon the divine order then; etc.

1 2 -

No opinion:

$\frac{1}{38\%}$ $\frac{-}{28\%}$ $\frac{2}{36\%}$

- 7 -

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

REASONS FOR BELIEVING ARMY WOULD DECREASE RUSSIAN DANGER ...

Those who saw a decrease in the threat of Russian aggression with the establishment of a West German army argue that the Russians would be deterred through fear and the prospect of greater resistance.

ACD "Suppose that a German army would be set up in Western Germany; would that, in your opinion, increase or decrease the danger of a Russian aggression?"

"Why do you think so?" (Asked of those who answered "decrease" to the previous question.)

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

The Russians would become afraid and would not start a war so soon: The Russians would have more respect then; because they will be scared a little then; because the Russians fear the Germans too; because the Russians are cowardly and the stronger the power of the opponent is the less they will wage an aggression; because the Russians will see then that it is not so easy to start a war; because the Russians will never initiate action by themselves, they will wait and agitate until they are attacked; etc.

10% 15% 11%

The Russians fear the German soldiers: Because the German soldier is a good soldier and the Russians fear him; because they are more afraid of a German army than of an American army, the German soldier is respected most of all; etc.

8 10 3

The Russians must reckon with a stronger resistance; strengthening of the Western powers: Then there will be an obstacle in their way which might not be run over so easily; because a strong bulwark would be created in Western Germany which might be decisive in the strategical thinking of the Russians; the Russians would see that they would meet with German resistance; because the defensive front against Russia would be enlarged; because the Russians will see that that they can not reach out so much any longer; because the Russian would be beaten back by the army then; etc.

7 22 8

Because Germany will defend herself: Because one will perceive that one can not pocket Germany so easily; because Germany, weak and defenseless, would become a victim otherwise; weakness always arouses greater desire for aggression in the opponent and gives him a better chance for aggression; etc.

2 2 2

Other remarks: One can check the Russians only by such means of power; then there would be the danger for the Russian of being attacked some day by the Western powers; then they would keep more in reserve; then we should be protected from the people's police; etc.

* 1 1

No opinion:

* 27% 50% 25%

* Less than one half of one per cent.

- 8 -

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

REASONS FOR BELIEVING ARMY WOULD LEAVE RUSSIANS UNAFFECTED ...

The reasoning among those who felt that a West German army would not influence Russian intentions was primarily either that the Russian adheres rigidly to his time table in spite of circumstances, or that Russia is too strong to be much influenced by the formation of a West German army.

"Suppose that a German army would be created in Western Germany, would that, in your opinion, increase or decrease the danger of Russian aggression?"

"Why do you think so?" (Asked of those who answered "has no influence" to previous question.)

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

The Russian does not allow himself to be disturbed in his intentions and aims: The Russian would attack whether a German army exists or not, if he wanted to do so; the Russians pursue their aims anyhow; Russia, that is my opinion, has made up her mind as to her standpoint and her aims anyhow; the plans of the Russians are not influenced by that; the aggression will happen anyhow, the Russian definitely does not allow himself to be influenced by that; etc.

9% 7% 6%

Russia is strong and a German army would not mean anything: Russia is strong enough, therefore it will not feel disturbed by that; the danger is existent and will remain as long as Russia is strong and communistic; this reason would be too little and futile for Russia; the army will be very small and therefore will not have any weight; etc.

7 5 4

The Russian has created an army in the Eastern zone too: Because we do only what the Russians have done in the Eastern zone long ago; I can not believe that Russia should see any offense in that; Russia has also pressed German men into uniforms in the Eastern zone; they have already a people's police which they would strengthen at most; etc.

1 1 1

Other remarks: That will not change, that would at best mean an aggravation of the partition of Germany; etc.

1 3 1

No opinion:

$\frac{1}{19\%}$ $\frac{2}{18\%}$ $\frac{4}{16\%}$

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

II. WEST GERMANY: RELATION TO THE ATLANTIC PACT

EXTENT OF AWARENESS OF ATLANTIC PACT ...

Extent of awareness of the Atlantic Pact has not increased appreciably in the US Zone in the past year. Now as before about six out of ten claim to have heard or read something about the pact. That no marked gains in awareness have occurred is perhaps to be expected in view of the fact that West Germany is not among the member nations.

"Have you read or heard about the Atlantic Pact?"

	Bavaria		Hesse		W. Eden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Apr 1949	Apr 1950	Apr 1949	Apr 1950	Apr 1949	Apr 1950	Apr 1949	Apr 1950	Apr 1949	Apr 1950	Apr 1949	Apr 1950
Yes	58%	63%	63%	67%	59%	62%	60%	63%	79%	81%	64%	60%
No	40	36	35	30	37	33	38	34	20	18	36	39
No opinion	2	1	2	3	4	5	2	3	1	1	-	1
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

In comparisons of US Zone groups the usual information pattern emerges of the men, the better educated, and the economically better situated revealing themselves to be more widely informed than their counterpart groups. Among age levels, adults prove to be somewhat more informed than either youths or elderly people (over 50.) And among political parties it is the CDU/CSU and the BP who reveal themselves to be least informed about the existence of an Atlantic Pact.

"Have you read or heard about the Atlantic Pact?"

	Yes	No	No opinion
<u>Sex:</u>			
Men	84%	15%	1%
Women	47	49	4
<u>Education:</u>			
8 years or less	58%	39%	3%
9 - 11	87	12	1
12 years or more	98	2	-
<u>Income (per month):</u>			
Under 100 DM	51%	43%	6%
100 - 200	58	40	2
200 - 300	65	31	4
300 or more	77	21	2
<u>Age:</u>			
15 - 24 years	56%	41%	3%
25 - 59	68	30	2
60 years and over	53	42	5
<u>Party Preference:</u>			
SPD	71%	26%	3%
CDU/CSU	56	42	2
FDP/LDP/DVP/BDV	77	22	1
BP	54	45	1
No parties	67	31	2
No opinion	51	41	8

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

SHOULD WEST GERMANY JOIN? ...

Those who indicated an awareness of the Atlantic Pact were next asked whether or not West Germany should join - with the results tabulated below. Over the past year, it can be seen, approval of joining has remained at a steady seven out of ten in the US Zone,

"In your opinion should West Germany join the Atlantic Pact?"
(Asked of those who said they had heard or read about the Atlantic Pact.)

ACD

	Bavaria		Hesse		W. Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Apr 1949	Apr 1950	Apr 1949	Apr 1950	Apr 1949	Apr 1950	Apr 1949	Apr 1950	Apr 1949	Apr 1950	Apr 1949	Apr 1950
Yes	77	76	63	69	75	65	73	72	86	86	70	80
No	11	14	11	18	13	23	11	17	12	8	11	10
No opinion	12	10	26	13	12	12	16	11	2	6	19	10
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Group differences in reactions to the idea of West Germany joining the Atlantic Pact are not appreciable. Men showed both wider approval and wider disapproval than did women - a large proportion of which registered "no opinion" on the issue.

"In your opinion, should West Germany join the Atlantic Pact or not?" (Asked of those who said they had read or heard about the Atlantic Pact.)

	Yes	No	No opinion	
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	75	21	4	100
Women	67	11	22	
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	71	16	13	
9 - 11	76	15	9	
12 years or more	74	26	-	
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
Under 100 DM	73	15	12	
100 - 200	69	17	14	
200 - 300	70	18	12	
300 or more	78	16	6	
<u>Age:</u>				
15 - 24 years	73	15	12	
25 - 59	71	18	11	
60 years and over	75	14	11	
<u>Party Preference:</u>				
SPD	74	15	11	
CDU/CSU	75	13	12	
FDP/LDP/DVP/BDV	77	15	8	
EP	85	9	6	
No parties	67	25	8	
No opinion	55	18	27	

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

SHOULD WEST GERMANY PARTICIPATE IN AN ATLANTIC PACT ARMY? ...

The prior question on the Atlantic Pact paves the way for raising a very important issue in connection with Western German defense. The issue is posed in the query below with the results as tabulated.

"Suppose West Germany would join the Atlantic Pact and be asked in connection with it to participate in a general army for defense of West Europe. Are you for it or against it?" (asked of those who said they had heard or read about the Atlantic Pact.)

ACD

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Yes, for it	70% (44)*	63% (42)	60% (37)	66% (42)	88% (71)	55% (33)
No, against it	24 (15)	28 (19)	33 (21)	27 (17)	11 (9)	31 (19)
No opinion	6 (4)	9 (6)	7 (4)	7 (4)	1 (1)	14 (8)
	100% (63)	100% (67)	100% (62)	100% (63)	100% (81)	100% (60)

* Figures in brackets give per cents based on the total population, i.e. inclusive of those who have not heard of the Atlantic Pact.

The very notable finding emerges that of the people in the US Zone who are aware of the Atlantic Pact, two out of three would be in favor of West German participation - in connection with the pact - in a general army for the defense of West Europe.

In the three Western sectors of Berlin the proportion who favor such a course is 88% of the people who are aware of the Atlantic Pact - which, since most Western Berliners are aware of the pact, brings the approval figure to 71% of the West Berlin population.

The strong German affinity for European integration even in matters military, is sharply pointed up by the fact that 48% - or almost half - of the US Zone respondents who express themselves in favor of German participation in an Atlantic Pact army, were against the formation of a West German army when that issue was earlier raised with them.

ACD

	For West German army	Against West German army	No opinion
For German participation in Atlantic Pact army	51%	48%	1% ... 100%
Against German participation in Atlantic Pact army	12	87	1
No opinion	22	60	18

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

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SHOULD WEST GERMANY JOIN? ...

Those who indicated an awareness of the Atlantic Pact were next asked whether or not West Germany should join - with the results tabulated below. Over the past year, it can be seen, approval of joining has remained at a steady seven out of ten in the US Zone.

"In your opinion should West Germany join the Atlantic Pact?"
(asked of those who said they had heard or read about the Atlantic Pact.)

	Bavaria		Hesse		W. Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Apr 1949	Apr 1950	Apr 1949	Apr 1950	Apr 1949	Apr 1950	Apr 1949	Apr 1950	Apr 1949	Apr 1950	Apr 1949	Apr 1950
Yes	77	76	63	69	75	65	73	72	86	86	70	80
No	11	14	11	18	13	23	11	17	12	8	11	10
No opinion	12	10	26	13	12	12	16	11	2	6	19	10
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Group differences in reactions to the idea of West Germany joining the Atlantic Pact are not appreciable. Men showed both wider approval and wider disapproval than did women - a large proportion of which registered "no opinion" on the issue.

"In your opinion, should West Germany join the Atlantic Pact or not?" (asked of those who said they had read or heard about the Atlantic Pact.)

	Yes	No	No opinion	
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	75	21	4	...
Women	67	11	22	100
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	71	16	13	
9 - 11	76	15	9	
12 years or more	74	26	-	
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
Under 100 DM	73	15	12	
100 - 200	69	17	14	
200 - 300	70	18	12	
300 or more	78	16	6	
<u>Age:</u>				
15 - 24 years	73	15	12	
25 - 59	71	18	11	
60 years and over	75	14	11	
<u>Party Preference:</u>				
SPD	74	15	11	
CDU/CSU	75	13	12	
FDP/LDP/DVP/BDV	77	15	8	
EP	85	9	6	
No parties	67	25	8	
No opinion	55	18	27	

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

Group differences become considerable more significant, however, when proportions approving or disapproving of German participation in a pact army are related to the whole population - instead of being calculated on the basis of only those people aware of the Atlantic Pact.

	For Germans in Pact army	Against Germans in Pact army	No opinion	have not heard of Atlantic Pact
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	58%	24%	2%	16% ... 100%
Women	29	12	6	53
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	38%	16%	4%	42%
9 - 11	59	22	6	13
12 years or more	72	24	2	2
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
Under 100 DM	35%	12%	4%	49%
100 - 200	37	16	5	42
200 - 300	42	18	5	35
300 or more	55	19	3	23
<u>Age:</u>				
15 - 24 years	39%	14%	3%	44%
25 - 59	43	19	5	33
60 years and over	40	10	3	47
<u>Party Preference:</u>				
SPD	50%	17%	4%	29%
CDU/CSU	41	12	3	44
FDP/LDP/DVP/BDV	59	13	5	23
BP	38	14	2	46
No parties	36	26	5	33
No opinion	27	15	9	49

The very important finding emerges from the above table that a definite majority of the men in the US Zone - who are the individuals principally concerned in the matter - express themselves in favor of German participation in an Atlantic Pact army for the defense of Western Europe. One quarter are opposed, and 16% have had no opportunity to come to a decision since they are not yet familiar with the Atlantic Pact.

It is highly significant also that that support for German participation in a pact army is strongest among the upper educational and economic levels - which were precisely the groups which were revealed to be most opposed to the establishment of a Western German army.

Another point not without interest relates to the SPD results in the above table. In spite of the fact that 29% could not be asked their opinions (since they had not heard of the Atlantic Pact), 50% of this party's adherents, or almost a majority, favor German participation in a pact army - this in spite of Dr. Schumacher's stand against any German participation in military matters.

III. REACTIONS TO EAST ZONE "POLICE"

ARE EAST ZONE MILITARY FORCES BEING ESTABLISHED? ...

The last point that was raised in connection with the problem of defending West Germany was the question of East zone military forces. In response to the inquiry below, six out of ten in the zone - over eight out of ten in Berlin - expressed the belief that German military forces were being established in the East zone.

"Do you believe that in the East zone German military forces are being established?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Yes	61%	59%	60%	60%	82%	58%
No	20	12	16	18	7	18
No opinion	19	29	24	22	11	24
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

The extent of belief in the existence of an East zone army is appreciably greater among the more informed elements of the US Zone population - the men, the better educated, and the higher income groups.

"Do you believe that in the East zone German military forces are being established?"

	Yes	No	No opinion
<u>Sex:</u>			
Men	76%	14%	10% ... 100%
Women	47	20	33
<u>Education:</u>			
8 years or less	57%	18%	25%
9 - 11	73	17	10
12 years or more	84	5	11
<u>Income (per month):</u>			
Under 100 DM	55%	17%	28%
100 - 200	55	17	28
200 - 300	63	18	19
300 or more	69	18	13
<u>Age:</u>			
15 - 24 years	63%	17%	20%
25 - 59	61	17	22
60 years and over	55	20	25
<u>Party Preference:</u>			
SPD	67%	17%	16%
CDU/CSU	55	20	25
FDP/LDP/DVP/BDV	71	15	14
BP	65	20	15
No parties	57	12	31
No opinion	27	21	52
<u>Origin:</u>			
Native	60%	18%	22%
Refugee	61	16	23

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

HOW DANGEROUS ARE THESE FORCES? ...

Those who felt that East zone forces were being established were next questioned as to how great a danger to West Germany they thought the situation posed. The larger proportion everywhere sampled spoke of some to very great danger in the situation.

"If you believe that, do you think the establishment of military forces in the East zone will be a very great danger for West Germany or not?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W. Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Very great danger	13%)	10%)	12%)	12%)	18%)	22%)
Great danger	14) 36%	10) 33%	14) 40%	13) 36%	16) 48%	13) 45%
Some danger	9)	13)	14)	11)	14)	10)
Little danger	10	10	7	10	9	5
No danger	14	13	13	13	25	7
No opinion	1	3	-	1	-	-
	61%	59%	60%	50%	82%	58%

There is a similarity of opinion among US Zone population groups in assessing the danger of an East zone police. In all groups, it will be noted below, the majority sentiment among those who believe that East zone forces are being established is that some to very great danger to West Germany derives from the situation. On the other hand, appreciable minorities see little to no danger in this particular matter.

"If you believe that, do you think the establishment of military forces in the East zone will be a very great danger for West Germany or not?" (Asked of those who believe military forces are being established in the East zone.)

	Very great to some danger	Little danger	No danger	No opinion
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	61%	17%	21%	1% ... 100%
Women	59	14	23	4
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	59%	16%	22%	3%
9 - 11	62	16	21	1
12 years or more	61	10	29	-
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
Under 100 DM	63%	13%	21%	3%
100 - 200	58	18	21	3
200 - 300	62	14	22	2
300 or more	59	17	23	1
<u>Age:</u>				
15 - 24 years	62%	16%	21%	1%
25 - 59	58	16	23	3
60 years and over	66	13	20	1
<u>Party Preference:</u>				
SPD	60%	17%	22%	1%
CDU/CSU	60	17	20	3
FDP/LDP/DVP/BDV	49	19	29	3
BP	66	11	22	1
No parties	63	10	24	3
No opinion	-	-	-	-
<u>Origin:</u>				
Native	59%	17%	21%	3%
Refugee	61	12	25	2

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

HOW COPE WITH THE DANGER? ...

Respondents who both felt that East zone forces were being established and that the situation was dangerous were asked for their recommendation on coping with the threat. The single most frequent reply was the formation of a counter army. However, numerous other suggestions were also made as is evident below.

"Do you regard the formation of (military) forces in the East zone as a very great danger for Western Germany or not?"

"What do you think the Western powers and Western Germany should do to prevent this danger?" (Asked of those who answered "very great, great, or some danger" to previous question.)

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

<u>The same; formation of an army; rearmament; Draft military forces too; they must rearm too, that strengthens most; form such forces too, although I am not in favor of it as a principle; rearm too; exactly the same as the East; formation of a militia here with us; etc.</u>	13%	24%	11%
<u>Application of protective counter-measures and preparations for any emergency; no yielding; Nothing other than carrying out precautionary measures; conduct a policy to show the Eastern zone that the West is prepared to avert the danger; secure safety by appropriate measures; be on the alert and watch; keep military forces ready; should not yield but resist stubbornly, even if it should lead to a war; continue their efforts for a united Germany and not yield in pursuing their aims; threaten the Russians that we shall draft an army in Western Germany too, if they don't demobilize the Eastern German army; etc.</u>	6	11	4
<u>The Western powers must protect us: Keep the Russians from our neck; the Western powers should take upon themselves to protect us; protection by allied military forces; America ought to see to it that they become so strong that they can brave the forces of the Eastern zone; etc.</u>	3	3	10
<u>Try to negotiate with the Eastern zone and the East to reach some kind of agreement: Come to terms by negotiations which will save Germany from any kind of a new militarism; try by diplomatic means to prevent that; reach an agreement with the Eastern zone in any case; they must get to an understanding with Russia and to mutual trust by democratic ways; etc.</u>	3	3	7
<u>The Western world shall hold together and conclude peace with Germany, so that Germany gets equal rights; hold together; it is only a question of accord between our own people and the Western powers; the Western powers should conclude peace with Germany; give Germany entirely equal rights; etc.</u>	3	1	2
<u>Strengthening of the police: Form a stronger police-apparatus; formation of well disciplined armed police forces; train the police better and make them more ready to fight; etc.</u>	1	3	2
<u>Improve the general conditions of Western Germany and unite her politically: The economic conditions of Western Germany should be improved so far that Communism has no prospect of success; provide for quiet and order in this country; etc.</u>	1	-	1
<u>They can not do anything against it, it is too late:</u>	1	-	1
<u>Other remarks:</u>	1	-	-
<u>No opinion:</u>	5 37%	4 19%	7 45%

* Some respondents gave more than one answer.

- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

R E S T R I C T E D

VIEWS OF THE GERMAN PUBLIC IN THE U.S. ZONE ON CHANCELLOR ADENAUER'S
PROPOSAL OF A FRANCO-GERMAN UNION

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Report No. 21
Series No. 2
31 May 1950
REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
HICOG APO 807
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INTRODUCTION ...

Following Chancellor Adenauer's statement on a possible German-French union, public reactions to it and related issues were measured by the Reactions Analysis Staff, OPub., HICOG. After the study was completed, the more far-reaching proposal of M. Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister, for French-German economic unity was made. But since both proposals deal with much the same basic issue, reactions to the West German Chancellor's suggestion remain pertinent.

The sample used in the present study consisted of 1500 cases in the U.S. Zone, 250 in the three Western sectors of Berlin, and 160 in Bremen, selected for representativeness by the standard random method. Interviewing was done by the trained German staff, supervised by American Surveys Officers.

SUMMARY ...

- ... A month after Chancellor Adenauer suggested a Franco-German union in an interview with Kingsbury Smith, half the US Zone public claimed not to have heard or read anything about it.
- ... But the suggestion was generally approved by those who did know of it.
- ... It was also generally believed that a union between West Germany and France would be a step toward a wider European union rather than a hindrance to it.
- ... Approval of a West European federation, in principle, remains high. From February 1948 to the present, six in ten US Zone residents have favored it.
- ... Three fourths in the Zone and nine in ten in West Berlin would like to see West Germany enter such a federation, and a majority feel that the entry of the Saar territory into this federation would not be a reason for non-participation.
- ... People who approve a Franco-German union tend more frequently than those who disapprove, to favor West German participation in a European federation.

Acceptance of both a Franco-German union and a West European federation is highest among the best educated, upper socio-economic, and upper income groups.

ADENAUER'S PROPOSAL OF A FRENCH-GERMAN UNION ...

More than a month after the Chancellor of the German Federal Republic, Dr. Adenauer had proposed a union between West Germany and France, half of the U.S. Zone public had not heard of the suggestion. But those who had heard of it were generally inclined to approve the idea.*

"Have you heard or read of Chancellor Adenauer's proposal that a German-French union be formed?" (If Yes) Are you in general in agreement with this proposal or not?"

	US ZONE	West Berlin	Bremen
Have heard and agree	37%	45%	35%
Disagree	8	8	5
No opinion	4	3	5
Have not heard	51	44	55
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

The fraction opposing the idea based their reasons on 1) traditional French-German enmity (2%); preference for a union of all of Europe not only France and Germany (2%), or absence of real basis for understanding between France and Germany (2%), and so on.

STEP TOWARD WESTERN UNION ...

Most of the informed group think that a French and German union would be a step toward a Western European union, rather than a hindrance.

"Do you think that the formation of a union between West Germany and France would be a step forward on the way to a West European union, or would it be a hindrance to it?"

	US ZONE	West Berlin	Bremen
Step forward	37%	46%	31%
Hindrance	3	6	3
Neither	3	1	6
No opinion	6	3	5
	<u>49%</u>	<u>56%</u>	<u>45%</u>

* On 7 March 1950 in an interview with Kingsbury Smith of the International News Service, Chancellor Adenauer proposed a union between the two countries. The survey on which this report is based was done during the last two weeks of April.

GROUP DIFFERENCES ...

People who have heard or read of the Chancellor's suggestion come from the groups which are customarily the better informed - that is the better educated, the men, the upper socio-economic groups, and so on.

	Heard or read	Have not	
<u>Education:</u>			
3 years or less	44%	56%	... 100%
9 - 11 years	69	31	
12 years or more	88	12	
<u>Sex:</u>			
Men	68%	32%	... 100%
Women	33	67	
<u>Socio-Economic Level:</u>			
Upper middle and upper	87%	13%	... 100%
Lower middle	61	39	
Lower	41	59	
<u>Monthly Income:</u>			
Under 100 DM	38%	62%	... 100%
100 - 199 DM	42	58	
200 - 299 DM	52	48	
300 DM and over	62	38	

WEST EUROPEAN UNION ...

Approval of the idea of a Western European Union is generally high, though regional differences are apparent. Proportionately more West Berliners than residents in the other areas favor the idea. Fewest approve in Bremen. In the Zone, residents of Bavaria are more likely to favor a European union than are those in Hesse or Wuerttemberg-Baden. Outright disapproval of a West European Union is infrequent in all regions, but many persons apparently have not yet arrived at any judgment on the matter.

"In general are you for the idea of establishing a federation of Western European states, are you against, or haven't you yet made up your mind about it?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
For	65%	57%	59%	62%	78%	50%
Against	5	2	3	4	4	5
Mind not made up and no opinion	<u>30</u> 100%	<u>41</u> 100%	<u>38</u> 100%	<u>34</u> 100%	<u>18</u> 100%	<u>45</u> 100%

Attitudes on this issue have remained quite stable since February 1948 when the question was first asked, as is seen in the U.S. Zone trend:

	Feb 1948	Sept 1948	Aug 1949	Apr 1950
For Western European Federation	59%	61%	61%	62%
Against	3	5	3	4
Kind not made up and no opinion	<u>38</u> 100%	<u>34</u> 100%	<u>36</u> 100%	<u>34</u> 100%

GROUP DIFFERENCES ...

Most favorable to the idea of a Western European federation are the better-educated and upper socio-economic groups, as well as the men and middle aged people. Catholics also tend to approve more frequently than Protestants.

	West European Union			
	For	Against	No opinion	
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	58%	4%	38%	...100%
9 - 11 years	76	4	20	
12 years or more	97	3	-	
<u>Socio-Economic Level:</u>				
Upper middle and Upper	93%	2%	5%	...100%
Lower middle	67	5	28	
Lower	57	4	39	
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	77%	6%	17%	...100%
Women	5	3	47	
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 30	53%	6%	41%	...100%
30 - 39	66	5	29	
40 - 49	64	3	33	
50 and over	64	2	34	
<u>Monthly Family Income:</u>				
Under 100 DM	55%	2%	43%	...100%
100 - 199 DM	61	3	36	
200 - 299 DM	64	4	32	
300 and over	65	6	29	
<u>Church Affiliation:</u>				
Catholics	65%	3%	32%	...100%
Protestants	57	4	39	

GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN A WESTERN UNION ...

Larger majorities would welcome the participation of West Germany in a West European federation. And few of those who want to join with the West feel that the entry of the Saar region into the union would be a reason for the non-participation of West Germany.

"Would you welcome or oppose having West Germany enter into such a federation of West European states?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Welcome	75%	73%	78%	75%	88%	63%
Oppose	8	5	5	7	6	4
Neither/Nor	3	6	7	5	1	7
No opinion	14	16	10	13	5	26
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

"Assuming the Saarland were taken into the West European union as an independent state, do you believe that would be a reason for the non-participation of West Germany in such a union or would it not be a reason?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Reason	14%	11%	10%	12%	16%	9%
Not a reason	50	53	57	53	66	51
No opinion	11	9	11	10	6	3
	<u>75%</u>	<u>73%</u>	<u>78%</u>	<u>75%</u>	<u>88%</u>	<u>63%</u>

Bearing out the point of view that Chancellor Adenauer's suggestion about a German-French union would be a step toward a wider union of European states is the fact that people who approve the Chancellor's proposal are also more likely to approve the entrance of West Germany into a Western union, than are those who disapprove his suggestion. However, even among the latter group as well as among those who have no opinion on Dr. Adenauer's suggestion a majority favors joining with other West European states.

West Germany in Western Union

Welcome Oppose Neither/Nor No Opinion

French-German Union

For	91%	4%	1%	4%	...100%
Against	68	23	5	4	
No opinion	66	7	7	20	

RESTRICTED

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THE PROBLEM OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN WESTERN GERMANY

I. German Appraisal
of its Causes and Consequences.

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PUB/RAS.

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Series No. 2
5 June 1950

REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
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Bad Nauheim Germany

RESTRICTED

INTRODUCTION ...

In February and in April 1950, the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs, HICOG, undertook a series of surveys on public opinion in regard to the unemployment situation in Western Germany. The results reported here deal with attitudes toward the problem in the US Zone, West Berlin, and Bremen. The second report in the series analyzes attitudes of persons registered as unemployed in Bavaria as compared with those of the public in Bavaria and in the US Zone.

The findings with which the present report deals are based on representative samples randomly selected of 3000 cases in the US Zone, 500 in the three Western sectors of Berlin, and 320 in Bremen. Interviewing was done in the homes of respondents by a staff of 120 trained German interviewers, supervised by American Surveys Officers.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS ...

1. That tensions of serious importance could develop in Western Germany should large-scale unemployment continue are suggested by the following results:
 - ... Unemployment is considered the most serious problem facing the Bonn government, not only outranking other economic problems, but far overshadowing political concerns in public thinking.
 - ... But predominant opinions are that the present unemployment situation is not the making of the German people, but results mainly from the policies pursued by the Western occupying powers - dismantling, credit restrictions, the Potsdam agreement, and so on.
 - ... The Bonn government is, however, assigned responsibility for solving the problem, according to the largest proportion of respondents. Increased reconstruction and rebuilding are the most frequently suggested solutions.
 - ... At the same time, a majority in the US Zone is of the opinion that the Federal government is not doing all it can to remedy the situation. In this connection, SPD, the opposition party, receives more votes than any other as the political party which is "doing most" to solve unemployment.
2. A further complicating factor in the pattern of attitudes regarding unemployment is the fact that large segments of the population see no solution to the problem as long as the East-West split of Germany continues or the expellees from the East remain in Germany, - two conditions which are likely to prevail for some time.

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3. For the present however, the majority of the US Zone population as well as that of West Berlin opposes adoption of any National Socialist measures to overcome unemployment, though large minorities advocate such methods as labor service, public works and the like. Scarcely any one proposes re-armament as a solution, which most respondents considered to be Hitler's main method of getting rid of unemployment.
4. As to potential repercussions of continued unemployment in Germany, a majority consider a trend toward Communism to be more likely than any resurgence of National Socialism.

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UNEMPLOYMENT THE NUMBER ONE PROBLEM ...

Solution of the unemployment problem is the paramount task facing the West German Federal Republic in the opinion of a majority of the residents of the US Zone, West Berlin, and Bremen. General economic problems receive second rank as the most pressing issue the Bonn government has to meet - except in West Berlin, which ranks German unification second. The problems involving refugees and housing follow in third and fourth place, respectively, in frequency of mention.

"In your opinion, what are the most important problems that the West German federal government has to solve?"

	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
<u>The unemployment problem, create job opportunities:</u>	52%	62%	56%
To provide jobs for the unemployed; to get the unemployed off the streets; etc.			
<u>General economic problems:</u> To lower prices; to raise salaries; tax reform; economic reconstruction; to promote industrial production; to raise standard of living; loans for businessmen; to promote interzonal trade; to acquire loans from abroad; to support the farmers; etc.	25	13	22
<u>Refugee problem:</u> To make it possible for the refugees to return to their home-country; international solution of the refugee problem; integration of the expellees into the Western German economy; etc.	20	8	11
<u>Build houses:</u> To build houses; that people are no longer forced to live in basements; to increase building projects; etc.	18	7	23
<u>Problems of certain groups:</u> Improvement of the social welfare for old or poor people; aid for persons bombed out; reparations for the Jews and persons persecuted for political reasons; to stand up for the release of our prisoners of war; etc.	11	6	12
<u>Reach an understanding with foreign countries:</u> Avoid a new war; conclude a peace treaty; integration of Germany into the community of European peoples; participation of Germany in the European Council; etc.	8	7	9
<u>Reunite Germany; abolish the zonal borders; create a government for all Germany:</u> Make the Russians leave the East zone; liberate the East; create the same currency for all Germany; annex Berlin to the West; etc.	4	26	5
<u>Create an orderly democratic state; to realize democracy:</u> To create a democracy that works; to guarantee constitutional rights and individual freedom; to strengthen the belief in democracy; to prevent revival of Nazi parties; etc.	4	3	2
<u>Berlin:</u> To transfer a part of the government to Berlin; provide the railway employees with Westmarks instead of useless East marks; to make possible free elections; to see that the allies don't leave us; etc.	-	9	-
<u>Miscellaneous remarks:</u>	5	3	4
<u>No opinion:</u>	10	3	6
	158%*	147%*	150%*

* Adds up to more than 100% because some people gave more than one answer.

MAJOR REASONS FOR UNEMPLOYMENT ...

Overpopulation, lack of capital, economic policies of the occupiers, and the consequences of the war are the four leading reasons for the current unemployment, as the residents of the US Zone and of Bremen see it. West Berliners give greater weight to the East-West split, placing it after lack of capital as a reason for unemployment there. Aftermath of the war and trade restrictions rank in third and fourth place in West Berlin.

"In your opinion-what are the reasons for the present unemployment in Western Germany (West Berlin)?"

	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
<u>Overpopulation of Western Germany; the loss of territories:</u> Many people in too small a space; the continuous stream of expellees from the East; as a consequence of the loss of territories in the East; etc.	35%	5%	25%
<u>Lack of money and capital; the financial policy:</u> There is a shortage of capital; the currency reform plays a part here too; the two different currencies; lack of money in economy; etc.	33	41	24
<u>Measures of the Western powers:</u> Dismantling of our factories; the production restrictions; selling off of Germany; high occupation costs; because we must pay so much for the Americans; Marshall Plan; etc.	21	7	28
<u>Aftermath of the war:</u> The destruction of factories in the war; bomb damages to industrial plants; economic collapse after the war and everything connected with it; our wharves don't work; there are no orders for industry; no shipbuilding; etc.	13	20	21
<u>Inefficiency and disaccord in the government:</u> Wrong measures of the government; misled economic policy of the government; inefficiency of the magistracy; controversies of the parties; etc.	8	4	6
<u>Trade restrictions and the imbalance of imports and exports:</u> Sale difficulties because of the dollar clause; artificial suppression of our trade; surplus of foreign goods; instead of exporting they import too much; etc.	7	19	8
<u>Political situation in Germany and Berlin:</u> Split between East and West; Berlin is too much cut off from Western Germany by her island position; the effects of the blockade; etc.	2	33	2
<u>High taxes; salaries and prices:</u> Employers must pay too many taxes; high prices paralyze our economy; wages and salaries too low; etc.	4	-	3
<u>Certain groups are interested in unemployment:</u> The Americans intend to use those people for the war; the government wants unemployment so they can make a new war; the capitalists favor unemployment so they can lower the salaries; the Allies don't want Germany to be wall off; etc.	4	-	3
<u>Miscellaneous remarks:</u>	7	8	5
No opinion	1	-	1
	135%	137%	128%

* Some people gave more than one answer

WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PRESENT UNEMPLOYMENT ...

The tendency in the US Zone and Bremen is to place main responsibility for the unemployment situation on the Western powers rather than on the West German government. In Hesse, unlike the other US Zone Laender, equal numbers blame the Western powers, the Bonn government, and both equally. Berliners are somewhat more inclined to name the West German government than the Western powers.

"In your opinion, who is mainly responsible for the present unemployment - the Western powers or the Germans?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Western powers	34%	21%	30%	29%	20%	30%
Germans	24	20	19	22	25	21
Both	14	21	17	17	7	14
The war; natural results of war; lost provinces;*	5	4	3	4	8	9
The Russians; they keep Germany split; stole our machines;*	2	2	-	2	13	2
Other answers; Hitler; international capitalists; general economic & political situation;*	3	3	4	4	9	1
No opinion	$\frac{18}{100\%}$	$\frac{29}{100\%}$	$\frac{27}{100\%}$	$\frac{22}{100\%}$	$\frac{18}{100\%}$	$\frac{23}{100\%}$

* Volunteered replies

REASONS FOR BLAMING THE WEST ...

The largest proportion of those who think the Western powers are responsible for the unemployment situation point to the dismantling program to justify their charge. Others claim the West does not permit the Germans enough freedom of action, and some cite the Western acceptance of the Potsdam agreement as reason for their opinion. The table giving their replies follows on the next page.

Reasons given for considering the Western powers
responsible for present unemployment situation:

	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
<u>They dismantle our factories; they remove every- thing from here and send it into other countries:</u>	11%	5%	16%
<u>They don't allow the Germans freedom of action (in general): They don't permit us to work as we want to; the Germans have not enough rights to solve the problem; we have to do what the Americans want; etc.</u>	6	5	4
<u>They are responsible for the expellees problem: The Western powers have allowed the expellees to come into Western Germany; they signed the agree- ments of Yalta and Potsdam; they didn't see to it that we expellees could stay home; etc.</u>	6	-	2
<u>They control our exports and imports: The Western powers hinder German foreign trade too much; they don't allow us to produce everything ourselves, but we must import so much; etc.</u>	3	3	4
<u>Lack of capital; financial measures and manipula- tions: They could give us more money, if they wanted to; they have devalued our money and the Americans have demanded the currency reform; etc.</u>	3	3	2
<u>Their political measures in general: Because they don't agree with each other; they should not have agreed to the partition of Germany; the delayed peace treaty; etc.</u>	1	-	1
<u>The restrictions on our economy and production: They have not approved certain building projects; they determine what we are allowed to produce; etc.</u>	1	1	3
<u>Miscellaneous remarks:</u>	1	3	1
<u>No opinion:</u>	1		
	<u>33%*</u>	<u>20%*</u>	<u>33%*</u>

* Some people gave more than one point.

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REASONS FOR BLAMING GERMAN AUTHORITIES ...

Persons who ascribe main responsibility for the current unemployment to the West German government give a variety of reasons for their opinions: governmental inefficiency, mistaken economic policies, responsibility for the late war, disunity and so on.

Reasons given for considering the Germans responsible for the present unemployment situation:

	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
<u>The inefficiency of the West German government</u> The old men in our government can't accomplish anything useful, they don't achieve anything; the federal diet should have done something earlier; the government is looking out only for their own interest; etc.	8%	6%	7%
<u>Unwise or incorrect economic measures:</u> Too high expenditures; wrong investments; because it is up to them to employ workers or not; too rapid abolition of rationing card system; they don't build, although there would be capital for this purpose; the federal government has not used the money that was given to Germany in the right way; the unemployment subsidies are too high; etc.	5	4	5
<u>Responsibility for the war:</u> That is a consequence of the lost war for which we Germans are responsible; we have lost the war and must take the responsibility for its consequences; we should not have started the war; etc.	4	5	4
<u>Disunity and self-interest:</u> The Germans are envious of their own fellow-citizens; the political currents conflict too much; there is a lack of cooperation; the refugees are privileged, as a result natives lose their jobs; the natives are privileged; they can get cheap labor by artificial unemployment; etc.	2	6	1
<u>Germans now responsible:</u> Because the Germans now have the power; that is our responsibility; etc.	1	2	1
<u>Miscellaneous remarks:</u>	1	1	2
No opinion	$\frac{1}{22\%}$	$\frac{1}{25\%}$	$\frac{1}{21\%}$

R E S T R I C T E D

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EXPECTED TO SOLVE UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEM ...

Despite the tendency to ascribe major blame for unemployment to the Western powers, preponderant opinions are that the solution of the problem is up to West German authorities. In the Zone, a plurality assigns the task to the Bonn government; in West Berlin, to the city government. (West Berlin figures, as given in the following table are a combination of 5% for the West German government and 48% for the West Berlin Magistrat, or city government.)

"In your opinion, who bears the main responsibility for solving the unemployment problem - the Western powers or the German federal government?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Western powers	24%	18%	22%	22%	27%	15%
Federal government and/or West Berlin Magistrat (in Berlin)	49	41	43	46	53	45
Both equally	18	27	18	20	14	31
Others	1	1	1	1	1	1
No opinion	8	13	16	11	5	8
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SOLUTIONS PEOPLE SUGGEST ...

When asked what they think should be done to solve the unemployment problem, about half suggest accelerated reconstruction efforts - building houses, factories, roads, water power projects, and so on. Others suggest procurement of more capital and enlarged trade possibilities. Some make specific proposals - "Stop giving unemployment pensions, but use the money to create work" ... "Abolish double wage earners" ... "Shorten hours."

It is worth noting that as few as 3% in the US Zone recommend the creation of work camps or labor service (Arbeitsdienst) and only 1% would introduce military training in order to take care of unemployment.

"What measures do you think should be taken to solve the unemployment problem?"

	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
<u>Reconstruction and rebuilding:</u> Build roads and highways; build water power plants, rebuild the destroyed towns; build public buildings; bridges; channel rivers; rebuild factories that don't work for rearmament; create an industry for the expellees; use taxes for economic development; building ships; improvement of ports; etc.	48%	42%	57%
<u>Procure money, credits, loans and investments:</u> By loans of the Western powers; by procuring capital; by Marshall Plan loans; by foreign investments; by long-term credits; Berlin should be supported by credits; increase circulation of money by paying for war losses; etc.	15	26	11
<u>Deal with the overpopulation problem:</u> By emigration of expellees and refugees; by returning the expellees to their home country; by distributing refugees in the different zones in proper regard for their being able to absorb them; etc.	11	1	3
<u>Develop trade:</u> By procuring raw materials; more freedom in our trade with countries; Western powers should do something to develop German trade; etc.	7	9	3
<u>Economy in government:</u> By saving money in the state budget; by lowering taxes; by a tax reform; by checking the budget; etc.	5	1	2
<u>Better utilization of the unemployed:</u> The state should use the unemployed in public projects and should give them more money than the usual compensation; by stopping unemployment support and using this money for creating work; etc.	3	5	2
<u>Labor and social reforms:</u> Abolishing dual incomes (wife and husband) by part-time work; closer contact between employers and employees; by preventing arbitrary dismissal; employers should give up a part of their profits in favor of their workers; by training unemployed workers for emergency vocations; etc.	3	3	2
<u>Labor service:</u> Obligatory work for youth; creating work-camps for young men; a voluntary work organization; etc.	3	1	5
<u>Regulation of wages and prices:</u> Lowering the prices; by raising wages and salaries; just balancing of the salaries; etc.	2	-	2
<u>Establishment of an army:</u> By introducing obligatory military training; etc.	1	-	1
<u>Unification of Germany:</u> By opening the borders of the East Zone; by solving the currency problem (East marks and West marks); by the Ruhr district remaining an integrated part of Germany; by incorporating the Saar province to the German federal republic; by regaining our Eastern provinces; etc.	1	12	2
<u>Miscellaneous remarks:</u>	4	2	4
No opinion	$\frac{12}{115\%}$	$\frac{6}{108\%}$	$\frac{14}{108\%}$

* Some people gave more than one answer

R E S T R I C T E D

MAJORITY DISSATISFIED WITH EFFORTS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ...

Considerable dissatisfaction is expressed with the efforts being made by the West German government to solve the unemployment problem. Over half of the USZone residents think the government could do more than it is doing to solve the problem. West Berliners express somewhat more satisfaction with the West German government than do people in the zone.

"Do you think the West German government is doing all it can to solve the unemployment problem, or could it do more?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Doing all it can	36%	32%	37%	35%	52%	38%
Could do more	55	52	48	54	43	50
No opinion	9	16	15	11	5	12
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

... More inclined than others to express dissatisfaction with the efforts of the Bonn government are the better educated, the upper income groups, men, and not surprisingly adherents of SPD, the opposition party. This is demonstrated in these comparative figures:

Proportion saying government could do more:

- ... 61% of those whose monthly income is 300 DM or more
in contrast to
- ... 42% with incomes under 100 DM monthly.
- ... 64% of the university trained, as compared with
- ... 51% with elementary schooling only.
- ... 57% of the men, as compared with
- ... 50% of the women; and
- ... 61% of those who prefer SPD,
in contrast with
- ... 40% of CDU/CSU sympathizers.

R E S T R I C T E D

R E S T R I C T E D

5 MOST EFFECTIVE POLITICAL PARTY ...

The Social Democratic party is generally regarded as the political party which is doing most to solve the unemployment problem, though, as is apparent in the table below, large proportions have no opinion on the matter

"As far as you can judge, which political party do you think is making the greatest effort to solve the unemployment problem?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
SPD	33%	35%	29%	33%	44%	29%
CDU/CSU	10	8	11	10	13	6
KPD	1	1	1	1	-	4
FDP/LDP	2	3	2	2	5	1
Others or combinations	5	2	1	3	6	2
None	3	10	6	8	5	13
All	7	6	3	6	5	14
No opinion	34	36	47	37	22	32
	100%	101%	100%	100%	100%	101%

There is also a tendency among most groups in the population to designate SPD as doing most. Even among adherents of other political parties, SPD is frequently named, though party loyalties apparently affect opinions on the issue. It is noteworthy, however, that SPD sympathizers appear to have greater confidence in efforts of the party of their choice than do those of CDU or FDP.

"As far as you can judge, which political party do you think is making the greatest effort to solve the unemployment problem?"

	SPD	CDU CSU	KPD	FDP LDP	None	All	Others	No opinion
<u>Party Preference:</u>								
SPD	73%	2%	1%	1%	4%	3%	**	16% ... 10
CDU/CSU	13	35	-	**	5	8	3	36
FDP/LDP	24	1	-	28	10	9	1	27
None	24	5	1	-	18	5	1	46
No opinion	8	2	-	1	5	7	1	76
<u>Sex:</u>								
Men	42%	11%	1%	3%	10%	7%	5%	21% ... 10
Women	25	8	-	2	6	5	3	51
<u>Origin:</u>								
Natives	33%	10%	1%	2%	8%	6%	4%	36% ... 1
New-residents, evacuees	32	12	-	2	10	7	4	33
Refugees	30	8	-	2	7	5	2	46
<u>Education:</u>								
8 years or less	32%	10%	1%	1%	8%	5%	4%	39% ... 1
9 - 11 years	35	9	1	4	8	6	2	35
12 years or more	39	11	-	10	10	13	2	15

* Some respondents gave more than one answer.
**Less than one half of one per cent.

THE ROLE OF TRADE UNIONS IN THE UNEMPLOYMENT SITUATION ...

Large proportions of the general population in all the points interviewed have no opinion about whether or not the trade unions are doing all they can in the present unemployment situation.

"Do you think the trade unions are doing all they can to solve the unemployment problem or could they do more?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Doing all they can	35%	27%	30%	32%	30%	20%
Could do more	26	18	22	24	27	25
No opinion	39	55	48	44	43	55
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

However, as seen in the second table below, most of the trade union members have an opinion on the subject - and 58% think the unions are doing all they can toward solving the problem, with 31% saying they could do more.

	Respondent is trade union member	Someone in family trade union member	No affiliation with trade union
Answer that unions are			
Doing all they can	58%	36%	27%
Could do more	31	25	22
No opinion	11	39	51
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

SOLUTION DIFFICULT WITH EAST-WEST SPLIT ...

The solution of the unemployment problem will be greatly handicapped according to many respondents by a continuance of the East-West split in Germany. The imponderables of this issue are, however, indicated in the table of replies below. Bavarians are almost evenly divided between thinking the problem can or cannot be solved assuming the continuance of a divided Germany, whereas in the two other Laender, (Hesse and Wuerttemberg-Baden) the pessimistic note predominates. West Berlin opinions divide equally, Bremen residents incline toward the optimistic view.

"If Germany should remain split into East and West in the future, do you think the unemployment problem might be solved in spite of this or not?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Yes, it can be solved	42%	39%	35%	39%	48%	51%
No, cannot be solved	46	47	47	47	49	39
No opinion	<u>12</u> 100%	<u>14</u> 100%	<u>18</u> 100%	<u>14</u> 100%	<u>3</u> 100%	<u>10</u> 100%

... Examination of various US Zone population groups indicates that when people come to a decision on this matter, the tendency grows to be believe that unemployment in West Germany may be solved despite the fact of a divided Germany. It will be noted in the next table that just about the same proportion within all population groups (rich or poor, educated or uneducated, men or women) feel that the unemployment problem cannot be solved so long as the East-West split continues. But within all these groups, whenever the "No opinion" replies decline in proportion, the "May be solved" replies increase. In other words, crystallization of opinions lead to the affirmative rather than the negative point of view.

"If Germany should remain split into East and West, do you think the unemployment problem may be solved regardless of this or not?"

	Can be solved	Cannot be solved	No opinion
<u>Education:</u>			
8 years or less	37%	47%	16% ... 100%
9 - 11 years	51	45	4
12 years or more	55	44	1
<u>Sex:</u>			
Men	46%	48%	6% ... 100%
Women	35	45	20
<u>Income (per month):</u>			
Under 100 DM	32%	43%	25% ... 100%
100 - 199 DM	38	48	14
200 - 299 DM	40	47	13
300 DM or more	47	45	8
<u>Origin:</u>			
Natives	39%	47%	14% ... 100%
Evacuees	46	43	11
Expellees	39	47	14

R E S T R I C T E D

EXPELLEES SERIOUS HANDICAP ...

The presence of the ethnic Germans expelled from Western Europe by the Potsdam agreement is considered proportionately a more serious bar to solving unemployment than is the East-West split of Germany.

About two-thirds of the US Zone residents doubt that if these refugees remain in Germany, the economy can absorb the unemployed.

"Supposing most of the expellees must remain in Germany - do you believe the unemployment problem can than be solved or not?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Yes, possible	30%	29%	27%	29%	43%	36%
No, not possible	66	61	64	64	54	54
No opinion	4	10	9	7	3	10
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

The better educated are more optimistic on this score than are the less educated. But the expellees themselves do not differ much from native Germans on the issue, as indicated in the table below.

"Supposing most of the expellees must remain in Germany - do you believe the unemployment problem can than be solved or not?"

	Possible	Not possible	No opinion
<u>Education:</u>			
8 years or less	27%	66%	7% ... 100%
9 - 11 years	40	56	4
12 years or more	41	59	-
<u>Origin:</u>			
Natives	28%	65%	7% ... 100%
Evacuees	34	62	4
Expellees	31	63	6

R E S T R I C T E D

R E S T R I C T E D

HITLER'S "SOLUTION" WELL UNDERSTOOD? ...

A large proportion of the population is aware of the measures Hitler took to get rid of unemployment. Two-thirds of the US Zone public and over three-fourths of the West Berliners say that he did it by building a war machine. A sizeable group mentioned the building activities of the National Socialists.*

"As far as you know, by what measures did Hitler chiefly solve the unemployment problem?"

	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
<u>By rearmament; by creating a war industry;</u> <u>by war preparations; by military projects;</u> By preparing for war; by producing war materials; by creating an army; by universal military training; etc.	66%	78%	74%
<u>By increasing building activities (housing projects, roads, ships); industry: By building houses and roads; by giving work to every branch of labor; by ordering employers to employ workers even if this would impair their profit; by building dikes; etc.</u>	39	29	28
<u>Labor service; compulsory work; voluntary work;</u> by dictatorship; concentration camps; By radical measures as in the East zone today; etc.	16	20	23
<u>By devaluing the money (by printing money):</u> He printed more money without covering its real values; he replaced the gold currency by a currency based on the labor potentiality of the masses; he made debts and produced or built on that as a base; etc.	2	2	2
<u>Other remarks:</u> By a planned economy; by collecting money; by lowering taxes; he had not solved it at all - he had only influenced the masses by his verbosity and realized only his imperialistic plans; by inflating the official staff; with the aid of the big capitalists; he had so many resources for the solution of this problem - industry, capital and the Eastern provinces; by Schacht's financial manipulations; with the money of the people; by unproductive work; etc.	5	6	3
No opinion	$\frac{14}{142\%}^{**}$	$\frac{7}{142\%}^{**}$	$\frac{13}{143\%}^{**}$

* A second report on unemployment will deal with similar questions on the political ramifications of the unemployment problem with special reference to the unemployed.

** Some people gave more than one answer.

R E S T R I C T E D

R E S T R I C T E D

MAJORITY OPPOSED TO NATIONAL SOCIALIST MEASURES ...

A majority of those interviewed - 54% in the Zone and 71% in West Berlin are opposed to taking any of the measures the National Socialists used to overcome unemployment. All groups in the population express about the same point of view on this question.

"If the unemployment problem remains acute for a time, would you be inclined to favor the kind of measures the National Socialists took to get rid of unemployment, or not?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Yes, favor	39%	30%	32%	35%	25%	37%
No	50	57	57	54	71	52
No opinion	<u>11</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>11</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Those who favor adapting measures against unemployment used by the National Socialist regime to the present situation in almost no instance have in mind the more reprehensible policies of the Nazis - as is clearly evident in the table following.

NATIONAL SOCIALIST MEASURES SUGGESTED TO ALLEVIATE UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEM:

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

Labor service: Labor service for young men; labor service, but not a military one; farm-service; assigning young men to urgent labor projects; labor service, but not a political one; etc.

14% 14% 17%

Improvement and extension of traffic facilities (roads, rivers, bridges, canals, railway-lines); building roads and highways; building more autobahns and canals; improve roads and repair them; by extending the Danube-Main Canal; build bridges; to enlarge the net of railways; etc.

14 6 9

Reconstruction: To build blocks of dwelling units; to develop a housing program; remove the rubble in destroyed towns; etc.

10 4 10

Establishment of a German army:

2 2 3

Other remarks: Force everybody to work; to create apprentice-training institutions; "Kraft durch Freude" (Strength through Joy) should be introduced again; to support families with several children; organize public welfare measures as Nazis did; create big state-owned factories; Saturday should be a holiday for the employed persons and the unemployed should work instead on Saturdays; a four-years plan; procure jobs for youngsters; training gymnastic teachers; foundation of sport schools; transfer workers to localities where more jobs are available; expulsion of foreigners; expansion of our living space (Lebensraum); to create a deep-sea fleet and a civil aviation; cultivate marshy land in Northern Germany; etc.

6 2 3

No opinion

3	2	3
49%	33%	45%

* Some people gave more than one answer.

WILL UNEMPLOYMENT RADICALIZE? ...

A trend toward Communism rather than National Socialism is foreseen by half the US Zone population, should the current unemployment situation continue. In West Berlin, where the unemployment is considerably more severe than in the Zone, over half say that they think continued unemployment would not encourage the people to accept either Communism or National Socialism. Attitudes of the employed and unemployed on this question were not found to differ significantly.

"Suppose unemployment continues in the future, do you believe that the population will then show a greater inclination toward Communism or toward National Socialism, or would unemployment not have any influence in this direction?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
More toward Communism	54%	47%	50%	51%	25%	40%
More toward National Socialism	21	21	19	20	19	27
It will not have any influence	15	19	15	16	53	22
No opinion	<u>10</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>11</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

THE PROBLEM OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN WESTERN GERMANY
II. Comparative Views of the
Bavarian Unemployed and the Bavarian and U.S. Zone Public.

Report No. 23
Series No. 2
5 June 1950

OFFICE OF THE U. S. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR GERMANY
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF

INTRODUCTION ...

In April 1950, the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs, HICOG, undertook a special study among the unemployed in Bavaria at the request of the Labor Affairs Division, OECB. The results of the findings obtained in this survey are compared with those of a study on unemployment done throughout the US Zone in February 1950.

The survey on the Bavarian unemployed was based on a random selection of 544 cases drawn from the unemployment lists in the Labor Office of Bavaria. Comparative figures for Bavaria as a whole as well as for the US Zone public result from surveys based on a randomly selected sample of about 1500 cases in Bavaria and 3000 in the US Zone. As in all studies made by the Reactions Analysis Staff, these reported here are based on results of interviews conducted by a professionally trained German staff, supervised by American Survey Officers.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS ...

1. The major finding in this study is the apparent lack of any trend toward radical solutions of the unemployment problem.
 - ... A majority of both the Bavarian unemployed and the US Zone public feel that the best way to overcome unemployment is through a free economy rather than a planned one.
 - ... Nationalization of industry as a means of solving unemployment is also rejected by a majority of the Bavarian unemployed.
 - ... And while a majority of the unemployed feel that trade unions are useful, they agree with the public and disavow strikes as a means of enforcing workers' demands.
 - ... Almost six in ten unemployed claim they would not yield certain specified personal freedoms for a guarantee of economic security. On this too they do not differ substantially from the general public.
 - ... Predominant opinions are that the National Socialists did away with unemployment by preparing for war. No one wishes to repeat that pattern, but a majority of the unemployed and almost four in ten of the public feel that Germans today could take a leaf out of Hitler's book and set up a construction program as a means of reducing unemployment.
 - ... There is little or no disposition on the part of the unemployed to copy measures they think are used in the East zone to create jobs, though four in ten believe there is no unemployment there. Coercion, forced labor, armaments, and Russian reparations largely account for the labor situation in Eastern Germany in the opinion of the Bavarian unemployed.

- ... A majority of Bavarian unemployed, but a smaller majority than among the Bavarian and US Zone public, feel that it is more important to check the spread of Communism than to unite Germany on the chance that Communism might then gain.
 - ... This attitude is noteworthy because two-thirds of all groups feel that it will be impossible to solve unemployment as long as the expellees from the East remain in Germany.
2. Despite the lack of evidence of any trend toward radicalism among the Bavarian unemployed, more than eight in ten feel that continued unemployment would have political repercussions. And like the public as a whole, they are inclined to think the trend would be toward Communism rather than toward National Socialism.
 3. However, when asked which political party is doing the most to help solve the problem, the Social Democrats lead the list among the unemployed, as well as among the Bavarian and US Zone public. The Christian Democrats trail far behind. Only 3% of the unemployed and 1% of the public name the KPD.
 4. Unemployment, considered by all the groups to be the "Number One" problem facing the Bonn government is largely thought to result from over-population. Lack of credit and dismantling are also cited as causes.
 - ... The Western powers, largely because of their part in the Potsdam agreement and dismantling, are more frequently held mainly responsible for the situation than is the Bonn government.
 - ... But predominant opinions among both the unemployed and the public is that its solution is up to the West German government rather than the Western powers.
 - ... The efforts of the Bonn government in this direction are considered insufficient by a majority in all groups.
 5. Over half of the unemployed feel they will find work within the next half year, and expect improved conditions in Western Germany within that time. Only a fifth have heard of jobs through the Labor Office, but could not take them for one reason or another. Three-fourths say they would take any job offered them, but in the next breath, 83% say they would refuse farm jobs. Poor pay, excessive labor, and physical infirmities are reasons given.

MOST PRESSING PROBLEM FACING BONN GOVERNMENT ...

Unemployment is the most pressing problem the Federal German republic has to solve in the opinion of eight out of ten of the unemployed in Bavaria. This is the problem most frequently cited by the general public also, but among them only five in ten mention it. The question and the catalogued replies for both the unemployed and the US Zone public follow.

"What in your opinion are the most important problems that the West German Federal government has to solve?"

	Bavarian Unemployed	US Zone Public
Solution of unemployment problem	81%	52%
Solution of refugee problem	41	20
Construction of houses	22	18
Unification of Germany	11	4
Stimulate economy, reconstruction, etc.	8	26
Solve problems of certain groups	-	11
Understanding with foreign countries	7	8
Bring wages and prices into line	7	-
Increase in veterans compensation	3	-
Decrease the civil service	3	-
Fight Communism	2	-
Obtain sovereignty of Germany	-	1
Reduction of occupation costs	*	-
Others: Return of PWs; prevention of dismantling; tax reduction; avoidance of personal quarrels in the government; reinstatement of death penalty; etc.	15	4
	200%*	144%*

... But opinions are divided on whether or not the Federal government will be able to solve all these problems. **

"Do you believe that the Federal government will be in the position to solve these problems?"

Yes, all	45%
Yes, some	11
No	40
No opinion	4
	100%

Main reason given by those who say Bonn will be unable to solve the problems, or only to solve some of them is that it is too dependent on the occupation powers (24%). Other reasons in order of frequency of mention are: disunity and egoism of the government (11%); lack of money (7%); East-West split (3%); too much dismantling (3%); miscellaneous, e.g. occupation costs, world disunity; loss of East Germany; etc. (4%).

* Adds to more than 100% because some people mentioned more than one problem.

** This question was asked only in the survey of the Bavarian unemployed.

CAUSES OF UNEMPLOYMENT ...

"Overpopulation" is most frequently cited by the unemployed in Bavaria as the main reason for unemployment in Western Germany. Dismantling, lack of money and credit, and results of the war are next most frequently named. The question with the frequency of replies follows:

"There are different views regarding the reasons for the present unemployment. Here are some of the reasons offered. Would you please select three which in your opinion are mainly responsible." (Card)

Unemployed

Unemployment is a result of:

The overpopulation of Western Germany because of refugees	73%
Dismantling	51
General lack of money and credit	46
Defeat and war destruction	38
East-West split	35
Politics; Failure of West German government to do enough because it follows capitalist line	14
Too high importation of manufactured goods	13
Too great influence of occupying powers on our economy	11
False financial policy of the Federal government	10

COMPARISONS WITH US ZONE PUBLIC ...

In the US Zone, people were asked to volunteer reasons for unemployment. Replies, it will be seen, were similar to those on the list from which the unemployed were asked to select the three main reasons. Thus, in the US Zone, overpopulation received top mention with 35%; lack of money and credit second with 33% mention; dismantling and restrictive measures of the occupation powers generally, third with a 21% vote. Less frequently stated causes were: aftermath of the war (13%), inefficiency and discord in Federal government (8%), trade restrictions (7%), high taxes (4%), unemployment artificially induced (4%), political situation (2%) and so on.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR UNEMPLOYMENT SITUATION ...

The preponderant opinion among the Bavarian unemployed as well as among the Bavarian and US Zone public is that the Western powers are more to blame for the unemployment situation than are the Germans.

"Who in your opinion is mainly responsible for the present unemployment: The Western powers or the Germans?"

	Bavarian Unemployed	Bavarian Public	US Zone Public
Western powers	50%	34%	29%
Germans	23	24	22
Both	12	14	17
Other	5	10	10
No opinion	10	16	22
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

Dismantling is the leading reason (31%) of the unemployed who blame the Western powers. Other allegations are: hindrances imposed on the German economy (18%); the Potsdam agreement (14%); exclusion of German competition from world markets (2%); occupation costs (1%); other (4%).

Much the same reasons were given by the US Zone public with dismantling mentioned by 11%, leading the list. Restrictions on the economy (6%) and responsibility for the exellees (6%) follow. Occupation costs (3%) and control of export and import markets (3%) are also mentioned.

Among the unemployed, the leading claim on the part of those who blame the Germans for unemployment is the inefficiency of the government (15%). Other reasons are: Incorrect economic policy (8%); disunity and party quarrels (4%); extravagant bureaucracy (3%); Germany to blame for the war (3%); lost the war (2%); others (4%). The US Zone public assigns much the same reasons for German responsibility.

RESPONSIBILITY OF EMPLOYERS FOR UNEMPLOYMENT ...

Three in ten of the sample of unemployed in Bavaria also say that employers share responsibility for unemployment, but two thirds absolve them of blame. *

"In your opinion do the employers also share blame for unemployment?"

Yes	30%
No	66
No opinion	4
	<u>100%</u>

Greed and parsimony is the predominant claim (18%) of those who blame the employers. "Speed-up" of labor is mentioned by 7%; use of "black" labor and poor management are each mentioned by 1%, respectively, and 6% bring up miscellaneous accusations.

* This question was not asked in the US Zone.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOLVING UNEMPLOYMENT ...

Though the Bavarian unemployed are more likely than the public generally to charge the Western powers with responsibility for the present unemployment, they agree with the public in their views on whose task it is to solve the problem. The largest number in all groups say it is up to the West German government.

"Who bears the main responsibility for solving the unemployment problem: The Western powers or the West German Federal government?"

	Bavarian Unemployed	Bavarian Public	US Zone Public
Western powers	30%	24%	22%
German government	44	49	46
Both equally	22	18	20
Other	1	1	1
No opinion	3	8	11
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

... But majority opinions among all groups are that the Bonn government is not doing all it could to remedy the situation.

"Do you think the West German government is doing all it can do to solve the unemployment problem or could it do more?"

	Bavarian Unemployed	Bavarian Public	US Zone Public
All it can	39%	36%	35%
Could do more	59	55	54
No opinion	2	9	11
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

The unemployed have much the same opinions regarding the efforts of the Bavarian government.

"Do you think the Bavarian government is doing all it can do to solve the unemployment problem, or could it do more?"

All it can	37%
Could do more	59
No opinion	4
	<u>100%</u>

SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY DOING MOST TO HELP ...

SPD (Social Democratic) is the party most frequently named by all groups as doing most about the unemployment problem. CDU/CSU trails far behind.

"As far as you can judge which political party do you think is doing the most to solve the unemployment problem?"

	Bavarian Unemployed	Bavarian Public	US Zone Public
SPD	45%	33%	33%
Bavarian party*	6	-	-
CDU/CSU	5	10	10
WAV*	5	-	-
KPD	3	1	1
FDP	2	2	2
Others	-	5	3
All	4	7	6
None	11	8	8
No opinion	19	34	37
	100%	100%	100%

* WAV and Bavarian parties included in "others" in Bavarian and US Zone figures.

MEANS OF SOLVING UNEMPLOYMENT ...

On the issue of "freedom" versus "planning" as a means of solving unemployment, "freedom" gets the larger vote. Here too the unemployed are in substantial agreement with the general public.

"What do you think would be the best way of overcoming unemployment?" (Card with statements in order of listing).

	Bavarian Unemployed	Bavarian Public	US Zone Public
"Through an extended planned economy, i.e. stronger control of the state over the economy".	31%	27%	27%
"Through the state giving the economy more freedom than it now has."	45	45	45
"Through a free economy with certain limitations imposed by the state - that is, retaining the present economic system."	15	9	7
No opinion	9 100%	19 100%	21 100%

NATIONALIZATION OF INDUSTRY ...

On a similar issue - nationalization of industry - the vote of the Bavarian unemployed falls in much the same way. Three in ten of the unemployed think that the nationalization of industry would conquer the problem of unemployment, but six in ten disagree. **

"Do you believe that unemployment would be overcome sooner if industry were nationalized?"

Bavarian Unemployed	
Yes	30%
No	60
No opinion	10
	<u>100%</u>

EXPELLEES AND UNEMPLOYMENT ...

Majority opinion in all groups is that unemployment cannot be solved as long as the expellees remain in Germany.

"Supposing most of the expellees must remain in Germany - do you believe the unemployment problem can then be solved or not?"

	Bavarian Unemployed	Bavarian Public	US Zone Public
Yes	37%	30%	29%
No	63	66	64
No opinion	*	4	7
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

* Less than one half of one per cent.

** This question was not asked in the US Zone.

INTEREST IN POLITICS ...

The unemployed in Bavaria express somewhat greater interest in politics than do Bavarians generally and the US Zone as a whole.

"Are you yourself interested in politics or do you prefer to leave that to others?"

	Bavarian Unemployed	Bavarian Public	US Zone Public
Interested	48%	38%	37%
Leave to others	52	62	63
	100%	100%	100%

Among the unemployed, the main reason for leaving political matters to others is a re-statement of lack of interest (24%). "Bad experiences in the past" are mentioned by 12%, and smaller fractions give the following reasons: "No point, the "Big Shots" will decide," (76%), "Not for women," (5%), "Have enough troubles as it is," (5%), and so on.

SECURITY VERSUS CIVIL RIGHTS ...

The unemployed appear more ready to yield certain rights for economic security than are Bavarians generally or the US Zone population as a whole.

"Are there any rights on this card which you would give up if the state would thereby promise you economic security?"

	Bavarian Unemployed	Bavarian Public	US Zone Public
Vote for party of own choice	30%	18%	17%
Read books and magazines of own choice	19	14	12
Take job of own choosing	14	7	7
Say what one wants to	11	5	4
Educate children as one wishes	4	1	1
All of them	-	2	2
	78%	47%	43%

UNITY OF GERMANY ...

A majority of the unemployed feel that it is more important to prevent the spread of Communism than to unite Germany on the chance that Communism might then gain. However, many more of them than of the Bavarian or general public would favor unification regardless of possible consequences.

"What do you think more important - to check the spread of Communism or to unite Germany in any case?"

	Bavarian Unemployed	Bavarian Public	US Zone Public
Check Communism	55%	73%	71%
Unite Germany	43	23	25
No opinion	2	4	4
	100%	100%	100%

* More than one choice was possible.

POLITICALLY REPERCUSSIONS OF UNEMPLOYMENT ...

Continued unemployment will have political repercussions in the view of most of the unemployed.

"Suppose the present unemployment continues - do you believe it will have an influence on the political views of the population?"

Yes	84%
No	13
No opinion	3
	<u>100%</u>

TREND WILL BE TOWARD COMMUNISM ...

And a majority thinks that in this event people will lean toward Communism rather than returning to National Socialism.

"Do you believe that then people will show a greater inclination toward Communism or toward National Socialism?" (Asked of those who answered "Yes" above.)

Communism	54%
National Socialism	25%
Other	5
	<u>84%</u>

Attitudes of the Bavarian and US Zone public in this connection are very similar to those of the unemployed. This is seen in results to a single question which combines the ideas expressed in the two preceding questions:

"Suppose unemployment continues in the future, do you believe that the population will then show a greater inclination toward Communism or toward National Socialism, or would unemployment not have any influence in this direction?"

	Bavarian Public	US Zone Public
Communism	51%	54%
National Socialism	20	21
No influence	16	15
No opinion	13	10
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

HITLER'S SOLUTION OF UNEMPLOYMENT ...

Both the unemployed in Bavaria and the US Zone public most frequently say that Hitler solved unemployment by building armaments and a war machine. It is noteworthy here that the unemployed mention this more frequently than does the public.

"By what measures, as far as you know, did Hitler solve the unemployment problem?"

	Bavarian Unemployed	US Zone Public
Rearmaments, army, war machine, etc.	39%	66%
Building, construction, roads, etc.	81	39
Labor service	15	16
Coercion, force	5	3
Other	4	4
No opinion	8	14
	<u>202%</u> *	<u>142%</u> *

* Some people mentioned more than one measure.

... However, about four out of ten unemployed would not adopt any of Hitler's measures in order to overcome unemployment and of the majority who would, very few advocate military measures as a solution.

"Should any of the measures used by the third Reich to overcome unemployment now be used again in order to overcome unemployment?"

Yes	55%
No	38
No opinion	7
	<u>100%</u>

(If "Yes") "Which measures do you have in mind?"

Building, construction, etc.	58%
Labor service	14
Army	8
Coercion in economic affairs	2
Emergency work	1
Other	3
	<u>86%</u> *

* Some people mentioned more than one measure.

A question along the same lines was also put to the public, with these results:

"If unemployment remains acute for a time would you be inclined to favor the kind of measures the National Socialists took to get rid of unemployment or not?"

	Bavarian Public	US Zone Public
Yes	39%	35%
No	50	54
No opinion	11	11
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

It will be noted that the public is not as ready as the unemployed to favor following measures employed in the Third Reich.

Building projects mentioned by 24% and labor service (14%) are the two most frequently mentioned methods in which the public thinks Hitler's example could be followed.

UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE EAST ZONE ...

Four in ten among the unemployed in Bavaria are of the opinion that there is no unemployment in the East Zone of Germany, but few of them are able to give any reasons to account for the alleged condition.

"The East zone radio stations state that there is no unemployment in the East zone. Do you believe that those statements correspond to fact or not?"

Yes, are true	39%
No, are not true	58
No opinion	3
	<u>100%</u>

(If "Yes") "What do you think are the reasons for this?"

No overpopulation in East zone	7%
Flight to the West	4
More money on hand	2
Dictatorship	2
More industry, coal mining	1
No dismantling	*
No opinion	29
	<u>45%**</u>

* Less than one half of one per cent.

**Some people gave more than one reason.

METHODS USED IN EAST ZONE ...

Jobs are created in the East zone by coercion, forced labor, production of armaments, Russian reparations, and so on is the opinion of most of the unemployed in Bavaria - and they want none of it in the West zone. The two questions and comparison of replies are:

"What measures are used in the East zone, in your opinion to create jobs?"

Forced labor	39%
Labor service in uranium mines	27
Armament production	17
Reparations and production for Russia	17
Police army	11
Nationalization of industry	9
Deportation of workers to Russia	9
Construction in general	6
Small wages	2
No capitalism	1
Other	6
No opinion	26
	<u>170%*</u>

* Some people mentioned more than one measure.

queried: "Should any of the measures used in the East zone to get rid of unemployment also be used in the West zone to get rid of unemployment?" - 9% say "Yes," 71% "No," and 20% withhold judgment.

The fraction which would follow East zone methods makes these suggestions: General construction (4%), production of armaments (1%), nationalization (1%), and 4% give miscellaneous answers.

CONDITIONS BEST FOR WORKERS IN THE U.S. ...

American workers are best off, is the predominant opinion of the Bavarian unemployed.

"What's your opinion - in which country in the world does the worker today have the best chance to earn a good living?"

The United States	44%
Switzerland	12
Australia	8
Sweden	8
Germany	5
Argentina	3
England	3
France	3
Canada	2
Others: Holland, South Africa, Denmark, Russia, Brazil, Norway, Chile, Abbyssinia, Belgium, Czechoslovakia	4
All the same	1
No opinion	7
	<u>100%</u>

STRIKES OPPOSED ...

Seven in ten of the unemployed oppose strikes to achieve workers' demands.

"Do you consider it fundamentally right or wrong if a labor union strikes in order to carry out the demands of the workers?"

Right	28%
Wrong	69
No opinion	3
	<u>100%</u>

It is noteworthy that the unemployed share a conservatism regarding strikes with their fellow Bavarians and the US Zone as a whole. This is seen by comparing the findings above with results obtained in February 1949 on a series of questions on labor's right to strike.

"Do you consider it right or wrong if labor unions call a strike to enforce higher wages for employees?"

	Bavaria	US Zone
Right	28%	24%
Wrong	64	63
No opinion	8	8
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

"Do you consider it right or wrong if labor unions call a strike to enforce higher food rations for employees?"

	Bavaria	US Zone
Right	34%	27%
Wrong	59	64
No opinion	7	9
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

"Do you consider it right or wrong if labor unions call a strike to protest against political decisions of German authorities?"

	Bavaria	US Zone
Right	24%	22%
Wrong	54	56
No opinion	22	22
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

BUT UNIONS FAVORED ...

But two-thirds (66%) believe that it is helpful to a worker to belong to a union. A fourth (25%) think unions are not useful, and 9% have no opinion.

Unions are helpful says the majority in these ways:

Protect the rights of the workers in general	27%
Protection against employer in pay schedules and leave matters	26
Individual worker is helpless, in union there is strength	8
Protection against firing	7
Promotes social services	3
Other	2
	<u>68%*</u>

* Some people gave more than one answer.

JOB OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UNEMPLOYED ...

A series of questions was put to the sample of the unemployed in Bavaria regarding their views on their chances for re-employment.

About half (56%) expect to find employment within the near future. But a third are pessimistic.

"Do you believe that you will find work within the next six months?"

Yes	56
No	35
Don't know	9
	<u>100</u>

... Six in ten expect more job opportunities in Western Germany six months hence.

"Do you believe that job opportunities will be better in Western Germany in six months, or worse, or just as they now are?"

Better	61
Worse	19
Same	19
No opinion	1
	<u>100</u>

... Only a quarter think the chances of finding a job in the kind of work they are trained in are good.

"Do you feel that the likelihood of finding work again in your field of training (or in the kind of work you were in last) is good, fair or poor?"

Good	23
Fair	25
Poor	50
Don't know	2
	<u>100</u>

Most say they have not been offered a job by the Labor Office.

"Has the Labor Office ever offered you a chance of a job since you became unemployed?"

Yes	19
No	81
	<u>100</u>

People who did not take such offers, give variety of reasons, as follow:

Unknown field	4
Came too late, place taken	3
Poor pay	3
Too old	3
Place of work inaccessible	2
Too hard work	2
Miscellaneous: Only a temporary job; no resident permit (Zusug); refused because a refugee; etc.	4
	<u>21</u>

* More than one reason was given by some respondents.

... Three quarters say they would take any job they were physically able to do. A quarter would wait.

"Would take any work that you were capable of physically, or would you rather wait until you found work which was more suitable and agreeable to you?"

Accept any	75
Wait	27
	<u>100</u>

... But when asked specifically whether they would take a job on a farm, more than eight in ten say "No," for the reasons as listed

"Would you, circumstances permitting, accept a job on a farm - (agricultural work)?"

Yes	17
No	83
	<u>100</u>

Have no interest in or acquaintance with work	38
Physically unable; too old, sick, wounded, etc.	31
Such poor pay	27
Too hard work, too long hours, irregular	5
Separation from family	2
Miscellaneous	4
	<u>107</u> *

... Poor pay is given as the main reason for the shortage of farm labor.

"What in your opinion, are the reasons for the lack of workers in agriculture?"

Poor pay, avarice of farmers; etc.	77
Migration from country to city	20
Hard work, long hours, irregularity	19
Poor living conditions	8
Is no lack	2
Other reasons	2
No opinion	3
	<u>131</u> *

* Some people gave more than one answer.

Population Characteristics of the Bavarian Unemployed Compared with Those
of the Bavarian and US Zone Public.

SEX

	Bavarian Unemployed	Bavarian Public	US ZONE Public
Men	76%	45%	45%
Women	24%	55%	55%
	100%	100%	100%

AGE

	Bavarian Unemployed	Bavarian Public	US ZONE Public
17 years and under	1%	5%	4%
18 - 24 years	15	14	14
25 - 44 years	49	39	40
45 - 54 years	23	19	20
55 - 64 years	11	12	12
65 years and over	1	11	11
	100%	100%	101%

EDUCATION

	Bavarian Unemployed	Bavarian Public	US ZONE Public
Elementary schooling only	88%	64%	82%
Some secondary	9	11	13
High school with diploma	2	2	2
University	1	3	3
	100%	100%	100%

SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS

	Bavarian Unemployed	Bavarian Public	US ZONE Public
Upper Middle and Upper	1	2	4
Lower Middle	2	21	28
Upper Lower	45	53	53
Lower Lower	53	24	15
	100%	100%	100%

ORIGIN

	Bavarian Unemployed	Bavarian Public	US ZONE Public
Resident since 1938 or before	46%	71%	72%
Expellee after war from East	42	18	18
Arrived between 1938-45 (from within Germany)	8	8	7
Arrived after the war (from other German regions)	4	3	3
	100%	100%	100%

MONTHLY INCOME

Bavarian Unemployed

Total Family Income		Per Capita Income	
Under 70 DM	8%	Under 20 DM	3%
70 - 119 "	39	20 - 30 "	20
120 - 159 "	20	31 - 40 "	24
160 - 199 "	11	41 - 50 "	16
200 - 249 "	9	51 - 60 "	11
250 - 349 "	10	61 - 70 "	8
Over 350 "	3	71 - 80 "	8
	<u>100%</u>	81 and more	<u>10</u>
			<u>100%</u>

In the US Zone and Bavaria, 50% and 52% respectively have monthly family incomes of under 200 DM, 17% in both have incomes from 200 - 249 DM, and 33% and 31% respectively have incomes of 250 DM or more.

Source of Income (Unemployed)

Unemployment compensation	38%
Relief	49
No claim to unemployment compensation	<u>13</u>
	<u>100%</u>

MARITAL STATUS

	Bavarian Unemployed	Bavarian Public	US ZONE Public
Single	36%	27%	25%
Married	55	61	63
Widowed	5	11	11
Divorced	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

POLITICAL PARTY PREFERENCE

	Bavarian Unemployed	Bavarian Public	US ZONE Public
SPD	42%	30%	27%
BP	10	13	7
CDU/CSU	9	24	20
FDP	6	7	6
WAV	6	3	2
KPD	-	1	1
Others	1	-	1
None	10	13	23
No opinion	<u>14</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>13</u>
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP

	Bavarian Unemployed	Bavarian Public	US ZONE Public
Yes - Member self	14%	10%	11%
Some one in family a member	10	14	14
No	<u>78</u> 102%*	<u>77</u> 101%*	<u>76</u> 101%*

* Adds to more than 100% because some respondents who were members also said members of their family belonged to trade unions.

WAR IMPRISONMENT (MEN ONLY)

	Bavarian Unemployed	Bavarian Public	US ZONE Public
Yes			
Returned 1945	21%	20%	20%
Returned 1946	12	6	7
Returned 1947	7	4	4
Returned 1948	8	4	1
Returned 1949	7	1	-
Returned 1950	*	-	-
No	<u>45</u> 100%	<u>65</u> 100%	<u>64</u> 100%

* Less than half of one per cent.

DISABILITY

	Bavarian Unemployed *
Yes	
Less than 50%	16%
50 - 70%	12
More than 70%	4
No	<u>68</u> 100%

* No comparisons with Bavaria and US Zone available.

REACTIONS OF A MUNICH MOVIE AUDIENCE TO
AN ANIMATED FILM BASED ON THE "RACES OF MANKIND"

Special Report

(after 23) 14 June 1950

REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
HICOG APO 807
Bad Nauheim Germany

007-11

INTRODUCTION ...

On May 20, 1950, the Reactions Analysis Staff, OPubA, HICOG through its Munich Unit conducted a survey on reactions to the animated film based on the book by Benedict and Weltfish entitled, "Races of Mankind." Respondents consisted of 278 persons in attendance at a Munich theater for the evening's performance at which the film - to be distributed under the sponsorship of the Congress of Industrial Organization - was shown.

During the intermission, respondents were asked to write in their replies to questionnaires which were distributed to them. More than 500 questionnaires were handed out, of which 278 were filled in. Thus the sample for this study should not be considered representative of the Munich public as a whole, or of the general movie audience. The results do yield information on the reactions to a film dealing with the problem of race.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS ...

- ... The film appeared to be well-received, a third of the audience liked it "very much," and a half "quite well."
- ... Most of the audience recognized the theme as dealing with the "brotherhood of man," and thought it was well-expressed in the film.
- ... For the most part the theme won the approval of the audience. And the few critics did not dislike the theme so much as what they said was the unsuitability of the medium to so serious a topic.
- ... Almost nine in ten recommend a wider showing of the film. The same proportion think that young people should see it, though opinions divide on whether it should be shown to children under 14 years. Reasons for the latter viewpoint are probably based largely on the feeling that the theme cannot be grasped by children, rather than on any disagreement with the theme.

OPINIONS ON ANIMATED FILMS ...

Almost all of the respondents (93%) say they like animated films, and most (88%) say they have seen other such films.

OPINIONS ON "RACES OF MANKIND" FILM ...

The film was generally well received - 33% said they liked it very much, and 50% liked it quite well. The question and replies follow.

"How in general did you like this evening's animated film?"

Very much	33%
Quite well	50
Not so well	9
Not liked	5
Completely disliked	2
No answer	1
	<u>100%</u>

COMMENTS OF THE AUDIENCE ...

People were also asked to write in further comments on their opinions on the film. Many failed to do so, but comments of those who did, follow.

... Comments of those who liked it are listed in order of frequency of mention:

It furthers understanding among people: Helps to reconcile peoples; concord and never again enmity; all the borders of the world should be abolished; in every race there are good and bad people; it presents the only possibility for building a free and happy world; etc. 10%

The idea is good: The idea is wonderful; the idea is very good, important for all politicians; it is full of sense; the idea of this film should be welcomed; etc. 6

Liberal, easily understandable and right: Modern and good, easily understandable for everyone - even for children; even very simple people can understand; tackles problems without prejudice and hits the core in consequence; etc. 4

Educational and informative: Important for enlightening people; it embodies educational values; it is clearly illustrated here how people are fooled by parties and so on; etc. 3

Represents sound human opinions: We are all part of mankind; it is a really sound point of view; one of the few reasonable American films with a general humane idea; etc. 2

Quite good, but rather unreal: The idea is very nice if it could be carried out; it would be fine but in practice would mean utopia, unfortunately - see the history of mankind; etc. 2

Technical shortcomings: Idea good, but color too pale; the animation was poor; not in the class with the best films of this kind; etc. 2

Miscellaneous remarks: Government officials should see such films; the topic was too extensive for such a film; difficult for younger people to understand; fairly good but a little naive; figures too abstract for our taste; an entirely new idea and one must get used to it at first; etc. 8

No answer: 46
83%

(Based on proportion who said "they liked the film 'very much' or 'quite well'.")

... Comments of those who claimed little or no liking for the film tend to stress the unsuitability of the medium to the theme, rather than dislike of the theme itself.

Artistically poor, good idea badly carried out: Not thorough and comprehensive enough; idea shouldn't be illustrated by an animated cartoon; inadequate; too impersonal; etc.

3%

Primitive and naive: Should be otherwise presented, not so childish; not to German tastes because it's so vapid; the basic idea was expressed to primitively; drawing too primitive; etc.

2

Nonsensical: Profound ideas shouldn't be illustrated by nonsense; childish tricks; etc.

1

Miscellaneous remarks: I didn't like the faces; it's the opinion of American trade unions; tedious; biased; etc.

2

No answer:

8

16%

(Asked of those who said "not so well liked," "not liked" and "completely disliked.")

THEME OF THE FILM ...

The theme of brotherhood was clear to most of the audience. When asked to write down the basic idea of the film, most respondents explained it in terms of mutual understanding among people, brotherhood and so on. Very few described it in antagonistic terms, as will be noted in their catalogued comments.

"What is, in your opinion, the basic idea of this animated film?"

Understanding among people and mutual reconciliation: To bring peoples closer to each other; international understanding; to eliminate prejudices; to bring about a mutual understanding; to learn how to tolerate and understand each other; the positive living together in a world that belongs to all; cooperation of peoples not under Communistic domination; reconciliation of peoples; the requirement of a world reconciliation and counter-measures (against mutual hostility); etc. 25%

Concord, unity and brotherhood: Concord among peoples; brotherhood of mankind; bringing people to good terms with each other; to propagate the basic ideas of fraternity; union of all men no matter of what race; etc. 16

Elimination of the race hatred: Harmony between the races; elimination of the race prejudices; to break the supremacy of the white race; the idea of peace among all the races; fraternization of the races; exchange the nonsense and calamity of class hatred for the idea of cooperation of all mankind; etc. 13

Equal rights for everybody - democracy: Equality; equal rights for everybody; that there are no differences among men; the same descent and the same opportunities; general human rights; democracy; living space for all the peoples; liberty, equality and fraternity but not in the Bolshevistic sense; etc. 8

Peace - against war and hatred among peoples: No war, eternal peace; pacifism; applied Christianity; love of peace; to ostracize hatred among mankind; common sense and concord; improvement of mankind; etc. 5

Political propaganda - propaganda by trade unions: Trade union propaganda; political instruction; political; propaganda; etc. 2

Humor: Interest in comics; humor; etc. 1

Communistic propaganda: Isn't the idea Bolshevistic?; Communistic propaganda; etc. 1

Junk: Real junk; nonsense; etc. 1

Other remarks: A practical presentation, an attempt; democratization of Germany; utopia; in the future it shall be so; we don't want to have to do anything with Negroes and Asiatics; the environment formed mankind, we all have the same natural talents; love's labor lost; whether races differ or not, all is determined by some big swine in East and West; etc. 8

No answer: 26
106%*

* Percentage adds up to more than 100 because some people gave more than one answer.

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IDEA OF FILM WELL EXPRESSED ...

Eight in ten of the respondents say that the basic idea was well expressed in the film.

"Do you find that the basic idea was well expressed in the animated film?"

Yes, well expressed	81%
Only fairly well	12
No, not well expressed	3
No answer	4
	<u>100%</u>

And seven in ten claimed to be in complete agreement with the film's interpretation of the idea.

"Do you agree with the interpretation set forth in this animated film, or do you disagree on some points?"

Agree with all points	71%
Disagree with some points	14
Agree with none	5
No answer	10
	<u>100%</u>

Those who took issue with some points in the film were asked to note them down. Their scattered comments ran this way, "The idea is not practicable;" "it seems oversimplified to me;" "denies certain hereditary traits;" "the future will show whether equal rights for all races is good;" "overlooks the existence of hereditary traits and determinants of development;" "the mind is willing, but the flesh is weak;" "white-black."

MORE PEOPLE SHOULD SEE IT ...

CO416

Almost nine in ten (87%) of the respondents recommend a wider audience for the film.

"Do you think it would be a good idea to show this film to as many people as possible?"

Good idea	87%
Not a good idea	7
No answer	6
	<hr/> 100%

SHOULD BE SHOWN TO YOUTH

The same proportion say that youth (under 20) should in any case see the film.

Yes, youth should see	87%
No, not see it	5
No answer	8
	<hr/> 100%

But opinions divided on whether children should see it.

.... 49% say children under 14 years should probably see it,
... 41% say they should not,
.... 10% do not answer.

In view of the general approval of the theme of the film, and the recommendations for a wider showing of it, the reluctance to show it to children probably results from a feeling that the theme is beyond a child's comprehension.

GENERAL COMMENTS ...

A few people added additional general comments regarding the film which are reported here.

"The American animated films 'Boundary Line' and 'Picture in your Mind' represent artistically a more interesting and more convincing illustration of these ideas."

"The idea of fraternization is ideal, not practicable, however, as materialism and egoism prevail too strongly."

"If possible many animated films, please. First of all those of Disney and Steinberg - but no vapid inadequate, unskillful bungling, or imitations, for instance (Wilhelm Busch Film)."

"This kind of film shows in what an uncomplicated manner one can solve certain problems. Everybody should see this film and draw his conclusions from it."

"Rather than in Germany it should be shown in other countries too (England)."

"It is just adequate for pupils of the third grade in grammar-school."

"Such a film, it is true, must work with human figures in order to arouse a collective conception, but these should rather have the characteristics of the figures of Disney, Hoegfeld, Busch, etc., than such grimacing egg-heads which from the beginning arouse skepticism about the positive in human beings. The discrepancy between the pictures and tone on one hand and the treatment and theme on the other hand may lead to superficial views not distinguishable from the Communist line rather than a real understanding (of the problem)."

RESTRICTED

00417

GERMAN YOUTH IN FIVE CITIES GIVE THEIR IMPRESSION OF THE SUPPLEMENT
"JUGEND IN DER FREIEN WELT"

**Classification cancelled
by authority of Leo P. Crespi
PUB/RAS.**

Report No. 24
Series No. 2
30 June 1950

REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
HICOG APO 807
Bad Nauheim Germany

RESTRICTED

INTRODUCTION ...

During the first week in June 1950, the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs, HICOG, made a survey of reactions to the special youth supplement entitled "Jugend in der Freien Welt", (Youth in the Free World) published by the Information Services Division, Office of Public Affairs, HICOG.

The study was done in the four major cities of the US Zone - Frankfurt, Nuremberg, Munich, and Stuttgart - and in the three Western sectors of Berlin. The sample consisted of 357 cases from the US Zone cities, and 142 from West Berlin, in all 499 cases. The sample was a representative random one of young people from 15 through 25 years of age. Interviewing was conducted in the homes of the respondents by trained German interviewers supervised by American field personnel.

The interviewers first called on the respondents with the magazine and made appointments to see them a few days later during which period they would have time to look over the magazine. On their return call, interviewers queried respondents on their opinion of the magazine, and then went through it with them requesting their detailed comments on all the stories and articles.

SOME GENERALIZATIONS ...

1. The supplement was generally well received.

- ... Nine in ten read it all or in part. In West Berlin, 26% claim to have seen the magazine prior to receiving it from the interviewers, only 5% in the Zone cities had seen it previously.
- ... Detailed questioning on the cover also yielded generally favorable results. A large majority feel that the cover is attractive.
- ... The combination of a handsome young man and the work bench largely accounts for its good reception. And among the few critics, typography and lack of color are criticized more frequently than the theme.
- ... As to the title "Jugend in der Freien Welt" - it is "completely satisfactory" to more than seven in ten respondents. The dissenters complain that all youth, and especially German youth, are not free.
- ... But more than half of the young people claim the cover page lacks a clear Western imprint, when queried specifically on the point, though very few volunteered this observation in the preceding questions. Those who think the cover could have appeared on an East publication, point to the tendency there to use the worker theme, and such words as freedom.

- a -

R E S T R I C T E D

- ... The story about Fritz Scholz (the cover subject) gave the most votes as "best-liked," though comments on specific articles and stories indicate that none found marked disfavor among readers. In general, replies to the queries on the various articles were very detailed, which suggests a high degree of interest in the general content of the magazine, if not equally in all of the articles.
- ... Six in ten are of the opinion that a true account of free youth is presented in the magazines. Critics say it is too optimistic or unbalanced in tone.
- ... Majority opinions of readers are that all or some of their friends or acquaintances would be interested in seeing the magazine.
- 2. Over half the readers do not know who published the magazine.
- 3. Though as already indicated, the supplement is generally well received, it finds much greater acceptance among the teen-agers, youth with elementary schooling only and those in the lower socio-economic levels, than in contrasting groups. As these groups represent the largest segments of the youthful population the magazine can be said to have mass appeal.
- 4. Readers have a wealth of suggestions regarding other content they would like to see in such a magazine. They are especially interested in reading more about world relations of youth, and about sports.

EXTENT OF READERSHIP ...

Almost all of the young people who were given the supplement "Jugend in der freien Welt" (Youth in the Free World) read it all or in part. Only one in ten claimed to have lacked time to read it.

"Have you found the time and opportunity to go through the magazine which I brought you a few days ago?"

	W-Berlin	Zone Cities	Total
Yes, completely	52%	46%	48%
Yes, partially	39	45	43
No, no time	9	9	9
	100%	100%	100%

... About a quarter (26%) of West Berlin youths had seen the magazine previously - only 5% had seen it in the Zone cities.

OPINIONS ON THE COVER ...

A detailed series of questions was asked about the cover to ascertain whether the initial impression would be favorable to readers or whether, on the contrary, young people might believe from a first glance that the magazine was of Communist origin.*

The Communist proclivity for presenting pictures of happy "Heroes of Labor" and "Activists" and making distorted use of terms such as freedom, democracy, peace, etc., makes this procedure necessary.

COVER WOULD ATTRACT READERS ...

The first approach was to ask whether the readers thought other readers would be attracted by the cover. To this question eight in ten young people replied that the cover would encourage readership.

"Do you believe that the title and picture on the cover would induce many young people to read this magazine, or not?"

	W-Berlin	Zone Cities	Total
Yes	79%	78%	78%
No	18	18	18
No opinion	3	4	4
	100%	100%	100%

* The cover is in black and white featuring a photograph of a smiling young man - the subject of one of the articles - dressed in work clothes sitting beside a lathe. The title "Jugend in der freien Welt" is in white lettering. There is no date of issue or name of publisher on the cover page.

... Study of group differences suggests that the cover has mass-appeal. For example the teen-agers (15 to 19 years), those whose education has been limited to elementary schooling (Volksschule), young women, and people in the lower socio-economic levels are more likely than their more sophisticated opposites to say the cover would attract readers.

Cover would:

	Attract	Not attract	No opinion
--	---------	-------------	------------

By age:

15 - 19 years	83%	15%	2% ... 100%
20 - 25 years	75	21	4

By Education:

Elementary	83	13	4
Middle	76	21	3
Diploma or University	47	47	6

By Socio-Economic Status:

Lower	83	14	3
Lower Middle	76	21	3
Upper middle and Upper	60	37	3

... The attractiveness of the picture and the fact that the picture depicts a young man at work are the two leading reasons readers say would encourage readership of the magazine. Others mention the cheerfulness of the young man pictured while some stress the youth aspect. Their reasons listed in order of mention follow on the next page.

"Do you think that the title and picture on the cover would induce many young people to buy this magazine or not?" - If "Yes": "Why do you think so?"

	Berlin	Zone Cities	Total
<u>Picture is attractive:</u> One gets curious to see whether it is as nice inside as it is outside; one has the feeling that it promises much; is well photographed, is promising; title and picture give a promising impression; etc.	16%	20%	19%
<u>It is a stimulus for the working youth:</u> Speaks to the working youth; by picturing a working young man it stimulates the interest of youth; the picture of the working place is certainly of interest, as it is the wish of people to have a steady job; etc.	14	21	19
<u>Cheerful youth at work:</u> Because the picture shows a young man who likes to work; it radiates joy of life and joy in work; the cheerful face of the young man at work encourages reading; a frank and honest face is attractive; etc.	13	14	13
<u>Because it's a magazine for youth:</u> Judging from title and picture one can assume that this magazine shows many interesting things for youth; because it is evident that this is a magazine for youth; because young people like to read what is written about them; etc.	10	8	8
<u>It is attractive for young people interested in technical things:</u> One thinks it is a technical magazine; a technical worker is shown which should attract many boys; many people are interested in machines; etc.	9	4	6
<u>Reports on youth all over the world:</u> One expects to learn something about youth all over the world; because they are interested to see how youth in other countries are doing; everybody wants to see and hear about his friends of the same age all over the world; etc.	7	2	4
<u>Other answers:</u> Because it's a magazine and, therefore, always meets interest; because it is a subject of today; would interest youth because they lean towards the West; because it's a new magazine; etc.	6	6	6
<u>No opinion</u>	$\frac{6}{87\%+}$	$\frac{5}{80\%+}$	$\frac{5}{80\%+}$

* Adds to more than the proportion saying the cover would attract because some people gave more than one answer.

... Respondents who feel that the cover would not attract buyers mention a variety of reasons for their opinion. As the table below shows, they feel that the interest of young people lies in other directions than work, or that the cover is not colorful enough, or that it looks like an East Zone product, and so forth.

"Do you think that the title and picture on the cover would induce many young people to buy this magazine or not?" If "No": "Why do you think so?"

	Berlin	Zone Cities	Total
<u>Greatest part of youth is interested in other things:</u> Because youth would like to read rather something about Rita Hayworth or other stars; the assortment is too great; they think it is a special trade journal or something political which doesn't interest most people, only sport is interesting; youth is too phlegmatic for that; youth today unfortunately has different opinions; most young people I know are interested in amusement only, - not in their work; etc.	6%	2%	6%
<u>Not interesting, not striking enough:</u> It is too gloomy and not striking enough; it is not exciting and provoking enough; it does not say enough, one should show construction, like building of houses etc.; there are perhaps better titles, the picture is too prodding, one could think it is to incite diligence; etc.	3	7	6
<u>Only certain groups have interest in this problem:</u> The picture on the title page has appeal to a certain part of youth, not to all; judging from the picture mechanics and locksmiths only would be interested in it; it appeals to young men only; etc.	5	2	3
<u>Could come from the East:</u> Title doesn't say enough, the magazine could also have been issued by the East; has such an Eastern-like look, like youth activists ("Jugendaktivisten"); such pictures on work are always shown by the East; etc.	3	1	2
<u>Other answers:</u> Because a great part of youth is without a apprentice-job; etc.	3	1	2
	18%	18%	18%

PERSONAL OPINION ON THE COVER ...

The young respondents also personally like the cover. They particularly like the photograph which they say made them interested in reading the magazine. And, as will be noted in the catalogued comments which follow, few of the negative comments appear to stem from any basic disagreement, but rather are based on particulars or on technical matters - e.g. "The cover is too dark," "The title is in too small type." Only 6% say the cover failed to arouse their interest -- but even this small fraction indicates no fundamental dislikes, all they want is a cover - and presumably contents - that represents their particular interests more closely.

"And what do you personally think of the cover?"

	Berlin	Zone Cities	Total
<u>It gives a nice impression:</u> He is a happy man, one gets the impression that the young man is doing his job joyfully; I like it because one gets the feeling that the young man likes his work; very attractive; well photographed; etc.	63%	57%	58%
<u>Like it because of the machine and worker:</u> It's good, technical things have my interest; I like it because it shows life as it is; I like it especially for there is no student on the title page; it's very good because I am interested in technical things; I am interested in it because I have to look for a job soon; etc.	15	12	13
<u>Good with qualifications:</u> I think it is good, but I don't like the title; it is a bit too dark and could be better; I think it's good, one has the feeling that the worker likes to do his work but the picture is too dark; it's quite nice, but I am afraid it appeals to youth only because there is a boy shown there; etc.	6	9	8
<u>Has technical faults:</u> Posed picture; letters are too small, not effective; looks affected; letters are illegible and it looks too gloomy; the picture is too "sunny" for this age; etc.	3	10	8
<u>No interest, wouldn't buy it:</u> No interest for such things, married, have a child, interested in household only; machine-building wouldn't interest me, therefore the magazine wouldn't attract me; as a girl I wouldn't buy it because I would assume there is only something for boys in it; pictures of sports would interest me more; etc.	6	6	6
<u>Could also come from the East:</u> One thinks of the East and that is repellent; I think that the picture looks so much like showing an "activist"; it seems almost as if the magazine came from the East Zone, because they always show youth at machines; etc.	3	2	2
<u>Other answers:</u> "Free world" and title picture don't fit together; looks like a paper from a labor union; etc.	-	1	1
<u>No opinion:</u>	$\frac{1}{100\%}$	$\frac{3}{100\%}$	$\frac{4}{100\%}$

TITLE IS LIKED ...

The title "Jugend in der freien Welt" (Youth in the Free World), specifically considered, is also completely satisfactory to more than seven in ten readers.

"Are you completely satisfied with the title, or is there something about it that you don't like?"

	W-Berlin	Zone Cities	Total
Completely satisfied	80%	71%	73%
Something not liked	18	26	24
No opinion	1	3	3
	100%	100%	100%

The main point of contention among the minority which has reservations about the title is that it is contrary to fact in that youth, particularly German youth, is not yet free. Only a very small fraction (5%) of the critics subscribe to the viewpoint that the phrasing of the title smacks of slogans and propaganda, (East Zone origin) and less than one per cent objects to the term "Jugend" (Youth) - both of which points were initially suggested by some American observers as possible bases of criticism.

"Are you completely satisfied with the title or is there something about it you don't like?" If "Something not liked":
"Why don't you like it?"

	Berlin	Zone Cities	Total
<u>Youth of the world is not yet free; there is not yet a free world: We are not yet free; because the term "Freie Welt" doesn't apply under present conditions; "Freie Welt" doesn't apply to us Germans as we are still hindered in our development; as yet we don't have a free world; it will take some time for youth to become free; etc.</u>	8%	15%	12%
<u>Title contains slogans; looks propagandistic (Same slogans are used by the East): It looks so much like propaganda of the Eastern type; could too easily become a catch-word; title sounds too much as if it came from the East Zone; because it sounds like politics, one has the impression of a propaganda magazine; because the East pretty often uses the same catch-words; etc.</u>	4	5	5
<u>Title promises more than there is in the magazine; doesn't fit the contents: Doesn't mean anything; should point more to the contents; promises so very much; etc.</u>	4	2	2
<u>Don't like the term "Youth" (Jugend): To me the term Youth applies to children under 14, so the term young people (junge Menschen) would have been better; young people don't like the term "Youth" (Jugend), it is such a collective term; etc.</u>	-	1	1
<u>Other answers: One would think it is an American magazine translated into German; title is too long; too general; etc.</u>	3	3	4
	19%	26%	24%

... People give a variety of reasons for their satisfaction with the title. The three leading ones are: the emphasis on freedom; its correspondence with the content; and its indication of world unity.

"Are you completely satisfied with the title or don't you like some things about it?" - If "Completely satisfied":
"Why do you like it?"

	Berlin	Zone Cities	Total
It emphasizes freedom: It's impressive for every boy to live in the free world; because work is in the foreground and the pictures are from a free world and not from one that oppresses; the title shows that it is a democratic magazine; because it stresses freedom; etc.	20%	18%	19%
<u>The title corresponds to the content:</u> Because it expresses what the magazine is about; because it summarizes the content of the magazine; it is appealing, you expect something from it; it is to the point; it says everything; etc.	14	14	14
<u>It indicates unity of the world:</u> Because the title already says that in here is something on youth from other countries; it is appealing to youth to have the feeling to be connected with the whole of the world; it shows the cooperation of youth of all of the world; because it has the connotation of unity; etc.	14	11	12
<u>The title is good:</u> No other title would have fitted; because it sounds well; it is quite good and suits our wishes; etc.	4	8	7
<u>Title and picture show that it is a magazine for youth:</u> Because it really appeals to youth; the word "Jugend" immediately shows that it is a magazine for youth; it shows that one is concerned with youth; the text appeals to youth; it's very fitting for a youth magazine; etc.	7	5	6
<u>Title is short, easy to grasp, clear:</u> Simple and clear; says much with few words; it is very good - you know what you read; hits the core; etc.	4	3	3
<u>Title shows contrast with the East:</u> Title is suitable here - in contrast to the East; because it points out the contrast with force and pressure on the other side (East); etc.	4	3	3
<u>Other answers:</u> It makes you want to read the magazine; because it expresses what we are feeling; the title is good as a challenge, reality looks different; magazine is usable for children up to 19.....; etc.	3	2	2
<u>No opinion</u>	$\frac{11}{81\%}$	$\frac{7}{71\%}$	$\frac{8}{74\%}$

EAST OR WEST ORIGIN? ...

Somewhat more than half the youth say the magazine cover lacks a clear-cut Western imprint and could accordingly also have originated in the East. It is noteworthy, however, that this observation comes as a result of a direct query; only a small fraction suggested it in the detailed questions on the cover, though an important aim of the series was, as already stated, to invite free expressions of opinions on this matter.

"Does the cover page clearly show that this issue was published by the West or could one assume that it also could have been published by the East?"

	W-Berlin	Zone Cities	Total
Clearly from West	41%	35%	37%
Also from East	56	51	52
No opinion	3	14	11
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

REASONS FOR OPINIONS ...

But reasons given for stating that the East could also have issued the magazine seem to be more discriminating and sophisticated than those advanced by the group that thinks it could only have come from the West. The former and larger group mentions such well-founded arguments as the following: The East constantly refers to "free" youth; the East is very fond of the "worker" theme; this is the typical East propaganda theme; the East is always presenting similar pictures, and so forth.

On the other hand those who hold the opinion that the magazine could only be of Western origin tend to argue from the facts of the Western situation. Leading contentions of this group are: 1) Only in the West are there such happy and free young men as the young man on the cover; and 2) the reference to freedom in the title could only apply to the West because there is no freedom in the East. The reasons given by both groups follow, listed in order of frequency of mention.

"Does the cover page show quite clearly that this magazine is issued by the West or could it also have been issued by the East?" - If "Also by the East:" "From what, do you think, can one recognize that?"

W-Berlin Zone Cities Total

<u>The East also uses the term "freedom":</u>	14%	11%	12%
Because it is called "freie Jugend" in the East, too; because the East, too, asserts it is free; the term "freie Jugend" is used propagandistically more often in the East than here in the West; because the East, too, says it is free; etc.			
<u>Subject "work" is favored in the East:</u> In the East the subject "work" is often chosen; "Arbeiter der Faust" they like to show in the East zone; everywhere in the East you see pictures of workers; pictures of working youth are something they like to show in the East; etc.	11	13	12
<u>Generally, propaganda of the East looks just like that:</u> Propaganda of the East looks just like that; in the East, too, much propaganda is like that; they do it just like that; it looks so neutral, could have been a camouflaged propaganda magazine; etc.	6	10	9
<u>What they show there exists in the East as well as in the West:</u> Workshops exist in the East and in the West; in the East there are working youths just as well as in the West; in the East one can also see workers at the work bench; the East, too has machines and young people; etc.	6	7	7
<u>The picture:</u> The East also shows such pictures; in Eastern youth magazines there are also pictures like that; the picture gives the impression that the magazine is intended for the so-called "Arbeiterjugend;" etc.	8	6	6
<u>Looks like picture of an "activist" (Hennecke; "Jungpionier"):</u> Because you could think it is a picture of an "activist"; one thinks it is a Hennecke-worker; the boy looks like a "Jungpionier"; etc.	7	-	2
<u>The title:</u> They use the same words in the East; the propaganda catch-words are the same in the East; the East often uses the same title; etc.	1	2	2
<u>There is nothing indicating the publisher:</u> Publisher isn't noted; nothing points to the West; nothing is there saying it is published by the West; etc.	4	1	2
<u>Other answers:</u> In the East, too, they are doing much for youth; they are not so honest in the East, and use same terms; etc.	1	2	2
<u>No opinion:</u>	-	2	1
	58%	54%	55%

* Some people gave more than one reason.

"Does the cover page show quite clearly that this magazine is issued by the West or could it also have been issued by the East?"
If "Quite clearly by the West": "From what, do you think, one can recognize that?"

	W-Berlin	Zone Cities	Total
<u>The picture of the young man shows that;</u>	14%	14%	14%
<u>youth in the East does not look so happy and free: "Such smiling boys don't exist in the East; youth in the East doesn't look like that when working; because people in the East look quite different; nobody in the East shows such a happy face; etc.</u>			
<u>By the title - there is freedom in the West only:</u>	16	8	11
Because of the words "Freie Welt" it can come from the West only; it says "Jugend in der freien Welt" and youth in the East is not free; etc.			
<u>Title in the East would contain more propaganda:</u>	6	4	5
Because there would be more propaganda in it if from East; because there is no propaganda in it; in the East it would be called "Der Aktivist" or the like; newspapers from the East already have more propaganda on the cover; etc.			
<u>Situation in East is different; (uniforms; no machines like that):</u>	3	2	2
Youth in the East has blue shirts and FDJ-badge; because they don't have machines like that in the East; etc.			
<u>From the general impression; clean, simple:</u>	2	2	2
Looks so absolutely clean; the general impression; because it's so simple and homely; etc.			
<u>Other answers:</u>	2	4	3
It comes clearly from the West; because there is no connection between youth of East and West; etc.			
<u>No opinion:</u>	-	2	1
	43%*	36%*	38%*

* Some people gave more than one reason.

GROUP DIFFERENCES ...

More inclined to feel that the cover does not have a clear Western imprint but could also come from the East are the more discriminating groups - young persons from the better educated, older, and upper socio-economic groups, and the young men. Comparative figures are shown:

	Clearly from West	Could come from East	No opinion
By Age:			
15 - 19 years	41%	48%	11% ... 100%
20 - 25 years	34	55	11
By Education:			
Elementary	40	49	11
Middle	35	54	11
Diploma and University	18	69	13
By Socio-Economic Level:			
Lower	38	50	12
Lower Middle	36	54	10
Upper Middle and Upper	31	60	9
By Sex:			
Men	28	63	9
Women	45	43	9

OPINIONS ON THE STORIES ...

The account of the career of Fritz Scholz receives by far the most votes as the best-liked story.*

Readers have a more difficult time selecting the story they like least, as is indicated in the large proportion of "No opinion" replies. Most frequently selected is the article "Naechstenliebe im Alltag" with the story on the Cleveland Museum following in close order.

The votes for "best liked" and "least liked" stories follow:

	Like best			Like least		
	W-Berlin	Zone	Total	W-Berlin	Zone	Total
Fritz Scholz weiss was er will	44%	32%	35%	7%	8%	8%
Worauf es ankommt	15	17	17	2	6	5
Jugend in der freien Welt	4	6	6	3	6	5
Naechstenliebe im Alltag	6	14	11	21	17	18
Du und Deine Umgebung	8	10	10	4	8	7
Ein Museum	6	4	5	12	16	15
Lehrreiche Liebhabereien	4	4	4	4	4	4
All	-	2	1	-	-	-
None	-	2	1	27	9	14
Other remarks	1	1	1	1	2	1
No opinion	12	8	9	19	24	23
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

* See appendix for a brief resume of the stories included in the magazine.

"FRITZ SCHOLZ WEISS WAS ER WILL" ...

Six inton found the story of Fritz Scholz "very interesting" with West Berliners somewhat more enthusiastic than youth in zonal cities.

"Do you find the article "Fritz Scholz weiss was er will" (knows what he wants) very interesting, somewhat, or only slightly interesting?"

	W-Berlin	Zone Cities	Total
Very interesting	70%	58%	61%
Somewhat interesting	8	17	14
Slightly interesting	3	10	8
Not read	19	15	7
	100%	100%	100%

WHY NOT INTERESTING ...

Two contradictory views are most often brought up by the small minority that found the Scholz story uninteresting. One is that it is a unique instance; the other is that it represents too commonplace an experience to feature. Some readers also say that the story is merely propaganda, or of too limited interest, etc. Their comments follows:

"Do you think, the article "Fritz Scholz knows what he wants" is very interesting, somewhat interesting, or slightly interesting?" If "somewhat interesting" or "slightly interesting": "For what reasons?"

	W-Berlin	Zone Cities	Total
<u>It is a unique case:</u> Too optimistic; it is only a model example; I wonder who might get by so easily in such a situation; etc.	4%	8%	7%
<u>It is a commonplace situation:</u> It is the fate of almost every boy today that he has to struggle for his life and to earn his living; many people are in a similar situation today; because it is something we experience every day; etc.	3	8	6
<u>It is merely a propaganda article:</u> I can't understand how anybody can pay for his living, clothing and so on with the wages of an apprentice; it is too romantic, too incredible; I don't know how Fritz Scholz has so much spare time; I can't believe that it is possible for an apprentice to go around with leather gloves and a sport suit; I can't imagine that such a big factory employs anyone without report-cards or protection; etc.	1	4	3
<u>Too limited in interest:</u> It has nothing for girls; I am a musician, for me the article isn't so interesting; it deals too much with machines; etc.	-	4	3
<u>Too much of this kind is already published:</u>	2	2	2
<u>Other remarks:</u>	$\frac{1}{11\%}$ *	$\frac{1}{27\%}$ *	$\frac{1}{22\%}$ *

* Some people gave more than one reason.

SCHOLZ IS LUCKY ...

Predominant opinions are that Scholz is an exception to the German rule - that only by great luck has he been able to get the kind of a job he wanted, with a chance for advancement and an education. But a large minority express a more optimistic note, holding that it would be possible for most young Germans to do the same.

"Do you believe that it is possible for most young Germans to do what Fritz Scholz did, or was he very lucky, in your opinion?" *

	W-Berlin	Zone Cities	Total
Most Germans could do same	34%	30%	31%
Very lucky	46	54	52
No opinion	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
	81%	85%	84%

"WORAUF ES ANKOMMT" ...

The response to this picture story about youth in various parts of the world (English title "What's important") is also largely favorable. A minority are either sceptical whether the treatment is adequate or out-rightly unimpressed.

A summary of their comments on the piece, grouped into favorable, sceptical, and unfavorable categories is given on the following page:

* Asked only of those who had read the story.

"What impression have you had from the article
 "What matters" (Worauf es ankommt)?"

W-Berlin Zone Cities Total

Favorable Answers

<u>It shows the interests, way of living, thinking, work and companionship of the youth of the entire world: One gets an impression of how the youth in all the world live and work; interesting to see what kind of problems and opportunities youth in other countries have; that young people are happy and content everywhere; the exchange of ideas of the youth of the entire world is furthered by that; the youth of the rest of the world is shown to the German youth; the article shows the freedom of youth in various countries; it is good that they tell us the opinion of foreign youth; etc.</u>	22%	20%	21%
<u>Generally a good impression, interesting and informative: A good impression; that is quite nice, the composition of ideals; it is all true; nice, brief and gives a general view of the whole; very interesting and instructive; etc.</u>	14	17	16
<u>Shows character, nature, aims, problems and way of living of the other peoples: The aims of other peoples are shown up here; the pictures show that many people try to progress; it gives some insight into what is going on in other countries; it affords a general view of the problems of all the countries of the free West; that every country has its customs and usages; there is the same freedom everywhere whether in France or in England; etc.</u>	18	9	12
<u>Shows that more contact and cooperation with other countries, especially among the youth, is necessary: The youth of the world shall hold together and remain good comrades; it shows that they must all cooperate and that Germany with her youth should not remain isolated; that is all very good, that the youth get contact with the youth of other nations; we ought to have a world government that all the good aspirations might be pooled to a good effect; the attitude of the youth in the other countries is good, one should meet with them much more; if there is no compatibility and mutual understanding in little things, it can't be better in important matters; etc.</u>	9	10	10
<u>Especially impressed by the enjoyment of life, the happy living together, the spare time pleasures, comradeship and sports of people there: I like it very much, especially the cooperation and leisure time pleasures; they show real enjoyment of life and companionship; very nice to see how happily people live together; how they work and spend their spare time in other countries; etc.</u>	6	7	6
<u>Especially impressed by the happy family life: I like it very much, especially the part about the happy family life; very interesting because one is familiarized with the family life in other countries; it is very informative, because it shows youth that a good family life is the most important thing; etc.</u>	4	2	2
	73%	65%	67%

W-Berlin Zone Cities Total

Sceptical Answers

All is very nice and good, but in reality it looks different: All is very nice and fine but I can't help saying, in reality it looks different; that there are only very few in every country who have such intentions; what they say here is right, but it is not yet realized; it would be very fine if it were practicable, but unfortunately youth lacks the means for it; the article is too rosy; there are so many limitations and difficulties for youth, in reality; the words below the pictures don't exactly describe the real characteristics of the country but just what the country lacks; I don't believe that it is so always and everywhere as it is depicted; one sees only the sunny sides of life here; it is all good and nice, but our youth hasn't that easy life as youth in other countries; etc.

8%

9%

9%

Unfavorable Answers

I don't believe these were young men who wrote the captions, only politicians speak such a language, besides it is too authoritarian; they don't mention enough about the German youth; some pictures are too superficial; some things are exaggerated; texts appear to be too sophisticated and like excerpts of political editorials; mediocre; doesn't succeed in establishing rapport with abroad; it looks like propaganda; it arouses illusions, nothing more; etc.

9

13

12

Noncommittal Answers

It shows that every country and youth everywhere have their troubles and problems: It aims to show the youth also the troubles of other countries; people and especially youth everywhere have their troubles; it shows that every country has its problems, not only Germany; etc.

3

1

2

Other remarks: It aims to show that there can't be good work without skill and knowledge; democratic and known demands are pronounced here; etc.

2

5

4

No opinion:

$\frac{11}{33\%}$

$\frac{9}{37\%}$

$\frac{9}{36\%}$

"NÄCHSTENLIEBE IM ALLTAG" ...

The two stories on the cooperative youth ventures "Nachbarschaftsheim Neukoelln" and "Jugenddorf Vaihingen" were also well received - the latter to a greater extent than the former.

"Did you find the report on ("Nachbarschaftsheim Neukoelln") ("Jugenddorf Vaihingen") very interesting; somewhat or slightly interesting?"

	W-Berlin		Zone Cities		Total	
	Neukoelln, Vaihingen		Neukoelln, Vaihingen		Neukoelln, Vaihingen	
Very	49%	58%	50%	59%	50%	58%
Somewhat	19	13	17	10	17	11
Slightly	4	6	10	9	9	8
Didn't read	28	23	23	22	24	23
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Readers who found the two stories rather dull gave various scattered reasons for their views. It would appear, however, that the life depicted there was too close to home for some readers. They do not like to see ruins, they do not like to read about young people having to rebuild their lives, shattered by the war.

"DU UND DEINE UMGEBUNG" ...

This article by Dr. Karen Horney (English title "You and your environment") was read by less than half of the young persons who saw the supplement. In West Berlin 45%, in Zone cities 47%, in all 46%, read the article.

About half of the readers of the article (23% in all) claim they had learned "something" from it when queried to the point. Asked to specify what they had learned, readers replied as follows on the next page.

"Has it been possible for you to learn something out of article?" What could you learn?"

	W. Berlin	Zone Cities	Total
<u>The article explains sex problems in an ethical way:</u> That one must inform young people in any case; that it is necessary to inform youth about sex questions in time; that youth must become better again; today they are all so spoiled; this instruction is absolutely to be welcomed, for much bad has happened as a consequence of too little knowledge, especially in sex matters; etc.	4%	6%	6%
<u>The article shows youth how they should conduct themselves in everyday-life:</u> The conduct of youth in everyday-life is depicted here; the article is informative and instructive; how one can spend one's spare time; first of all how young men have to conduct themselves in their life; that one shall adapt oneself; etc.	5	4	4
<u>The article leads youth to knowledge of themselves:</u> Every person should improve himself and recognize his faults; that one should mind one's own faults first and not at first those of others; to look for one's own faults; to consider oneself not too important; etc.	3	2	2
<u>The article guides youth to the importance of a happy family life and one of mutual respect:</u> A good family life is the best support of the state; we must respect our fellow-men too, without regard to their descent; etc.	3	2	2
<u>The article encourages youth to a free choice of their profession and to a feeling of independence:</u> That one shall choose the profession one likes and is satisfied with; that one must like one's profession and shall not depend on support by the state, but shall look for a job; one shouldn't depend on the parents but start a life of one's own; etc.	1	2	2
<u>The article gives youth a freer view:</u> One gets a freer view, because these things have been unknown to us; to continue learning more and more without thinking; "I cannot;" etc.	3	-	1
<u>The article encourages youth to a free expression of their opinion:</u> That one shall pronounce one's opinion freely; if one has to reproach something one should criticize openly; etc.	1	*	1
<u>Other remarks:</u> That one should much more think over such things; that youth must hold together; how important one considers youth in America; the term ideal is here excellently illustrated; first of all the attitude of the older people to our problems; that it pays to stand up for freedom; etc.	6	5	5
<u>No opinion:</u>	$\frac{1}{27\%}$	$\frac{1}{22\%}$	$\frac{1}{24\%}$

* Less than one half of one per cent.

BUT MORE SUCH ARTICLES WELCOMED ...

Predominant opinions among readers of the article "You and Your Environment" are that they would like to read other such articles.

"Would you like to read more articles of this kind or would you rather read articles of another kind?"

	W-Berlin	Zone Cities	Total
More of this kind	32%	31%	31%
Other kind	10	11	11
Both	3	2	2
No opinion	<u>45%</u>	<u>47%</u>	<u>46%</u>

EIN MUSEUM, DAS KINDER REGISTERT ...

How American children are taught to appreciate art is considered by most readers the purpose of this story of children's patronage of the Cleveland museum. Only a minority see the more subtle point - that it exemplifies how freedom of expression may be encouraged among the very young.

Their interpretations of the purpose of the article are catalogued in order of frequency of mention.

R E S T R I C T E D

"What does the article "A Museum that Delights Children" intend to show, as far as you can judge it?"

	Zone W-Berlin	Cities	Total
<u>How one can educate children to a taste for art: Lead children to art and develop their creative talents; education of youth by art; children are to acquire early an understanding of art; they want to acquaint even small children with literature and painting; they want to make the museums attractive to children; etc.</u>	27%	29%	29%
<u>To stimulate youth, to develop their talents; To arouse interest in the children, also for things that are beyond their usual realm of play; that one can interest children for other things than military toys too; to educate children early to free and independently judging men; to guide even children to form judgments of their own; etc.</u>	23	13	16
<u>What American children do: It is to show how the children are educated in America; they intend to illustrate the American way of living; that in America every child can frequent the museums without a teacher; etc.</u>	5	8	7
<u>To show that even children like art: That even the children have a taste for art and they are not to be kept out of it from the beginning; that children are enthusiastic about museums too, and that they therefore should be made more accessible to them; etc.</u>	9	6	7
<u>To arouse interest in a future career: A sense for their future profession is aroused in the children; that children may occupy themselves with something that might be of advantage to them in their future life; etc.</u>	4	5	5
<u>Critical and negative comments: Whether it is a good idea to introduce children to the museums, is doubtful, it bored me when I was a school boy; I can't imagine that children feel they have a good time in a museum; the picture of little Carol is a posed picture in my opinion; in order to show how advanced even the American children are, it is apish, however, the pictures are to deceive us about race prejudices in America; etc.</u>	4	7	6
<u>Children are kept off the street and learn something: Mischievous is avoided by that therefore children should be kept busy; that the children are well protected in big cities; etc.</u>	2	3	2
<u>Other remarks: The elimination of race discriminations; now youth cooperates without quarrelling; that young people see what existed in former times, and how everything was; it describes a modern and right education; to create a better future for youth; etc.</u>	6	7	7
<u>I did not read it:</u>	20	24	23
<u>No opinion:</u>	1 101%	4 105%	3 105%

* Percentages add to more than 100% because some readers mentioned more than one point.

R E S T R I C T E D

LEHRREICHE LIEBHABEREIEN ...

This one-page spread on educational hobbies was also favorable commented on by readers, as indicated in their replies listed below:

"And what do you think about the article Lehrreiche Liebhabereien (educational hobbies)?"

	W-Berlin	Zone Cities	Total
Interesting, good that young people can occupy themselves with such things: I think, it is very fine if the youngsters have time and opportunity to pursue their hobby, besides one can discover their interests by that; that is very nice, these young people are very seriously occupied with these things; it shows, that youngsters can exercise their hobbies; etc.	29%	27%	28%
Interesting, good, very good (without further comments): 16 It is very nice; it is all right, it is realistic; I liked it very much; it is really interesting; very inspiring; etc.		14	14
Instructive; shows what young people can learn in their spare time: It is very interesting because one sees how one can develop professional abilities in common efforts; one discovers abilities that one was not aware of; etc.	11	5	14
Even little children can try their hand in handicraft: That it is very nice if children occupy themselves that early, it is also better for their future; it is very interesting that children can achieve great things with hobbies as for instance with astronomy, almost everybody has the two other hobbies; etc.	7	6	6
These suggestions are very good and useful; Good, but it ought to be more comprehensive; more instructions are good and interesting; it might present more; etc.	4	5	5
No interest: Not much, that is too much matter of taste, I don't care for that, some have extraordinary aptitudes; it didn't interest me; etc.	3	6	5
Gives instructions and suggestions for handicraft: Very good, it gives suggestions for doing handicraft oneself; well written, but the handicraft works could be better elaborated; it stimulates doing handicraft; etc.	4	3	3
The Germans have no time and no money for something like that: It is quite nice, but we have nobody who might arrange something like that; we are not yet so far advanced in Germany, it is out of question for the youth because of financial reasons; not practicable in Germany; etc.	2	1	2
Other remarks: One likes to read it, but these are evidently exceptions, almost little geniuses; the article is too unimportant; etc.	6	5	5
I did not read it:	17	17	17
No opinion:	2 101%	2 101%	2 101%

* Percentages add to more than 100% because some readers mentioned more than one point.

GENERAL APPRAISAL ...

Only a small fraction think there should have been more pictures in the magazine. More than a fourth would welcome more text. But two-thirds think the distribution between pictures and text is right as it is.

"In general, would you have liked more pictures or more text, or is it right as it is?"

	W. Berlin	Zone Cities	Total
More pictures	4%	8%	6%
More text	34	24	27
Right as is	65	65	65
No opinion	1	3	2
	100%	100%	100%

ACCURACY OF CONTENTS ...

The impression of the majority is that a true picture of youth in the free world is given in the magazine. Three in ten feel too favorable a presentation is given.

"Have you the impression that an actually true picture of youth in the free world was presented here or does it present too favorable a picture?"

	W. Berlin	Zone Cities	Total
True	71%	55%	60%
Too favorable	25	36	32
No opinion	4	9	8
	100%	100%	100%

... The educated, older, and upper socio-economic youth groups are more inclined than their counterparts to see too favorable a presentation, as are young men in contrast to young women. Comparative figures are:

	True picture	Too favorable	No opinion	
By Age:				
15 - 19 years	67%	25%	8%	.. 100%
20 - 25 years	55	38	7	
By Education:				
Elementary	67	24	9	
Middle	52	43	5	
Diploma or University	37	58	5	
Socio-Economic Level:				
Lower	65	27	8	
Lower Middle	58	37	5	
Upper Middle and Upper	32	54	14	

WHY TOO FAVORABLE A PICTURE ...

Critics who think the magazine was not entirely accurate in its presentation three points: 1) it fails to show the darker side; 2) shows the exception, not the rule; and 3) the presentation was too idealized. Their comments follow:

"Have you the impression that the magazine presents a true picture of the youth in the free world or does the magazine show too favorable a picture?" (Those who answered "too favorable" were asked: "In what respect?"

	W. Berlin	Zone Cities	Total
<u>Fails to show darker side:</u> It doesn't show the misery in the free world, for instance in America; it doesn't mention the dark sides; a great part of what it shows is presented euphemistically, I think the positive sides must be balanced by the negative sides; we Germans have had practical experiences which may not be effaced too easily; too many laughing faces and cheerful youth, nothing about unemployment and similar problems; etc.	13%	21%	19%
<u>Shows the exceptions, not the rule:</u> The inmates of the youth village certainly are not always so well dressed as in the pictures; Fritz Scholz is shown working too hard (overzealous) here, it can't be true in reality; these are only depictions about a certain class which don't apply to the entire country; not everybody is so well off, there are many youngsters who are unemployed and have many cares and worries; these are only single cases, the broad reality looks different; etc.	6	10	9
<u>Idealized:</u> Love for one's fellow-men in everyday-life doesn't correspond to reality; some things are too exaggerated and idealized, especially in the pictures; everything is too much idealized, reality looks different, there is much more misery and distress among the youth too; etc.	4	3	3
<u>Other remarks:</u> Because the German youth has not yet experienced freedom; the youth, especially in Berlin, is much more neglected; we cannot imagine what it is to be free, we always lived under coercion; etc.	2	1	1
<u>No opinion:</u>	<u>25%</u>	<u>1</u> <u>36%</u>	<u>*</u> <u>32%</u>

* Less than one half of one per cent.

FRIENDS WOULD LIKE TO SEE IT ...

Large majorities think that most or some of their friends and acquaintances would be interested in the supplement. As will be noted in the table, youth in the Zone cities are more inclined to say "some" than "most".

"Do you believe that most of your friends and acquaintances would be interested in this magazine or only some or scarcely any of them?"

	W-Berlin	Zone Cities	Total
Most	42%	29%	33%
Some	40	48	46
Scarcely any	13	18	16
No opinion	5	5	5
	100%	100%	100%

... Again, the older, better educated, upper social level, and male youths more frequently show reservations than do their opposites.

Interest of Friends and Acquaintances in Magazine:

	Most	Some	Scarcely any	No opinion
By Age:				
15 - 19 years	41%	44%	10%	5% ...100%
20 - 25 years	28	47	21	4
By Education:				
Elementary	34	46	16	4
Middle	36	45	14	5
Diploma and University	16	39	37	8
By Sex:				
Men	27	51	19	3
Women	37	42	15	6
Socio-Economic Level:				
Lower	35	45	15	5
Lower Middle	31	46	19	4
Upper Middle and Upper	26	51	17	6

MORE ABOUT YOUTH OF ALL THE WORLD ...

Majorities think that the magazine carried enough about German and American youth, though a considerable number would like more about them. But almost half would like to have seen more about young people from all parts of the world.

"Would you have liked to have read more in this magazine about (German youth) (American youth) (World youth) or was it all right as it was?"

	W. Berlin	Zone Cities	Total
<u>German youth</u>			
More	25%	31%	29%
Less	8	6	7
All right	65	59	61
No opinion	2	4	3
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
<u>American youth</u>			
More	34%	23%	26%
Less	3	15	12
All right	60	58	58
No opinion	3	4	4
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
<u>World youth</u>			
More	46%	50%	49%
Less	1	4	3
All right	51	43	45
No opinion	2	3	3
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

... It will be noted in the above table that young zonal readers are more inclined than West Berliners to recommend less on American youth.

PUBLISHER OF THE MAGAZINE ...

Over half the readers did not know who the publisher of the magazine is.* Those who say they do know, give a variety of more or less correct answers, as follows:

"Could you please tell me who published this magazine?"
(If yes,) "Who?"

	N. Berlin	Zone Cities	Total
Yes:			
American Military Government	1%	4%	3%
American High Commission	16	25	22
Information Division (HICOG or ORGUS)	11	9	9
The Americans	8	8	8
Heute, or Heute Publishers	-	1	1
Other	4	2	3
	40%	49%	46%
No:	60%	51%	54%

... As would be expected, the older, better educated, upper social level groups, and the young men - generally representative of better informed groups - more often know that the issue was of American origin.

	Know Publisher	Do Not Know	
By Age:			
15 - 19 years	42%	58%	... 100%
20 - 25 years	51	49	
By Education:			
Elementary	42	58	
Middle	51	49	
Diploma or University	71	29	
By Socio-Economic Level:			
Lower	40	60	
Lower Middle	54	46	
Upper Middle and Upper	70	30	
By Sex:			
Men	55	45	
Women	40	60	

* On the bottom of the last page this statement appeared in very fine print, "This edition 'Youth in the Free World' was compiled and published by the Information Services Division of the American High Commission for Germany."

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER ARTICLES ...

queried on what other articles young readers would like to see in a magazine for youth, the respondents came forth with a variety of suggestions. The request for articles on sports leads, followed by a request for more articles and stories about foreign youth.

"What else would you like to see in such a youth magazine?"

	W-Berlin	Zone Cities	Total
Sports: More about sport of young teams, more articles and pictures about sport; sport from all the world; young people practising sport; etc.	20%	19%	20%
More about other countries and the world: Experiences, labor reports of youth groups of other countries; the opinion of foreign youth about Germany; pictures concerning youth abroad and at home; what they are doing; more reports about hiking tours; more about the art of our neighbor countries; etc.	13	17	16
Quiz, puzzles, anecdotes, jokes, drawing, humor: Crossword puzzle; articles about music, puzzles, riddles and funny stories, I miss something funny, a humorous sketch; a reasonable amount of comics; etc.	11	11	11
Articles on education, opportunities and professional chances: There should be more articles about the education problem, besides more articles about the professional or vocational training of youngsters and proposal for spare time pleasures; expert articles about various professions; etc.	10	12	11
Technical and scientific articles: Technical articles about atomic research and so on; about atomic physics, radio, technic and so on; technical progress abroad in fields that are not so advanced in Germany; about biology and animals; youth as radio constructors; etc.	14	8	10
Articles about art, literature, culture and science: More about cultural things; literary criticism, discussion about good novels; perhaps article series about music and art general, theatre, sports; etc.	12	8	10
I like everything, it is good that way, no further proposals: Nothing else, there is enough in it for my mentality; it is sufficiently comprehensive; it is right so; etc.	13	7	9
More for girls, fashion, style and so on: Something more about fashion and more for girls; something about child care; etc.	8	10	9
Stories, short stories, novels, biographies: A good short story; a good novel; one page for stories; short stories and so on; some more intellectual inspiration like good short novels and famous paintings; etc.	6	8	7
Other remarks: About boy scout life; more pictures and reports from Berlin; discussion of actual questions of the day; more top play must be given to Christendon; a question-and answer column concerning youth; youth itself should have more of a say in it; young Germans that are not made up the American way would have more appeal in the pictures; more actual things about Germany; more about the German youth; descriptions of young married couples, how the marriage relationship should be; articles about world policy; how youth in the East zone is doing, for comparison's sake; comparisons between the youth of former times and now; one should first of all familiarize youth with their German home-country and show beautiful landscapes, resort-places, tours, youth hostels and so on; etc.	6	11	9

* Some people gave more than one answer.

APPENDIX

1. The story of Fritz Scholz whose picture also is the cover feature is about a young man who fled from the East to the West zone and following some vicissitudes is now employed in an automobile factory. He intends to continue his professional education, and appears confident that the West affords him an opportunity to get ahead in the world.
2. "Worauf es ankommt" (What matters) is largely a picture spread featuring activities of young people in the free world, noted with phrases such as tolerance, cooperation, objectivity, etc. The theme is unity and liberty.
3. "Naechstenliebe im Alltag" (Brotherly Love in Everyday-Life) consists of pictures with brief text on cooperative youth ventures in reconstruction as well as the educational and recreational activities of the participants organized along democratic lines.
4. "Du und Deine Umgebung" (You and Your Environment) is a one-page article authored by Dr. Karen Horney. As the title indicates, it is concerned with the psychological relationship of the young German to his social environment. It is the most "serious" article in the magazine and unlike to others it is not illustrated.
5. "Jugend in der freien Welt" (Youth in the Free World) is the brief lead story and as such indicates the theme of the magazine - a free youth in a free and democratic society.
6. "Ein Museum, das Kinder begeistert" (A Museum that delights children) contains pictures and captions about children frequenting the Cleveland, Ohio, Museum of Art. The tenor of the article is that these children have the chance to express themselves, not that they are all embryonic artists.
7. "Lehrreiche Liebhaberereien" (Educational Hobbies) is a one-page illustrated story on youthful hobbies of an educational kind, e.g. miniature automobile models, astronomy, etc.

POST MORTEM ON THE WHITSUNTIDE MARCH
A Survey of West Berliners' Evaluations

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R E S T R I C T E D

INTRODUCTION

From June 8, to June 12, 1950, following the FDJ Whitsuntide march on Berlin, the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs, interviewed a representative quota sample of 300 cases in the three Western sectors of Berlin in order to obtain West Berlin reactions to the Eastern-sponsored rally and their evaluations of its general success or failure as a move in the East-West struggle.

The present study is complementary to one conducted in early April in which a representative random sample of 500 West Berliners were interviewed regarding their general thinking and state of morale in view of the projected Whitsuntide march on Berlin.

Group comparisons are omitted in the present report as in the interest of speed only enough cases were gathered to delineate overall trends in thinking.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS

I. DID MEETING ACCORD WITH EXPECTATIONS?

- ... Two-thirds of the West Berliners found the course of the Whitsuntide activities to be just about what they expected. One third, anticipated more violent episodes than actually occurred.
- ... Estimates on the number of participants involved vary, with the largest single proportion judging less than 400,000.

II. WAS MEETING WELL HANDLED BY WEST?

- ... Almost two out of three were convinced that the FDJ fully intended to march into West Berlin during the course of the meeting.
- ... In the opinion of the majority of West Berliners a West sector invasion was deterred by fear of the consequences in the light of the vigorous counter-measures taken by the West.
- ... West Berliners almost without exception give their stamp of approval to the manner in which the potentially explosive situation was handled by the Western powers and by the West sector police.
- ... Most West Berliners spent Whitsuntide in customary activities, with few impelled either by interest or concern to view the demonstration.

III. WAS MEETING A SUCCESS OR FAILURE FOR THE EAST?

- ... Few West Berliners believe that East zone youths took part in the Whitsuntide meeting out of belief in Communist ideology. Coercion and pressure are most often cited as actual reasons.
- ... Three quarters express the general judgment that the idea did not work to the advantage of the East.

- b -

R E S T R I C T E D

- ... Only about one in ten believe that many people in the East zone were impressed with the results of the rally.
- ... An even smaller proportion feel that many West Berliners were impressed.
- ... Only one in ten feel that the meeting prompted the participants themselves to become more favorable toward Communism. In the judgment of 42 per cent, they returned home less favorable, while a third saw no influence one way or the other.
- ... What they saw and experienced of the actual realities of West Berlin is stressed as the major reason by those who believe that FDJ adherence to Communism was weakened as a result of the meeting.

IV. PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS OF FDJ'S

- ... Among West Berliners who either saw or spoke to FDJ members, the prevailing impression of them as individuals was a favorable one of innocent youths with but limited responsibility for the situation in which they find themselves.

V. SHOULD WEST EMULATE FDJ?

- ... Less than one in five among West Berliners consider a single uniformed organization of the FDJ type as in any way desirable for German youth.
- ... Major objections resolve around the theme that Germans have tried that sort of thing before - with distinctly untoward consequences.

VI. WHAT ABOUT FURTHER EASTERN ATTEMPTS TO DOMINATE BERLIN?

- ... The larger proportion of West Berliners do not feel that the Whitsuntide march marks the end of Eastern efforts to dominate Berlin.
- ... Those who anticipate further onslaughts, however, are almost without exception confident that the West Berliners and the Western powers will remain steadfast in their resistance.

VII. TRENDS IN SOME BERLIN ATTITUDES IN WAKE OF WHITSUNTIDE

- ... In the light of the manner in which the Western powers handled the Whitsuntide threat, the majority of West Berliners - as was not the case priorly - are now of the opinion that American policy toward Russia is adequately firm.
- ... However, a considerable minority still feel that recent American policy has been overly-conciliatory (measured prior to Korean developments), most often giving as the reason American desire for peace.
- ... Another apparent effect of Whitsuntide is to swing a larger proportion of West Berliners to the belief that the danger of the Russians taking over all of Berlin has decreased in recent months.
- ... The coming and going of the Whitsuntide march has had no discernible effect on the almost exceptionless conviction among West Berliners that the Americans will not desert them so long as their presence is necessary to guarantee security.

R E S T R I C T E D

I. DID MEETING ACCORD WITH EXPECTATIONS?

MAJORITY FOUND MEETING AS EXPECTED ...

Approximately two-thirds of the West Berliners found the course of the White-tide activities to be just about what they had expected. One third, however, it may be seen from the comments below, had anticipated more violent episodes than actually occurred.

"Was the FDJ-meeting about as you had expected it to be, or had you expected it to be different?"

Was as expected	63%
Had expected something different	34
No opinion	3
	<u>100%</u>

"What had you expected?" (Asked of those answering
"Had expected it (the FDJ-meeting) to be different.")

Some small-scale riots: Some brawls and demonstrations; that the FDJ would try to stage riots in West Berlin frictions; offenses; demonstrations and noise; small-scale riots; tumult; hostile encounters; that there would be difficulties between West Berliners and the FDJ; hostile encounters at the sectoral borders; frictions between East-police and West-police; etc.

21%

Large-scale riots and incidents: Bloodshed; shooting; looting; that youth would proceed to hostile actions against the West-police; that the shops would be looted; we were afraid there would be raids; etc.

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Marching into West Berlin by the FDJ or the Russians (by force, if necessary): That the FDJ would invade West Berlin by violence; marching in of the FDJ escorted by the people's police; I thought the Russians would try to march in, anyway; that the Communists would invade West Berlin; marching into the West sectors; etc.

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Other remarks: A larger number of FDJ-boys in West Berlin; I didn't think that the East would prevent FDJ from marching into West Berlin; etc.

$\frac{1}{35\%}$ *

* Totals more than 34% as a few respondents gave more than one answer.

OPINIONS VARY ON SIZE OF MEETING ...

Estimates on the number of participants involved in the meeting vary with the largest single proportion judging less than 400,000. A third of the respondents, however, could offer no estimate as to probable size.

"How many young people, according to what you heard or read, took part in the FDJ-meeting?"

700,000 or more	6%
500,000 to 700,000	8
500,000	14
400,000	7
Less than 400,000	28
No opinion	<u>37</u>
	100%

The turn-out did not impress West Berliners alike as to whether it was larger or smaller than they had anticipated.

"Was that more or fewer young people than you had expected?"

More	25%
Less	21
Like expected	15
No opinion	<u>2</u>
	63%

II. WAS MEETING WELL HANDLED BY WEST?

MAJORITY SAW WEST SECTOR INVASION DETERRED BY WESTERN FIRMLINESS ...

Almost two out of three were convinced that the FDJ fully intended to march into West Berlin during the course of the meeting.

"Did you think the FDJ really intended to march into West Berlin?"

Yes	62%
No	29
No opinion	<u>9</u>
	100%

On an open question on the main reason why the FDJ did not march into West Berlin the dominant theme is fear of the consequences in the light of the vigorous counter measures taken by the West. An interesting interpretation that figured with some frequency (15%) is that the Eastern youths were prohibited from entering the Western sectors because the discrepancy between Eastern propaganda and Western realities might damage their morale.

"What do you think was the main reason why the FDJ didn't march into the Western sectors?"

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The firm stand and the counter-measures of the West: The firm stand of the Western powers; the resistance of the allies; the allies blocked it; the counter-measures of the magistrate and the Western allies; the prohibition of the West magistrate; the prohibition by the Western powers; because everything was prepared here for giving them a "hearty" welcome; they would have been repelled by force at the sector borders; the strong counter-measures; because they had been previously warned by the Western powers; the West was too well prepared, therefore they refrained from it for caution's sake; etc.

33%

Fear of the West - fear of eventual consequences: They were afraid of being attacked; they were afraid; because those in the leading positions were afraid; they were concerned about the consequences; fear of the West-police; fear of the counter-measures; fear of the Americans; etc.

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That the FDJ should not be allowed to see the differences between the East and the West sectors; a threat to East propaganda; the danger of their deserting: So that they would not see the difference between the standard of life of the West sectors and the living standard of the East sector; they should not see how it is with us in West Berlin; they should not have any contact with us so they won't doubt the SED; they would have liked it too much here, perhaps, and they would have strayed from Communism; the SED was afraid that the children might remain here; that they should not learn about the free life here; fear that they might desert; because it would have harmed them propagandistically; etc.

15

To avoid quarrels and hostile encounters: To avoid quarrels; because they didn't want to provoke frictions; they feared it might lead to a war; because they didn't want to run the risk of hostile encounters; there should be no bloodshed; etc.

11

Prohibition by the East (the SED, by Russia) because of caution or fear: Prohibition by the East; they were not permitted to do so; because it was forbidden; they were not supposed to do so according to the SED directives; it was countermanded by Moscow; they have been kept back by their leaders on order from Moscow; the Russians wouldn't expose themselves to any danger that wouldn't benefit them; etc.

10

The East felt too weak: They have felt themselves too weak; they didn't feel sure of their success; because the Russians considered this moment not yet mature for such an action; etc.

5

They never intended to: I don't believe that they really wanted to do that; because they were not at all interested in that; had only been announced for reasons of mere tactics, but had not been seriously planned; because the East was not at all interested in that; etc.

3

Passive resistance by both parents and youth: The boys would never have marched, even upon order; not to assume too much responsibility toward the East zone parents; etc.

1

Other remarks: They wanted to act fairly in order to make a good impression; because they didn't get the order from the Russians; etc.

1

No opinion:

6
102%

* Percentage adds up to more than 100% as some people gave more than one answer.

OVERWHELMING APPROVAL OF WEST POWER HANDLING OF SITUATION ...

Almost without dissent West Berliners give their stamp of approval to the manner in which the potentially explosive situation was handled.

"Do you think the Western powers acted correctly in handling the situation, or should they have acted differently?"

Acted correctly	95%
Should have acted differently	4
No opinion	1
	<u>100%</u>

"What should they have done?" (Asked of those answering "Should have acted differently" to preceding question).

They should not have made it difficult for youth to cross the sector borders; They should not have stopped the youth at the borders of the Western sectors; etc.

26

They should have permitted the FDJ to march in West Berlin too; They should have offered places for their marching; etc.

1

They should not have lined up so many troops in the streets, but kept them on the alert only; They should not have posted tanks against the youngsters; etc.

1

Other remarks: They should not have made so much fuss about it in the newspapers; etc.

43

* Less than one half of one per cent.

OVERWHELMING APPROVAL OF CONDUCT OF WEST SECTOR POLICE ...

Almost without exception the judgment of West Berliners was that their police conducted themselves well.

"How do you think the West sector police conducted themselves in general during the FDJ-meeting: Very well, well, fairly well, or badly?"

Very well	47%
Well	45
Fairly well	2
Badly	-
No opinion	6
	<u>100%</u>

MOST SPENT WHITSUNTIDE IN USUAL PURSUITS ...

That West Berliners went calmly about their usual activities, undismayed by the Eastern demonstrations so close upon them, is strongly suggested by the reports given as to how the day was spent. The large majority either remained at home or engaged in customary holiday excursions and festivities. Few apparently felt impelled either by interest or concern to view the demonstration.

"May I ask how you and your family spent Whitsuntide?"

At home; in our garden; have had some rest; nothing extraordinary:
We stayed at home because of lack of money; I worked in my garden; at home because of the bad weather; at home because of caution; I was idle at home because I needed some rest; I am sick and had to stay at home; cared for my household; celebrated my engagement; etc.

59%

Trips, walks, entertainment in the Western sectors: Whitsuntide trip; walking with my children; motor-car exhibition; playing football; dancing; attending a musical entertainment; at the botanical garden; water sports; in our weekend-house; at the pleasure park; a steamer trip; at the zoo; at the cycle-race; at my home country; etc.

38

Visited relatives and acquaintances: With acquaintances; visiting a sick person; with relatives in West Berlin; together with friends; was with my grandchildren; visiting neighbors; etc.

12

Attended the Whitsuntide meeting: I went to see the Whitsuntide meeting; I went to see the hubbub; I was interested in the mood and spirits of the FDJ; out of curiosity I was in Treptow (in the East sector); we have looked at the demonstrations; I was on the streets, also in the stadium "Mitte" (East sector); etc.

6

Worked at place of business: Guard-duty at the bank; my husband had to work on Whitsuntide; my wife had to work for the German Red Cross; etc.

4

In the East sector (not for the purpose of attending the Whitsuntide meeting): I went to see some friends in the East sector; visiting somebody in the East sector; on a piece of ground of my own in the East sector; in East Berlin; etc.

3

Looked for contact with the FDJ-youth, talking to them and entertaining them: Going through the streets and talking to the FDJ members and entertaining them; I looked for the FDJ and gave them chocolate; etc.

$$\frac{2}{124\%}$$

* Percentage adds up to more than 100% because some respondents gave more than one answer.

III. WAS MEETING A SUCCESS OR FAILURE FOR THE EAST?

COMMUNIST BELIEFS PLAYED LITTLE PART IN PROMOTING ATTENDANCE ...

Few West Berliners believe that East zone youths took part in the Whitsuntide meeting out of belief in Communist ideology. Coercion and pressure are most often cited as actual reasons, with curiosity and interest in adventure following.

"Do you think that the FDJ members took part in the Whitsuntide meeting because they, generally speaking, believe in Communism, or did they do it for other reasons?"

Because they believe in Communism	9%
For other reasons	83
No opinion	8
	<u>100%</u>

"What then were their reasons for taking part?" (Asked of those who answered "For other reasons" to preceding question).

Coercion and pressure: Because they were compelled to do so; because of coercion, in order to keep their jobs; they all were forced; it was coercion and pressure; coercion by the Russians; the majority were forced; etc.

44%

Desire to come to Berlin: They wanted to see Berlin; because they wanted to get to West Berlin; they only wanted to see Berlin and to visit relatives and acquaintances; etc.

36

For adventure and excitement: They wanted to see what is going on here; youth is always receptive to new ideas and actions and always likes to take part in such things; because of curiosity and craving for sensation; interest in travel; joy of new experiences; it was a pleasure trip for youngsters; wearing a uniform, marching and crying "Hurrah" appealed to them; interest in adventures; etc.

10

To get better food and clothing or other advantages for themselves: Because of the better food they get in West Berlin; because of the food, cookies, candies and so on; to see West Berlin and eat to their heart's content; in order to get a pair of shoes; because they were equipped with clothes, that was the main attraction for most boys; because of the advantages; because they had been promised so much; etc.

6

Out of fear: Because of fear of the concentration camps; because of fear that they would be arrested by the Russians and the people's police; etc.

3

To get a true picture of the real conditions here: They wanted to see what is going on here in reality; etc.

3

Conciliatory intentions: They wanted to meet as good comrades with the West Berliners in order to maintain peace; etc.

1

Ignorance: The majority of them didn't think it over; etc.

1

Other remarks: Many wanted to stay here; because of national enthusiasm; etc.

1

No opinion:

*
105% **

* Less than one half of one per cent.

** Percentage adds up to more than 83% as some people gave more than one answer.

WHITSAUNTIDE MEETING WAS A DISADVANTAGEOUS IDEA FOR THE EAST ...

In evaluating the Whitsuntide meeting, three quarters of the West Berliners express the judgment that the idea didn't work to the advantage of the East,

"Do you believe that the idea of the Whitsuntide meeting of the FDJ in Berlin was an advantageous plan for the East, or not?"

Yes	15%
No	76
No opinion	9
	<u>100%</u>

FEW BELIEVE MANY IN EAST ZONE IMPRESSED BY MEETING ...

Only about one out of ten among West Berliners (12%) believe that many people in the East zone were impressed with results of the Whitsuntide rally. The predominant opinion is that "very few" people would be likely to be impressed,

"Do you think many people in the East zone were very impressed with the FDJ-meeting, or only a small number, or very few?"

Many	12%
Small number	24
Very few people	44
No opinion	20
	<u>100%</u>

FEWER YET BELIEVE WEST BERLINERS IMPRESSED ...

Only an insignificant five per cent judge that many West Berliners were impressed by the rally.

"Do you think that many West Berliners were very impressed with the FDJ meeting, or only a small number, or very few?"

Many	5%
Small number	12
Very few people	79
No opinion	4
	<u>100%</u>

PREPONDERANT OPINION MEETING LEFT FDJ LESS FAVORABLE TOWARD COMMUNISM ...

Only one in ten (9%) among West Berliners say the meeting caused the participants themselves to become more favorably disposed toward Communism. In the judgment of 42%, they returned home less favorable disposed, while a third saw no influence one way or the other.

"What influence do you think the FDJ meeting had on the young people's attitudes toward Communism: are they now more favorable disposed toward Communism, less favorable disposed, or did their participation have no influence on them?"

More favorably disposed	9%
Less favorably disposed	42
No influence	36
No opinion	13
	<u>100%</u>

What they saw and experienced in West Berlin is stressed as the major factor among those who believe that the FDJ adherence to Communism was weakened as a result of the meeting.

"Why do you think this?" (Asked of those who answered "less favorably disposed" to preceding question).

They saw the life and democracy in West Berlin and talked to West Berliners: They have seen the Western sectors; they have seen how comfortably the West Berliners live; they have talked with West Berliners and became familiar with democracy; many of them have been in the Western sectors and got other impressions; they saw that we have more to eat; they saw that we are better off; many of them saw the real situation here in West Berlin with their own eyes; etc.

20%

They saw that they had been given a false description about the conditions in West Berlin: Because the conditions in West Berlin were different from what they had been told; the FDJ members felt very well here and recognized the falsehoods of the East press, which claims that there is only well-being over there; they became aware of having been fed with lies; they saw crammed shops in the West sectors and recognized the Communist lies; etc.

8

They can compare East and West (and see the difference): They saw the difference between East and West; they saw the difference between a real democracy and a people's democracy; they know West Berlin now and can compare; etc.

6

The meeting was badly organized: Bad lodging, insufficient food; because there were too many bad conditions in the camps; too great hardships, bad food; large-scale riots, brawls; shooting between FDJ and West Berliners; there were deaths by accidents; they were badly housed; etc.

4

Coercion and fear were too great: There was too much coercion; properly considered, they are afraid of the Russians and the SED; etc.

2

Good treatment and reception by the West Berliners: The favorable reception and food in the West sectors; by the good reception in West Berlin; the good treatment by West Berliners; etc.

1

They will spread the truth in the East: Because quite a lot of them have been here and will report the truth in the East zone now; etc.

1

Other remarks: Many of them have remained here and the others too will think about all that (will revise their opinion); they don't want to have anything to do with Communism, the same as the others; etc.

$\frac{1}{43\%}$ *

* Adds up to more than 42% because a few respondents gave more than one answer.

100-260
The few who judged a strengthening of communistic sentiment among FDJ members as a result of the meeting argue mainly in terms of the impressiveness of mass spectacles on the minds of youth.

"Why do you think this?" (Asked of those who answered "more favorably disposed" to preceding question).

The manner of the meeting impressed and influenced youth: Because they are doubtlessly impressed by the meeting; they were so enthusiastic about the meeting; the entire business at the meeting and all its concomitant events appealed to the youth; youth like it; the demonstrations, dances, music and marchings always impress; etc. 3%

The large gathering impressed them: Those masses were imposingly impressive for them; mass demonstrations always increase enthusiasm; etc. 2

Many advantages were offered to them in connection with the meeting: They had free trips, free food; because they were offered so much: sport arrangements, theatre performances, clothing, excellent food; etc. 2

The Communist propaganda could be put into effect: Because such a great marching definitely makes propaganda for Communism; by the extent and pomposity of the demonstrations and the active propaganda for the Communists; etc. 1

They are too young and unexperienced to see through it all: By the outward effects, they themselves are still too young to make their own judgment; demonstrations, music, and so on had some effect, youth doesn't tend to criticize and absorbs all the false phrases; etc. 1/9%

IV. PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS OF FDJ'S

ATTITUDES NOT UNFAVORABLE TOWARD FDJ'S AS INDIVIDUALS ...

Despite reported adherence to a normal round of activities on Whitsunday, about two out of three West Berliners had an opportunity to observe or speak to some members of the FDJ. It appears from the general tenor of the comments that the prevailing impression was a favorable one of innocent youths who have but limited personal responsibility for the situation in which they find themselves. Only a very small minority spoke of receiving a distinctly bad impression from the FDJ members with whom they chanced to come in contact.

"Did you personally see or talk to any FDJ members in West Berlin?"

Saw some	40%
Talked to some	28
Did not see any	32
	100%

"What impression did you have of them?" (Asked of those who answered "saw some" or "talked to some" to preceding question).

Generally a good impression: A good impression; they were nice and peaceful; a polite and orderly impression; they were nice and friendly boys; they behaved in an orderly way; nice boys; naive souls; they were good-natured; simple naive boys; etc. 10%

They showed themselves to be pleased and surprised at the living conditions in West Berlin: They didn't like to leave, they liked it here with us; that they felt very well here; they were enthusiastic about West Berlin; they were delighted at our being so nice to them; they were amazed by the situation here (reconstruction and living standard); they can't be our real enemies, for they were delighted at the nice displays in our shop-windows; they were like new-born children in a fabulous world; they were curious and enraptured; they wanted to remain in West Berlin; they were glad that they could come to us; etc. 16

They were not enthusiastic but scared and intimidated: They had come here under coercion; one could feel that they were under coercion very much; they were very depressed; there were no symptoms of idealism; they were weary of all that hubbub and noise; intimidated, scared and ill-informed; they were timid and afraid; etc. 10

Generally - a bad impression: Not good, they were undisciplined and ill-bred; poor ragged youth; worse fed than we are; they look half-starved; they made a sad impression; poor boys in shabby clothes who were greedy for everything; etc. 8

The majority are negative toward Communism (Russia, SED): They are dissatisfied with the SED and the Russians after having seen the conditions here; they don't want to have anything to do with Russians and the SED; 70% were not in favor of Communism; they are not Communists; it is their standpoint that they are only deceived in the East zone; etc. 6

They are only misled: They were only misled and still children; they are dazzled and misled, they have no idea what is going on; stereotyped creatures without an opinion of their own; they are manipulated with slogans; etc. 5

Enthusiastic about the marching and infatuated with their ideas: They were enthusiastic about the marching; healthy, cheerful and influenced by their ideas; they were conceited; etc. 2

Other remarks: Idiotic cries of "friendship"; in the East they are fanatics, in the West, skeptics; etc. 2

No opinion: 3

71% *

*Adds to more than proportion who saw or talked to FDJ members as a few respondents gave more than one comment.

V. SHOULD WEST EMULATE FDJ?

GENERAL DISTASTE FOR CENTRALIZED UNIFORMED YOUTH ORGANIZATION ...

Results to the two questions below indicate clearly that few West Berliners consider the FDJ type of organization in any way desirable for German youth.

"Do you think that in West Germany and West Berlin a single, uniformed youth organization should also be established, or not?"

Yes	15%
No	80
No opinion	5
	<u>100%</u>

"If you had a son or daughter, would you like to see them belong to such a youth organization?"

Yes	13%
No	83
No opinion	4
	<u>100%</u>

Opposition to a centralized uniformed youth organization on the FDJ model derived from a variety of reasons most of which revolved around the theme that Germans have tried that sort of thing before - with distinctly untoward consequences.

"Why are you of this opinion?" (Asked of those who answered "No" to preceding question).

Would be the same as under Hitler and his Hitler youth, we are tired of that; Would be the same as with the Hitler youth, always bowing to the others; would become a second HJ then; too reminiscent of the Hitler youth; giving a uniform to youth is a fascistic idea which I reject; would be too similar to the Nazi regime; would lead to excesses again as under Hitler; we need no new HJ in blue; we have been tired of that since Hitler's times; we have had enough of it, we lost two sons in the war; we have the picture of the HJ in our mind, as victims of the will of a certain power; etc.

26%

Might have bad consequences and lead to militarism and war; Because they will be soldiers again then; no marching, that would be too military; children shall not march but play; that would lead to a war; there would be bloodshed then; we have experienced that, uniforms bring about war; because that is dangerous in Germany, that leads to excesses; that would aggravate the hostility between East and West; that would strengthen Nationalism too much; etc.

15

Rejection of any kind of uniforms; No uniforms at all; there should never again be any uniforms in Germany; I am against every kind of uniform; the Germans don't like uniforms any longer, that applies even more to a youth organization like the HJ; we have had too bad experiences with uniforms; etc.

13

We want to be free, free from coercion and constraint: Would mean a new form of coercion; one should never exercise any coercion upon youth; in that case the freedom which the Western powers have given to us would be limited; would be robbing youth of their freedom; everybody should be free to pursue his own creed and aims; youth would be suppressed again then; should be left up to youth whether to join or not to join any organization, this would be a repetition of the HJ; contradicts the political standards of the West; would be undemocratic to permit only one organization; would lead to a uniform mass-type (of man) eliminating any individuality, the uniformity of the dress would also bring about a uniform conception of labor methods and political attitude; etc.

13%

Would be the same as in the East zone (FDJ): Then we should have the same as in the East zone; reminds of the FDJ and also of the HJ; is the same as under Hitler and in the East; no organization in any case, that sounds so Eastern; etc.

5

Youth had better learn something and be educated by the parents: They should work instead of organizing demonstrations; youth had better learn an orderly profession; youth should be educated by the parents; youth should learn to avoid marching; because children should remain children; the soul would be poisoned; is only an education under the influence of the predominant directives as under the Nazis, that should be left up to the parents; etc.

3

Would bind youth too much to party organizations and politics: There will be disputes and quarrels then, for every party would claim sponsorship then; would have political implications and that would be dangerous; one should not poison youth by politics; because children are driven too much into a certain political direction then; because it would become a party organization; why should our children let themselves be abused by politics; etc.

2

Nobody would participate and nothing would be achieved by that: Because nobody would participate in it; here nobody is interested in such things; one would not achieve anything by that; etc.

2

Other remarks: Would cause too much alarm among the people; because it is more peaceful otherwise, that leads only to pomp and agitation; children would be exploited, nothing else; would condition children to a negative attitude toward their parents; because there are financial difficulties involved; there are enough police and occupation soldiers here; as a principle I am against it; because boys and girls are not separated within the "Talken" youth group; etc.

3

No opinion:

2

84% *

* Adds up to more than 80% as some of the respondents gave more than one answer.

The small minority who voiced approval of the idea of establishing an FDJ type of youth organization in the West gave a variety of reasons for their position.

"Why are you of this opinion?" (Asked of those who answered "Yes" to preceding question).

To provide a better education and training for youth; more discipline; Youth will be educated more strictly and with more stress on discipline; in the first place to keep them away from the streets and to give them an occupation, as for instance the labor service; in the second place, youth must be schooled to understand what democracy means; it is the best solution to organize youth if they are to get at something; etc.

64

As a counter-balance against the East: There should be another organization in the West as a counter-balance against the FDJ in the East; to protect us, one doesn't know what the Russians are planning; politically viewed, if they train youngsters over there it should be done here too; that our youth will be as unified as the youth in the East; etc.

4

Youth will have cohesion; Because youth will not be split into many little groups then; because a splitting up is always bad; so that the youth can stand together at least; democratic youth also needs leadership; etc.

4

Other remarks: There won't be quarrels anymore; because my boy is a member of the "Falks" (Social Democratic youth group) and perhaps we can win over the East youth by that; I think it was nice in the Hitler youth in former times, but it must not be military; etc.

$$\frac{1}{15\%}$$

VI. WHAT ABOUT FURTHER EASTERN ATTEMPTS TO DOMINATE BERLIN?

MAJORITY EXPECT FURTHER EFFORTS ...

The larger proportion of West Berliners do not feel that the Whitsuntide march marks the end of Eastern efforts to dominate Berlin.

"Do you expect the East to make a new attempt in the future to take over all of Berlin?"

Yes	53%
No	40
No opinion	7
	<u>100%</u>

CONFIDENCE IN WILL TO RESIST ...

However, those who anticipate further Eastern attempts to take over Berlin are almost without exception confident that the Western Berliners and the Western powers will remain steadfast in their resistance.

"Can one count on most Berliners resisting such an attempt?"
(Asked of those who said "Yes" to prior question).

Yes	50%
No	3
No opinion	-
	<u>53%</u>

"And what about the Western powers: Do you think one can count on them to support the resistance of the West Berliners, or not?"

Yes	50%
No	2
No opinion	1
	<u>53%</u>

VII. TRENDS IN SOME BERLIN ATTITUDES IN WAKE OF WHITSUNTIDE

FEWER NOW SAY AMERICAN POLICY TOO CONCILIATORY ...

Prior to the Whitsuntide meeting a majority of West Berliners were of the opinion that recent American policy toward Russia has been too conciliatory. The firm measures taken by the West to cope with the Whitsuntide rally evidently impressed a considerable number, however. After the rally majority opinion shifted to the view that American policy is adequately firm. Nevertheless, a considerable minority* still feel that recent American policy has been over-conciliatory, citing the reasons listed.

"Are you of the opinion that recent American policy toward Russia has been as firm as it could be under the circumstances, or do you think it has been too conciliatory?"

	April (Before meeting)	June (After meeting)
Firm enough	36%	51%
Too conciliatory	58	42
Not conciliatory enough	-	-
No opinion	6	7
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

* Prior to the Korean developments.

"What do you think is the reason for that?" (Asked of those who answered "Too conciliatory" to preceding question).

America wants to eliminate tensions in a peaceful way; avoid application of force, violence and war; So as not to drive the tensions to the breaking-point; to avoid aggravating the situation; they don't want a war; probably their desire to maintain peace; America doesn't want to precipitate people into bad luck; they always try to find a peaceful solution; they try to reach their aim with patience; they don't want to cause political hyper-tension; because they seek reconciliation; to avoid war; etc.

19%

America is not strong enough for a firmer policy at present: Probably they are not yet sufficiently armed for a firm stand against Russia; because they do not yet feel a match for Russia; they are not yet strong enough for the war; the time is not yet mature for the Americans to take action; they are not yet able to wage a war; Europe is not enough armed yet; etc.

7

Fear of Russia: Because they fear that the Russians have the A-bomb too; the pretended superiority of Russia (arms, ammunition); America is afraid of the Russians; etc.

3

Because of America's democratic principles: Their democratic system, in deference to the opinion of the people, is contrary to the dictatorships; for democratic reasons; etc.

2

American policy is cautious for tactical reasons: For tactical reasons; for diplomatic reasons; etc.

1

America underestimates the danger and methods of the Russians: The Americans have still not seen through the tricks of the Russians; they don't know the Russians; they trust the Russians too much; etc.

1

Because of America's basically fair attitude: The tactfulness of the Americans, they are not so ruthless as the Russians; as a world power they have a more conciliatory attitude than the Russians; etc.

1

Other remarks: They don't get along with the Englishmen and French, thus they can't act as they would like to; they don't want to start a war because of Germany; the Americans should muster more energy and not put up with so many moves of the Russians; America is afraid that the Russians will kill the German prisoners of war in Russia, if the Americans take a firmer stand; they should chase the Russians out; etc.

2

No opinion: I should like to know; don't know any motive; etc.

6

42%

MORE SEE DECREASE IN THREAT OF RUSSIAN TAKEOVER ...

Another apparent effect of Whitsuntide is to swing a larger proportion of West Berliners to the belief that the danger of the Russians taking over all of Berlin has decreased in recent months.

"Do you think the threat of the Russians taking over all of Berlin has increased or decreased during the last months?"

	December 1949	April (Before meeting)	June (After meeting)
Greater	13%	30%	16%
Less	53	25	38
Unchanged	29	41	40
No opinion	5	4	6
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

CONFIDENCE IN AMERICANS REMAINS AT HIGH LEVELS ...

The coming and going of the Whitsuntide march had no discernible effect on the almost exceptionless conviction among West Berliners that the Americans will not desert them so long as their presence is necessary to guarantee security.

"Do you believe that the Americans will stay in Berlin as long as they stay in Germany?"

	April (Before meeting)	June (After meeting)
Yes	92%	93%
No	7	5
No opinion	1	2
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

"And do you believe that the Americans will stay here as long as necessary for the security of West Berlin, or will they leave too soon?"

	April (Before meeting)	June (After meeting)
Yes, will stay	97%	94%
No, will leave too soon	2	4
No opinion	1	2
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

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TRENDS AND CURRENT ATTITUDES REGARDING
THE VOICE OF AMERICA BROADCASTS

Report No. 26
Series No. 2
26 July 1950

REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
HICOG APO 807
Bad Nauheim Germany

RESTRICTED

INTRODUCTION ...

In May 1950, as part of a larger study on media, the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs, HICOG, measured the Voice of America audience in the US Zone, in the three Western sectors of Berlin, and in Bremen both as to its extent and listener reactions to the programs.

A randomly selected, representative sample of 3000 in the US Zone, 500 in Berlin and 300 in Bremen were interviewed in their homes by trained German interviewers, supervised by American survey officers.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS ...

- ... The VOA audience in West Berlin increased by 17% from June 1949 to May 1950, and is now 55% of the total population there. In the US Zone little change in the size of the audience occurred - 36% now claim they generally listen. The total listenership to VOA in all places surveyed is 39% of the total public.
- ... The Voice of America is heard regularly or occasionally by 60% of the radio audience and by 89% of the people who customarily tune in their radios at seven o'clock in the evening.
- ... VOA listenership also appears not to be confined to special groups, but to represent a cross-section of the German public in the areas surveyed. This suggests that the Voice of America is doing well in its appeal to the interests of Germans in all walks of life.
- ... Majorities hold that the VOA programs are "good," largely because they are considered informative and instructive. The minority who consider them "fair" or "poor" claim the programs lack interest to them, are biased, ignore German interests and tastes, and so on.
- ... Large majorities feel that the VOA broadcasts create a favorable impression of the United States among listeners in Western Germany as well as among those in Eastern Germany.
- ... Main reasons for thinking a favorable impression is gained in Western Germany are that they create mutual understanding, are objective, and present a winning picture of the American people.
- ... The very few who think the VOA broadcasts create either an unfavorable or no impression at all in Western Germany are harshly critical. They allege bias, fulsome praise of the U.S. and so on.
- ... The fact that the Voice of America brings information and instruction to the news-hungry East Germans is largely adduced as a reason for its effectiveness in winning friends for the U.S. there.
- ... The critical minority doubt that East zone Germans are able to weigh facts any more, or fear their poverty has made them envious of the West, or feel few of them have the opportunity to listen to the broadcasts.

- a -

R E S T R I C T E D

THE SIZE OF THE VOA AUDIENCE ...

A prominent development of the past year in respect to the size of the German VOA radio audience is a gain of 17 % in West Berlin, to the point where now more than a majority (55%) of the population of the Western sectors claim to be regular to occasional listeners. Little change has apparently occurred in US Zone listenership during the same period - from June 1949 to May 1950 - except for a slight drop in Wuerttemberg-Baden. *

	<u>VOA Listeners as</u> <u>% of Total Popula-</u> <u>tion</u>		<u>VOA Listeners as</u> <u>% of German Radio</u> <u>Audience</u> May 1950**	<u>VOA Listeners as</u> <u>% of 7 pm Radio</u> <u>Audience</u> May 1950**
	June 49	May 50		
<u>Total US Zone:</u>	38%	36%	57%	90%
Bavaria	34	33	52	90
Hesse	37	35	62	90
W-Baden	50	42	67	90
West Berlin	38	55	73	86
Bremen	45	49	62	83
Total all local- ities	36	39	60	89

The above figures show in addition that the VOA broadcasts are heard regularly or occasionally by a majority of German radio listeners everywhere sampled - and by almost three out of four listeners in Berlin.

Finally, when attention is focused upon 7 pm tuners in, it is seen that the VOA program pretty well sweeps the field with an average of 89% regular to occasional listening at that time.

This 89% coverage of the 7 o'clock audience is of course a very impressive figure. Certainly part of it arises from the fact that the VOA broadcasts blanket all the areas surveyed seven evenings a week. But on the other hand in all these places it is possible to obtain other programs, from the uninterrupted hour of musical classics over the American Forces Network to the program of Russian sponsored radio Leipzig, which is as impeccable in its musical taste as it is questionable in its propaganda.

* The audience figures were obtained from a series of questions, asked in sequence as follows: 1) "Do you listen to the radio?" If regular or occasional listening claimed, 2) "Do you usually listen at 7 o'clock in the evening?" If usually or sometimes, 3) "What program do you usually hear at 7 o'clock in the evening?" Those respondents who did not voluntarily mention VOA, 4) were further queried: "Have you ever heard the "Voice of America?" If the reply was yes, 5) "Do you know what time these broadcasts are on the air?" VOA listeners were taken to be those who volunteered hearing it at 7 o'clock plus those who claim to listen to it sometime and know the time of broadcasts.

** The '49 figures cannot be compared here as "seldom" listeners were then included as part of the radio audience and in the present study it has been considered desirable to use a more conservative definition.

R E S T R I C T E D

DIVISION OF VOA AUDIENCE WITHIN GROUPS ...

It is evident that the more informed groups - the better educated, the men, and the economically better situated - listen somewhat more often at 7 o'clock than do their counterparts. Such a finding is typical; but less obvious is the point that in all groups those who are listening at 7 o'clock are very much more likely to be listening to the VOA than to any other program.

	<u>Usually hear VOA at 7 pm</u>	<u>Usually hear other programs at 7 pm</u>	<u>Never listen at 7 pm & non-radio listeners</u>	
<u>Within Education Groups:</u>				
Elementary only	36%	8%	56%	... 100%
Middle and higher	53	9	38	
Diploma and University	52	10	38	
<u>Within Monthly Family Income Groups:</u>				
Under 100 DM	29%	8%	63%	... 100%
100 - 149.99 DM	30	9	61	
150 - 199.99 DM	32	7	61	
200 - 249.99 DM	44	8	48	
250 - 299.99 DM	50	9	41	
300 - 399.99 DM	48	7	45	
400 - 749.99 DM	48	9	43	
750 DM and more *	49	18	33	
<u>Within Sex Groups:</u>				
Men	46%	8%	46%	... 100%
Women	34	8	58	
<u>Within Age Groups:</u>				
Under 20 years	33%	9%	58%	... 100%
20 - 29 years	42	9	49	
30 - 39 years	43	9	48	
40 - 49 years	39	6	55	
50 - 59 years	41	9	50	
60 years and over	33	9	58	
<u>Within Religious Groups:</u>				
Catholic	34%	7%	59%	... 100%
Protestant	42	9	49	
No affiliation	56	5	39	

* Based on too few cases for adequate reliability.

Even clearer documentation of the fact that the VOA message is reaching a representative cross section of the German population sampled, rather than confined to special groups, is the close comparison evidenced below between the group composition of the VOA audience and that of the US Zone population at large,

Distribution of the VOA audience among various population groups compared with US Zone

	<u>VOA</u> <u>Audience</u>	<u>Total US Zone</u> <u>Population</u>
<u>By Education:</u>		
Elementary only	75%	84%
Middle and higher	20	12
Diploma and University	5	4
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
<u>By Monthly Family Income:</u>		
Under 100 DM	11%	16%
100 - 149.99 DM	11	13
150 - 199.99 DM	13	18
200 - 249.99 DM	22	18
250 - 299.99 DM	14	10
300 - 399.99 DM	15	13
400 - 749.99 DM	12	10
750 DM and over	2	2
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
<u>By City Size:</u>		
Under 5,000	39%	56%
5,000 - 9,999	11	9
10,000 - 24,999	10	6
25,000 - 99,999	12	10
100,000 - 249,999	9	7
250,000 and over	19	12
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
<u>By Sex:</u>		
Men	50%	44%
Women	50	56
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
<u>By Age:</u>		
Under 20 years	5%	8%
20 - 29 years	19	18
30 - 39 years	21	20
40 - 49 years	22	21
50 - 59 years	19	17
60 years and over	14	16
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
<u>By Religion:</u>		
Catholic	39%	54%
Protestant	55	44
No affiliation	6	2
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

The significance of the close correspondence in the above sets of figures should not be overlooked. It suggests that the VOA is doing well in its efforts to tailor its themes and its appeals to the interests and comprehensions of Germans in all walks of life. It is apparently succeeding in short in being a real "mass media" in a area where such mass contact is difficult to attain.

MAJORITY LIKE VOA BROADCAST ...

Among listeners to the Voice of America, majority opinions are that the programs are good. It will be noted in the table below that Western Berliners are most inclined to rate them good, Bavarians, least so. This is in line with the fact that in Bavaria the VOA has succeeded in attracting its smallest proportion of the radio audience (52%), and in Berlin its largest (73%).

"Do you consider these broadcasts good, fair, or poor?"
(Asked only of VOA listeners)

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US Zone	W-Berlin	Bremen
Good	58%	65%	69%	63%	83%	65%
Fair	35	27	26	31	15	27
Poor	3	-	3	2	1	3
No opinion	4	8	2	4	1	5
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

REASONS FOR SAYING VOA IS FAIR OR POOR ...

The main reason advanced by the minority who feel the programs are only fair is that the listeners are not especially interested in the material presented. Another reason brought up with some frequency is that the programs lack objectivity.

"In what way (are they "fair" or "poor")?"

	US Zone	Berlin	Bremen
<u>Not interesting, or only partly interesting:</u> Sometimes it has subjects not interesting to me; one hears good and also poor discussions; doesn't interest me; etc.	43%	24%	45%
<u>Not objective; biased:</u> Main purpose of broadcasts is propaganda; American speakers are too biased; strongly propagandistic; etc.	18	23	27
<u>Topics don't concern Germans:</u> Can't compare our way of life with America; hard to judge comparisons between America and Germany from here; doesn't correspond with our likes and mentality; etc.	10	-	11
<u>Too political:</u> As long as it isn't political, it's interesting; too much about politics; etc.	6	4	-
<u>Poor reception; poor speakers:</u>	3	16	4
<u>Miscellaneous:</u> Not enough about the common people; too didactic; treat us like we were in kindergarten; too highbrow; music and presentation is unrestful, but the broadcasts about known people and places are very good; etc.	24	35	13
<u>No opinion:</u>	<u>6</u> 110%*	<u>4</u> 106%*	<u>4</u> 104%*

* Adds to more than 100 per cent because some people gave more than one reason.

R E S T R I C T E D

REASONS FOR SAYING VOA IS GOOD ...

"People get to know how Americans live" is cited by about half (49%) of the people who find the Voice program good. Their clarity and instructive value is the second most frequently mentioned reason. Catalogued reasons, accompanied by typical comments follow:

"In what way (are they good)?"

US Zone Berlin Bremen

Informs about the American way of life:

The description of the way people live in America; one gets a look of the life of the American people; it creates understanding of other people; it unites people and we get acquainted with the situation; etc.

49% 45% 41%

Is instructive; interesting; clear: Very instructive; it is clarifying and informative; very interesting and brings much that is worthwhile; brings something about everything and that's nice; etc.

37 41 50

Realistic; informative: Tells us things we didn't know before; hear so much about things not heretofore clear; etc.

11 13 5

Objective reporting: In contrast to Russia doesn't include obtrusive propaganda; report the facts; they tell the truth; etc.

3 5 8

Interesting lectures, talks: Find out many particulars about technical advances; the intellectual aspects interest me; etc.

3 1 -

Learn of US desire to aid Germany: It pleases us to hear that the "Voice of America" has goodwill to us; they are friendly to Germany; they want to help Germany rebuild; etc.

2 2 -

Miscellaneous: I like the fact that the two announcers take turns; once in a while it's corny (Kitsch), then one turns it off; etc.

2 1 -

No opinion:

$\frac{2}{109\%}$ $\frac{2}{110\%}$ $\frac{-}{104\%}$

* Adds to more than 100 per cent because some people gave more than one reason.

GROUP DIFFERENCES ...

Few marked, or consistent, differences occur within various population groups regarding the quality of VOA broadcasts as is seen in the following table:

Voice of America Programs are:

Good Fair Poor No opinion

By Monthly Family Income:

Under 100 DM	71%	22%	3%	4% ... 100%
100 - 149,99 DM	71	21	1	7
150 - 199,99 DM	73	23	1	3
200 - 249,99 DM	62	32	3	3
250 - 299,99 DM	69	27	1	3
300 - 399,99 DM	64	34	-	2
400 - 749,99 DM	62	32	3	3
750 DM and over	69	16	6	9

By Age:

Under 20 years	65%	24%	4%	7% ... 100%
20 - 29 years	62	33	1	4
30 - 39 years	60	32	3	5
40 - 49 years	69	23	1	2
50 - 59 years	72	23	2	3
60 years and over	77	17	1	5

By Religion:

Catholic	62%	32%	2%	4% ... 100%
Protestant	70	25	2	3
No affiliation	71	22	4	3

By Education:

Elementary only	68%	26%	2%	4% ... 100%
Middle school	63	32	2	3
Diploma and University	67	29	3	1

By Sex:

Men	64%	31%	3%	2% ... 100%
Women	69	25	1	5

City Size:

Under 5,000	62%	30%	2%	6% ... 100%
5,000 - 9,999	62	29	3	6
10,000 - 24,999	64	28	5	3
25,000 - 99,999	59	36	2	3
100,000 - 249,999	69	25	1	5
250,000 and over	61	35	3	1

R E S T R I C T E D

VOA GIVES GOOD IMPRESSION OF THE USA ...

Preponderant opinions are that the VOA broadcasts win friends for the United States in West Germany.

"What impression do you believe the Voice of America broadcasts have on the people of West Germany (West Berlin); a very favorable, favorable, unfavorable, or very unfavorable impression of America?"

	US Zone	W-Berlin	Bremen
Very favorable	6%	13%	18%
Favorable	68	77	53
Unfavorable	2	*	2
Very unfavorable	*	-	-
No effect	6	1	5
No opinion	18	9	22
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

* Less than half of one per cent.

WHY AN UNFAVORABLE IMPRESSION? ...

The very small group which claims the broadcasts leave an unfavorable or very unfavorable impression of the U.S. on West Germans give a variety of reasons, all of them harshly critical. The comments, too few for effective categorizing, are as follows: The broadcasts are biased propaganda with fulsome praise of America; again people learn to know only one side, this time sent from America; the theory of the broadcasts and the grabbing policy of the U.S. aren't in harmony: Most people turn off the radio when the program comes on.

WHY NO IMPRESSION? ...

Those who feel VOA has no influence whatsoever claim, among other things, that "people aren't as affected by such broadcasts as one might expect or wish"; that most people don't think about them at all, or have no interest in such things. Also the claim is made that most people don't believe the broadcasts are true.

WHY A FAVORABLE IMPRESSION? ...

Most frequently stated reasons for believing the programs create good will are: They contribute to mutual understanding; they are objective and they create liking for Americans. Catalogued replies follow on the next page.

R E S T R I C T E D

"Why do you think so?" (Answers of those who thought it gives W-Germans a very favorable or favorable impression.)

US ZONE Berlin Bremer

<u>Because they bring Germany and America closer together; promotes understanding and exchange of ideas: Both countries get more confidence in each other through it; people get closer ties with America, especially through the "question and answer" program; those who can't go to America come to know what goes on in America; the Voice of America contributes to bringing people of two continents together; the cleft between America and Germany is lessened; it creates a true alliance between America and Germany; etc.</u>	32%	27%	27%
<u>Because the broadcasts are objective, very instructive and clarifying: America reports objectively about itself; one gets the impression of a natural uncolored presentation of American life, without propaganda or incitement; people get a good over-all knowledge of America; etc.</u>	24	22	24
<u>Because the broadcasts are well received: Everyone likes to hear how it is in America; the many letters from listeners attest the interest in America; brings interesting stories about America; what people like can't be unfavorable; etc.</u>	10	13	7
<u>Because America makes friends for itself through them: Perhaps some people hated America, but now, have come to like it because of the broadcasts; the broadcasts are good advertising for America; etc.</u>	10	16	15
<u>Because broadcasts show that America is truly concerned about us: People gradually find out that America has favorable intentions toward us and will really help us as they have promised to do; they know our worries and needs and want to aid; the people hear there that the Americans are for the Germans; etc.</u>	9	10	5
<u>Because broadcasts are good object lessons in democracy: Through these broadcasts, Americans show Germans what democracy means; they have the ring of freedom; Germans want to be democratic and they get guidance through the program; get acquainted with the advantages of life in a free country; etc.</u>	7	6	11
<u>Miscellaneous: So many want to emigrate to America; propaganda against Soviet Russia; etc.</u>	2	2	4
<u>No opinion:</u>	<u>7</u> 100%	<u>5</u> 101%	<u>7</u> 100%

* Some people gave more than one answer.

INFLUENCE IN THE EAST ZONE ...

Majority opinions are also that the Voice broadcasts give East Zone Germans a favorable impression of the United States. However, as would be expected, a relatively large number feel unable to make a judgment on the matter.

"And what impression do you believe the Voice of America broadcasts have on the people in East Germany - do they give a very favorable, a favorable, unfavorable or very unfavorable impression of America?"

	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Very favorable	10%	22%	14%
Favorable	41	61	30
Unfavorable	4	1	6
Very unfavorable	*	-	-
No effect	7	1	6
No opinion	38	15	44
	100%	100%	100%

WHY AN UNFAVORABLE EFFECT ...

East Germans are unable to weigh the truth because they are so subject to Russian propaganda, is the leading argument of the small group which thinks the VOA broadcasts have an unfavorable effect among Eastern Germans.** Another point mentioned is that the Eastern Germans are envious and dissatisfied - they are under so much pressure that they do not dare to speak freely and become increasingly dissatisfied. A very few say also that the Eastern Germans do not like Americans, or do not believe what the Americans say.

WHY NO EFFECT ...

The main argument of the few** who say the broadcasts have no influence one way or the other is that the East zone residents do not dare to listen to the broadcasts out of fear of Russian retaliation. Also it is said that the people are too skeptical as a result of the long years of need to believe what they hear. Other arguments are that the broadcasts are not heard, either because of Russian jamming or for other reasons.

* Less than one half of one per cent.

**The number of cases is too small for accurate percentaging.

R E S T R I C T E D

... Main reasons for saying the VOA broadcasts impress Eastern Germans is because they are informative.

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

People become informed; counteract the one-side views from the East; Because once the Western side is heard the East can't work the way they want to; the population of East Germany gets a clear picture of world events; raises doubts about East broadcasts; compared with Communist broadcasts, these broadcasts can only have favorable results; they must have a good effect because the Eastern press denies it; etc.

31% 29% 40%

Awakens longing of people for Western ways, Western standards, and union with West Germany: People are then in a position to make comparisons and note how much better it is in the West; the Eastern Germans are under so much compulsion and long for a better life such as is possible with the Americans; the East also wants to join with the West; the people there see how the Americans take care of us in West Germany; etc.

29 19 12

Broadcasts give the people support, hope and encouragement: The people bestir themselves to hear everything about America, for their only hope lies with it; the people live there under the Eastern yoke, these broadcasts give them the courage to stand firm; they would like to be freed from Russia and these broadcasts give them support; they think that all help will come from the West; etc.

13 25 5

People recognize the difference between American and Russian conditions: The difference between American and Russian policy comes into prominence through these broadcasts; they learn the difference between America and Russia; etc.

9 5 11

Sympathy for America increases by the broadcasts: People learn that everything is better in America and they want the same for themselves; we learn to know the good side of the Americans; America wins sympathy; etc.

7 13 10

People are won for the democratic cause and learn to despise Communism and dictatorship: Eastern population learns to know the difference between Bolshevism and democracy better; people get to know how much better life is in a real democracy; people find out that something much better than a Hitler or Stalin dictatorship exists - namely democracy of the American pattern; etc.

7 4 13

Broadcasts are interesting and interest people: They certainly must find them even more interesting than we do in the West zones; they are very interesting and the East Germans also like to hear them; they are so natural and everyone can understand them; etc.

1 2 -

Miscellaneous: Many people from the East zone write letters to the Voice of America; much higher class than the Russian broadcasts; etc.

1 1 1

No opinion:

$\frac{3}{101\%}$ $\frac{3}{101\%}$ $\frac{8}{100\%}$

* Some people gave more than one answer.

R E S T R I C T E D

RESTRICTED

00481

TREND IN GERMAN OPINIONS ON
SOCIALIZATION OF INDUSTRY

**Classification cancelled
by authority of Leo P. Crespi
PUB/RAS.**

Report No. 27
Series No. 2
27 July 1950

REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
HICOG APO 807
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RESTRICTED

INTRODUCTION ...

In November 1947 the Reactions Analysis Staff surveyed a representative sample of Germans in the American zone and in the three Western sectors of Berlin on their attitudes toward socialization or nationalization of industry. (The term used in the interviews was "Verstaatlichung.")

To ascertain if any changes had occurred in German thinking in this important area of economic attitudes, the same questions were again put to the German people in May 1950.

In the earlier survey the sampling embraced approximately 3000 cases in the US Zone and 500 in the three Western sectors of Berlin. In the current survey the sample comprised approximately 1500 cases in the Zone, 250 in Berlin and 160 in Bremen. In both studies the German respondents were interviewed in their homes by the trained German staff operating under professional American field supervisors.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS ...

- ... Currently the majority of US Zone residents (54%) do not believe that the worker would be better off if German industry were socialized. This figure represents an increase of 13 percentage points from the 41 per cent who held such a view in November 1947.
- ... In Berlin an even greater shift of opinion has occurred over the past two and one half years with over two in three now rejecting the idea that socialization of industry would improve the lot of the worker.
- ... The workers themselves in the US Zone and Berlin reveal much the same trend in their opinions in this matter as does the public in general.
- ... In the US Zone the extent of support for socialization - including those who favor it only in part - has dropped from 49 per cent in November 1947 to 38 per cent in May 1950. Contrariwise, opposition to socialization - even in part - has increased from 24 per cent to 37 per cent.
- ... In Berlin a similar trend has occurred with even greater losses of support for any socialization measures.
- ... Despite the fact that the Social Democratic Party formally espouses socialization of German industry there is far from an unanimous conviction among US Zone residents of SPD persuasion that even heavy industry should be socialized. Disapproval has grown to the point where now almost one in three oppose even partial socialization.
- ... Among Berlin adherents of SPD opposition to socialization of even heavy industry alone has increased from 27 to 43 per cent since November 1947.
- ... Group comparisons in Berlin and the US Zone reveal that the sharp decrease in support for socialization of German industry either in whole or in part is general among all segments of the population, rather than confined to any particular groups.

- a -

R E S T R I C T E D

WOULD SOCIALIZATION OF INDUSTRY BENEFIT THE WORKERS? ...

The first of the two questions utilized in the present study approaches the extent to which Germans believe that social ownership of industry benefits the group for whom it is generally argued socialization offers the most advantage - namely the workers. The table below clearly demonstrates that currently (as of May 1950) the majority of US Zone residents (54%) do not believe that the worker would be better off if industry were socialized. This figure represents an increase of 13 percentage point from the 41 per cent who held such a view in November of 1947.

In Berlin an even greater shift of opinion has occurred over the past two and one half years, with 69 per cent - or over two in three - now rejecting the idea that socialization of industry would improve the lot of the worker.

"Do you believe that the worker would be better off if industry would be socialized?"

	Bavaria		Hesse		W-Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Oct 1947	May 1950	Oct 1947	May 1950	Oct 1947	May 1950	Oct 1947	May 1950	Oct 1947	May 1950	Oct 1947	May 1950
Yes	30%	25%	27%	19%	30%	24%	30%	23%	36%	19%	*	30%
No	38	52	46	58	41	54	41	54	50	69	*	45
No opinion	32	23	27	23	29	22	29	23	14	12	*	25
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		100%

* Surveying in Bremen did not commence until after this date.

WHAT DO THE WORKERS THEMSELVES THINK? ...

quite as interesting as the views of the general public are those of the workers themselves as to whether or not they would be better off if industry were socialized. Their opinions reveal the same trend as the public at large with now 58 per cent in the US Zone - a 17 per cent increase - who hold that the worker would not be better off with socialization of German industry. In Berlin almost three out of four (72%) currently take this view.

"Do you think that the worker would be better off if industry were socialized?"

US ZONE

	Yes		No		No opinion		
	Nov 47	May 50	Nov 47	May 50	Nov 47	May 50	

OCCUPATION

Workers	41%	29%	41%	58%	18%	13%	...	100%
Business and Professional	26	21	59	63	15	16		
Farmers	24	17	46	56	30	27		
Housewives	28	24	30	44	42	32		

BERLIN*

	Yes		No		No opinion		
	Nov 47	May 50	Nov 47	May 50	Nov 47	May 50	

OCCUPATION

Workers	36%	18%	54%	72%	10%	10%	...	100%
Business and Professional	33	15	59	77	8	8		
Housewives	35	17	41	72	22	13		

Corroborative findings in the present connection derive from an April 1950 survey of the unemployed in Bavaria (a random sample of 544 cases drawn from the unemployment lists in the Labor Office.) The question went as follows, with the results appended:

"Do you believe that unemployment would be overcome sooner if industry were nationalized?"

Yes	30%
No	60
No opinion	10
	<u>100%</u>

* Farmers are omitted in Berlin since in this metropolitan area there are almost none of that occupation.

WHAT IS PRESENT EXTENT OF SUPPORT FOR SOCIALIZATION? ...

In the US Zone opposition to socialization of industry rose from 24% to 37% from November 1947 to May 1950. At the same time approval of socialization (all or only heavy industry) dropped from 49% to 38%. As will be noted in the table below, opposition increased most markedly in Hesse among the Laender of the US Zone.

"Are you for or against the socialization of heavy industry, that is, the coal mines and the iron and steel industry?"

If "For": "Should all industry be socialized?"

	Bavaria		Hesse		W. Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Nov	May	Nov	May	Nov	May	Nov	May	Nov	May	Nov	May
	1947	1950	1947	1950	1947	1950	1947	1950	1947	1950	1947	1950
All industry	17%	11%	10%	5%	14%	11%	15%	10%	22%	11%	*	16%
Heavy only	29	28	40	25	41	34	34	28	35	29	*	18
Neither	25	36	26	49	19	29	24	37	29	47	*	39
No opinion	29	25	24	21	26	26	27	25	14	13	*	27
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		100%

It should also be noted above that growth in disapproval for socialization has been greater in the past two and one half years in Berlin than in the US Zone as a whole. Support for complete socialization has dropped by half from 22 per cent in November 1947 to 11 per cent in May 1950. And opposition to even partial socialization of industry has risen 18 percentage points from 29 to 47 per cent. The reasons for these marked changes and their possible relationships to events must be left to more complete study.

* Surveying in Bremen did not commence until after this date.

POLITICAL PARTY AND ATTITUDE TOWARD SOCIALIZATION ...

Since the Social Democratic Party (SPD) formally espouses socialization of German industry, it becomes of particular moment to observe how its members line up, in comparison to the other political parties, on the issue of socialization. It is evident below that there is far from a unanimous conviction among US Zone residents of SPD persuasion that even heavy industry should be socialized. Moreover disapproval of socialization has grown to the point where now almost one out of three (32%) oppose even partial socialization.

"Are you for or against the socialization of heavy industry, that is, the coal mines and the iron and steel industry?"
If "For": "Should all industry be socialized?"

POLITICAL PARTY PREFERENCE

	Socialize all industry		Socialize heavy only		Do neither		No opinion		
	Nov	May	Nov	May	Nov	May	Nov	May	
	1947	1950	1947	1950	1947	1950	1947	1950	
US ZONE									
SPD	17%	14%	50%	38%	18%	32%	15%	16%	... 100%
CDU/CSU	13	9	28	24	29	39	30	28	
LDP/DVP/EDV/FDP	9	5	39	36	41	48	11	11	
BERLIN*									
SPD	23%	12%	36%	31%	27%	43%	14%	14%	
CDU/CSU	19	7	41	28	32	54	8	17	

It is perhaps even more notable that in Berlin, a traditional stronghold of the SPD, opposition to socialization of even heavy industry alone has increased from 27 to 43 per cent.

* The third political group is omitted in the Berlin comparison as there are too few cases to give a reliable picture.

FURTHER GROUP COMPARISONS ...

Study of further group trends and comparisons which are tabulated below reveal numerous significant findings among which may be highlighted:

1. The sharp decrease in support for socialization of German industry either in whole or in part is general among all population groups, rather than confined to any particular population segment.
2. Whereas in November 1947 more than a quarter in many groups supported socialization of all German industry, at present in no population group examined does such support exceed 14 per cent.
3. Of all the numerous population groupings examined in the US Zone and Berlin, only among two - US Zone SPD members and workers in Berlin - does support for some degree of socialization attain majority status. In these two groups support is 52 and 53 per cent respectively.

"Are you for or against the socialization of heavy industry, that is, the coal mines and the iron and steel industry?"
If "for": "Should all industry be socialized?"

EDUCATION

	Socialize all industry		Socialize heavy only		Do neither		No opinion		
	Nov 1947	May 1950	Nov 1947	May 1950	Nov 1947	May 1950	Nov 1947	May 1950	
US ZONE									
8 years or less	16%	10%	33%	27%	22%	35%	29%	28%	..100
9 - 11	11	5	43	37	29	46	17	12	
12 years or more	8	8	49	37	40	50	12	5	
BERLIN									
8 years or less	26%	12%	35%	30%	23%	43%	16%	15%	
9 years or more*	9	7	33	27	51	59	7	7	

INCOME (PER MONTH)

US ZONE									
0 - 250 DM	16%	11%	32%	26%	22%	34%	30%	29%	
250 DM and more	11	7	41	32	30	44	18	17	
BERLIN									
0 - 250 DM	28%	12%	32%	29%	24%	45%	16%	14%	
250 DM and more	14	8	39	29	37	51	10	12	

* The higher educational groups are combined in the Berlin comparison as there are too few cases for separate indication.

R E S T R I C T E D

SEX

	Socialize all industry		Socialize heavy only		Do neither		No opinion	
	Nov	May	Nov	May	Nov	May	Nov	May
	1947	1950	1947	1950	1947	1950	1947	1950
US ZONE								
Men	15%	9%	44%	40%	30%	43%	11%	8%... 1%
Women	14	10	26	20	19	33	41	37
BERLIN								
Men	18%	4%	45%	45%	32%	49%	5%	2%
Women	25	14	29	21	27	46	19	19

SIZE OF TOWN

US ZONE								
0 - 10,000 population	15%	9%	32%	27%	23%	36%	30%	28%
10,000 - 250,000	14	10	37	32	26	39	23	19
BERLIN								
	22%	11%	35%	29%	29%	47%	14%	13%

AGE

US ZONE								
Under 29 years	15%	11%	29%	31%	24%	37%	26%	21%
30 - 49	16	12	36	27	22	36	26	25
50 years and over	13	6	32	28	26	39	29	27
BERLIN								
Under 29 years	21%	14%	44%	25%	27%	52%	8%	9%
30 - 49	20	6	31	32	36	50	13	12
50 years and over	26	13	37	29	22	41	15	17

RELIGION

US ZONE								
Catholics	16%	9%	30%	28%	24%	38%	30%	25%
Protestants	13	9	39	29	23	33	25	24
BERLIN								
Catholics	16%	13%	33%	24%	37%	43%	14%	20%
Protestants	22	10	35	27	29	51	14	12

OCCUPATION

US ZONE								
Business and Professional	12%	7%	45%	36%	31%	43%	12%	14%
Workers	20	13	42	36	21	38	17	13
Farmers	12	6	29	30	30	39	29	25
Housewives	15	10	26	18	19	34	40	38
BERLIN*								
Business and Professional	15%	8%	36%	33%	29%	53%	10%	6%
Workers	29	8	38	45	23	42	10	5
Housewives	23	10	29	12	28	57	20	21

* Farmers are omitted in Berlin since in this metropolitan area there are almost none of that occupation.

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TRENDS IN OPINIONS ON THE WEST GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC

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REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
HICOG APO 807
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RESTRICTED

INTRODUCTION ...

Since the inception of the West German Federal Republic, the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs, AICOG, has measured public attitudes toward it. This report details the trends in opinion as of the most recent survey on the subject, made in May 1950.

In the May study, two questionnaires were used. Each was asked of randomly selected representative samples of the German public, consisting of approximately 1500 respondents in the US Zone, 250 in Berlin, and 150 in Bremen. In all, approximately 3000 persons in the US Zone, 500 in West Berlin and 300 in Bremen were interviewed.

Interviews were conducted in the homes of the respondents by trained German interviewers who are supervised by American Surveys Officers.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS ...

- ... Approval of the activities of the Bonn government has increased. In May 1950, a majority in the US Zone said they were satisfied with their government's actions to date.
- ... Predominant opinions also are that the Federal Republic keeps public welfare in mind rather than purely political party aims.
- ... Six in ten US Zone residents claim satisfaction with Chancellor Adenauer's activities to date. In West Berlin, the Chancellor's vote of confidence reaches three quarters of the population.
- ... Ability to identify Dr. Adenauer as the Chancellor has also increased among the public. In May, 62% in the US Zone, 79% in West Berlin, and 74% in Bremen knew that he was Chancellor of the Federal Republic.
- ... Majority opinion is that the establishment of the Bonn government had no effect on the East-West split. About a quarter (23%) in the US Zone feel that it served to widen the split. Comparison with results obtained prior to the formation of the West German government indicates that then more people anticipated a wider split as a consequence of the formation of the West government.
- ... Predominant opinions continue to be that the Bonn government is not sufficiently independent of occupation authorities; but the number who believe that it is independent enough has increased during the past half year. Only a small minority designate the West German government as an allied puppet.
- ... More than three fourths now feel that the West German government is more independent than the East German government, an increase of ten points during the past six months.
- ... Large majorities continue to describe the East Zone German government as a Soviet puppet.

- a -

SATISFACTION WITH THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT ...

In the latest survey the proportion of US Zone residents expressing satisfaction with the achievements of the Federal Republic for the first time reached majority status - 51 per cent. In Berlin three out of four (77%) now express approval of the operation of the West German government.

"In general are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the activities of the West German government to date?"

	Nov 1949	Dec 1949	Mar 1950
<u>US ZONE</u>			
Satisfied	43%	36%	51%
Dissatisfied	31	30	30
Neither	11	11	7
No opinion	15	23	12
<u>Bavaria</u>			
Satisfied	45%	37%	54%
Dissatisfied	25	31	31
Neither	11	8	5
No opinion	16	24	10
<u>Hesse</u>			
Satisfied	33	27	44%
Dissatisfied	37	32	30
Neither	14	17	12
No opinion	16	24	14
<u>Baden</u>			
Satisfied	42%	44%	49%
Dissatisfied	37	26	29
Neither	7	0	0
No opinion	14	21	13
<u>Berlin</u>			
Satisfied	66%	71%	77%
Dissatisfied	23	17	10
Neither	4	3	6
No opinion	7	9	7
<u>Bremen</u>			
Satisfied	47%	47%	53%
Dissatisfied	33	19	25
Neither	9	11	7
No opinion	11	23	0

SOURCES OF SATISFACTION ...

"I can't complain" is most frequently advanced by zonal residents as a reason for their satisfaction with the Bonn government. Next in order of mention is the improvement in living conditions.

"In what way (are you satisfied with the activities to date of the Bonn government)?"

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

<u>No complaints (general):</u> I have nothing to complain of about their work; they do as much for us as they can; they do their best; they try as best as possible; etc.	18%	15%	16%
<u>Improved living and economic conditions:</u> One can eat better now; they have got funds to fight unemployment; they're trying to do something about unemployment; etc.	12	19	19
<u>General improvement:</u> Because of support of the Federal government everything is already much better; everything has improved; everything goes along at a regular pace; etc.	7	14	13
<u>Works for public good:</u> Works for human liberty; refugees are getting aid; have supported Berlin; etc.	3	0	2
<u>Better than East Zone:</u> One can see how it looks in the East as compared with the West; with us things have gone well; not as in the East; etc.	2	3	3
<u>Government pursues good policies:</u> Government is against militarism and war; it works for peace; is concerned with overcoming difficulties; etc.	1	4	4
<u>Gets along well with West powers:</u> Stopped dismantling; cooperates well with West; gets along well in foreign affairs; etc.	1	4	3
<u>Miscellaneous:</u> Are democratic; have a hard time because the occupation powers interfere; etc.	2	4	2
<u>No opinion:</u>	$\frac{5}{51\%}$	$\frac{5}{77\%}$	$\frac{5}{67\%}$

* Some people gave more than one answer.

SOURCE OF DISSATISFACTION ...

Most frequently mentioned source of dissatisfaction with the West German government is its alleged indifference to the people in general and specific groups in particular. High taxes is another cause of complaint, as is the failure of the government to solve the unemployment problem.

"In what way (are you dissatisfied with the activities to date of the Bonn government)?"

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

<u>Indifferent to people and to specific groups:</u> They don't worry about the public; we haven't got any emergency help yet; they ignore the refugees; don't do anything about disabled veterans; etc.	10%	1%	10%
<u>Taxes too high; extravagant:</u> Taxes getting higher all the time; they should be more sparing with money; salaries of officials are too high; they think only of their per diem and pensions; etc.	9	1	3
<u>No solution of unemployment:</u> Unemployment is still as great as ever; too little work has been created; do too little about unemployment; etc.	6	1	6
<u>Don't keep their promises:</u> Lot of talk but no deeds; make too many promises; all laws are only on paper; they talk a little too much; etc.	3	*	3
<u>Lack of clear line of policy:</u> They parties do what they wish and don't know what they want; no cooperation; don't work together; etc.	2	2	3
<u>Prices too high, wages too low:</u> Wages of workers too low; prices are too high; etc.	2	1	2
<u>Subservient to West powers:</u> Didn't protest against dismantling; should oppose Western powers more effectively; etc.	1	-	1
<u>Do not support Berlin:</u> They are so little concerned with Berlin; haven't done enough for Berlin; they praise our valour, but do nothing for us; etc.	-	4	-
<u>Miscellaneous:</u> The proposals of Pastor Niemöller fall under the table; must do more about the prisoners of war problem; haven't achieved a peace treaty; etc.	2	*	1
<u>No opinion:</u>	1 36%**	10%	29%**

* Less than half of one per cent

**Some people gave more than one answer.

GROUP DIFFERENCES ...

As would be expected, persons who think the Bonn government is sufficiently independent of allied influence, or if influenced, still is not a puppet of the West, or believe that the Bonn government seeks to further general welfare, are more inclined than those who hold opposite views on these issues to say that the federal government is doing a satisfactory job.

Among population groups, differences on the issues are not marked.

Satisfaction with West German Government

Satisfied Dissatisfied Neither/Nor No opinion

By Attitudes:

Role of occupiers:

Occupiers too influential	48%	36%	9%	7%	... 100%
Bonn independent enough	56	32	6	6	

West German gov't a puppet:

Yes	41%	45%	5%	9%	... 100%
No	52	29	10	9	

Aims of West German gov't:

Public welfare	67%	19%	7%	7%	... 100%
Party aims, first	31	54	8	7	

By Group Differences:

By Education:

Elementary only	51%	31%	6%	12%	... 100%
Middle	60	28	8	4	
Diploma and university	59	32	6	3	

By Sex:

Men	54%	34%	8%	4%	... 100%
Women	48	28	7	17	

By Origin:

Natives	51%	29%	8%	12%	... 100%
Refugees	49	36	4	11	

By Party Preference:

CDU/CSU	58%	24%	6%	12%	... 100%
FDP	53	30	10	7	
SPD	55	30	3	7	
None	33	40	8	19	
No opinion	45	22	11	22	

By Age:

Under 20 years	47%	20%	5%	28%	... 100%
20 - 29 years	53	29	8	10	
30 - 39 years	46	32	9	13	
40 - 49 years	46	39	7	8	
50 - 59 years	52	28	10	10	
60 - 69 years	65	18	6	11	
70 and over	54	34	3	9	

By Religion:

Catholics	51%	31%	6%	12%	... 100%
Protestants	51	29	9	11	

MOTIVATION OF BONN GOVERNMENT ...

Majorities ranging from 52 per cent in the US Zone to 71 per cent in West Berlin feel that the public welfare rather than the aim of their own political parties is the primary concern of Bonn. However, as many as a third in the US Zone feel that political party considerations weigh more heavily with the German government.

"Do you find that the West German government keeps the welfare of the West German people in view or do you believe that they primarily follow the aims of their parties?"

	US ZONE*	Berlin	Bremen
Public welfare	52%	71%	67%
Party aims	32	18	27
No opinion	16	11	6
	100%	100%	100%

More likely than others to say that concern for the public good motivates the Bonn government are adherents of CDU/CSU, and FDP, the better educated, and the men. (But more men than women claim that the government primarily serves party interests.)

West German Government:

	Keeps public welfare in view	Primarily serves party interests	No opinion
<u>By Party Preference:</u>			
CDU/CSU	58%	24%	18%...100%
FDP	63	29	8
SPD	53	34	13
None	42	43	15
No opinion	21	28	31
<u>By Education:</u>			
Elementary only	50%	32%	18%...100%
Middle	54	37	9
Diploma and university	75	14	4
<u>By Sex:</u>			
Men	56%	35%	9%...100%
Women	50	29	21

* Laender figures are not shown as they are all very similar to the US Zone total.

CHANCELLOR ADENAUER'S RECORD ...

Chancellor Adenauer receives a majority vote of confidence from the public on his conduct of affairs to date. Hessians, are less inclined - and West Berliners more inclined - than persons in other localities to express satisfaction with the Chancellor's performance.

"Are you in general satisfied or dissatisfied with the activity of Chancellor Adenauer of West German federal republic?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W. Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Satisfied	66%	51%	64%	62%	75%	61%
Dissatisfied	14	17	13	15	12	13
Neither/Nor	6	14	10	9	4	16
No opinion	14	18	13	14	9	10
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

REASONS FOR DISSATISFACTION ...

Expressions of dissatisfactions with Chancellor Adenauer cover a range of miscellaneous complaints. He is alleged by some to have neglected the problems of distressed groups, e.g. the "little" men, the refugees, etc.; or held responsible for the alleged failure to do anything but talk; or to be too anti-labor or pro-capitalist, and so on.

Classified comments of the dissatisfied minority follow:

	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
<u>He neglects problems of certain groups:</u> Adenauer doesn't care about the little men, the refugees, or crippled veterans; he shows absolutely no understanding of the refugees; pays little attention to the people's interests; etc.	4%	*	3%
<u>He has not accomplished anything:</u> So much talk and nothing behind it; hasn't completed anything positive; he talks a lot, but no one can see any deeds; hasn't done anything; etc.	2	2	1
<u>He does nothing for the workers, is pro-capitalist:</u> He's not concerned about the workers' living conditions; he's only for the capitalists; etc.	2	1	4
<u>He has not yet solved unemployment:</u> He hasn't fought enough against unemployment; he has concerned himself too little about the unemployment problem; etc.	2	*	1
<u>He has not done enough about taxes:</u> He hasn't done anything about lowering taxes; because of the recent tax law; etc.	2	1	-
<u>He follows dubious policies:</u> He agrees too often with the Allies, he tags along; too clerical; he's for war; too much party policies; etc.	1	2	1
<u>He is egotistic, ignores opposition:</u> He is too egotistic, doesn't listen often to parliament's opinion on important matters; he is too independent, he should be more of an agent of the popular will; he has dictatorial views and ignores criticism; etc.	1	2	-
<u>Miscellaneous:</u> He doesn't pay enough attention to Berlin; he is too old; the government agreed to the separation of the Saar; the Saar and Ruhr questions; etc.	3 17%	4 12%	3 13%

* Less than one half of one per cent.
**Some people gave more than one answer.

In all attitudinal and population groups, the predominant expression of opinion is satisfaction with Chancellor Adenauer's accomplishments to date. Particularly likely to give the Chancellor a vote of confidence are the better educated and of course those who prefer the coalition parties - CDU/CSU and FDP. It is noteworthy, however, that six in ten followers of the Social Democrats express satisfaction. Also of interest is the fact that religious affiliation appears to have little bearing on evaluations of the Chancellor.

Satisfaction with Adenauer
Satisfied Dissatisfied Neither/Nor No opinion

By Attitudes:

Relative dependency on occupiers:

East German gov't more dependent	66%	14%	9%	11%...100%
West German gov't more dependent	53	23	6	13
Both equally	43	27	13	17

Establishment of West German gov't and East-West split:

Widened split	63%	17%	10%	10%...100%
No influence	69	15	9	7

Interest in politics:

Personally interested	70%	18%	7%	5%...100%
Leave it to others	57	13	10	20

By Education:

Elementary only	60%	15%	9%	16%...100%
Middle	71	11	10	8
Diploma and university	80	10	3	7

By Sex:

Men	69%	16%	9%	6%...100%
Women	56	14	9	21

Party Preference:

CDU/CSU	78%	6%	5%	11%...100%
FDP	79	10	5	6
SPD	59	22	11	8
None	44	18	13	25
No opinion	49	9	10	32

By Age:

Under 20 years	60%	6%	5%	16%...100%
20 - 29 years	62	14	8	16
30 - 39 years	61	17	10	12
40 - 49 years	56	18	10	16
50 - 59 years	66	14	9	11
60 - 69 years	66	15	7	12
70 years and over	65	11	10	14

By Religion:

Catholics	65%	14%	7%	14%...100%
Protestants	60	14	10	16

R E S T R I C T E D

IDENTIFICATION OF ADENAUER AS CHANCELLOR ...

Knowledge of the fact that Dr. Adenauer is Chancellor of the Federal Republic has increased since November 1949. However, almost four in ten in the US Zone still do not know. It is interesting to note that in Bavaria where CSU is the dominant party, fewest are able to identify the Chancellor.

"Could you please tell me who is the Chancellor of the West German government?"

	Nov 1949	May 1950
<u>US ZONE</u>		
Adenauer	44%	62%
Heuss	13	12
Other and don't know	<u>43</u>	<u>26</u>
	100%	100%
<u>Bavaria</u>		
Adenauer	36%	55%
Heuss	12	13
Other and don't know	<u>52</u>	<u>32</u>
	100%	100%
<u>Hesse</u>		
Adenauer	56%	77%
Heuss	12	7
Other and don't know	<u>32</u>	<u>16</u>
	100%	100%
<u>W. Baden</u>		
Adenauer	48%	64%
Heuss	19	12
Other and don't know	<u>33</u>	<u>24</u>
	100%	100%
<u>Berlin</u>		
Adenauer	47%	79%
Heuss	25	12
Others and don't know	<u>28</u>	<u>9</u>
	100%	100%
<u>Bremen</u>		
Adenauer	49%	74%
Heuss	21	15
Other and don't know	<u>30</u>	<u>11</u>
	100%	100%

THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT AND THE EAST-WEST SPLIT !!.

Half of the US Zone residents (three-quarters of the Berliners) hold the view that the formation of the West German government had no effect on the East-West split. About a quarter think it served to widen the split.

"Do you think that the formation of the West German government widened the split of Germany into East and West, or didn't it have any influence?"

	<u>US Zone*</u>	<u>Berlin</u>	<u>Bremen</u>
Widened split	23%	21%	28%
No influence	51	76	57
No opinion	26	3	15
	100%	100%	100%

* Laender figures are not shown, since they vary but little.

Prior to the establishment of the Bonn government more people anticipated a wider split as a result. This is shown in the trend of replies to a question in similar vein:

"Do you think that the split of Germany into East and West will be increased by the formation of a provisional Western government, or will this have no influence?"

	<u>Aug</u> <u>1948</u>	<u>Sept</u> <u>1948</u>	<u>Feb</u> <u>1949</u>	<u>July</u> <u>1949</u>
<u>US Zone</u>				
Widen the split	47%	51%	43%	35%
No influence	33	25	28	34
No opinion	20	24	29	31
<u>Bavaria</u>				
Widen the split	44%	49%	40%	35%
No influence	36	26	31	32
No opinion	20	25	29	33
<u>Hesse</u>				
Widen the split	55%	57%	51%	37%
No influence	24	22	22	37
No opinion	21	21	27	26
<u>W-Baden</u>				
Widen the split	46%	50%	44%	35%
No influence	34	27	25	32
No opinion	20	23	31	33
<u>Berlin</u>				
Widen the split	51%	54%	47%	41%
No influence	45	40	47	50
No opinion	3	6	6	9
<u>Bremen</u>				
Widen the split	53%	68%	54%	38%
No influence	38	26	33	39
No opinion	9	6	13	23

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INFLUENCE OF THE OCCUPYING POWERS ...

In the past half year, more people - except in Bremen - have come to the opinion that the Bonn government is sufficiently independent of the occupation authorities. However, in the US Zone the weight of opinion remains that the Western powers have too much influence: in contrast, West Berliners tend to think Bonn is sufficiently independent.

"Do you think the Western powers have too great an influence in the decisions of the West German government, or are you of the opinion that the West German federal republic is sufficiently independent?"

	US Zone			Berlin			Bremen		
	Nov '49	Dec '49	May '50	Nov '49	Dec '49	May '50	Nov '49	Dec '49	May '50
Too influential	42%	41%	44%	48%	33%	38%	47%	45%	56%
Independent enough	25	31	34	38	56	51	28	30	28
No opinion	30	28	22	14	11	11	25	25	16
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

However, few of those who allege the occupiers are too influential, believe that influence goes so far as to make the federal government a mere puppet.

"It has been said that the West German government is a puppet government, and can only do what the Western powers prescribe - do you agree with this or not?" (Asked of those who said "too great an influence" above.)

	US Zone			Berlin			Bremen		
	Nov '49	Dec '49	May '50	Nov '49	Dec '49	May '50	Nov '49	Dec '49	May '50
Yes, puppet	15%	14%	12%	9%	6%	7%	15%	8%	15%
No, not puppet	25	24	30	30	27	31	32	36	39
No opinion	2	3	2	-	-	-	-	1	2
	42%	41%	44%	39%	33%	38%	47%	45%	56%

R E S T R I C T E D

GROUP DIFFERENCES ...

More inclined than others to think that the Western occupying powers exert too great an influence over the West German government are the better educated, followers of FDP, and men. It is interesting to note that there is only a slight difference between opinions of people of Christian Democratic and of Social Democratic persuasions on this issue, though the latter say somewhat more frequently that the Allies are too influential. So apparently followers of SPD do not entirely share the occasionally expressed views of the parliamentary leaders of their party that the present government is lacking independence. Differences within age groups are not too consistent on this issue.

Influence of West Powers on Bonn Government:

Too influential Gov't Independent No opinion
Enough

By Education:

Elementary only	40%	35%	25% ... 100%
Middle	57	35	8
Diploma and University	80	20	-

By Sex:

Men	56%	32%	12% ... 100%
Women	34	36	30

By Party Preference:

CPU/GSU	48%	36%	24% ... 100%
FDP	56	34	10
SPD	45	39	16
None			
No opinion			

By Age:

Under 20 years	39%	36%	25% ... 100%
20 - 29 years	49	30	21
30 - 39 years	47	33	20
40 - 49 years	42	38	20
50 - 59 years	45	34	21
60 - 69 years	36	34	30
70 and over	38	30	32

R E S T R I C T E D

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RELATIVE DEPENDENCY OF EAST AND WEST GOVERNMENTS ...

On the issue of the relative dependency of the Western and Eastern German government on their respective occupation authorities, majorities have consistently named the East government as the more dependent. This view appears to be increasing in the US Zone, particularly among the Hessians.

"Which one of the two German governments do you think is more dependent on the occupation powers: The East or the West German government?"

	Oct 1949	Nov 1949	May 1949
<u>US Zone</u>			
East German	65%	73%	76%
West German	6	5	6
Both equally	12	6	6
No opinion	16	16	12
<u>Bavaria</u>			
East German	70%	75%	75%
West German	6	5	6
Both equally	9	5	6
No opinion	15	15	13
<u>Hesse</u>			
East German	56%	64%	80%
West German	7	5	3
Both equally	18	10	7
No opinion	19	21	10
<u>W-Baden</u>			
East German	69%	72%	77%
West German	4	7	7
Both equally	12	6	4
No opinion	15	15	12
<u>Berlin</u>			
East German	92%	86%	90%
West German	2	3	4
Both equally	5	6	4
No opinion	1	5	2
<u>Bremen</u>			
East German	75%	75%	77%
West German	5	3	5
Both equally	11	5	10
No opinion	9	17	8

RESTRICTED

RUMORS IN WEST GERMANY FOLLOWING
THE KOREAN OUTBREAK

Classification cancelled
by authority of Leo P. Crespi
PUB/RAS.

Special Report

31 July 1950

REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
AICOG APO 807
Bad Nauheim Germany

RESTRICTED

R E S T R I C T E D

INTRODUCTION ...

On July 21, 1950, as part of a rapid survey of German reactions to Korean developments, a representative sample of 300 cases in the US Zone and 100 each in Berlin and Bremen were questioned as to current rumors. To encourage the respondents as strongly as possible to come up with their experiences the inquiry was framed as "which rumors have you heard lately" rather than the less compelling query - "have you heard any rumors lately".

Only types of rumors and relative prevalence are approached in the current study. Degree of credibility and other considerations must be left to future inquiry.

SOME GENERALIZATIONS ...

1. The strained international situation has been accompanied by a spate of rumors in the urban communities of the US Zone as well as in West Berlin. Though all of the current rumors reported here have their origin in the East-West situation and the possibility of the extension of the Korean conflict, considered specifically they deal with many facets of the larger situation.
2. The largest single topic of rumor has to do with food - food shortages and hoarding, and the re-introduction of food rationing.
3. It is important to note, however, that rumors concerning food shortages and hoarding constitute only a small fraction of the total current rumors. Rumors dealing with political and military matters make up the great bulk of all current rumors.
4. The finding that food worries in the current situation, as measured by rumor trends, are subordinate in importance to more direct political and military perturbations, may superficially appear to be controverted by the extent of reported hoarding incidences on the part of US Zone Germans. It must be appreciated in this connection, however, that food anxieties are practically the only kind that the common citizen can do something concrete to assuage. So other anxieties may preponderate, as the present rumor study suggests, but cannot be so readily evidenced in behavior.
5. The implication of the present study is that any information campaign to allay current German anxieties should not overly preoccupy itself with narrow food considerations but should rather be directed toward the entire political and military situation.

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R E S T R I C T E D

RUMORS IN THE U.S. ZONE OF GERMANY

00505

(Topics Listed in Order of Frequency of Mention)

I. Hoarding and Increase in Prices of Food and Rumors about Imminent Rationing Because of the International Situation.

They say food prices are going up again.
 Food ration cards will be issued again within the next six weeks, people want to hoard food if a war is coming.
 Partial rationing is to be introduced again.
 They intend to ration food again because of the hysterical purchases.
 Supposedly the Americans have really stopped importing food into Germany.
 One should buy up a lot because there will be a new war.
 One must reckon with a new rationing in West Germany because of the international situation.
 People should hoard because food is getting scarce.
 There will be a famine.
 It is generally asserted that the ration card system is to be introduced in West Germany again.
 There are rumors that a new world war would break out and that food will get scarce again.
 The wife of a common laborer is reported to have hoarded two-hundred-weights of sugar.
 They say there is going to be another Korea here so people are hoarding food.
 That Irlmeier has prophesied a war and that people should buy food.*

II. An Imminent War Between East and West.

Both the Russians and the Americans are arming tremendously.
 Korea is only supposed to be a prelude for the coming war.
 The war will shift to Europe.
 The Russians could take Germany without any resistance.
 Russia intends to attack Germany, Korea is only a diversion maneuver.
 That a war between America and Russia will break out in August or September.
 Russia will attack West Germany in the near future.
 That a war will break out and that West Germany will be involved, therefore it would be better to cross over the Rhine.
 We shall have a war, perhaps in 6 months from now and that many people in America believe in an imminent war.
 Everybody says that there will be a war.

III. American Families and Civilians Leave West Germany.

Evacuation measures for American families are in preparation.
 The Americans have ordered their families to return to America, in some cases because of the war danger.
 They say that a family came to Bayreuth and stayed only two days and then returned to America.
 The American civilians in the town of Hof have already moved out of their apartments, women and children are on the way to America.
 American civilians are reported to be leaving West Germany already.
 The American civilians have been ordered to leave Europe.
 That the Americans will send home their wives and children after September 1st.

* Irlmeier is a pseudo-prophet in Bavaria, a follower of Nostradamus, and has acquired wealth from his "prophetic" writings.

R E S T R I C T E D

The Russian takes action, the Americans must give in, thus American families are already packing.
 In Echterdingen aeroplanes are ready so that in an emergency the Americans may fly off immediately.
 The Americans are going to leave West Germany because they are afraid of the Russians.

IV. Russian Troop Concentrations in the East Zone and Other Preparatory Measures for a War.

Large numbers of Russian and Czechoslovakian tanks are standing at the border, so it seems things will soon start here.
 The Russians send agents to West Germany in order to have guerilla fighters carry out sabotage.
 The Russians concentrate their troops at the zonal borders.
 The Russians are waiting near Hof preparatory for the march into the West.
 A war between America and Russia in the near future, troop concentrations in the East zone directed to the West.
 Troop reinforcements in the East zone.
 Mongolian workers and massed troops are reported to have arrived in the East zone.
 In the East zone there are many volunteers for Korea.
 The Germans in Poland are being drafted.

V. Formation of a German Army and Re-armament in West Germany.

There will be a German defense army set up within two months.
 They say West Germany is going to set up an army.
 Some German factories are producing arms again.
 Germany is being re-armed and the Americans will withdraw.
 They intend to establish 25 German divisions.

VI. Germans are Already Being Drafted or Have Enlisted in the American Forces.

Germans are already being drafted, and volunteers accepted.
 Former members of the German Air Force have been summoned to the Rhine-Main Air Base for mustering.
 In Regensburg volunteers for the American Air Force are going to be enrolled, five have already enlisted.
 The Americans intend to draft young German men under 25 years of age.

VII. Concentration of American Troops at the Eastern Borders.

American troops are rolling toward the Bavarian-Czechoslovakian border every night.
 America will attack Russia, this can be deduced from the concentration of strong tank units at the border of the East zone.
 The Americans are carrying on maneuvers but it won't be limited to maneuvers.

VIII. War Preparations in the Balkans.

The Russians are making preparations in Yugo-Slavia.
 They say there will be a war in the Balkans, there are troop concentrations at the border of Yugo-Slavia.

IX. Pressure on Employees of American Authorities or Families in West Germany.

German maids working for the Americans are to be courtmartialed after the Russian invasion.

All German employees of American offices who do not resign before August 1, 1950, will be subject to prosecution by a Russian court martial later on. There will be one year of Siberia for every day of work for the Americans after August 1, 1950.

The German employees of the Americans have been ordered by radio Leipzig to resign as soon as possible, or they will have a bad time after the Russians come in.

X. American Troops are Withdrawn from Germany and Germany Left Without Any Adequate Defense.

The American troops are being withdrawn from Germany and we are to be abandoned to the Russians without any protection.

It is possible that Germany can't be adequately protected any longer because America needs stronger troops in Korea.

Unmarried and childless Americans have been transferred from Germany to America to be used in Korea later on, therefore the American troops have once more decreased in numbers.

XI. American Defeat in Korea.

The Americans are said to have suffered a terrific defeat in Korea without that fact being published.

The Americans have been terribly beaten in Korea so far.

The Americans are being driven out of Korea.

XII. Allies Plan Blasting Operations at the Rhine.

They say England won't participate as a defense of Germany.

The blasting operations at the Rhine are very alarming facts.

The Loreley-Rock affair.

XIII. Pro-Eastern Attitudes are being Assumed.

Many people in Germany hang their flag toward the Eastern wind now.

They say that many people in West Germany would not dislike having the Communists come into West Germany.

People are now adopting a reserved attitude, they are trying to get into contact with Communists.

XVI. America's Propaganda Prepared and Provoked War in Korea.

The Americans initiated the war in Korea quite systematically by propaganda and war preparations.

They say the Americans prepared and provoked the war in Korea by propaganda.

I have heard that 20,000 German people are in
case of a war.

There is much hoarding of goods on the part of many wholesale traders because they reckon there will be war soon; one reason for hoarding is to give these hoarded goods to the Russians.

The students intend to side directly with the Russians in case of a war because so they can become American prisoners of war.

Meats and fats are going up in price because Americans themselves must economize for their troops.

Irlmeier has predicted three days of "all-out-gloom" in connection with people's belief in a war as things were started in Korea.

That Irlmeier prophesied a war in the harvest season in which case Ingolstadt will be saved from greater distress.

The American army is considering the possibility of supplying troops with rubber boots in order to facilitate their retreat.

After their experience in Korea the Americans now realize that their occupation policy is entirely wrong.

That before setting up a West German Federal police Mr. Clay must give a good speech and reverse his old policies.

The German employees of the CIC are quoted as already having their air tickets to America in their pockets.

White-metal and other metals for canning industry have been confiscated by Americans.

It is said that the Russians don't intend at all to invade West Germany, but that West Germany will fall an easy prey to the Communists without any aggression by the Russians.

00508

- 4 -

R E S T R I C T E D

(Topics Listed in Order of Frequency of Mention)

I. Rationing and Higher Prices of Food.

We shall have a rationing system again.
A cut in social support payments and rising prices of fats.
Everybody should provide themselves with food, there will be war soon.
Foods are said to get scarce, but I don't believe it, they only want to make more money.
Things will be started in Berlin, too, as it happened in Korea, people hoard food, potatoes and coals.
They rumor it would be started soon, also with us, it would be the right thing to hoard food.

II. Rearmament and War Preparation of the East Zone.

The Russians are building bases for an attack against the West along the zonal borders.
The Russians bring troop reinforcements to Eastern Germany.
The people's police makes warlike preparations in the East zone.
Intensified rearmament in the East zone.
There are again large concentrations of Russian troops in the environs of Berlin.

III. Russian Aggression Against West Germany and West Berlin.

Aggressive action will be taken against West Berlin and West Germany as it was in Korea.
West Berlin shall be defeated after Korea.
After the SED party congress they intend to conquer West Berlin and West Germany.
The people's police will make a sudden attack on West Berlin.
In autumn things will be started with us, then the people's police will take action.
The Russians will soon invade West Germany.

VI. A World War Seems to be Imminent in the Balkans and East Asia.

The East Asia affairs and the Balkans controversies will lead to a world war.
A Russian attack on Berlin, West Germany and Yugo-Slavia in autumn 1950.
Russia prepares aggressive measures at other Asiatic places (Iran) and stages diversion measures at the Yugo-Slav border.
People expect that Russia will attack Yugo-Slavia.

V. General War Rumors.

That a war is imminent.
There will be a war in the near future.
The Korean conflict is the starting shot of a new war.
There will be a war in Germany as soon as Korea is done with.
There will be a war.
The Russians are the driving force in the Korean conflict.

America will eventually drop an atomic bomb on Korea.
The Americans will apply the atomic bomb in Korea.
America will and must apply the atomic bomb in Korea that the world
conflagration will be nipped in the bud and suffocated at the outset.

VII. Miscellaneous.

The Western powers will give up Berlin immediately in the case of a war.
After the harvest Russia will attack America.
Whether the Russians will leave Berlin voluntarily or only in a war that is
the question.

The DM will be de-valued.

That many Germans will be recruited by the Americans for Korea.

The Russians will use the atomic bomb if they are going to lose in Korea.

Equalization of the East-West currency; hoarding of food in West Germany.

A new blockade for Berlin.

The Americans are withdrawing their troops from West Germany because they
are needed in Korea.

That the Russians will yield if they lose in Korea and will withdraw from
Germany then.

Germany is to be rearmed.

SOME FURTHER DETAILS ON POST-KOREAN RUMORS

INTRODUCTION

A prior special report has presented the types and frequencies of various post-Korean rumors in the US Zone and Berlin.* In the present supplementary report more detailed exposition of various rumors are presented as investigated by the German field operatives of the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs.

* Rumors in West Germany following the Korean outbreak, Special Report, 31 July 1950, Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs.

**Classification cancelled
by authority of Leo P. Crespi
PUB/RAS.**

Special Report

3 August 1950

REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
HICOG APO 807
Bad Nauheim Germany

R E S T R I C T E D

I. RUMORS CONCERNING AMERICANS AND EMPLOYEES OF AMERICANS.

A. Intimidation of German Employees of Occupation Authorities.

Radio Leipzig announced that employees of the American occupation authorities who have not resigned by August 1, 1950, will be called to account.

All Germans who have worked for Americans will be sent to Siberia; each day of work with the occupation forces will mean a year in a concentration camp; names have already been registered.

Communist troops in Korea have punished or killed all the former employees of Americans or people who cooperated with them.

B. Reinforcement and Transfer of American Units.

American tanks are lined up along the Czech border and American troop movements toward the border are made at night; noises have repeatedly been heard at night.

10,000 Negroes have been alerted in Regensburg.

American pilots have recently been moved to the Manching airport, near Ingolstadt; at the Neubiberg airport work goes on day and night because these units will either be transferred to Korea or will be considerably reinforced.

C. Americans Leave West Germany.

American civilians stationed in border areas and their families have been called upon to keep themselves ready for evacuation at any time; detailed plans have been worked out and will be given to the American families.

The requisitioned houses in the city of Hof have already been released by American civilians as they are about to return to America.

American soldiers will fly out of Germany as soon as the Russians come.

In case of war all American women with children will be transported to Southern France; Germany east of the Rhine will be given up and all the Rhine bridges will be blasted.

All Americans have left Switzerland.

D. Other Rumors About Americans.

The Americans have cut the gasoline ration for Germans just so they can sell theirs at a higher price.

The Americans encourage war rumors so they can more readily get rid of their canned donkey-meat.

PX goods, especially tea and sugar, are more strictly rationed now.

In America, sugar is very scarce and will be rationed.

R E S T R I C T E D

II. GENERAL WAR RUMORS AND PROPHECIES.

A. Irlmeier* Prophecies.

In the town of Oberdolling, near Ingolstadt, Irlmeier announced that a war will start at harvest time, but that the Ingolstadt neighborhood will be spared.

Furniture and goods are being transferred from big cities to the rural district of Altoetting by businessmen, because Irlmeier said this region will be saved.

Irlmeier is quoted as saying that a Russian invasion will take place and prevent the Catholics' Day celebration in Passau on September 2, 1950.

B. Other War Rumors.

America is deceiving Russia militarily by not using its newest weapons in order to take Russia by surprise in a later action.

Heuss and Adenauer are spending their vacations in Switzerland only because of the danger of war.

The war scare has been created on purpose to prepare Germans for the establishment of a German army.

Blasting operations on the Rhine bridges and highways have been accelerated since the outbreak of the Korean conflict. Plans have been made to withdraw American troops to the other side of the Rhine and create a no-man's land twenty kilometers wide in the vicinity of the blasting operations.

Only Negroes are to be used in combat, and they are deserting because they want nothing to do with war.

Czech travellers have told Germans that the next war will be an insect war. Czech planes, they say, have already dropped insects on German fields, which have been found by farmers.

The Siemens and other similar factories have received rearmament orders and employ a large number of people to fill them.

* Irlmeier is a pseudo-prophet in Bavaria, a follower of Nostradamus, and has acquired a considerable following.

III. GERMAN VOLUNTEERS FOR KOREA.
LUCRATIVE OFFERS TO FORMER GERMAN OFFICERS.

The American army is accepting volunteers for the Korean war, who will receive a monthly salary of DM 1,500.

German officers and men who have volunteered for Korea and concentrated at a secret locality in Southern France, equipped there and sent to Japan by ship. They will receive salaries of DM 500 per month.

Young men are waiting eagerly to be drafted into the American army.

- 2 -

R E S T R I C T E D

The East Zone has offered former German generals and staff officers who live in the Western zones positions in the People's Police; 1000 Westmarks will be paid the family members remaining at home, and generals will receive 2000 East Marks. Some high army officers have accepted the offers, because they can't live on the 150 Marks paid them in West Germany.

IV. FOOD RATIONING AND OTHER FOOD RUMORS.

Orders have been issued to prepare for food rationing; the harvest isn't good this year because of the bad weather, and foreign countries don't export so much to Germany any longer because of the political insecurity, so food must be rationed.

The German government has been asked secretly by the Americans to hoard food and clothing so that there will be an available internal supply in case of a Russian invasion, since in that event the import of food and clothing would have to be stopped immediately.

Food prices will rise and the money will be devalued. Dealers are hoarding their merchandise for the purpose of speculation.

There will be no war, so food is being hoarded needlessly.

There's no point in hoarding food, since the Russians would confiscate it anyway if they come.

V. MISCELLANEOUS RUMORS.

The wave length of Radio Munich was changed only so that the population couldn't keep well informed about the Korean conflict.

Over fifty percent of the businessmen of Augsburg have informed the Deutsche Post authorities that they are not using their radios because reception from Radio Munich is almost impossible.

Refugees maintain that they have been told they will be back in their homelands within two years.

Farmers say the scarcity of rainfall is a result of the American atomic experiments.

Adenauer has a garden which cost the government DM 120,000 to make and maintenance expenses will amount to DM 60,000 a year.

All those who refuse to sign the petition sponsored by the Communists against the use of atom bombs will be sent to Siberia.

R E S T R I C T E D

00515

GERMAN REACTIONS TO THE AMERICAN-SPONSORED
NEWSREEL - WELT IM FILM

DECLASSIFIED
by authority of
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[illegible]

Report No. 29
Series No. 2
4 August 1950

REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
HICOG APO 807
Bad Nauheim Germany

R E S T R I C T E D

INTRODUCTION ...

In May 1950, as part of a larger study on media, the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs, HICOG, queried the public regarding the newsreel Welt im Film produced by the Motion Picture Branch, ISD, OPubA, HICOG. Persons who said they attend motion picture theaters with more or less frequency were asked whether they saw Welt im Film as well as other newsreels, and their opinion of them.

The survey was based on a representative random sample of 3000 residents of the US Zone, 500 in the three Western sectors of Berlin, and 300 in Bremen. Interviews were conducted in the homes of respondents by trained German interviewers working under the supervision of American Surveys Officers.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS ...

- ... Four in ten US Zone residents state that they see the newsreel Welt im Film every time they attend a motion picture theater. An additional one in ten say that they see it occasionally. Both in Berlin and in Bremen somewhat larger proportions report regular or occasional viewings of Welt im Film production.
- ... How strongly Welt im Film still dominates the German newsreel scene - though it is no longer compulsory for German theater owners to present it - is highlighted by the fact that over three quarters of US Zone movie-goers report seeing the newsreel every time they attend a motion picture theater.
- ... The large majority of the people who report seeing Welt im Film judge it to be good rather than fair. Scarcely anyone calls it poor.
- ... Only within one group in the population do differences in judgment regarding the quality of the newsreel appear. Judgments of "fair" are somewhat more frequent among university trained than among less educated respondents. However, even in this customarily more critical group two out of three hold the newsreel to be good.
- ... Among the small minority of US Zone respondents who have seen newsreels other than Welt im Film - and who can hence make a comparative judgment - preferences seem pretty well divided at this time between Welt im Film and Fox Movie Tone News. Among Berliners, however, - the majority of which have had the opportunity to see more than one newsreel - preference for Welt im Film leads by a wide margin.

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PROPORTION OF GENERAL PUBLIC SEEING WELT IN FILM ...

Four in ten US Zone residents state that they see the newsreel Welt in Film every time they attend a motion picture theater. An additional one in ten say that they see it occasionally. Both in Berlin and in Bremen somewhat larger proportions report regular or occasional viewings of Welt in Film productions.

"Do you see the newsreel Welt in Film every time you attend the movies or only sometimes?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Every time	43%	31%	45%	40%	34%	57%
Sometimes	8	12	8	9	18	11
Never	1	2	1	1	3	-
No opinion	1	3	2	2	5	1
Do not go to movies	47	52	44	48	40	31
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

PROPORTION OF MOVIE AUDIENCES SEEING WELT IN FILM ...

How strongly Welt in Film still dominates the German newsreel scene - though it is no longer compulsory for German theater owners to present it - is better shown when coverage is calculated on the movie audience, i.e. exclusive of those who never attend movies.

"Do you see the newsreel Welt in Film every time you attend the movies or only sometimes?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Every time	81%	64%	81%	77%	57%	83%
Sometimes	15	25	14	17	29	16
Never	2	5	2	2	5	-
No opinion	2	6	3	4	9	1
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

That fewer West Berliners see Welt in Film every time they attend the cinema arises no doubt from that fact that Berlin movie-goers also attend theaters in the other sectors.

Persons who see Welt in Film regularly do not appreciably differ as to population characteristics from those in the film audience who do not. This is hardly surprising in view of the fact - as has just been indicated - regular Welt in Film spectators embrace the bulk of the movie audience.

WELT IM FILM CONSIDERED GOOD ...

The large majority of the people who report seeing Welt im Film judge it to be good rather than fair. Scarcely anyone calls it poor.

"How do you like the newsreel Welt im Film?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W.Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Good	86%	82%	83%	84%	90%	83%
Fair	12	16	13	13	8	13
Poor	*	*	1	*	*	1
No opinion	2	2	3	3	2	3
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Only within one group in the population do differences in judgment regarding the quality of the newsreel appear. Judgments of "fair" are somewhat more frequent among university trained than among less educated respondents. However, even in this customarily more critical group two out of three hold the newsreel to be good.

Welt im Film is:

	Good	Fair	Poor	No opinion
<u>By Education:</u>				
Elementary only	87%	11%	*	2% ... 100%
Middle	86	11	1	2
Diploma and University	68	26	1	5

* Less than one half of one per cent.

OTHER NEWSREELS ...

About two in ten US Zone movie-goers say they have seen newsreels other than Welt im Film since the end of the war. In West Berlin six in ten have done so - again doubtless because they have not confined their attendance to US Sector theaters.

"Since the end of the war have you ever seen any other newsreels?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W.Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Yes	22%	27%	17%	22%	62%	32%
No	63	48	68	61	25	54
Can't say exactly	15	25	15	17	13	14
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

... The Fox Movie Tone (Fox Tonende Wochenschau) is the newsreel most frequently listed in the US Zone as seen by the minority which claims to have seen newsreels other than Welt im Film. In West Berlin the Russian films Augenzeuge and Defa are named more frequently than the Fox newsreels.

"Which have you seen?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W. Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Fox Movie Tone	20%	23%	14%	19%	30%	25%
New German newsreel	3	3	1	2	1	4
Blick in die Welt (Fr.)	-	*	1	*	9	-
Welt im Bild	-	-	-	-	4	-
Augenzeuge and Defa (R.)	1	1	2	1	34	1
Others	-	*	1	*	1	*
Don't know	1	1	1	1	*	3
	<u>25%</u>	<u>28%</u>	<u>20%</u>	<u>23%</u>	<u>79%</u>	<u>33%</u>

* Less than one half of one per cent.

WHICH NEWSREELS PREFERRED? ...

Since only 22 per cent of the movie audience in the US Zone have seen newsreels other than Welt im Film it is somewhat early to come to any firm conclusion about relative popularity. At the present time among the small group who can make a comparative judgment Welt im Film and Fox Movie Tone seem to be competing rather equally. In Berlin, however, the majority of movie-goers (62%) have seen newsreels other than Welt im Film. Among these respondents, it may be seen in the figures below, Welt im Film is by a considerable margin the most preferred newsreel.

"Which do you like best?" (Asked of those who see Welt im Film and other newsreels.)

	Bavaria	Hesse	W. Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Welt im Film	33%	27%	33%	32%	54%	42%
Fox Movie Tone	28	27	29	28	21	22
New German newsreel	2	1	-	1	1	3
Blick in die Welt	-	-	-	-	2	-
Welt im Bild	-	-	-	-	1	-
Augenzeuge and Defa	1	-	-	-	1	-
Others	-	1	2	1	-	-
Both equally	14	23	15	16	4	7
Indifferent	3	8	6	5	-	6
No opinion	19	13	15	16	16	20
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

CONFIDENTIAL

HAVE THE WESTERN OCCUPYING POWERS FURTHERED OR HINDERED
GERMAN RECONSTRUCTION

**Classification cancelled
by authority of Leo P. Crespi
PUB RAS.**

Report No. 30
Series No. 2
8 August 1950

REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
HICOG APO 807
Bad Nauheim Germany

CONFIDENTIAL

In May 1950 a representative sample of the German population in the US Zone, Bremen and the Western sectors of Berlin were asked to give their opinion in respect to each of the Western occupying powers, as to whether the power in question had furthered or hindered the reconstruction of Germany. The objective was to ascertain to what extent differential reactions had grown up in respect to the Western occupying powers. Obviously to the extent that different feelings exist toward the Americans, the British and the French they are realities to be reckoned with - however unjustified they may be in fact.

The sample comprised 1,500 cases in the US Zone, 250 in Berlin and 160 in Bremen. As usual interviewing was conducted by trained German interviewers under the professional American supervision of the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS ...

- ... Capping a continuous rise from a low point in November 1947, two out of three US Zone residents now express the opinion that the Americans have furthered the reconstruction of Germany.
- ... On the other hand the British and French do not fare at all well as viewed by US Zone respondents on their contribution to German reconstruction.
- ... There is considerable no opinion since US Zone residents have little direct experience with British and French reconstruction efforts, but among those with opinions the view heavily predominates that the British and the French have "hindered" the reconstruction of Germany.
- ... Moreover, since the last prior survey in September of 1949, negative attitudes toward the British and French have increased.
- ... However invalid such negative judgments may be it has to be appreciated that they present a serious problem of public relations to the occupation powers.
- ... Group breakdowns in the US Zone of attitudes toward American reconstruction efforts, reveal that the increase in favorable attitudes between September 1949 and May 1950 is general among all the groups examined rather than confined to any particular segments of the population.
- ... Continuing a steady rise from November 1947, extent of German approval of American reconstruction efforts has in Berlin almost reached a figure of nine out of ten (89%). Judgments of British and French are considerably more favorable than in the US Zone, but again (a) they are far under the American levels, and (b) they show significant increases in unfavorable attitudes since the prior survey in September of 1949.
- ... In Bremen the most notable disclosure of the current survey is a sharp worsening in attitude toward British reconstruction efforts - with which Bremen residents have some first hand contact, living as they do in an enclave of the British Zone. Judgments that the British have hindered the reconstruction of Germany have risen 19 per cent since September of 1949, to the point where it is now the majority view (55%).

- A -

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

- 7... Various forms of economic aid are cited in support of their judgment by almost all of the respondents who feel that the Americans have furthered the reconstruction of Germany.
- ... The few who feel that America has by and large hindered German reconstruction focus mainly upon dismantling in support of their contention.
- ... Respondents who feel the British have furthered German reconstruction divide their reasons between provision of economic aid and general expressions of cooperation and help.
- ... Almost all of the arguments in support of the view that the British have hindered the reconstruction of Germany center on dismantling - usually for allegedly commercial advantages.
- ... The very limited number of respondents who express the feeling that the French have furthered the reconstruction of Germany speak of either economic aid, the Schumann Plan, or general cooperation with the Americans and the British.
- ... The scathing comments more often than not voiced by those who hold that the French have hindered the reconstruction of Germany makes the conclusion inescapable that antagonism toward the French is still a very serious factor to be reckoned with among a substantial portion of the German population.

- b -

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TRENDS AND COMPARISONS IN THE US ZONE ...

The current survey reveals an 8 per cent increase since September 1949 in the proportion of US Zone respondents who indicate the belief that the Americans have furthered the reconstruction of Germany.

The latest gain caps a continuous rise from a low point of 39 per cent in November 1947, and pretty well assures beyond reasonable doubt that this favorable point of view is the majority sentiment in the US Zone.*

"Do you think that the (Americans) (British) (French) have furthered or hindered the reconstruction of Germany?"

US ZONE

	Americans		British		French	
	Sept 1949	May 1950	Sept 1949	May 1950	Sept 1949	May 1950
Furthered	60%	68%	6%	10%	3%	4%
Hindered	9	9	32	37	31	37
Neither/Nor	18	14	11	14	11	16
No opinion	<u>13</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>51</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>43</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

On the other hand, the figures above clearly disclose, the British and French do not fare at all well as viewed by US Zone respondents on their contributions to German reconstruction. There is considerable "no opinion" of course, since US Zone residents have little direct experience with British and French reconstruction efforts, but among those who have opinions negative attitudes heavily predominate. Moreover, the proportion who feel that the British and the French have "hindered" the reconstruction of Germany has since September 1949 grown a statistically reliable 5 per cent and 6 per cent respectively. However invalid such negative judgments may be it cannot be denied that they present a serious problem of public relations to the occupation powers.

* One must be more than ordinarily cautious in interpreting the results to questions bearing so directly and obviously on American prestige, as in such circumstances occasional respondents may be prompted by courtesy or other considerations to exaggerate their pro-American sentiments in answer to an American sponsored survey.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

GROUP COMPARISONS IN US ZONE VIEWS OF AMERICAN EFFORTS ...

Group breakdowns in the US Zone of attitudes toward American reconstruction efforts, reveal that the increase in favorable attitudes between September 1949 and May 1950 is general among all the groups examined rather than confined to any particular segments of the population.

"Do you think that the Americans furthered or hindered the reconstruction of Germany?"

US ZONE

	Furthered		Hindered		Neither/Nor		No opinion	
	Sept 1949	May 1950	Sept 1949	May 1950	Sept 1949	May 1950	Sept 1949	May 1950
<u>Education:</u>								
8 years or less	60%	68%	8%	9%	17%	14%	15%	9%
9 - 11	62	70	9	9	23	14	6	7
12 years or more	55	75	16	10	18	10	10	5
<u>Income (per month):</u>								
0 - 149 DM	59%	68%	7%	8%	14%	13%	20%	11%
150 - 299 DM	60	69	10	9	19	14	11	8
300 DM and more	65	71	8	8	20	14	7	7
<u>Sex:</u>								
Men	66%	71%	10%	9%	18%	14%	6%	6%
Women	55	67	8	8	18	14	19	11
<u>Age:</u>								
Under 29 years	58%	63%	9%	11%	18%	16%	15%	10%
30 - 49	62	70	10	9	19	14	9	7
50 years and over	60	72	7	6	16	12	17	10
<u>Party Preference:</u>								
SPD	71%	76%	8%	6%	16%	12%	5%	6%
CDU/CSU	67	76	6	5	14	11	13	8
FDP/LDP/DVP	69	72	10	10	17	13	4	5
BP	45	67	9	14	28	12	18	7
<u>Origin:</u>								
Natives	59%	68%	9%	9%	18%	14%	14%	9%
All others	64	70	8	9	15	12	13	9

TRENDS AND COMPARISONS IN BERLIN AND BREMEN ...

Continuing a steady rise from November 1947, extent of German approval of American reconstruction efforts has in Berlin almost reached a figure of nine out of ten (89%). Judgments of British and French are considerably more favorable than in the US Zone, but again (a) they are far under the American levels, and (b) they show significant increases in unfavorable attitudes since the prior survey in September of 1949.

"Do you think that the (Americans) (British) (French) have furthered or hindered the reconstruction of Germany?"

	BERLIN					
	Americans		British		French	
	Sept 1949	May 1950	Sept 1949	May 1950	Sept 1949	May 1950
Furthered	85%	89%	46%	35%	17%	13%
Hindered	4	2	18	27	26	34
Neither/Nor	9	7	20	24	31	33
No opinion	2	2	16	14	26	20
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

In the Berlin results, it should be appreciated, German evaluations of the British and French reconstruction efforts are not so much based upon second hand information as in the US Zone because the Berlin surveying is conducted in all three Western sectors.

In Bremen the proportion who hold that the Americans have furthered German reconstruction has not reliably changed from September 1949. Then as now approximately two out of three hold this view. The most notable change has occurred in attitude toward British reconstruction efforts - with which of course Bremen residents have some first hand contact, living as they do in an enclave of the British Zone. Judgments that the British have "hindered" the reconstruction of Germany have risen 19 per cent since September of 1949, to the point where it is now the majority view (55%).

"Do you think that the (Americans) (British) (French) have furthered or hindered the reconstruction of Germany?"

	BREMEN					
	Americans		British		French	
	Sept 1949	May 1950	Sept 1949	May 1950	Sept 1949	May 1950
Furthered	71%	67%	8%	8%	1%	3%
Hindered	5	7	36	55	22	27
Neither/Nor	18	23	17	20	15	27
No opinion	6	3	39	17	62	43
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

REASONS GIVEN FOR AMERICAN EVALUATION ...

Various forms of economic aid are cited in support of their judgment by almost all of the respondents who feel that the Americans have furthered the reconstruction of Germany.

"Do you think that the Americans have furthered or hindered the reconstruction of Germany?"
If "furthered": "In what respect?"

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

By providing economic assistance: By financial aid; by giving raw materials and loans; they have sent us food in our most distressed situation; the airlift to Berlin has contributed to that, too; the Americans have sent medicines, food, and money; by feeding the school-children; etc.

35% 60% 30%

By the Marshall Plan: They have supplied us with the means for reconstruction; for instance, the Marshall Plan; etc.

13 15 21

General answers (Help by the Americans, generally):

They helped us in every way; there is order everywhere; the entire reconstruction has been furthered by them; they strived to help us where they could; there is much progress here now; etc.

9 15 9

By political (moral) aid: By giving us security; by saving us from Communism; they issue positive ordinances for schools and children; by according us democratic freedoms; by forming a government in Western Germany; by certain freedoms they granted us; etc.

5 10 3

By furthering rebuilding: They help us very much at rebuilding our cities, whereas there is no rebuilding in the East Zone; by allotting building materials; etc.

5 2 3

By provision of work: They provided for work and created good living conditions; etc.

1 1 -

By the currency reform:

- 1 1

Other remarks: They have not taken from us as much as the Russians did; they dismantled least of all; by a free economy; we have still much more than the people in the East Zone; because they are on bad terms with the Russians and will need us occasionally; they have done especially much for the children; they have not snatched anything from us and we are not suppressed either; by the early release of the prisoners of war; because our rights have been acknowledged by them; they allowed us free scope of action; because religion has attained rehabilitation; etc.

2 1 3

No opinion:

4 1 3
79% 106% 73%

* Some people gave more than one answer.

The few who feel that America has by and large hindered German reconstruction focus mainly upon dismantling in support of their contention.

"Do you think that the Americans have furthered or hindered the reconstruction of Germany?"
If "hindered": "In what respects?"

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

By dismantling (for reasons of eliminating competition and because of envy and hatred): They tolerate the dismantling, that is their fault, for their financial aid is incompatible with that; because they have dismantled a large part of our industry; etc.

5⁴ 1⁴ 3⁴

By their occupation policy: By their laws, decrees, and agreements; we have no freedom of action in our economic relations; because they hinder exports; by the currency reform; by building houses for themselves and by confiscation; etc.

3 1 1

By hindering the recovery of our economy: The German reconstruction initiative, especially the private initiative, has been hindered by the Americans in many cases instead of being furthered by them; they always keep us down and don't allow us any progress; they don't let us act freely in the world market; etc.

1 - -

Other remarks: Because there are not enough loans; because they have not supplied us sufficiently with raw materials; they have helped the uncultured Russian people too much; there is no evidence of any reconstruction by the Americans as far as I see; they don't allow us to build large ships; because they don't conclude a peace treaty with us; because they have not chased out the Russians from the out-set; because we must rebuild everything alone; the ERP-capital should be used more for the rebuilding of houses and only a very small part of it for the importation of fruits and vegetables; because no apartments for refugees have been built as yet; etc.

1 1 3

No opinion:

$\frac{-}{10^{*}}$ $\frac{-}{3^{*}}$ $\frac{1}{8^{*}}$

* Some people gave more than one answer.

"Do you think that the British have furthered or hindered the reconstruction of Germany? "
If "furthered": "In what respects? "

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

<u>By providing economic assistance:</u> By helping and supporting us; they gave us food, too; they support us, too; because they have supplied us with goods, too; by deliveries of goods; etc.	3%	14%	3%
<u>General answers:</u> By cooperation with the Americans; by their democratic treatment; by taking part in the airlift; they helped us, along with the Americans, to further progress in Germany; because they don't interfere with our affairs and approve of everything; their attitude toward us is friendly; etc.	3	14	2
<u>By furthering rebuilding:</u> One can see much reconstruction work in the British sector; by building roads and highways; they have done as much reconstruction work as the Americans did; etc.	1	2	2
<u>By political (moral) aid:</u> They have secured peace and quiet; they have not blocked the way to our government; by allowing us a free development and to work freely; etc.	1	2	-
<u>By provision of work:</u> For many Germans they provided work in England; they secured work for many Germans who were without a job; etc.	-	1	-
<u>No opinion:</u>	$\frac{2}{10\%}$	$\frac{2}{35\%}$	$\frac{1}{8\%}$

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Almost all of the arguments in support of the view that the British have hindered the reconstruction of Germany center on dismantling - usually for allegedly commercial advantages.

"Do you think that the British have furthered or hindered the reconstruction of Germany?"
If "hindered": "In what respects?"

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

By dismantling (for reasons of eliminating competition and because of envy and hatred):

The British are dismantling factories all the time; by the prohibition of production for I.G.-Farben and radio tubes; by reckless dismantling; they want to keep down the German economy; etc.

33%

25%

46%

By hindering the recovery of our economy: The British only have the aim to annihilate Germany because of fear of the recovery of our industry; they have always been our adversaries in the field of economy and do everything to keep us at the bottom; etc.

1

1

3

By exploitation: They have only filled their own pockets; they take too much from us because they are poor themselves; they take our patents from us; etc.

1

-

2

By their occupation policy: By their laws, decrees and agreements; they have always objected to political concessions toward us, also in the case of the Saar; by unreasonable and revengeful tactics toward Germany; etc.

-

1

1

By distrustful policy toward the Germans: They are still against us; the attitude of the British toward us is very resentful and they will never allow reconstruction here; they hate Germany too much; etc.

-

-

1

Other remarks: Because they make too many concessions to the Russians; they didn't supply us with raw materials and didn't authorize us to act independently as the Americans did; they have to do much reconstruction work in their own country, too, and they started there rather than here, of course; because they didn't fight against the Russians at the end of the war; etc.

1

*

1

No opinion:

$\frac{1}{37\%}$

$\frac{-}{27\%}$

$\frac{1}{55\%}$

* Less than one half of one per cent.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

REASONS GIVEN FOR FRENCH EVALUATION ...

The very limited number of respondents who express the feeling that the French have furthered the reconstruction of Germany speak of either economic aid, the Schumann Plan, or general cooperation with the Americans and the British.

"Do you think that the French have furthered or hindered the reconstruction of Germany?"
If "furthered": "In what respects?"

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

By providing economic assistance: By furthering our economy; because they are interested in trading with Germany; the French put money at our disposal, too; by importation and exchange of goods; by initiating a trade agreement and a customs union; etc.

1% 2% 1%

By the Schumann Plan: The last visit of Schumann gives us hope; by the last agreement between Schumann and Adenauer; by the industry agreement proposed by Schumann; in respect to the Schumann Plan it seems as if they would shift to a friendly attitude toward Germany now; etc.

1 2 1

General answers: They are no longer our enemies now; they want to help us, too; etc.

1 1 -

Other remarks: They also cooperate with the two others; they intend to help us by cooperation with the Americans; they are not so presumptuous and don't consume so much for themselves; by giving us back the city of Kohl; etc.

1 6 -

No opinion:

$$\frac{1}{4\%} \quad \frac{2}{13\%} \quad \frac{1}{3\%}$$

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The nature of the reasons brought forward by those Germans who hold that the French have hindered the reconstruction of Germany indicate clearly that Antagonism toward the French is still a very serious factor to be reckoned with among a substantial portion of the German population. Many of the comments below, it will be noted, are highly colored emotionally and to say the least, scathing in tone:

"Do you think that the French have furthered or hindered the reconstruction of Germany?"
If "hindered": "In what respects?"

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

By exploitation: They have been robbing and stealing here all the time; by taking the Saar territory from us which is an essential part of our economy; they have sucked out of Germany everything they could strip us of; because they take everything from us; the French Saar-robbery proves that they want to keep us down; by territorial annexations such as the Saar; etc.

17% 12% 11%

By dismantling (for reasons of eliminating competition and because of envy and hatred): They take everything from us because they have a deep-rooted hatred against us; etc.

9 7 7

By bad treatment of the German population and distrust toward the Germans: Because they are afraid of us; they don't back German concerns; because they resent us; they don't want an understanding with us; by their irreconcilable hatred against anything German; because they have a traditional hostile attitude toward us and don't want to have anything to do with us; they gave us less to eat in the French Zone; etc.

6 7 3

By hindering the recovery of our economy: They are not interested in a reconstruction of Germany; they want to keep us at the bottom, there is no economic recovery possible in their zone, they strangle everything; the French still regard us as their hereditary foe; the French are sometimes worse than the Russians; if they would have had to decide about it, they would have kept us down; they fear our competition; because France has destroyed willfully everything which might have led to a faster reconstruction of Germany, for reasons of security; etc.

4 5 2

By their occupation policy: By their laws, decrees, and agreements; they have made difficulties for our government all the time; they counteract any progress and improvement in Germany; by the Ruhr-Statute; they isolated their zone in the beginning and industry couldn't work; they have always objected to lifting the zonal borders and to other alleviations for us; they have kept their zone isolated for too long a time; etc.

3 5 3

By deforesting our forests; by coercive wood exports: They have deforested here at a large scale without any consideration of the consequences; the best woods of the "Black Forest" are cut down; etc.

4 - 1

By consuming too much for themselves here (Occupation costs are too high): By excessive occupation costs; by living entirely on the economy of their zone and by sending everything seizable to France; etc.

1 - 1

No opinion:

$\frac{1}{45\%}$ $\frac{1}{37\%}$ $\frac{2}{30\%}$

* Some people gave more than one answer.

R E S T R I C T E D

/ Classification cancelled
by authority of Leo P. Crespi
PUB/RAS.

TRENDS IN AWARENESS AND PATRONAGE
OF THE U.S. INFORMATION CENTERS
IN THE US ZONE, WEST BERLIN AND BREMEN

Report No. 31
Series No. 2
8 August 1950

REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
HICOG APO 607
Bad Nauheim Germany

R E S T R I C T E D

R E S T R I C T E D

INTRODUCTION ...

As part of a larger study on reactions to various media, the public in the US Zone, West Berlin and Bremen were queried in May 1950 by the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs, HICOG, regarding their knowledge and patronage of the Amerika Haus (US Information Centers). A representative sample - randomly selected - of 3000 persons in the US Zone, 500 in Berlin and 316 in Bremen were interviewed in their homes by trained German interviewers working under the supervision of American Survey Officers.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS ...

- ... Awareness of the existence of Amerika Haus has become widespread in the US occupied areas of Germany. Majorities ranging from 62% in the US Zone as a whole to 74% in Bremen are now aware of the presence of such US centers of information in the larger German cities.
- ... This awareness is buttressed by the ability on the part of most to specify one or more of the facilities which Amerika Haus offer to the public.
- ... Public awareness of specific Amerika Haus offerings has increased nine-fold in the US Zone during the past two and a half years and though the centers are largely confined to cities, the rate of increase in knowledge is greatest in rural villages, increasing twenty-fold there, in contrast to about seven-fold in the largest cities.
- ... Patronage of Amerika Haus has also increased markedly since February 1943. Then one US Zone citizen out of every 100 claimed to visit the centers. In May 1950 seven out of every 100 say they do so. Comparative figures for West Berlin are 2% to 9%, and for Bremen 3% to 15%. Patronage in the larger cities is of course relatively much greater.
- ... Considering limitations of accessibility and physical capacity of the centers, the present patronage figures are far from inconsiderable.
- ... Comparison of the group composition of those who are aware of the Amerika Haus with the group composition of the general population shows that knowledge extends fairly evenly throughout all segments of the population.
- ... There is a tendency for Amerika Haus clients to be drawn more heavily from the customarily more informed groups - the better educated, the more prosperous, the professional and white-collar occupations, and the men. Notwithstanding this fact, however, a fairly large proportion of visitors to the centers come from the more inert and difficult to reach strata of the German population.

- 2 -

R E S T R I C T E D

R E S T R I C T E D

AWARENESS OF AMERIKA HAUSER ...

The existence of Amerika Hauser (US Information Centers) in Western Germany is now widely known by the German public in the US occupied areas. This fact is revealed in the most recent survey of May 1950 which discloses that majorities ranging from 62 per cent in the US Zone as a whole to 74 per cent in Bremen are aware of the existence of such centers of US information.

Proportions knowing there are Amerika Hauser ...

... 60% in Bavaria
... 65% in Hesse
... 61% in Wuerttemberg-Baden

... 62% in US Zone as a whole

... 63% in West Berlin
... 74% in Bremen

AMERIKA HAUSER OFFERINGS ...

Persons who are aware of the existence of the US Information Centers are also more likely than not to know what the public is offered there. In the US Zone approximately six in ten of the aware groups can specify one or more of its facilities and offerings; in West Berlin eight in ten, and in Bremen nearly nine in ten of this group can do so. Translated into terms of the entire adult public of these localities, this means that almost four in ten zonal residents, five in ten West Berliners and about two-thirds of the Bremen residents are in possession of specific information about Amerika Hauser.

R E S T R I C T E D

Detailed free answer replies are listed below. (Figures in the first column are based on the proportions knowing there are Amerika Hauser; those in parenthesis, on the total adult population in each locality.)

"Do you know what the public is offered there?"
(Asked of those who said they had heard there were Amerika Hauser in the larger cities.)

	US ZONE*	Berlin	Bremen
Know offerings	62% (38%)	80% (49%)	87% (64%)
Do not know	38 (24)	20 (14)	13 (10)
	100% (62%)	100% (63%)	100% (74%)

Offerings are:

Library, periodicals	45% (28%)	46% (29%)	70% (52%)
Lectures, discussions	34 (21)	55 (34)	49 (36)
Films, plays	24 (14)	48 (30)	48 (35)
Concerts, recitals	18 (11)	18 (11)	18 (11)
American literature	8 (5)	11 (7)	21 (15)
Language lessons	8 (5)	5 (3)	8 (6)
Exhibitions, art	6 (3)	20 (12)	6 (5)
Other	8 (5)	5 (3)	4 (3)
question not asked	- (38)	- (37)	- (26)

(Percentages total more than 100 because some people named more than one offering.)

*Figures for the Laender (States) are not shown as they are similar in each Land to the US Zone total.

R E S T R I C T E D

INCREASE IN AWARENESS ...

Publicity regarding the US Information Centers appears to have been very effective. During the past two and a half years there has been a remarkable growth in awareness that there are US centers of information in West Germany. Using the public's ability to specify offerings of the centers - a fairly rigid test of awareness - as a basis for comparison,** from February 1948 to May 1950, the proportion of the US Zone population who could do so increased nine-fold, or from 4% to 38% of the total US Zone population fifteen years of age and older. The fact that the Amerika Hauser are only situated in the larger cities makes this over-all zonal increase in awareness more impressive. During the same period, the comparative increases for Berlin and Bremen were from 11% to 49%, and from 22% to 64% respectively.

... The following table shows the comparative trend in greater detail:

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Feb 1948	May 1950	Feb 1948	May 1950	Feb 1948	May 1950
Know offerings	4%	38%	11%	49%	22%	64%
<u>Offerings are:</u>						
Library, inc. American Literature	4	33	5	36	13	67
Lectures, discussions	1	21	7	34	11	36
Concerts, recitals	*	11	1	11	3	11
Films, plays	*	14	2	30	-	35
Language lessons	*	5	*	3	*	6
Exhibitions, art	-	3	-	12	-	5
Other	-	5	1	3	-	3
Do not know offerings	96	62	39	51	78	36

* Less than one half of one per cent.

(Percentages add to more than 100 because some people mentioned more than one offering.)

** As already stated, 62% in the US Zone claim to know that Amerika Hauser exist. But not all of these people were able to cite specific offerings. For this reason, the comparative trend was based in the interests of maximum accuracy on the groups which could mention offerings.

R E S T R I C T E D

COMPARATIVE TRENDS BY SIZE OF COMMUNITY ...

Since the Amerika Hauser are located in the larger cities, it is interesting to note the comparative growth in awareness according to size of the communities in which respondents live. Not surprising is the fact that the larger the community the more likely people are to be informed. More interesting is the fact that the greatest proportional increase in awareness has occurred in the rural villages: in May 1950, over twenty times as many village people know what the Amerika Hauser offered than did so in February 1948.

By Size of Community:	Can Specify Amerika Haus Offerings:	
	Feb 1948	May 1950
Under 2000	15	22
2000 - 4,999	3	32
5000 - 9,999	5	43
10,000 - 99,999	7	54
100,000 - 249,999	14	57
250,000 and over (Excluding West Berlin and Bremen)	6	59

PATRONAGE OF AMERIKA HAUSER ...

Necessarily far fewer people will have visited an Amerika Haus than know about them. The centers only exist in the larger cities of West Germany which of course pose problems of access to more rural areas. Moreover, attendance of the various programs must of course be limited to the capacity of the buildings in which the centers are located.

In the light of such inevitable limitations of this type of medium the latest patronage findings seem far from inconsiderable. In the US Zone seven per cent of the entire population 15 years or over - or roughly 931,000 people - claim to have visited an Amerika Haus one or more times. This percentage figure is an average for the Zone as a whole, and as will be seen below is considerably higher in the larger zonal cities. In West Berlin 9% and in Bremen 15% say they have patronized the centers - which roughly projects to 155,000 people in West Berlin and 65,000 in Bremen.

INCREASE IN PATRONAGE ...

These latest patronage figures cited above represent a marked increase in extent of attendance since the earlier survey in February 1948.

	Patronage of Amerika Hauser	
	Feb 1948	May 1950
Berlin	2	9
Bremen	3	15
US ZONE	1	7
By Size of Community (US ZONE)		
Under 5000	*	4
5000 - 9,999	1	9
9,999 - 99,999	2	12
100,000 - 249,999	6	17
250,000 and over	1	12

* Less than one half of one per cent.

GROUP DIFFERENCES ...

Comparisons of the group composition of the people who are aware of Amerika Haesuser with the group composition of the general population reveals that knowledge of the existence of the US Information Centers extends fairly evenly throughout all segments of the population. The customarily more informed groups - the better educated, the men, and urban residents - are somewhat more likely to know of the centers, but the differences are not large.

In respect to actual attendance, in contrast to simple awareness, there is a greater tendency for Amerika Haus clients to bulk from the more informed groups - the better educated, the men, the more prosperous, and the professional and white-collar occupations. In spite of these preponderating tendencies, however, the tabular comparisons show that far from an insignificant proportion of the Information Center visitors are drawn from the more inert and more difficult to reach strata of the German population.

	Proportions knowing of <u>Amerika Haesuser</u>	Proportions visiting <u>Amerika Haesuser</u>	Proportions in Total <u>Population</u>
<u>Education:</u>			
Elementary only	74%	45%	81%
Middle	20	36	15
Diploma and university	6	21	4
Still in school	*	4	*
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

* Less than one half of one per cent.

<u>Sex:</u>			
Men	48%	54%	42%
Women	52	46	58
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

<u>City Size:</u>			
Under 5000	45%	27%	55%
5000 - 9,999	10	11	9
10,000 - 24,999	8	8	7
25,000 - 99,999	12	20	10
100,000 - 249,999	9	16	7
250,000 and over	16	18	12
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

<u>Age:</u>			
Under 20 years	6%	10%	7%
20 - 29 years	20	25	17
30 - 39 years	21	19	19
40 - 49 years	22	20	22
50 - 59 years	18	16	16
60 - 69 years	10	8	12
70 years and over	3	2	5
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

	Proportions knowing of <u>Amerika Hauser</u>	Proportions visiting <u>Amerika Hauser</u>	Proportions in Total <u>Population</u>
<u>Religion:</u>			
Catholics	42%	36%	45%
Protestants	52	59	51
Others	2	1	1
No affiliation	4	4	3
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
<u>Monthly Family Income:</u>			
Under 100 DM	11%	9%	13%
100 - 149,99 DM	12	10	14
150 - 199,99 DM	14	14	16
200 - 249,99 DM	20	14	20
250 - 299,99 DM	12	14	11
300 - 399,99 DM	15	11	12
400 - 749,99 DM	12	15	10
750 and over	2	18	1
Don't know	2	6	3
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
<u>Occupation:</u>			
Professional and Technical	7%	16%	5%
Business and Managerial	11	12	9
Clerical	21	29	16
Skilled workers	27	19	26
Semi-skilled workers	10	6	11
Unskilled workers	6	1	7
Service	8	9	8
Farm	9	4	16
None	1	4	2
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

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GERMANS VIEW THE KOREAN OUTBREAK
I: URBAN TRENDS IN U.S. OCCUPIED AREAS

Classification cancelled
by authority of Leo P. Crespi
PUB/RAS.

Report No. 32
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14 August 1950

REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
HICOG APO 807
Bad Nauheim Germany

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INTRODUCTION ...

To keep abreast of developments in German opinion following the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs, has conducted regular "flash" surveys in the US occupied areas. The coverage in these 24 hour urban surveys embraces a 300 case quota sample of US Zone cities over 25,000 population, and 100 case quota samples for Berlin and Bremen.

The present report delineates the trends in German opinions that have evidenced themselves in the four post-Korean surveys that have thus far been conducted (through August 7, 1950). Besides continuing these trends, it is planned in following reports to (a) present urban opinion for West Germany as a whole,* i.e. inclusive of the British and French Zones, and (b) present a complete picture of attitudes in the US occupied areas (based on a regular full-scale random sample), with a consideration of group differences.

For a better understanding of the results that are presented it is well to be reminded of the predominant views emphasized at the time each of the four surveys were conducted. As ascertained from German newspapers on the day preceding and the morning of surveys the emphases were as follows:

July 7th : Tone was of growing pessimism. Papers stressed North Korean advances with spearheading forces only 30 kilometers from American headquarters at Taejon.

July 21st : Tone was of optimism. Papers focused upon successful amphibious landing of American troops near Pohang.

July 28th : Tone was of pessimism as the North Koreans continued their steady advances even in the face of American reinforcements.

August 7th: Tone was of growing optimism. Paper spoke of new American reinforcements continually arriving and being dispatched to critical sectors of the front.

* This extensive enlargement of survey scope marks a new departure for the Reactions Analysis Staff. It is hoped that such coverage can be provided more and more frequently as circumstances permit.

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AWARENESS AND EVALUATION OF COMMUNIST ATTACK

WHO ATTACKED FIRST? ...

Despite heavy Communist propaganda to the contrary there is little doubt among urban US Zone Germans that the Communists were the aggressors in the Korean outbreak. In all three surveys on this question only miniscule proportions, among those who had opinions, failed to single out the North Koreans as the attackers.

"Can you tell me who attacked first in Korea?"

	US ZONE			Berlin			Bremen		
	7th	21st	28th	7th	21st	28th	7th	21st	28th
North Korea -									
Communists - Russia	74%	83%	85%	87%	89%	92%	75%	94%	90%
South Korea	3	3	1	-	1	-	1	-	-
Others	3	1	1	-	-	1	3	-	1
No opinion	20	13	13	13	10	7	21	6	9
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

WAS ATTACK JUSTIFIED? ...

Minute also are the proportions among the West Germans sampled who felt that there was any justification for the Communist attack upon the South Koreans.

"In your opinion was the attack of the Communists justified or unjustified?" (Asked of those who answered "North Korea", "Communists" or "Russia" to preceding question.)

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	July 7	July 21	July 7	July 21	July 7	July 21
Justified	1%	2%	1%	2%	1%	5%
Unjustified	66	74	82	80	68	72
No opinion	7	7	4	7	6	17
	74%	83%	87%	89%	75%	94%

WHO INSTIGATED ATTACK? ...

And finally it is evident that most urban US area Germans with opinions in the matter feel that the aggression in Korea was not instigated by the North Koreans on their own, but was prompted by Russia.

"Do you believe that communist North Korea started the war on its own, or do you think that the war was instigated by Russia?" (Asked of those who answered "North Korea", "Communists" or "Russia" to initial question.)

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	July 7	July 21	July 7	July 21	July 7	July 21
Started war on its own	3%	4%	3%	2%	3%	11%
Was instigated by Russia	64	73	81	83	66	68
Others	1	1	-	1	1	1
No opinion	6	5	3	3	5	14
	74%	83%	87%	89%	75%	94%

C O N F I D E N T I A L

AWARENESS AND EVALUATION OF AMERICAN INTERVENTION

HAS AMERICA ENTERED THE FRAY? ...

By July 7th, 12 days after the attack, well over four out of five German city-dwellers in the US occupied areas knew that America had entered the battle.

"Do you know whether America has intervened in the Korean conflict with armed forces?"

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	July 7	July 21	July 7	July 21	July 7	July 21
Yes, has intervened	89%	93%	86%	92%	85%	97%
No, has not intervened	2	1	2	2	5	-
No opinion	9	6	12	6	10	3
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

WAS AMERICAN ACTION A SURPRISE? ...

The majority in the US Zone and in West Berlin claim that the American action in Korea did not take them by surprise - which is probably a little exaggerated in view of the fact that the predominant German opinion has for some time been that American policy is over-conciliatory toward Communism.

"Had you personally expected the measures America has taken in the Korean conflict or were you surprised by America's action?"

	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
	July 21	July 21	July 21
Expected	56%	60%	45%
Surprised	34	37	40
No opinion	10	3	15
	100%	100%	100%

WAS AMERICAN ACTION JUSTIFIED? ...

Approval of the American action in Korea is widespread among the Germans sampled. Approximately three quarters in the US Zone and Bremen - nine out of ten in Berlin - express agreement with the measures taken.

"In general, do you agree with America's actions in Korea or do you disagree with them?" (Asked of those who expressed an opinion in the preceding question.)

	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
	July 21	July 21	July 21
Agree	72%	90%	79%
Disagree	11	6	4
No opinion	7	1	2
	90%	97%	85%

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

AWARENESS AND APPRAISAL OF UN AID

HAS THE AMERICAN ACTION UN BACKING? ...

Approximately four out of five Zone respondents and Berliners - fewer in Bremen - appear to be aware of the fact that the United Nations back the American response to the Korean outbreak.

"Can you tell me please, whether the UN, that is the United Nations, supports the American measures in Korea or not?"

	US ZONE			Berlin			Bremen		
	July			July			July		
	7th	21st	28th	7th	21st	28th	7th	21st	28th
Does support	77%	85%	80%	80%	85%	83%	68%	71%	66%
Does not support	4	1	4	-	1	3	1	3	11
Don't know	19	14	16	20	14	14	31	26	23
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

ARE OTHER COUNTRIES HELPING IN THE FIGHT? ...

Even as late as August 7th, feeling could not be called widespread among the Germans sampled, that other countries were helping the Americans and South Koreans in their battle against the aggressors. Among zonal respondents less than a majority indicated the belief that other countries were helping.

"As far as you know, are the Americans and the South Koreans fighting alone against North Korea, or are other countries fighting against North Korea, too?"

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	July	Aug	July	Aug	July	Aug
	28th	7th	28th	7th	28th	7th
Alone	39%	33%	33%	22%	33%	25%
Other countries	47	48	45	58	45	55
No opinion	14	19	22	20	22	20
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

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HOW MUCH IS THE HELP? ...

Moreover, most of those who stated that other countries were helping expressed the opinions (1) that the amount of aid was limited to negligible, and (2) that the other countries were doing less than they could under the circumstances to help South Korea.

"Is the amount of aid from other countries great, not so great, or doesn't it carry much weight at all?" (Asked of those who said "other countries were helping" in previous question.)

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	July 28th	Aug 7th	July 28th	Aug 7th	July 28th	Aug 7th
Great	27	47	8	10	2	4
Not so great	19	21	14	22	19	20
Doesn't carry much weight	24	22	19	22	22	26
No opinion	2	1	4	4	2	5
	<u>47</u>	<u>48</u>	<u>45</u>	<u>58</u>	<u>45</u>	<u>55</u>

"Do you think that these other countries are doing what they can under the circumstances to help South Korea, or not?" (Asked of those who said "other countries were helping" in initial question.)

Yes, they are doing what they can	10	10	19	22	5	16
No, they are not doing what they can	34	33	22	36	35	32
No opinion	3	5	4	-	5	7
	<u>47</u>	<u>48</u>	<u>45</u>	<u>58</u>	<u>45</u>	<u>55</u>

EVALUATION OF KOREAN NEWS REPORTING

ARE AMERICAN NEWS REPORTS TRUSTWORTHY? ...

In a July 21st inquiry a majority in Berlin - approximately four out of ten in the US Zone and Bremen - expressed the belief that the American reports on Korea were "very trustworthy." Most of the remainder gave "fairly trustworthy" as their opinion, with only a negligible number saying "not at all trustworthy."

"Do you think that the American reports on the conflict in Korea are very trustworthy, fairly trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy?"

	US ZONE July 21	Berlin July 21	Bremen July 21
Very trustworthy	41	59	37
Fairly trustworthy	49	35	41
Not at all trustworthy	4	1	1
No opinion	6	5	21
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

In a slightly different inquiry on the 28th, four out of five in the Zone and Bremen - nine out of ten in Berlin - gave as their impression that American reports about Korea presented both sides of the picture - the unfavorable as well as the favorable.

"Do you have the impression that in general the reports from the American side about the conflict in Korea present the favorable as well as the unfavorable facts, or are only happenings favorable to America reported?"

	US ZONE July 28	Berlin July 28	Bremen July 28
Unfavorable as well as favorable	80%	90%	78%
Only favorable	9	6	12
No opinion	11	4	10
	100%	100%	100%

ARE COMMUNISTS REPORTS TRUSTWORTHY? ...

Communist news reports arouse considerably less confidence among the Germans sampled, with only one out of twenty in the Zone and Bremen - one out of 100 in Berlin - holding them to be "very trustworthy." Opinion splits between "fairly trustworthy" and "not at all trustworthy" in the Zone, with however majority opinion leaning definitely toward the latter in Berlin.

"Do you think that the Communists reports on the conflict in Korea are very trustworthy, fairly trustworthy or not at all trustworthy?"

	US ZONE July 21	Berlin July 21	Bremen July 21
Very trustworthy	5%	1%	6%
Fairly trustworthy	35	22	33
Not at all trustworthy	36	60	21
No opinion	24	17	40
	100%	100%	100%

Asked directly to compare the reliability of Korean news from American versus Communist sources few indeed give the palm to the latter.

"Which news about the struggle in Korea is more reliable: that from the American or that from the Communist side?"

	US ZONE July 28	Berlin July 28	Bremen July 28
From American side	67%	86%	81%
From Communist side	3	2	1
No opinion	30	12	18
	100%	100%	100%

C O N F I D E N T I A L

WHAT ABOUT PEACE PROPOSALS

HAVE PEACE PROPOSALS BEEN MADE? ...

As of July 28th, only among US Zone city-dwellers had awareness of the existence of peace proposals reached majority status. In Berlin and Bremen the majority either indicated that they did not know or held that proposals to settle the Korean conflict had not yet been made.

"Have you heard or read whether proposals have been made to settle the Korean conflict?"

	US ZONE July 28	Berlin July 28	Bremen July 28
Yes, have been made	63%	41%	46%
No, have not been made	8	10	17
Don't know	29	49	37
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Those who answered "Yes, have been made" were asked the following question:

"Who has made such proposals?"

	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
England	13%	4%	5%
India - Nehru	39	22	30
Others	10	9	5
No opinion	7	6	6
	<u>69%*</u>	<u>41%</u>	<u>46%</u>

* Percentage adds up to more than 63% because some respondents gave more than one answer.

SHOULD PEACE DISCUSSIONS PRECEDE NORTH KOREANS' WITHDRAWAL? ...

Throughout the last three surveys majority opinion has held firm in the US Zone and Berlin that no offers to negotiate the Korean situation should be accepted without the North Korean aggressors first removing themselves from South Korea. This sentiment is strongest in Berlin where two out of three espouse the view. In Bremen, the acceptance of any offer of negotiation receives the preponderant vote.

"Should the West accept any offer to negotiate the Korean situation while the North Korean aggressors are still in South Korea, or should the West accept such an offer only when the North Koreans have left South Korea?"

	US ZONE			Berlin			Bremen		
	July 21st	July 28th	Aug 7th	July 21st	July 28th	Aug 7th	July 21st	July 28th	Aug 7th
Should accept any offer	30%	34%	28%	19%	26%	26%	42%	42%	47%
Should accept only when the North Koreans have left South Korea	54	52	52	67	57	58	41	42	39
No opinion	16	14	20	14	17	6	17	16	14
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

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EXTENT OF WAR APPREHENSIONS

DOES KOREA MEAN WORLD WAR? ...

From the initial survey the predominant opinion among the Germans sampled - majorities in the Zone and Berlin - has been that the Korean conflict does not mark the opening of a new world war, but rather is an experiment to test the power of the West.

"Are you of the opinion that the Communists want to start a new world war through the Korean conflict, or do you believe that the Korean conflict is only an experiment in order to test the power of the West?"

ACD

	US ZONE			Berlin			Bremen		
	July			July			July		
	7th	21st	28th	7th	21st	28th	7th	21st	28th
Communists want to start a new world war	24%	22%	26%	28%	32%	32%	26%	23%	34%
Only an experiment	56	59	54	62	54	56	43	48	47
Neither/Nor	8	8	10	3	8	5	9	12	6
No opinion	12	11	10	7	6	7	22	17	13
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

WORLD WAR WITHIN TEN YEARS? ...

However, the Korean outbreak has apparently upped the proportion of urban residents in the US Zone who feel that a world war will break out within the next ten years. In September 1949, slightly over half in the Zone thought there would be a war within that time. Now two out of three express such a belief - with similar proportions in Berlin and Bremen.

"Do you think there will be a new world war within the next ten years, or not?"

ACD

	US ZONE			Berlin		Bremen	
	Sep(49)	July 7	July 21	July 7	July 21	July 7	July 21
Yes	55%	69%	66%	67%	64%	60%	64%
No	29	21	22	31	33	25	24
No opinion	16	10	12	2	3	15	12
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

ANOTHER KOREA IN GERMANY? ...

Throughout the series of four surveys the predominant opinion in all the areas sampled has been that the danger of another Korea in Germany is "great" rather than "fairly great" or small. However, as many as a third in Berlin - a quarter in the Zone and Bremen - hold that the likelihood of such an eventuality is small.

"Do you think that the danger that a conflict like the one in Korea will arise in Germany is great, fairly great or small?"

ACD

	US ZONE			Berlin			Bremen		
	July			July			July		
	7th	21st	28th	7th	21st	28th	7th	21st	28th
Great	38%	37%	44%	39%	42%	51%	42%	48%	34%
Fairly great	27	32	29	30	23	24	25	19	29
Small	29	28	23	26	34	25	33	24	18
No opinion	6	3	4	5	1	-	-	9	13
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

C O N F I D E N T I A L

EXTENT OF CONFIDENCE IN WEST

IS KOREA ALL LOSS ON THE WESTERN BALANCE SHEET? ...

The Germans are far from considering the Communist aggression in Korea a complete disaster for the West. This is indicated by the finding that a majority in Berlin - and about as many as feel otherwise in the Zone and Bremen - hold on July 21st that the political advantages to the West of being alerted and unified by the incident outweigh the military losses.

"If you consider the situation in Korea, who is politically in the stronger position at the present time, - the Communist powers as a result of their military progress, or the Western powers, who have thus been alerted and unified in their counter-measures?"

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	July 7	July 21	July 7	July 21	July 7	July 21
The Communist powers	47%	42%	29%	34%	33%	39%
The Western powers	33	39	61	56	38	36
No opinion	20	19	10	10	29	25
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

WILL KOREAN AGGRESSORS BE DRIVEN OUT? ...

Confidence that within a reasonable length of time the West will succeed in driving the aggressors out of South Korea definitely took a drop in Germany from the July 21st survey to that of one week later. Newspapers on the 21st were optimistically focusing on the successful amphibious landing of American reinforcements near Pohang. On the 28th, however, the tone of Korean news was definitely pessimistic in the face of continued American reverses. However, as of the latest survey of August 7th, the preponderant feeling everywhere - the majority sentiment in Berlin - was one of confidence. And nowhere in any of the three inquiries on this point has more than one out of five expressed the view that he was "not confident at all" about a successful outcome in Korea.

"Are you confident, less confident or not confident at all that within a reasonable length of time the Americans will succeed in driving the North Koreans out of South Korea?"*

	US ZONE			Berlin			Bremen		
	July 21st	July 28th	Aug 7th	July 21st	July 28th	Aug 7th	July 21st	July 28th	Aug 7th
Confident	57%	37%	50%	67%	50%	55%	50%	37%	44%
Less confident	29	34	25	23	32	27	31	31	33
Not confident at all	8	19	15	6	12	12	13	19	11
No opinion	6	10	10	4	6	6	6	13	12
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

* question is now being asked in terms of Americans and other UN nations.

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IS AMERICA FACING UP TO THE WORLD CRISIS? ...

Rather marked differences of opinion show up between US Zone city-dwellers and Berlin and Bremen respondents as to whether or not America is preparing as well as possible to contend with all further international contingencies. Berliners have the greatest confidence with four out of five approving American efforts. Zonal confidence is a little less extensive with two out of three approving. In Bremen, however, the preponderant opinion with almost a majority (49%) is that America is not preparing as well as possible. The reasoning lying behind these quite different judgments must be left to future more detailed inquiries.

"From what you have recently heard or read, do you think that America is preparing as well as possible to meet all further international developments, or not?"

ACD

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	July 21	July 28	July 21	July 28	July 21	July 28
Yes, as well as possible	74%	68%	85%	82%	31%	36%
No, not as well as possible	13	20	9	9	38	49
No opinion	<u>13</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>25</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

WOULD AMERICA STAND FIRM IN EUROPE? ...

Despite the pessimistic news emanating from Korea around July 28th, a definite majority everywhere sampled - four out of five in Berlin - expressed the conviction that America would take a firm stand in Western Europe in the event of Communist aggression there.

"Considering the events in Korea, are you firmly convinced that America would take a firm stand in case of Communist aggression in Western Europe, or are you less or not at all convinced of that?"

ACD

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	July 21	July 28	July 21	July 28	July 21	July 28
Firmly convinced	69%	62%	87%	80%	66%	60%
Less convinced	18	24	11	16	17	21
Not at all convinced	7	8	1	2	4	7
No opinion	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>12</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

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ARE WESTERN POWERS DOING EVERYTHING THEY SHOULD IN GERMANY? ...

In the face of a month of Korean developments (July 7th to August 7th), by and large the feeling has apparently been growing that the Western powers are not doing everything that they should to insure the security of West Germany. As of the most recent survey a majority of Zone respondents and residents of Bremen have come around to expressing such a view. In Berlin a majority (53%) still hold that everything necessary is being done, but the proportion feeling otherwise has grown from 25 to 44 per cent.

"Do you feel that the Western powers are doing everything that they should to insure the security of West Germany?"

ACD

	US ZONE				Berlin				Bremen			
	July			Aug	July			Aug	July			Aug
	7th	21st	28th	7th	7th	21st	28th	7th	7th	21st	28th	7th
Yes, do everything	45%	46%	32%	32%	74%	54%	54%	53%	41%	26%	33%	40%
No, do not do everything	45	44	60	59	25	40	37	44	44	58	56	51
No opinion	10	10	8	9	1	6	9	3	15	16	11	9
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Opinions vary on what more the Western powers should do with emphasis focusing more and more on either (1) sending more occupation troops to Germany and Europe and (2) establishing a West German army. Much more detailed inquiry into German attitudes in this critical area is now under way and will be reported upon shortly.

"What more should the Western powers do?" (Asked of those who answered "No, do not do everything" to preceding question.)

ACD

	US ZONE				Berlin				Bremen			
	July			Aug	July			Aug	July			Aug
	7th	21st	28th	7th	7th	21st	28th	7th	7th	21st	28th	Aug
Establish West German army	10%	10%	14%	15%	6%	15%	17%	15%	7%	13%	16%	13%
Establish federal police force	4	3	3	6	4	4	6	5	4	5	5	7
Send more occupation troops to Germany and Europe	12	18	22	23	12	17	10	18	18	26	27	15
Give written guarantee of security to West Germany	**	8	9	7	**	2	2	2	**	12	6	7
Others	16	9	11	12	5	6	8	14	15	16	1	6
No opinion	3	1	4	3	2	1	4	4	-	2	1	3
	45%	49%*	63%*	66%*	29%*	45%*	47%*	58%*	44%	64%*	56%	51%

* Some respondents gave more than one answer.

**This category of answers was not parceled out of the "others" category until the second survey.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SHOULD WEST GERMANY BE NEUTRAL?

WHAT WOULD BE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS? ...

The effect of Korean developments has been to increase somewhat the proportion of US Zone city-dwellers and Berliners who feel that in the event of war it would be most advantageous for West Germany to keep out altogether. However, sentiment still pretty much splits between this view and siding with the West in the US Zone and Bremen. And in Berlin, despite some drop, approximately two out of three favor siding with the West.

"In case of war, would it be more advantageous for West Germany to side with the Western powers or to side with Russia, or would it be more advantageous if West Germany would keep out of a war altogether? "

	US ZONE				Berlin			Bremen		
	Sept(49) 27th	July 7th	Aug 21st	Aug 7th	July 7th	Aug 21st	Aug 7th	July 7th	Aug 21st	Aug 7th
Side with Western powers	45%	44%	39%	46%	78%	75%	64%	42%	46%	47%
Side with Russia	1	2	2	1	-	-	1	-	-	1
Keep out	46	51	56	52	21	24	35	48	48	49
No opinion	8	3	3	1	1	1	-	10	6	3
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

* Some changes in question wording have been introduced during the course of this trend - which are not likely, however, to seriously disturb the comparability of the results.

IS NEUTRALITY POSSIBLE? ...

The wording of the above question - would it be more advantageous for West Germany to stay out of war altogether - invites Germans to express what they might wish, quite apart from what is possible under the circumstances. Hence, though the results are valuable as an indication of German wishes, they are not to be looked upon as indicating the actual proportion of West Germans who in the event of a war would rally to the Western banner. This point is shown clearly in the results below to two follow-up questions.

"Do you think that it would really be possible for Western Germany to keep out altogether of a conflict between East and West?" (Asked of those who answered "Keep out" to preceding question.)

	US ZONE			Berlin			Bremen		
	July	21	Aug 7	July	21	Aug 7	July	21	Aug 7
Yes	9%		6%	6%		11%	3%		4%
No	41		41	17		22	36		38
No opinion	6		5	1		2	9		7
	56%		52%	24%		35%	48%		49%

"And with whom should West Germany side, with the Western powers or with Russia?" (Asked of those who answered "No" to preceding question.)

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	July	21	July	21	July	21
Western powers	38%		36%		16%	19%
Russia	1		1		1	1
No opinion	2		4		-	2
	41%		41%		17%	22%

DECISION ...

So combining the last two tables to obtain the net realistic decisions of the Germans sampled i.e. decisions which take into account what is possible under the circumstances - discloses widespread support for the West.

DCD

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	<u>July 21</u>	<u>Aug 7</u>	<u>July 21</u>	<u>Aug 7</u>	<u>July 21</u>	<u>Aug 7</u>
Side with Western powers	77%	82%	91%	83%	73%	79%
Side with Russia	3	2	1	2	1	2
Keep out	9	6	6	11	3	4
No opinion	<u>11</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>15</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

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GERMANS VIEW THE KOREAN OUTBREAK

II. Urban Opinions in Western Germany

**Classification cancelled
by authority of Leo P. Crespi
PUB/RAS.**

Report No. 33
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23 August 1950

REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF
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INTRODUCTION ...

In the initial report of this series* the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs, presented urban German reactions to the issues raised by the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. In the present report opinion coverage on these issues is extended to an urban sample of Western Germany as a whole, i.e. inclusive of the British and French, as well as the American, zones. These Western German results derive from a newly established 48-hour "flash" survey embracing a representative urban quota sample of 640 cases drawn from Western German cities 50,000 and over in population, and a 200 case quota sample in Berlin.

The final report of the current series - forthcoming about two weeks hence - will present a complete picture of Korean attitudes in the US occupied areas based upon a regular full-scale random sample of the entire German population, rural as well as urban. Detailed consideration of group differences in opinions will be left to this report as the necessity for speed in the "flash" surveys preclude the extensive number of cases that is desirable for such group comparisons.

The current survey was conducted August 15th through August 17th in Western Germany, through August 18th in Berlin. The Korean news context in German papers during this period was neither markedly optimistic nor pessimistic as it focused upon Communist build-up for a major offensive and an American build-up to repulse it.

*Germans View the Korean Outbreak - I. Urban Trends in US Occupied Areas, Report No. 32, Series No. 2, 14 August 1950.

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AWARENESS AND APPRAISAL OF UN AID

Since previous surveys so clearly suggest that urban Germans quite agree that the North Koreans are guilty of an unprovoked attack and the Americans are justified in countering - these issues were by-passed in the current inquiry to begin with the question of UN support.

HAS THE AMERICAN ACTION UN BACKING? ...

As of mid-August, awareness of UN backing for the American action in Korea is fairly uniform throughout all of Western Germany, around a figure of three out of four.

"Can you tell me please, whether the UN, that is the United Nations, supports the American measures in Korea or not?"

	WEST* GERMANY		British Zone		US Zone				Berlin			
	Aug 15-17	Aug 15-17	Aug 15-17	Aug 15-17	July 7th	July 21st	Aug 28th	Aug 15-17	July 7th	July 21st	Aug 28th	Aug 15-18
Does support	72%	71%	77%	85%	80%	77%	80%	85%	83%	76%		
Does not support	4	5	4	1	4	2	-	1	3	6		
Don't know	24	24	19	14	16	21	20	14	14	18		
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		

The pattern of results above, particularly the fact that some say the UN "does not support" American action in Korea, makes it evident that a few respondents are not just indicating whether or not they have heard there is formal UN approval, but also their judgment of the value of the UN help - which following questions will reveal many feel to be limited.

*The West German sample includes a proportionate allotment of respondents from French Zone cities 50,000 or more in population and from Bremen. However, the number of cases that result for these two areas are too few to permit reliable separate tabulations of their results. Hence only the British Zone with 416 cases, the US Zone with 182, and Berlin with 200 are separately tabulated for comparisons.

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ARE OTHER COUNTRIES HELPING IN THE FIGHT? ...

Though a slight majority of urban West Germans (52%) state that other countries are helping the Americans and South Koreans fight against the Communist invaders, a substantial minority say they are fighting alone.

"As far as you know, are the Americans and the South Koreans fighting alone against North Korea, or are the other countries fighting against North Korea, too?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone			Berlin		
	Aug 15-17	Aug 15-17	July 28th	Aug 7th/15-17		July 28th	Aug 7th/15-18	
Alone	32%	33%	39%	33%	34%	33%	22%	26%
Other								
countries	52	51	47	48	50	45	58	57
No opinion	16	16	14	19	16	22	20	17
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Clearly from the above figures many West Germans are still unaware of air and naval support in the Korean battle from other UN nations, or are unwilling to concede that such efforts short of ground troop participation constitute any really adequate help in the fight.

HOW MUCH HELP IS THERE? ...

Dissatisfaction with aid to UN forces in Korea is considerable, even among those who say that other nations are helping the Americans and South Koreans. In Berlin and the British Zone this group is larger than the proportion who feel that other countries are doing what they can under the circumstances.

"Do you think that these other countries are doing what they can under the circumstances to help South Korea, or not?"
(Asked of those who said "other countries were helping" in initial question.)

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone			Berlin		
	Aug 15-17	Aug 15-17	July 28th	Aug 7th/15-17		July 28th	Aug 7th/15-18	
Yes, they are doing what they can	18%	16%	10%	10%	22%	19%	22%	20%
No, they are not doing what they can	28	28	34	33	25	22	36	35
No opinion	6	7	3	5	3	4	-	2
	52%	51%	47%	48%	50%	45%	58%	57%

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PEACE PROPOSALS

SHOULD ANY PEACE DISCUSSIONS PRECEDE COMMUNIST WITHDRAWAL? ...

Opinion splits in Western Germany as to whether or not Communist withdrawal should be made a prerequisite to any peace discussions. In Berlin, however, a definite majority (61%) are of the view that the Communists should first withdraw.

"Should the West accept any offer to negotiate the Korean situation while the North Korean aggressors are still in South Korea, or should the West accept such an offer only when the North Koreans have left South Korea?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone				Berlin			
	Aug 15-17	Aug 15-17	July 21st 28th		Aug 7th/15-17		July 21st 28th		Aug 7th/15-18	
Should accept any offer	36%	37%	30%	34%	28%	35%	19%	26%	26%	24%
Should accept only when the North Koreans have left South Korea	40	38	54	52	52	43	67	57	68	61
Qualified answers	5	5	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	8
No opinion	19	20	16	14	20	16	14	17	6	7
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

The trend in the US Zone, it should be noted, has shown a decline in the proportion who would condition peace negotiation on prior withdrawal. This drop and the general extent of support for accepting any offer to negotiate may not be unrelated to the growing expressions of concern in the German press that America may be becoming too deeply involved in Asia, to the detriment of Western Europe.

WAR APPREHENSIONS

ANOTHER KOREA IN GERMANY? ...

The predominant opinion among urban West Germans as a whole, - as well as in Berlin - is that there is "great" danger of another Korea coming to pass in Germany. The next largest proportion say "fairly great" with about a quarter holding such a danger to be small.

"Do you think that the danger that a conflict like the one in Korea will arise in Germany is great, fairly great or small?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone				Berlin			
	Aug 15-17	Aug 15-17	July 7th 21st 28th		Aug 7th/15-17		July 7th 21st 28th		Aug 7th/15-18	
Great	41%	45%	38%	37%	44%	39%	34%	42%	51%	49%
Fairly great	31	31	27	32	29	30	35	23	24	28
Small	22	18	29	28	23	26	26	34	25	23
No opinion	.6	6	6	3	4	5	5	1	-	-
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

A feeling of "great" danger appear from the figures above to be somewhat less prevalent at the present time in the US Zone than either in the British Zone or in Berlin.

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EXTENT OF CONFIDENCE IN WEST

WILL KOREAN AGGRESSORS BE DRIVEN OUT? ...

The largest proportion of West German city-dwellers - a majority in Berlin - state they are confident that the Americans and other UN nations will drive the aggressors out of South Korea within a reasonable length of time. However, one in three in Western Germany express themselves as "not too confident" and one in five as "not confident at all" of such an outcome.

"Are you confident, not too confident or not confident at all that within a reasonable length of time the Americans and the other members of the United Nations will succeed in driving the North Koreans out of South Korea?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone				Berlin			
	Aug 15-17	Aug 15-17	July		Aug		July		Aug	
			21st	28th	7th/15-17		21st	28th	7th/15-18	
Confident	41%	40%	57%	37%	50%	47%	67%	50%	55%	62%
Not too confident	31	31	29	34	25	29	23	32	27	30
Not confident at all	18	19	8	19	15	15	6	12	12	7
No opinion	10	10	6	10	10	9	4	6	6	1
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

*Prior to last survey question was posed only in terms of Americans.

In the US Zone extent of confidence at the present time appears to have struck an average between the high point of July 21st, when American troops landed at Pohang, to the low point of July 28th in the face of steady Communist advances even against American reinforcements.

IS THE U.S. FACING UP TO THE WORLD CRISIS? ...

Favorable reactions to the extent of American mobilization in the present crisis is widespread in Western Germany with two out of three holding that America is preparing as well as possible to meet all further international developments. In Berlin close to nine in ten take such a view.

"From what you have recently heard or read, do you think that America is preparing as well as possible to meet all further international developments, or not?"

ACD

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone				Berlin			
	Aug 15-17	Aug 15-17	July		Aug		July		Aug	
			21st	28th	15-17		21st	28th	15-18	
Yes, as well as possible	67%	63%	74%	68%	82%		85%	82%	87%	
No, not as well as possible	15	17	13	20	8		9	9	10	
No opinion	18	20	13	12	10		6	9	3	
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%	

Since the survey on July 28th apparently a sharp rise has occurred in the proportion of US Zone urbanites who commend American preparations. To the extent that such a rise can be substantiated in further inquiry it is possible that it results at least in part from newspapers, newsreels, radio commentaries, etc., shifting from a narrow focus on the details of Korean fighting to more and more information and emphasis on broader events - in which of course American mobilisation efforts would figure prominently.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

WOULD AMERICANS STAND FIRM IN EUROPE? ...

Whatever reservations Western Germans may have about American provisions for German defense there is little doubt of American intentions. Seven out of ten city-dwellers in West Germany express themselves as "firmly convinced" that the Americans would take a firm stand in case of Communist aggression in Western Europe. Only one in twenty go so far as to say that they are "not at all convinced" of a firm American stand in such an eventuality.

"Considering the events in Korea, are you firmly convinced that America would take a firm stand in case of Communist aggression in Western Europe, or are you less or not at all convinced of that?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone			Berlin		
	Aug 15-17	Aug 15-17	July 21st	Aug 28th	Aug 15-17	July 21st	Aug 28th	Aug 15-18
Firmly convinced	70%	70%	69%	62%	73%	87%	80%	89%
Less convinced	15	15	18	24	14	11	16	8
Not at all convinced	5	5	7	8	6	1	2	1
No opinion	10	10	6	6	7	1	2	2
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Extent of confidence in the present connection seems to have grown in the US Zone since the last survey, and perhaps in Berlin, too. Possibly this judgment, like the one in the question preceding is being favorably influenced by a growing awareness of the extent of American mobilization.

ARE WESTERN POWERS DOING EVERYTHING THEY SHOULD IN GERMANY? ...

One of the more striking disclosures of the latest survey is the indication of a sharp rise among US Zone urban respondents in the proportion who feel that the Western powers are doing everything that they should to insure the security of West Germany. Now it appears that a majority take a favorable view, while in past weeks the majority opinion had been definitely contrary. In Berlin, too a negative trend has apparently been arrested.

"Do you feel that the Western powers are doing everything that they should to insure the security of West Germany?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone			Berlin		
	Aug 15-17	Aug 15-17	July 7th	Aug 21st	Aug 28th	July 7th	Aug 21st	Aug 28th
Yes do everything	43%	40%	45%	46%	32%	32%	53%	74%
No, do not do every- thing	43	45	45	44	60	59	38	25
No opinion	14	15	10	10	8	9	9	1
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

In the absence of any obvious reason for the above trends - except again the possible growing realization of the extent of American mobilization - attempts at explanations are best postponed until the results are forthcoming from the full-scale study now under way in the US Zone and Berlin.

Attention to the favorable trend in confidence in West German security in the US Zone and Berlin should not lead one to overlook that in the British Zone and in West Germany as a whole, as many feel that the Western powers are not doing as much as they should as feel the contrary.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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THE QUESTION OF GERMAN REARMAMENT

SHOULD A WEST GERMAN ARMY BE ESTABLISHED? ...

The first question that was posed on the complex issue of German rearmament inquired into the extent of approval-disapproval of a Western German army, without qualifying its nature as an independent army or one integrated with European forces. Under these circumstances the findings reveal that only in Berlin is a majority (69%) in approval, and currently in the British Zone a slight majority of city-dwellers (52%) are against the idea.

"There has been considerable talk recently about whether or not Western Germany should have an army. Are you for it or are you against it?"

ASD

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone		Berlin	
	Aug 15-17	Aug. 15-17	Dec 8/49	Aug 15-17	Dec 8/49	Aug 15-18
For it	39%	36%	25%	48%	48%	69%
Against it	50	52	71	43	50	30
No opinion	11	12	4	9	2	1
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Clearly, however, since December of 1949, support for such an army has risen sharply in both the US Zone and in Berlin, the two areas for which trend figures are available. This trend will be considered in more detail in the final report of the present series.

The opinions of men are in some ways so much more important than those of women on specific army issues that in spite of the limited number of cases in this "flash" survey sex comparisons are strongly called for - if only for indications to be followed up in further study. On the present question it may be seen below, there is a considerable difference - particularly in the US Zone - between the opinions of men and women. More will be said on this point in the final report.

"There has been considerable talk recently about whether or not Western Germany should have an army. Are you for it or are you against it?"

	WEST GERMANY		British Zone		US Zone		Berlin*	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
For it	46%	33%	42%	31%	55%	43%	76%	70%
Against it	47	52	52	52	38	46	24	25
No opinion	7	15	6	17	7	11	-	5
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

*Because of technical problems the sex comparison in Berlin on this and two subsequent questions is based upon but half the sample or 100 cases. For this reason the Berlin comparison should only be taken as suggestive.

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SHOULD WEST GERMANY PARTICIPATE IN AN ATLANTIC PACT ARMY? ...

A much more revealing indication of West German attitude toward rearmament derives from an inquiry which raised the question of German participation in a general army for the defense of Western Europe within the framework of the Atlantic Pact. The majority reaction everywhere sampled for an army so specified was approval. Six out of ten city-dwellers were for it in West Germany as a whole, with almost nine out of ten in Berlin.

Several West European Nations and America recently signed a defense pact, the so-called Atlantic Pact.

"Suppose West Germany would join the Atlantic Pact and be asked in connection with it to participate in a general army for defense of West Europe? Are you for it or are you against it?"

ACD

	WEST GERMANY Aug 15-17	British Zone Aug 15-17	US Zone Aug 15-17	Berlin Aug 15-18
For it	61%	59%	67%	86%
Against it	27	29	21	12
No opinion	12	12	12	2
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Moreover, among the men - who are obviously most directly concerned - approval reaches even higher levels.

	WEST GERMANY		British Zone		US Zone		Berlin	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
For it	68%	55%	65%	54%	74%	60%	38%	87%
Against it	27	26	30	28	24	20	12	9
No opinion	5	19	5	18	2	20	-	4
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

WHAT ABOUT CHURCHILL'S PLAN FOR A EUROPEAN ARMY? ...

As a final inquiry in this area Churchill's plan for a European army with German participation as propounded in his Strassbourg speech of August 11th, was put to the respondents. First interviewees were asked if they had yet heard of the plan - with the results following.

"In this connection it would also interest us to know whether you have heard or read about Churchill's speech at Strassbourg a few days ago, in which he called for the establishment of a West European army, with German participation?"

	WEST GERMANY Aug 15-17	British Zone Aug 15-17	US Zone Aug 15-17	Berlin Aug 15-18
Yes, have heard	57%	57%	57%	53%
No, have not heard	43	43	43	47
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

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Those who answered negatively to the above query were told the following: "In his speech at Strassbourg Churchill called for the establishment of a West German army with German participation." Then the critical question was asked with the results appended.

"Are you for or against the participation of Western Germany in the West European army which Churchill called for?"

C D

	WEST GERMANY Aug 15-17	British Zone Aug 15-17	US Zone Aug 15-17	Berlin Aug 15-18
For it	55%	53%	62%	83%
Against it	34	37	25	14
No opinion	11	10	13	3
	100%	100%	100%	100%

Again it may be seen, that for a specifically European type of army urban West Germany and Berlin vouchsafe majority approval. Comparison of these results with those on participation in an Atlantic Pact army suggests, however, that, particularly in the British Zone, the Atlantic Pact framework holds more appeal than does a Churchill-sponsored plan for a West European force.

This difference for the British Zone comes even more clearly to light when the opinion of men are separately viewed.

"Are you for or against the participation of Western Germany in the West European army which Churchill called for?"

	WEST GERMANY		British Zone		US Zone		Berlin*	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
For it	60%	51%	56%	51%	70%	56%	91%	81%
Against it	36	33	41	33	25	25	9	12
No opinion	4	16	3	16	5	19	-	7
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

*Break is based on 100 cases only.

Forty-one per cent of male urban residents of the British Zone oppose Churchill's plan it may be seen, whereas on the Atlantic Pact question only 30 per cent were in opposition. Among US Zone men there is hardly any differential reaction. These facts suggest that antagonism toward the British in the British Zone, because of dismantling, presumed opposition to European integration, and the like has progressed to the point where attachment of a British label - even Churchill who enjoys considerable German esteem - has a depressing effect upon favorable replies. Firm conclusions here must await further study.

THE NEUTRALITY ISSUE

WHAT WOULD BE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS? ...

In West Germany opinion splits almost half and half among urban dwellers as to whether it would be more advantageous for West Germany to side with the Western powers in the event of a war or to keep out of a war altogether. In Berlin more than two out of three see more advantage in siding with the West.

"In case of war, would it be more advantageous for West Germany to side with the Western powers or to side with Russia, or would it be more advantageous if West Germany would keep out of a war altogether?"*

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin			
	Aug 15-18	Aug 15-18	Sept(49) 27th	July 7th 21st	Aug 7th/15-18	July 7th 21st	Aug 7th/15-18
Side with Western powers	48%	48%	45%	44% 39%	46% 48%	78% 75%	64% 71%
Side with Russia	1	1	1	2 2	1 2	- -	1 -
Keep out	47	47	46	51 56	52 47	21 24	35 28
No opinion	4	4	8	3 3	1 3	1 1	- 1
	100%	100%	100%	100% 100%	100% 100%	100% 100%	100% 100%

* Some changes in question wording have been introduced during the course of this trend - which are not likely, however, to seriously disturb the comparability of the results.

In the US Zone, the trend figures indicate, neutrality sentiments have dropped from their high point of a 56 per cent majority on July 21st, to a point approximating the level of September 1949 - well before the Korean conflict.

IS NEUTRALITY POSSIBLE? ...

The wording of the above question, it must be emphasized, gives a measure of what Germans might wish - quite apart from what they think is possible under the circumstances. It is clear from the tabulations below that results are quite different when judgment is made in terms of what is possible under the circumstances.

"Do you think that it will really be possible for Western Germany to keep out altogether of a conflict between East and West?" (Asked of those who answered "Keep out" to preceding question.)

ACD

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone			Berlin		
	Aug 15-18	Aug 15-18	July 21st	Aug 7th/15-18		July 21st	Aug 7th/15-18	
Yes	9%	7%	9%	6%	11%	6%	11%	7%
No	32	34	41	41	29	17	22	20
No opinion	6	6	6	5	7	1	2	1
	47%	47%	56%	52%	47%	24%	35%	28%

"And with whom should West Germany side, with the Western powers or with Russia?" (Asked of those who answered "No" to preceding question.)

ACT

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone			Berlin		
	Aug 15-18	Aug 15-18	July 21st	Aug 7th/15-18		July 21st	Aug 7th/15-18	
Western powers	27%	29%	38%	36%	26%	16%	19%	20%
Russia	1	1	1	1	-	1	1	-
No opinion	4	4	2	4	3	1	2	1
	32%	34%	41%	41%	29%	17%	22%	20%

DECISION ...

Combination of the last three tables makes it evident that the realistic judgments of the Germans sampled - i.e. judgments which take account of what is possible - add up to widespread support for the West. Three out of four urbanites in the US Zone, in the British Zone, and in Western Germany as a whole say that they would side with the Western powers in the event of a conflict with Russia. In Berlin nine in ten indicate such support.

ACT

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone			Berlin		
	Aug 15-18	Aug 15-18	July 21st	Aug 7th/15-18		July 21st	Aug 7th/15-18	
Side with Western powers	75%	77%	77%	82%	74%	91%	83%	91%
Side with Russia	2	2	3	2	2	1	2	-
Keep out	9	7	9	6	11	6	11	7
No opinion	14	14	11	10	13	2	4	2
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

A SUMMARY OF TRENDS
IN RADIO LISTENING IN WEST BERLIN

Report No. 34
Series No. 2
28 August 1950

REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
HICOG APC 807
Bad Nauheim Germany

INTRODUCTION ...

This report summarizes the trend of radio listening in the three Western sectors of Berlin from January 1948 through May 1950. The findings are derived from data obtained in a number of surveys made by the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs, HICOG ... (formerly the Opinion Surveys Branch, ISD, OMGUS).

All of the results are based on representative randomly selected samples of the population of American, British and French sectors of Berlin. Most of the samples consisted of 500 cases, but in some instances 250 persons were interviewed. As in all surveys, made by the Reactions Analysis Staff, the interviews were conducted in the homes of respondents by trained German interviewers supervised by an American Surveys officer.

TRENDS IN RADIO LISTENING IN WEST BERLIN....

During the past two and a half years, Radio Berlin, the Soviet-controlled station has reportedly ~~lost~~ approximately two-thirds of its audience, to the point where now only 15% in the Western sectors of Berlin say they regularly or occasionally listen to its broadcasts.

In sharp contrast, during the same period the proportion reporting regular or occasional listening to RIAS, the American-sponsored station, has increased from a half to almost three-quarters of the Western sectors' population. Since the size of the total radio audience in West Berlin is 75% of the public, this means that RIAS is currently being tuned in by 98% of the radio audience.

NWDR, the British-sponsored station, has also increased its audience considerably over this period, rising from 24% in early 1948 to 43% of the West Berlin public in the most recent survey.

A large part of the gain in RIAS listenership, and conversely the loss sustained by Radio Berlin, parallel the Berlin blockade and subsequent developments in the cold war.

The trend in listenership is shown in the tables on the following page. Figures in the first table show the size of radio audience in the three Western sectors; in the second table the proportion of the total population (15 years of age and older) in West Berlin listening to various stations is shown; and the third table gives the share of the radio audience obtained by the stations. *

* The questions from which the trend derives are: "Do you listen to the radio?" "Which stations do you listen to?" (Asked of those who reply "Yes, regularly" or "Yes, occasionally" to the prior question.)

Total Radio Audience

	<u>1948</u>			<u>1949</u>		<u>1950</u>
	Jan	June	Oct	July	Nov	May
Radio Listeners	69%	71%	66%	69%	76%	75%
Non-Listeners	<u>31</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>25</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Proportion of West Berlin Population
Listening to Various Stations

	<u>1948</u>			<u>1949</u>		<u>1950</u>
	Jan	June	Oct	July	Nov	May
Stations:						
RIAS	51%	65%	60%	66%	74%	73%
NWDR	24	25	28	32	37	43
Radio Berlin	42	43	37	22	24	15
Other East	*	-	*	*	1	4
Other West	*	3	9	4	7	2
	<u>117</u>	<u>136%</u>	<u>134%**</u>	<u>124%</u>	<u>143%**</u>	<u>137%**</u>

* Less than one half of one per cent.

** Percentages total more than the per cent of radio listeners because some people mentioned more than one station.

Proportion of West Berlin Radio Audience
Listening to Various Stations

	<u>1948</u>			<u>1949</u>		<u>1950</u>
	Jan	June	Oct	July	Nov	May
Stations:						
RIAS	73%	84%	90%	97%	98%	98%
NWDR	34	36	37	46	48	58
Radio Berlin	61	64	56	32	31	20
Other East	*	-	1	1	1	6
Other West	2	5	12	5	10	2
	<u>170%</u>	<u>189%</u>	<u>196%**</u>	<u>181%</u>	<u>188%**</u>	<u>184%**</u>

* Less than one half of one per cent.

** Percentages add to more than 100 because some radio listeners mentioned more than one station.

The figures above do not measure preference, it should be noted, but only listenership. Previous studies indicate, however, that RIAS is not only the most widely heard but the most popular Berlin station. Also, since there is a close correlation between size of audience and preference, it can be assumed from the above table that RIAS is currently retaining its lead as most popular radio station in West Berlin. (See Reports No. 181, "The RIAS Audience in Western Berlin," (July 7, 1949), and Report No. 4, Series 2, "RIAS and Listeners in Western Berlin", Feb. 8, 1950.)

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FURTHER STUDY OF POST-KOREAN RUMORS IN GERMANY

34-S-1

Special Report

29 August 1950

REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
HICOG APO 807
Bad. Nauheim Germany

Classification cancelled
by authority of Leo P. Crespi
PUB/PAS

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R E S T R I C T E D

INTRODUCTION ...

In two prior reports* the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs, presented findings on the types and prevalence of rumors which arose in the US Zone and West Berlin as a consequence of the Korean outbreak. This third report pursues further the study of post-Korean rumors through (a) extending the coverage to the British Zone, (b) extending the coverage to East Berlin and the East Zone, and (c) repeating the survey of rumors in the US Zone and West Berlin for disclosure of possible trends.

The findings on British Zone, US Zone, and West Berlin rumors gathered in connection with an August 15th to 17th "flash" survey of urban West Germany embracing a representative quota sample of 416 cases in the British Zone, 182 in the US Zone, and 200 in the three Western sectors of Berlin. Rumors current in East Berlin and the East Zone were obtained through a special study involving the interviewing of a sample of 184 East Berliners and East Zone residents as contacted at money changing centers in West Berlin during the period August 16th through 21st, 1950.

The topics prevailing in the current rumors are tabulated in order of frequency from those most frequently mentioned to those least frequently touched upon by the urban respondents sampled in this study. Listed under each rumor topic will be found a complete itemization of each of the rumor variants related to the topic in question.

SOME OVERALL INDICATIONS ...

1. Judging from the results in the US Zone and West Berlin - the only areas for which trends are available - the volume of post-Korean rumors has trailed off considerably in the interval between July 21st and August 17th.
2. Rumors concerning food rationing - the dominating single theme in the July 21st survey in the US Zone and West Berlin - have lost their leadership in these areas to rumors bearing on the imminence of war. In the British Zone and in East Berlin-East Zone food rationing rumors score in frequency no more than third and fifth respectively in the current survey.
3. Rumors about an asserted remilitarization of West Germany currently lead all other specific topics in the British Zone. In the East Berlin-East Zone survey this theme runs a strong second in frequency. Remilitarization rumors are apparently much less frequent in the US Zone and West Berlin, though relative to the overall decrease in volume they are possibly slightly more frequent now than in the July survey.
4. Rumors about American families and civilians leaving West Germany have quite disappeared, though in the July survey this theme was the third most frequent in the US Zone.
5. The recently announced policy of the SED to encourage Communist agitation in West Germany seems to have touched off rumors - as yet of no great frequency - of plans for or instances of Communist inspired disturbances.

* Rumors in West Germany Following the Korean Outbreak, Special Report, 31 July 1950.
Some Further Details on Post-Korean Rumors, Special Report, 3 August 1950.

RUMORS IN EAST BERLIN AND EAST ZONE

(Topics Listed in Order of Frequency of Mention)

I. Russian Troop Concentrations in the East Zone and Other Preparatory Measures for a War.

In the area of Neuenhagen, Wuhlheide and Biesdorf, Russian troops have been withdrawn and transferred to Strausberg.

The Russians are holding maneuvers in the East Zone.

Strengthening of munitions production is going on. New employment of laborers in munitions factories; they are being strictly guarded.

Former air force buildings are being used as training centers for people's police; they receive excellent training, artillery and tanks.

Every two months recruiting-officers of the people's police try to make young men enlist.

Russian staff and troops were transferred to Seelow (Mark Brandenburg) and to Poland.

Troop movements and artillery in Brandenburg.

Silesia, East Prussia and the Magdeburg area are crowded with Russian and Chinese troops.

At Halle all employees of the District Court are said to receive training with weapons.

Russian maneuvers in the Potsdam, Drewitz and Ravensberg area.

Transports of soldiers and tanks have been observed passing the Guesten rail center (Sachsen-Anhalt).

Russian tanks are gathering in the area of Gross-Schoenebeck (Schorfheide). Large numbers of tanks and Asiatic regiments are standing along the Elbe line.

II. Remilitarization in West Germany.

The industrial police force is being strengthened but is still not to be compared with the people's police and a German army.

A new German army is being built up in West Germany.

Germany will participate in the war.

Large numbers of Germans are fleeing over to West Germany to enlist in the new army.

German generals and officers are rebuilding the German army.

Germans in West Germany are drafted and wear American uniforms.

German industry in West Germany is producing arms.

Americans are trying to get German volunteers in West Berlin; they are promised an initial payment of 1,000 West Mark.

The Americans are recruiting former SS members.

Demolition and rearmament in the West Zones.

West German police will be armed and put in barracks, likewise the industrial police.

Rebuilding of the German army under the leadership of German generals and officers.

Labor battalions are being armed in West Germany.

Former SS members are released from West German prisons in order to establish new SS formations.

America is getting arms from German industry and will reestablish the German army.

III. An Imminent War Between East and West.

There is a fear that the U.S.A. is too tied up in the Korean war to protect Europe against a Russian invasion.
 The population is worried about Korea; will war break out in Germany?
 Korea is lost due to insufficient American reinforcements.
 If Korea is lost war will break out here.
 War is inevitable.
 In autumn Berlin will be taken by the people's police.
 At the same time the Russians will march into West Germany.
 The Western powers will withdraw over the Rhine in case they are defeated in Korea.
 The Americans have already decided on six (6) targets on which to drop the atom bomb.
 After a Communist victory in Korea the people's police will start a similar action in Germany.

IV. General Rumors About Conditions in West Germany.

The population believes to a great extent what the Western newspapers write.
 Unemployment in the West is worrying the people in the East.
 Leather is scarce in West Germany, it is needed for rearmament.
 Soap in the West has become more expensive.
 Firms are hoarding material for military purposes.
 People in West Germany are starving; they have been living on horse meat for some time.

V. Rationing of Food.

Threat of starvation in West Germany because the Western powers are using their ships exclusively for war purposes.
 Farmers in the East Zone are hoarding food, believing that war is going to start in autumn.

VI. Communist Agitation in West Germany.

People's police deserters are trying to spread Communist propaganda in West Germany.
 Many political fugitives are actually sent over by the Russians as agents.

VII. Miscellaneous.

The Russians are supposed to have said they plan to water their horses at the Rhine before Christmas.
 Illegal movements are increasing in the West Zones.
 All the roads to Berlin were blocked some time ago because two members of the people's police had not reported for duty at Potsdam in the morning and were believed to have fled to West Berlin.
 West Berlin firms like "Sarotti" are being transferred to West Germany.
 In case the Communists should take over Berlin the West Berliners will have to pay higher taxes to make up for the higher living standard they have had.
 Knapsacks for the Berlin youth meeting in May were originally manufactured for Korea.
 Russian officers are not supposed to use German taxi-cabs at Gross-Glienicke (near the Gatow air field in the British sector of Berlin) to prevent them from deserting; Russian guards are instructed to shoot immediately.

R E S T R I C T E D

RUMORS IN THE BRITISH ZONE OF GERMANY

(Topics Listed in Order of Frequency of Mention)

I. Remilitarization in West Germany.

Universal military service will be introduced within the near future.
 Men between 25 and 28 years of age will be drafted into the police.
 Frontier police will be provided with better arms.
 Working battalions will be gathered.
 The dock-yards will be used for rearmament.
 The German munitions industry will begin to work.
 Helgoland will be turned into a rocket launching base against the East.
 The police forces will receive training together with the British and will also receive tanks.
 Blohm & Voss (Hamburg) are building PT-boats and other warships; arms are being manufactured in the Ruhrgebiet to go to France.
 German volunteers are being enrolled for reinforcements.
 Former Air Force and SS personnel are to report to the British authorities every fortnight.
 East Zone factories are producing arms again and German units are being set up in the Russian Zone; arms will be produced again very soon in West Germany.
 Intensified rearmament will make rationing inevitable.

II. An Imminent War Between East and West.

General fear of war for Germany.
 War can break out any day.
 Russian invasion of Germany.
 There will be war in Germany soon.
 Most countries are rearming, therefore a war will start soon.
 War will break out after the harvest.
 According to Russian broadcasts war will begin at Christmas.
 Russia seeks a new war.
 Russians are preparing an attack on Western Germany.
 The Rhineland population is of the opinion that the Russians will invade Western Germany at an early date.
 Russia will attack the Western powers.
 The Russians will be here soon.
 Russia will come marching in.
 People living in the Hof area are actually moving westward.
 The allies are going to withdraw and leave us to the Russians.

III. Rationing of Food.

There will be ration cards for sugar soon.
 Everything will be rationed again.
 Now rationing.
 Ration cards for main food.
 War will break out, sugar is scarce, everything will be rationed again soon.
 A partial issue of ration cards.

R E S T R I C T E D

IV. Russian Troop Concentrations in the East Zone
and Other Preparatory Measures for a War.

Troops and tanks are being concentrated in the East Zone.
Tanks are standing in the East Zone near the frontier.
180,000 Russians are said to be stationed between Helmstedt and Magdeburg.
Movement of troops, both British and Russian, in the Harz and near
Nienburg, as well as maneuvers,

V. Preparations for a Defense Line at the Rhine.

It is planned to fortify a Rhine defense line.
Preparations are being made to blow up German factories and mines in
case of war.
British soldiers are said to have been examining the explosives on the
newly built Rhine bridges.
The Loreley-Rock is going to be blown up in order to flood the Rhine
valley.
The occupation powers are going to withdraw over the Rhine and abandon
us to the Russians.
The Elbe and the Rhine are going to be the defense lines.

VI. Rumors Concerning Korea.

Volunteers are enlisting in Western Germany for Korea.
It is being talked about that the defeat in Korea is MacArthur's fault
for which he will be dismissed.
Schoerner and Seydlitz are the leading North Korean generals.
War in the Far East will possibly extend to China and the U.S.A.

VII. Russians are Causing Berlin Traffic Difficulties.

The Russians have blocked a railroad line to Berlin.
New difficulties on the part of the Russians in Berlin traffic.

VIII. Communist Agitation in West Germany.

Communist propaganda in schools through juvenile agents.
Many Communists and Russian agents are in Western Germany.
Considerable illegal Communist activities in Hannover.

IX. Miscellaneous.

Raw materials are being held back to go to Franco.
Russia wants to attack Yugoslavia.
Astrology is predicting a catastrophe in September.
Hitler is supposed to be still alive.
At the East Bavarian border people are drinking a lot in order not to
leave anything to the Russians who will invade the country soon.

R E S T R I C T E D

RUMORS IN THE U.S. ZONE OF GERMANY

(Topics Listed in Order of Frequency of Mention)

I. An Imminent War Between East and West.

There will soon be a war between East and West.

A new war is to come soon.

War will break out in the near future.

After the harvest the Russians will start marching through Europe.

It is heard again and again that the Russians will come soon.

Communism will come to us soon.

In autumn the Russians will start a war, it was announced to the Volkspolizei.

II. Rationing of Food.

Food will be rationed again.

Food ration cards will be introduced again.

Food prices are rising immensely again.

There will be ration cards for sugar.

Food will be rationed in the USA as well as in Germany.

III. Russian Troop Concentration in the East Zone and Other Preparatory Measures for a War.

East Zone police is ready to march into West Germany.

Twenty-three (23) divisions of Mongols in Berlin barracks are waiting to attack the population.

Russian planes are flying over Oberfranken.

15-year old boys are drafted into the Volkspolizei in the East Zone, the Volkspolizei being a covert German army.

IV. Remilitarization in West Germany.

West Germany will be remilitarized again.

Secretly many Germans are being drafted in West Germany.

The German munitions industry is to be rebuilt again.

The union of the DPs and the labor battalions is the beginning of a new German army.

V. Communist Agitation in West Germany.

The Communists are taking note of their opponents now in order to be able to punish them later on.

The Communists now have organized a resistance movement.

The Communists are calling for resistance against the Western powers.

VI. American Forces Will Withdraw from Germany.

The Americans will withdraw from Germany because they are afraid.

In case of war the Americans will give up Germany, so it will be wiser to get friendly with the Russians before they come.

R E S T R I C T E D

VII. Preparations for a Defense Line at the Rhine.

The Rhine will be the defense line.

The Americans will blow up the Rhine bridges in case of war.

VIII. Rumors Concerning Korea.

Former SS troops are fighting in Korea (on the side of the North Koreans). The Americans are deliberately holding back in Korea, but will be victorious in the end.

IX. Miscellaneous.

The Americans are circulating rumors about the Russians not having the atom bomb, but they are going to be surprised. Everybody who has been working for the Americans will be arrested by the Russians.

Revolution will break out in France and Italy in case of war.

The Communists want to march into Yugoslavia and Tibet.

War is inevitable, the Russians will come, the Americans will withdraw and the Spaniards will come and create a "Greater Germany" (Grossdeutschland).

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RUMORS IN WEST BERLIN

(Topics Listed in Order of Frequency of Mention)

I. An Imminent War Between East and West.

A new war will break out.
 We shall have a war next year.
 War will start in October.
 War will break out in the near future.
 It is believed that war will break out in September.
 Another war is inevitable.
 War will begin this autumn, East against West.

II. The Russians Will Attack Berlin and the West.

The Russians are going to overrun Berlin within the near future.
 The Communists are going to take over Berlin in autumn.
 The Russians are seeking to overrun Western Germany.
 The Russians are going to take over Berlin.
 The Russians will capture Berlin after the election in October.

III. Rationing of Food.

We shall have a new war very soon and everything will be rationed again.
 Possible rationing.
 Hoarding of food in Western Germany and possible rationing.

IV. Remilitarization in West Germany.

A new German army is being established in West Germany.
 The Americans are rebuilding the German army in West Germany.

V. Russian Troop Concentrations in the East Zone and Other Preparatory Measures for a War.

Heavy Russian armaments are concentrating at the Elbe.
 Russia is concentrating her troops in the Russian Zone.

VI. Miscellaneous.

The East Zone post-office authorities are sending men to Aue (uranium mines).
 The U.S. is going to drop the atom bomb on North Korea.
 The Americans are going to leave Berlin.
 The knapsacks manufactured for the Berlin youth meeting in May, 1950, were originally made for Korea.
 The American army accepts German volunteers to throw into the war in Korea.
 Formosa will be attacked by the Communists within the near future.

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OBSERVERS EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS
OF COMMUNIST PRESS IN WEST GERMANY

Downgraded to
OFFICIAL ONLY
by [redacted]
Chief, Research Staff

Report No. 35
Series No. 2
8 September 1950

REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
HICOG APO 807
Bad Nauheim Germany

Classification changed to
Restricted
by authority of Leo P. Crespi
PUB/RAS CONFIDENTIAL

INTRODUCTION ...

In July 1950, the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs inaugurated a new dimension to its measurement of German public opinion. This was to ask two groups of expert observers, one consisting of Americans, the other of Germans their views on German opinion in the communities they live and work in. Two panels were set up, one made up of the Kreis Resident Officers, and the other of the German Interviewers employed by the Reactions Analysis Staff. Though differing in nationality and background, members of both panels are alike in that they are not only daily in touch with Germans of all walks of life, but are trained to observe and report on the German scene. For these reasons the judgments rendered by the two panels should prove a valuable supplement to the broader measurement of attitudes as expressed by the public.

The subject of the first inquiry put to the two panels, as reported here, deals with the issue of the Communist press in Western Germany. Further inquiries on relevant issues will be made as they arise in the future.

HIGHLIGHTS ...

There is a remarkably close correspondence between the views of both panels on the issue of the Communist press in West Germany. Large majorities of both the American and German expert observers are opposed to prohibiting the publication of the KPD press, and both are largely in agreement regarding its influence or lack of influence. A summary of their views follows:

1. Both the Resident Officer and German Interviewer panels are largely agreed that only a few or very few people in their communities read KPD newspapers. As evidence, they cite the election returns, low membership of KPD, population characteristics, e.g. membership in the Catholic Church, predominance of farmers, etc., and lack of sales outlets.
2. Related to the above is the judgment by the large majority of both panels that the readers of the KPD press are mostly of Communist persuasion. The few who think otherwise say non-Communists read these papers for their sensationalism or to get the "other side."
3. More than nine in ten in both panels hold the view that Communist newspapers fail to win converts. The three main reasons cited to support this opinion are: 1) fundamental hostility to Communism owing to experiences with the Russians, knowledge of East Zone conditions and lessons of the Third Reich; 2) the obviousness and crudity of Communist propaganda, and 3) only conditions and circumstances, not the press, can make Communist converts. The minority in both panels who believe the KPD press does help to convert people to Communism point to the proclivity of that press to feed on resentments of the West Germans toward the occupying powers and dismay the gullible.

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4. The KPD press is held by both panels to have little success in shaking confidence in Western policies and actions. Supporting opinions follow much the same pattern as those offered in discounting the ability of the press to make Communist converts, e.g., the basic anti-Communism of the German public, paucity of readers, crudeness of their propaganda and so on.
5. Members of both panels vote overwhelmingly (83%) against banning the Communist press. Main reasons against prohibition are: the KPD press would then merely go underground and have more influence as a result; it contradicts a basic tenet of democracy, "freedom of the press;" and such suppression of the KPD press is unnecessary because its influence is insignificant.
6. Opinion of the urban public in West Germany regarding the issue of suppression of the KPD public are at variance with those of the expert observers' panels. City dwellers in West Germany vote 48% for banning, with 39% against. In West Berlin 67% are for suppression, and only 29% against it.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

NUMBER OF READERS OF COMMUNIST PAPERS INCONSIDERABLE ...

The preponderant judgment of both panels of expert observers is that Communist newspapers are not widely read in their areas. Queried late in July, 88% of the Resident Officers panel and 89% of the German Interviewers panel estimated that few or very few people read KPD papers.

"As you know, the Communist newspapers are at present permitted to be published in Western Germany without any restrictions. In your best judgment, do you think the number of Germans living in your area of work who read these papers is considerable, moderate, few or very few?"

	KRO	Interviewers
Considerable	2%	2%
Moderate	10	9
Few	35	45
Very few	53	44
	100%	100%

It will be noted above that Resident Officers are more inclined than the Interviewers to put the number of readers as "very few."

Volunteered comments indicate that among both groups the reasons for judging KPD papers to be not widely read are much the same. Some of the observers point to the paucity of KPD affiliates in their communities, as well as to the election results. Others give reasons such as these:

1. Most residents of their communities are farmers, or in occupations other than factory or industrial work, and thus not interested in KPD papers.
2. The strong influence of the church in their communities mitigates against the reading of the Communist party press.
3. The papers are not on sale at newsstands, or come only to subscribers. Typical comments regarding this point are:

"KPD press has no sales outlet in this Kreis. Papers are distributed to party members through party headquarters."

"No Communist newspapers are published or sold on newsstands in this area. So far as I know, the only people receiving these papers are the few resident Communists who receive them by mail."

"People in my community would have to travel twenty minutes in order to get to a newsstand that sells a Communist paper."

"Only one Communist newspaper appears in our Kreis. The system of distribution is as follows: Due to lack of sufficient subscribers the papers are sent to the chairman of the local KPD chapter, who, in turn, distributes them to party members. The papers are circulated among the members and therefore the number of people reading them are approximately two-hundred. The local KPD has established a showcase bulletin board in one of the busiest streets in the city. This showcase attracts a considerable number of people who pass by."

"There are only 60 subscribers in this Kreis to the SVZ. Magazine stands a short time ago refused to sell this publication any longer."

- The few Kreis Resident Officers (12%) who estimate that more than a few persons read the Communist press made these comments:

"Many people read the Communist papers who are not KPD members or sympathizers just for interest and to keep up with KPD propaganda. Also more people read this paper than buy it, as all KPD members are supposed to pass it on to others after they have read it, and it is especially circulated among workers in factories, etc."

"(There are two big factories here) ... there is quite a growing Communist movement. The barbershops have copies of Communist papers lying around."

"Since KPD 'Betriebsgruppen' are well organized in factories they are very active in advertising these papers and they are being read by a lot of non-Communists."

"... not all the readers are subscribers, too. The number of subscribers of Communist newspapers and literature in this area is only moderate."

"Communist newspapers are regularly distributed among the laborers of the ... industries."

The German Interviewers (11%) who judged the Communist press to have many or a moderate number of readers made the following comments:

"Just live in a workers' neighborhood, where the number of KPD followers is greater than the average."

"Every second inhabitant reads the SVZ... an issue is read and then discussed in place of business, pubs, or at work."

"There are many Communist papers that are not recognized as such by the masses - therein lies the danger of Communist infiltration."

"The majority of readers in my opinion are the unemployed who get the papers for nothing near the place their cards are stamped and then read them for lack of anything else to do."

"The number of readers grows daily, especially in factory and construction circles."

READERS ARE MOSTLY COMMUNISTS ...

Both groups of expert observers are largely of the opinion that the readership of the Communist press in their communities is mainly confined to persons of Communist persuasion.

"Do you think readership of these papers is confined largely to people of KPD persuasion, or are most of the readers non-Communists in your judgment?"

	KRO	Interviewers
Largely Communist persuasion	86%	85%
Mostly non-Communists	11	13
fifty-fifty	3	2
	100%	100%

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Resident Officers (11%) who expressed the opinion that readers of KPD papers were mostly people of non-Communist persuasion commented as follows:

"Read considerably in refugee circles, due mainly to the following — sympathetic to refugee circles and problems."

"Very often the newspapers are only read for local interest and partly just for sensationalism."

"Read largely by those who want sensationalism, or who want to compare, or those who hope to be in a better position in the event of later KPD domination."

"The Communistic press is read by all KPD members who, out of obligation, have to read the paper. But this Communistic press for the following reasons is read by others too:

- "1. Other newspapers do not deal enough with the workers' problems;"
- "2. All local politicians, trade union officials, work councils, etc. read the Communistic press in order to keep informed about the Communistic activity, further, to be informed about scandals on a local as well as federal basis. The reason being that Communist papers are the only papers to publish any small incident immediately to bring it into the bright light."

Some of the comments made by the German Interviewers (13%) who feel most readers are not Communists, are:

"Very many businessmen who have subscribed for business reasons also occasionally read them, but in general pay little attention to them."

"I suppose that those who read these papers do it to be informed and are not outright Communists."

"KPD membership is very small, so that if these papers are read at all they must be read by non-Communists."

"KPD papers are not always recognized as Communist."

"Readers only want to keep up with what kind of nonsense the Communists are up to."

"Otherwise the paper would have been bankrupt long ago."

"Many Communist labels are not recognized. Sensationalism and getup as 'revelations' do the rest."

C O N F I D E N T I A L

KPD PRESS FAILS TO WIN CONVERTS ...

Both panels are strongly convinced that the Communist press wins few converts to Communism.

"How effective do you think the Communist press in Western Germany is in converting West Germans to Communism?"

	KRO	Interviewers
Very effective	1%	-
quite effective	5	4%
Not very effective	62	61
Not effective at all	31	35
Undecided	1	-
	100%	100%

The main argument advanced by both the Resident Officer (72%) and the Interviewer panel (66%) for stating that the KPD press does not make Communist converts is that the West German public is already firmly anti-Communist or anti-Russian.

Comments of the Resident Officers run thus:

"The population is convinced that Communism is identical and even worse than Nazism."

"The people in this area do not desire Communism - election returns from all Laender prove that Communist votes are decreasing, so the Communist press cannot be regarded as effective."

"Returned PWs and returning travellers dispel any doubts."

"The obvious facts plus the many other information media at present available to the West German people."

"After twelve years of Nazi practices the Germans have an aversion towards such propaganda methods."

"Communist propaganda sounds all too different from local residents' personal experience as PWs or refugees from East Germany."

"Many Germans have friends or relatives in the East Zone and through correspondence and personal contacts, unfavorable conditions in the East do much to discredit information published in the Commie press."

"Communist propaganda will not overcome the antipathy with which the German people regard the Soviet Union."

The Interviewer panel speaks as follows:

"The prison of war problem, conditions in Russia and the East Zone, autocratic tendencies of the Communists and plain fear of Communism eliminate any influence on the West Germans."

"The Germans were taught a lesson by the Third Reich."

"The East Zone policy talks for itself, the best example in the loss of votes in the last elections."

"Overt Communist propaganda is rejected by the people."

"The bad treatments of PWs in Soviet Russia has limited the possibility of winning West Germany."

"People here in the West know conditions are better than in the East. Also the Germans know Bolshevism well and don't want it."

"The Communist press hasn't the slightest chance to convert people because of the ruling antipathy towards everything Communistic among the population."

"The people to the extent that they even glance at the sheet have been informed enough about the conditions in the East by the East refugees and returnees from Russia so they recognize lies and propaganda."

"Because of years of propaganda (III. Reich) and personal experiences and accounts (War in Russia, PW problem) the German people have become absolute foes of the Communist system."

"Because of bad experiences during recent years, the word Communism is like a red rag to our predominantly Christian population."

"Most of the West German people are immune to the blandishments of the KPD press because former soldiers and above all those who have returned from Russian imprisonment have not minced words in their descriptions. Besides, there are reports of the experiences and descriptions from acquaintances and relatives regarding conditions in the East Zone. Phrases cannot push facts out the way."

The second most frequently cited reason of both panels is that Communist propaganda is too obvious or crude to win converts among West Germans (KRO panel, 13¹/₂, Interviewers panel, 12¹/₄).

The Resident Officers say:

"Most people are amused and entertained by these papers and read them for their sensationalism."

"Many Germans find the material included in Communist papers so ridiculous as to be laughable."

"The exaggerations of the Communist press are so discernible that they have little effect."

Typical comments of the Interviewers who hold this view, are:

"The Communist propaganda shows its hand too obviously."

"People in my community are disgusted by Communist propaganda."

"The masses even recognize the obvious, lying propaganda of the Communists."

A third point on which the two panels are agreed (8% respectively) is that it is not the press but conditions or circumstances which lead to the growth of Communism.

Resident Officers comment:

"Unemployed, refugees penned up in over-populated camps, etc., are easily influenced, but this depends largely on the insufficient conditions of living, housing etc."

"In times of stress and economic insecurity the Communist press is somewhat effective."

"Policy and actions of the Western powers in Germany and in foreign policy are more influential."

"People are converted more on a basis of fear stimulated mostly by Radio Leipzig or by literature other than newspapers."

The Interviewers panel expresses these views:

"Danger exists particularly among the poor who think they might be better off under Communism."

"Most of the people reject it entirely, but people who have lost their jobs because of dismantling or other reasons and are in bitter need today believe more and more in propaganda coming from the East Zone."

"People don't become Communists from reading Communist papers but because of bad living conditions, misery and so on."

"Such things as dismantling and preparation for demolitions give Communist press good soil to sow seeds in."

"Any tendency toward Communism results less from the KPD press than from the mistakes of the Western allies and from nationalistic feelings."

Each of the panels also mention other reasons for their minimizing the influence of the KPD press.

Confidence in the West is strong (4%): "Because Western Germany is greatly interested in a West European union;" "freedom and other sources of news is quite effective in counteracting Communist reports;" etc.

Miscellaneous (5%): "Church influence is too strong in this Kreis;" "opinions have been formed by now;" "only criticize Bonn government, contains no news or effective ideas;" etc.

A few members of the panels, however, indicate why they think that the Communist press has some effect in Western Germany:

The Communist press is indirectly of some effect (6%): The press furnishes Communists with arguments they inject into meetings and elsewhere. In other words, the contents go beyond the actual readers and therefore one cannot say the papers are not effective;" "indirectly they succeed by creating fear in spreading false statements;" etc.

The Interviewers panel also mention factors, as follows:

Paucity of Communist papers hinders influence (14): "Can't be influential because there are scarcely any Communist papers to be had (around here);" "only read by Communists;" "if the Communists have any success it is through broadcasts, talks, theatre acts etc., but not through the press which reaches only a very small circle;" etc.

Convinces only a few opportunists (3): "But there is the danger that part of the population would go over to Communism to protect themselves (general opinion that West Germany would be overrun by Russian in the event of war);" "perhaps some influence with the collaborationists and the over-anxious who want to prepare for all eventualities;" etc.

Miscellaneous (5): "Even though the greater part of the population is not inclined toward Communism, the fact must not be overlooked that many people in the bottom of their hearts believe in the inevitability of Communism, and that the best thing therefore is to become as well acquainted and friendly with it as possible;" "it would not be correct to state that the Communist press is completely without success for there will always be people who fall for its propaganda as experience has taught;" "there is so much contradiction from papers of other parties and the non-partisan press that the KPD press can have little influence;" etc.

REASONS FOR SAYING KPD PRESS WINS CONVERTS ...

A few members of both panels (5 KRO and 4 Interviewer panels) feel the Communist press is effective in winning converts to the cause. Their arguments are listed as follows:

... Resident Officers:

"It is obvious that the KPD press is making every effort, legal or illegal, to build up resentment of the German people against occupation personnel."

"While it is not believed the publications are necessarily converting West Germans to Communism, they are doing much to scare and are weakening the non-Communists' attitudes toward the subject."

"Newspaper readers cannot discriminate between objective and subjective reporting, therefore all dissatisfied elements are easily led astray by these erroneous papers."

... German Interviewers:

"People in economic need and misery have a very open ear for this sort of propaganda. If something is repeated again and again, people listen in the end."

"Newspapers are able to mention facts like the Korea crisis, with consequent result that confidence in the US is undermined. Further, there is the strong criticism of the Federal government which settles many problems without sufficient regard and understanding (higher food prices, equalization of war losses, etc.). Dismantling in the British Zone."

"Yes, especially in working class circles. Misdeeds on the part of the occupation powers will always be utilized by Communists for their own purposes."

"Unemployment is blamed on the Western powers since the papers say they have only provoked it."

COMMUNIST PRESS INEFFECTIVE AGAINST WEST ...

The Resident Officer and the Interviewer panels both are largely agreed that the KPD newspapers do little to shake West German confidence in Western policies and action. It will be noted however, that in both groups the proportion saying they have considerable effect is somewhat larger than that saying they win converts.

"Do you think the effectiveness of these papers in shaking the confidence of the West German people in the policies and actions of the Western powers is very considerable, considerable, not very considerable, or negligible?"

	KRO	Interviewers
Very considerable	-	-
Considerable	14	9
Not very considerable	54	54
Negligible	32	37
	100%	100%

REASONS FOR INEFFECTIVENESS ...

Reasons for stating the Communist press does little to shake confidence in the Western powers follow much the same pattern as those advanced regarding its failure to win converts. Comments for both panels are cataloged and listed in order of frequency of mention.

RESIDENT OFFICERS' REASONS FOR INEFFECTIVENESS ...

KPD propaganda is uninfluentia (has low circulation, small readership): No increase in KPD party membership - no increased agitation in town hall meetings; I think the Communist press has almost no effect; it is believed that the Communist paper does not have a large enough circulation; lack of readers is probably the biggest factor; nearly all people who read it are KPD anyway; number of votes for KPD was lower than in former elections; etc.31%

Knowledge of situation in the East - fear and hostility toward Russia and Communism (general skepticism): Effectiveness in the past has largely been offset by first hand reports from former PWs and some first-hand knowledge distributed by West Zone visitors to the East; the Germans once have been the victims of such propaganda as it is spread today by Communist papers and apart from a few exceptions they reject it; in other than KPD circles the feeling against Communism is so strong that many times these papers have the opposite effect; experience since 1933 makes the German people more or less safe against Communism; the majority of our population are Catholics who refuse publications which are under the standard of good papers; the Communist papers are received with mistrust; etc.23%

Had indirect effect (to spread doubts and seeds of discontent, source of rumors): The effectiveness is indirect; it provides a media for the launching of rumors; on occasion of the Korean conflict rumors were spread out; can at times have considerable effect when the paper in question is the source of an interesting rumor; undoubtedly many of the stories picked up and published by the leftist press are repeated by non-Communists who are unaware of their infamous origin, thusly they are able to exert their maximum influence; but quite enough to let the German people consider the efforts being made by the Western powers with a certain skepticism; a lie repeated often enough assumes itself to be a truth; etc. 10

Other things have more effect; policy and actions of the Western powers in Germany and in foreign policy: Undoubtedly since the Korean war the confidence of the German people in this area has been very greatly shaken and the Communists have exploited the Korean war with propaganda as much as possible; recent war news and adversities suffered by United Nations and US troops may have contributed to the effectiveness of the KPD papers in shaking the confidence of West German people; except that remarks are made about dismantling, American robbery of patents; Communistic radio and speeches of KPD leaders have a far greater effect; etc. 10

Communists are doing poor propaganda (tendency too obvious): As the Communist press does not show objectiveness in their attitude towards the policy of the Western powers and as they indulge in open agitation; because the press is stupidly written or directed at stupid people; the paper is so ridiculous in many cases that non-Communists pay little attention to them; people through humorous curiosity like to read the little scandal stories printed in the "Volkszeitung" but it will never succeed in undermining their confidence; because the West Germans are able to read from other sources and form their own judgment; etc. 10

Economic and social conditions are more important: It is easy to understand that in those localities where unemployment is greatest Communistic propaganda is more acceptable than in the localities where we find a more stable economy; only point which is being made effective in Communistic propaganda is the one based upon the unemployed; etc. 4

Confidence in the West (US policy): The quick reaction of the USA in Korea was received by the West Germans with great satisfaction; public opinion polls show that the confidence of the West German people in action of Western powers is great; the Germans are aware of gains of Western democracy; etc. 3

Others: With reservations; if the Communists show victories then their following will jump up; repeated requests for the assurance by German officials to make the Elbe and not the Rhine river the front line of defense of the Western world; it's also generally agreed that the non-Communistic papers are more objective in their comments; most of those who get this material regard it as silly but wonder how it affects

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the less intelligent man in the street and out-of-work youth; largely due to the fact that our own overt information media has brought the facts to West Germany and they know what we are doing for them; though the greater part of the German population does not admit the help of American policy for Western Germany they realize that in the East Zone no help at all is given; the general level of education is not very high; these papers spread the corruptness of the Western government which the people like to hear; etc. 7%

INTERVIEWERS' REASONS FOR INEFFECTIVENESS ...

Reports about the real conditions in the Communist ruled districts (East Zone) serve as a warning: The great difference of the living standard as well as of personal and political freedom of the population in Eastern and Western Germany is obvious; the population sees every day the measures taken by the Communist party in Germany and elsewhere; the difference of the living standard in East and West Germany speaks its own language; the policy and measures of the West are known to the people as being good and favorable, the policy of the East as being unfavorable and bad; by political refugees, visitors, etc., the Western population has been informed about the real conditions in the East Zone, pressure, deprivation etc.; people do not feel hungry anymore, in contrast to the East Zone; the people see perfectly well, that they are far better off in the West and that is most important; etc. 37%

General skepticism, fear (the lesson of the Third Reich) of Communism, and fear of the East (Russia), and totalitarianism: Every single one remembers the Third Reich methods of stupifying the people (Verdummungspolitik) and will not fall for the Communist propaganda; the newspapers not being taken seriously because of their pro-Russian tendency and chiefly on behalf of the lies and the hatefulness; the greater part of the population is rather skeptical toward the sort of news and reports the Communist newspapers produce; the fear of losing personal freedom is great; Communist newspapers are not considered trustworthy; people are against Communist reports because Communist press is not able to diminish general fear of the Russians; because 95% of the Germans fear nothing in the world more than Communism and the Russians; the KPD is not liked well at all; etc. 23%

The tendency of the Communist propaganda is too obvious: The press has such a markedly obvious tendency that even simple and stupid people don't fall for it; obvious methods of stupifying the people (Verdummungsmethoden); etc. 16%

Number of readers is limited: The number of readers is small; etc. 15%

Only in the event of an economic break-down will the Communist press be successful: A part of the population fears they will lose their jobs some day, and therefore be possibly more susceptible to Communist propaganda; the success, of course, will always depend on the social position held by the reader; as long as the economic conditions are acceptable in West Germany the Communists will hardly succeed; etc. 9%

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Others: There is some success because doubts arise among the population; in this connection I heard from people not able to judge themselves the remark: "One does not know anymore what one can believe;" results like that arise from the clever misrepresentation of facts which are uncontrollable in most cases; it is necessary to mention more often than before the willingness and the assistance of the Western powers to rebuild Germany; etc. 116

REASONS FOR SAYING CONFIDENCE UNDERMINED ...

The few Resident Officers (146) who think the KPD press has considerably affected West German confidence in the Western powers comment as follows:

"Using the German national pride, calling for sovereignty, independence, etc. and cleverly evaluating dismantling measures, alleged war preparation; they make a great part of the workers doubt the honesty of the Western powers toward Germany, this is especially true among SPD and unorganized workers."

"Although I stated above that these newspapers are not very effective in converting West Germans to Communism, I believe that the contents unnerve large groups of Germans and implant animosity and doubt about our policies and activities."

"I fear that there are many Germans who deduce that there must be some truth to the articles that appear in these newspapers — else we would not permit their publication; it must be remembered that the German people are not entirely aware of the implications of a free press."

"Shaking confidence in the policies and actions of the Western powers is a different matter; the Communist press does keep alive the challenge to the West and does feed on the fears of the average citizen, who without realizing it, quotes the fears promoted in the Communist press."

"Potentially effective; does not tend to create new Communists, but does help to undermine our policies through constant one-sided attacks."

"Within Western Germany there are other citizens beside the Communists who do not like the allied authorities; these people might spread news and slogans from Communist papers for the purpose of creating unrest and disunity; thus the effectiveness of the Communist papers within certain circles might be considerable."

"While it is not believed that the majority is ready or willing to turn to Communism, it is felt that the Communist press is effective in swaying the opinion of lesser educated people."

The Interviewers who are of this opinion (9%) speak along these lines:

"They are in the position to be able to mention facts (Korea) which will undermine the confidence; the Federal government is making many mistakes for which the occupation powers are held responsible, which is true in some cases (dismantling by the British)."

"Every mistake made by the Federal government and the occupation powers is taken up by the Communist press in a very clever way; the constant pointing out of dismantling and unemployment is not without effect."

"If an uncontradicted statement is repeated frequently something of it remains in the minds of people; there are people who say that 'the Communists are right in this and this; they at least dare to speak up,' a very dangerous development."

"In the long run the economically weak begin to see prospects for improvement under a regime, that is constantly praised and think: 'We can only gain not lose'."

"In many cases the Western powers have failed to correct Communist reports that were obvious defamations."

COMMUNIST PRESS SHOULD NOT BE SUPPRESSED ...

It is the opinion of the large majority (83%) of both panels that the Communist newspapers in Western Germany should not be suppressed. Around one in six do advocate prohibiting them.

"Whether or not it is advisable to permit Communist papers in West Germany to continue publishing is now an important question facing American policy makers. What is your best judgment on this issue — should they be prohibited from publishing or not?"

	KRO	Interviewers
Prohibited	14%	17%
Not prohibited	83	83
Ambiguous	3	-
	100%	100%

REASON AGAINST SUPPRESSION ...

The two leading arguments advanced by the Resident Officers' panel for not suppressing the Communist press are that 1) they would then merely go underground and have a greater appeal, and 2) it would be against democratic principles. Their comments cataloged and listed in order of frequency of mention follow:

Will publish underground anyway and have greater appeal:
(Control more difficult, produces martyrs, makes propaganda more effective, etc.): If we prohibit the Communist newspapers, it will be beautiful worldwide propaganda material for the Communists; also it will make martyrs out of them, cause them to be smuggled and distributed secretly which will appeal to the German love of being involved in something clandestine and secret, particularly when it is of political nature; prohibition of the Communist would drive

Communitistic publicity underground; an increased whispering campaign would be the result and all sorts of rumors, which now are traceable to their source, would become untraceable; because prohibited papers would probably be more widely read; the role of martyrs suits their plans most admirably; they will go underground; because such a measure would give them additional agitation material; would only draw more attention to the Communists; might be more underground; it's better to have it out in the open where we can counteract KPD propaganda; because the papers can be observed more closely as long as they are published overtly; we will have a much more difficult job to check on them; etc. 50%

Contrary to democratic principles and no way to promote democracy in Germany: We cannot really call ourselves a "free-press" and deny that to the KPD; prohibition is a totalitarian method; would be a smack in the eye for freedom of press; if you prohibit Communist newspapers in the Western Zones send all your resident officers home and forget preaching equal rights for all; the "so this is democracy" argument might possibly find support among certain groups; would undoubtedly compare it to the Nazi action prohibiting the Communist and Socialist press; also the non-Communists would regard this an assault on the basic rights, namely here the freedom of the press; it would be a considerable setback for what we are trying to carry through, the Reorientation program; would not serve as a good example for our policy of promoting democratic thoughts; etc. 30%

Influence of KPD press is insignificant, therefore prohibition unnecessary - unwise: It is my opinion that it is not necessary that they be prohibited from being published; paper reaches only a few people; little would be gained since very few Germans in this area pay much attention or give much credence to articles in the Communist press; I do not feel its influence is great enough to warrant it (prohibition); has actually little effect (KPD); etc. 19%

One should more stringently enforce existing law and papers should be banned if they become a threat: The publication of Communist newspapers should be stopped if they present a threat to the security of the occupation forces and Western Germany; a policy of censorship would be more valuable than one of outright prohibition; should be heavily punished whenever and wherever they falsify or distort fact, prohibition however would be unwise; should not hesitate to make use of the powers conferred upon the High Commission by HICOM LAW No. 5; vicious Communist attacks can (should) be dealt with promptly in occupation courts; stringent control on distribution of Communist propaganda should be established; the newspapers should be compelled to publish retractions when it can be proven that the original article was erroneous; etc. 14%

Can be more easily exposed in pen, can't compete:
It is better to have such a newspaper which distorts the truth and publishes the absolute untruth to be published openly where it may be read and compared to the other free newspaper; the Communist newspapers are clearly labeled and people reading them know the source and can judge the information accordingly; another reason for not stopping Communist propaganda is that most of the Communist propaganda, and most of their statements made in regards to world policy, can very easily be disproved; etc. 13%

Editorial action exposing Communist propaganda would be helpful: I suggest the counter-propaganda method; all efforts should be concentrated on informing the general public about the true aims of Communism, the only danger lies with the refugees and the unemployed; etc. 10%

Prohibition only if party itself is forbidden first:
I do not agree that the Communist press be suppressed when the party itself is legal; as long as our government does not ban the Communist party it would not be advisable to launch such an action; etc. 9%

Would be a sign of weakness on part of West: Such an act would appear that we are afraid of the Communists; reaction of most Germans would be: "Perhaps the KPD did tell the truth and the Allies are afraid"; prohibition of Communist newspapers might display weakness on the part of the Western powers; etc. 8%

Rumors and radio propaganda just as effective or more:
The propaganda published in the Communist newspapers is not anywhere near as dangerous as rumors etc. which are spread and planted and are difficult to trace to their source; we are of the opinion that radio propaganda from the East disturbs Germans more than Communist newspapers; Communist propaganda can be transmitted by radio and by means of rumors; etc. 5%

Others: In my opinion the most unsettling factor so far as the press is concerned is, at the moment, not the Communist press but the sensational way in which German newspapers are presenting world news; etc. 2%

The Interviewers panel advances most frequently the following three arguments: 1) the appeal of a forbidden underground press; 2) suppression would serve Communist interests; and 3) suppression is contrary to democratic principles.

Their comments also listed in order of frequency of mention are:

Illegal activities and "the appeal of doing something forbidden" would make the Communist press more dangerous and more successful than before (control would be more difficult; etc): There is the fear that illegally the circulation of the newspapers would even increase, there would be the danger also that non-Communists reading these newspapers would be ready to accept informations through them; that the Communists forced by prohibition, would become illegal and thus more dangerous, actual control becoming considerably more difficult;

prohibition would only activate the Communist propaganda; control more difficult, a considerably wider circulation as underground newspapers would result than is the case to-day; experience teaches that most people prefer to do something that is prohibited than something that everyone is free to do; underground newspapers would go from hand to hand, which would be much more dangerous because control would not be possible any longer; a licensed and permitted press is easier to control than an illegal one; official publication permits considerable control; etc. 50%

An actual prohibition would be the best propaganda for the Communist party (KPL, Russia) and "grist to their mill" (would produce martyrs): A permanent prohibition would only create new outcries against the methods of the capitalists; would mean an undeserved victory for Communist propaganda; the danger of creating Communist martyrs would be disproportionably greater than the results of official prohibition; prohibition would give new means of propaganda to Russia; it is always advisable to let the enemy speak up instead of not allowing him to get a word in, thus attracting general attentions; the Communists would claim prohibition of their press as being oppression, I consider it unwise to favor a movement by making martyrs of protagonists; etc. 40%

Prohibition would not be justifiable in a democracy (freedom of speech and press): Of primary importance seems to me the fact that prohibiting Communist newspapers would never be compatible with democratic principles; nobody should be able to reproach the Americans for having deprived anyone of the principles of freedom of speech and press; the status of a democratic press must be preserved; one must have the courage to demonstrate by action that one is serious about freedom of speech in a democracy; it would give the enemy reason to attack the fundamental rights of democracy (freedom of press); etc. 31%

Prohibition is unnecessary because the influence of the Communist press is generally unimportant, the population is quite immune: In my opinion the Communist press does not meet with the approval of the Western German population; because the Communist press does not exercise influence on the population I consider a prohibition unnecessary if not dangerous; danger scarcely exists of the Communists making new friends in the West by their propaganda; only a relatively small number of people claims the Communist party to be the only one that dares speak up; the people don't fall for the Communists, the greater part of the population being immune to Communist propaganda; etc. 20%

Prohibition would be unwise, possibly being interpreted as weakness of the Western powers: It would be unwise because it might be considered a weakness on the part of the Western powers; indubitably prohibition would be considered a weakness of the democratic American position; etc. 18%

Intensive counter-propaganda and supervision of the Communist press: A stringent supervision of the Communist press would be advisable to check the truth of their publications; the non-Communist newspapers should pay more attention to the Communist propaganda and, if occasion arises, comment and rectify their articles; it is simple to refute lies with facts; etc. 12%

Take economic and social measures to neutralize Communism: Steps and measures to relieve misery among workmen and employees; through economic stabilization of the living conditions Communist propaganda will lose the ground under its feet; reduction of social misery through reduction of unemployment; etc. 11%

The Communist newspapers should only be prohibited if they offend the law (temporary prohibition): Prohibition is only legitimate if the KPD press should call for open or covert resistance to the government; attacks against the German Constitution and the laws of the Central Council; temporary prohibition; etc. 11%

Prohibition only under the condition that the KPD would be prohibited at the same time: If one does not prohibit the Communist party one should leave it the right of free press; in my opinion one cannot prohibit the newspapers and let the party continue; etc. 4%

REASONS FOR ADVOCATING SUPPRESSION ...

The minority of both panels that feels the KPD press should be banned agree in general that an intolerant, totalitarian press is not entitled to tolerance from those it seeks to undermine and that the harm the KPD press can do outweighs any effect of the accusation that prohibition denies freedom of the press. Typical comments of both panels are:

... The Resident Officers panel:

"It is a recognized fact that Communists are accomplished propagandists and seem to have unlimited funds available for propaganda purposes. The effect of their threats and most recent propaganda can be most keenly felt in the field. The longer they are permitted to keep the German mind muddled and the population apprehensive, the longer we will require to achieve our goal in Germany."

"People will say there must be something to this Communist propaganda as the Americans do not make any effort to prohibit or deny such. That we need to do is to build up a strong counter-propaganda machine."

"While it is believed that if Communist publications were forbidden, there would immediately appear underground or illegal publications; however,

shorn of the prestige of a legitimate paper, they would lose a great deal of that effectiveness in so far as the non-Communist elements of the population are concerned."

"Due to the fact that the American Zone newspapers are not allowed to be published in the East Zone."

"As adequate proof is at hand that the sponsors of these papers violate the basic rights of humanity, their publication should be forbidden. It is incongruous that they be allowed to publish their manifest untruths whereby they may find followers amongst the gullible or where they may stir unrest amongst the unfortunate and unemployed."

"In all intents and purposes the shooting war has started and it is felt that any weapon (including newspapers) in the hands of the enemy should be banned and destroyed."

"Most Germans are of the opinion that the Communist press should be prohibited. They say that there is no tolerance shown in the Eastern Zone and they do not believe that we should be tolerant toward overt or covert Russian propaganda."

... The Interviewers panel:

"Whoever fights democratic opinions cannot claim democratic rights; if an opponent has been recognized as such it should be understood that he will be opposed by all means."

"Because they misuse democracy for their aggressive plans."

"The Communists are determined to use ruthless measures and violence; whoever puts himself in the position of an outsider to democracy must count upon being banned. You cannot expect anyone inactively to witness the undermining of his house."

"Totalitarianism can only be fought by totalitarianism. Undermining must not be tolerated under any circumstances any longer."

"The American government would be acting against her own interests. Prohibitions of course are undemocratic but could in this case be compared with the measures for fighting National-Socialistic tendencies. The constant undermining activities must be considered dangerous to the government. Too much frankness on the part of democracy was the death-blow once before to the Weimar Republic."

"Even from false statements something always remains to poison public opinion. The most stupid propaganda still has some influence today."

"From the democratic point of view Germany will not be mature for some time to come; the German people are not independent enough."

"The outstandingly difficult situation requires the occupation powers to take measures justifiable even in a democratic state under the given circumstances."

"Prohibition should only become effective when the respective newspaper tries to defend the Western powers, otherwise freedom of press should be respected."

THE URBAN PUBLIC'S VIEW ON PROHIBITION OF KPD PRESS ...

Residents of West German cities are much more inclined than either of the expert observers panels to prohibit publication of the Communist press. This was ascertained in a survey made in cities of 50,000 or more population throughout Western Germany during August 15-18, 1950.* Preponderant opinion (45%) in Western German cities was for prohibiting the Communist press, with 38% against prohibition. In West Berlin, 67% voted to prohibit with only 29% against. The question and replies by region are:

"As you know Communist newspapers are at present allowed to be published in Western Germany without any restrictions. If you had to make the decision would you allow the publication of Communist newspapers to be continued or would you prohibit their publication?"

	WEST GERMANY Aug 15-18	British Zone Aug 15-18	US ZONE Aug 15-18	Berlin Aug 15-18
Would allow	38%	38%	39%	29%
Would prohibit	45	45	48	67
N.A.	5	4	5	3
No opinion	12	13	8	1
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

* The study was a "flash" survey based on an urban quota sample of 640 cases in Western Germany and 200 in Western Berlin. Results are not shown separately for the French Zone because of the small number of cases there.

THE QUESTION OF REMILITARIZATION IN WESTERN GERMANY

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PUB/RAS.

Report No. 36
Series No. 2
15 September 1950

REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
HICCG APC 807
Bad Nauheim Germany

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✓ WHAT ABOUT A WEST GERMAN ARMY - WITHIN A EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK ?

General Opinion ...
Group Differences ...

Within recent months, particularly with the outbreak of Korean hostilities, the issue of Western German remilitarization has come in for considerable attention by political leaders and by the West German press. The present report endeavors to describe current German public opinion on the issue, as ascertained through the scientific survey methods of the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs.

The present findings derive from a survey conducted in the US occupied areas of Germany in the period between August 8th and September 8th, 1950. Interviewed in the study was a representative random sample of approximately 1,500 cases in the US Zone, 300 in Berlin, and 200 in Bremen. As usual the interviews were obtained from randomly selected respondents by a trained German staff under the general supervision of American survey officers. Detailed description of the sampling methods employed is available upon request. The analysis and interpretation of the data has been performed by the professional survey staff of the Office of Public Affairs.

MAJOR FINDINGS IN BRIEF

THE PRESENT MAJORITY SENTIMENT IN THE US OCCUPIED AREAS OF GERMANY IS IN FAVOR OF THE IDEA OF WEST GERMAN REMILITARIZATION, BUT ONLY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A WEST EUROPEAN DEFENSIVE ARMY. Support for an army without qualifying it as integrated in a Western European framework drops below majority status because few West Germans prefer, and many will have no part of, an independent German army.

Sixty-three per cent in the US Zone, 90 per cent in Berlin, and 76 per cent in Bremen expressed themselves in favor of German participation in a Western European defensive army within the framework of the Atlantic Pact. Seventy-two per cent of the men in the US Zone favor the idea, and 69 per cent of the men in the militarily significant age range of 18 to 44 years.

When the respondents were asked whether they are for or against a West German army, without any specification as to its type, only 43 per cent in the US Zone expressed approval, with 45 per cent in opposition. In Berlin 73 per cent expressed approval of a German army under such circumstances, and in Bremen 54 per cent. In a follow-up question put to these respondents, it was revealed that in all the areas surveyed preference for a Western European type of army exceeded preference for an independent German army about two to one.

IS GERMAN AID NECESSARY FOR WEST GERMAN DEFENSE ?

GENERAL OPINION ...

A majority of West Germans everywhere sampled, almost two out of three in the US Zone as a whole, express the opinion that West Germany cannot be defended without German help.

"Do you believe that the Western powers are able to defend West Germany without German help or will they need German help?"

DCD

	Bavaria	Hesse	W. Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Without German help	23%	24%	21%	22%	38%	18%
Will need German help	66	56	62	63	58	70
qualified replies	1	3	2	2	2	1
No opinion	10	17	15	13	2	11
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Berlin has the largest proportion, it will be noted, who believe that the Western powers could defend West Germany without German aid. That such a viewpoint does not spring from any widespread disinclination in Berlin to approve German help will be evident in the results to subsequent questions.

In the US Zone, group similarities are more striking than group differences on the necessity of German aid in the defense of West Germany. The view that German help is needed clearly dominates in all strata of the population. It is perhaps worth noting, however, that though the preponderance of US Zone youth see a necessity of German aid in West German defense, they are less inclined than their elders to take such a view.

As is typical, absence of opinions on the present issue is more frequent among the generally less informed elements of the population, i.e. the women, the less educated, the lower income, the rural and the politically undecided.

"Do you believe that the Western powers are able to defend West Germany without German help or will they need German help?"

	Without German help	Will need German help	qualified replies	No opinion	*Number of cases
<u>Sex:</u>					
Men	21%	69%	3%	7% ... 100%	716
Women	24	57	1	18	772
<u>Education:</u>					
8 years or less	22	62	1%	15%	1225
9 years and more	24	67	3	6	266
<u>Income (per month):</u>					
0 - 149 DM	21%	61%	1%	17%	412
150 - 299	22	64	2	12	668
300 DM and more	25	67	2	6	354
<u>City Size:</u>					
Under 2,000 pop.	24%	60%	1%	15%	577
2,000 - 24,999	23	62	2	13	472
25,000 and over	21	66	3	10	439
<u>Age:</u>					
15 - 24 years	31%	57%	2%	10%	221
25 - 59	23	63	2	12	1024
60 years and over	15	64	2	19	243
<u>Party Preference:</u>					
SPD	19%	73%	-4	8%	289
CDU/CSU	23	67	1	9	282
(FDP/LDP/DVP/EDV)	21	67	3	9	(90)
(BP)	21	74	1	4	(78)
None of them	23	46	2	29	496
No opinion	24	58	3	15	212
<u>Origin:</u>					
Native	23%	62%	2%	13%	1224
Refugee	22	64	3	11	258

*These are the numbers of cases falling into the specific subgroups listed in this and subsequent similar tables. It should not be overlooked that the numbers for the two political categories parenthesized are too few for reliable conclusions. In these instances the results are shown merely for whatever suggestive value they may possess.

WHAT ABOUT A WEST GERMAN ARMY - TYPE UNSPECIFIED ?

GENERAL OPINION ...

The initial question on the complex problem of German rearmament is not the crucial one in the present study, but has been posed both early enough and often enough to offer a useful picture of trend developments. This is an inquiry into the extent of approval or disapproval of a Western German army, without specifically qualifying its nature as an independent army or one integrated with European forces. On the army issue, so presented, it is revealed that since November 1949 US Zone approval of a German army has risen from 26 per cent to a figure of 43 per cent. Conversely disapproval has dropped from firm majority status (62%) down to 45%. In Berlin over the same period, support for such an army has jumped from approximately one half up to three quarters of the population of the three Western sectors. In Bremen approval has doubled and now stands at 54 per cent.

"There has been considerable talk recently about whether or not Western Germany should have an army. Are you for it or are you against it?"

	US ZONE			Berlin			Bremen		
	Nov	Apr	Aug	Nov	Apr	Aug	Nov	Apr	Aug
	'49	'50	'50	'49	'50	'50	'49	'50	'50
For it	26%	39%	43%	48%	51%	73%	25%	35%	54%
Against it	62	56	45	57	48	26	69	59	41
No opinion	12	5	12	2	1	1	6	6	5
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Laender breakdowns of the US Zone returns disclose that Hesse shows considerably less favor for a German army, as this question puts the issue, than does either Bavaria or Wuertemberg-Baden. Reasons for such a difference will have to await further study.

	Bavaria			Hesse			W-Baden		
	Nov	Apr	Aug	Nov	Apr	Aug	Nov	Apr	Aug
	'49	'50	'50	'49	'50	'50	'49	'50	'50
For it	32%	47%	48%	16%	29%	31%	22%	29%	43%
Against it	56	49	44	71	65	50	69	66	46
No opinion	12	4	8	13	6	19	9	5	11
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

The following table of group differences in the US Zone presents quite a number of interesting comparisons and trend indications. But perhaps the most notable facts are the changes in opinion in the ranks of SPD adherents and among refugees. SPD leaders have for some time expressed opposition to the idea of West German remilitarization. In the light of this it is of considerable interest to observe that since May of 1950 apparently the largest gain in approval of a German army, and the largest loss in disapproval, has occurred among respondents who reported they preferred SPD to other political parties. During the same period, it should be finally noted, very nearly as large a change in attitudes has occurred among the refugee elements in the US Zone population.

"There has been considerable talk recently about whether or not Western Germany should have an army. Are you for it or are you against it?"

	For it		Against it		No opinion		
	May	Aug	May	Aug	May	Aug	
	'50	'50	'50	'50	'50	'50	
<u>Sex:</u>							
Men	41%	48%	58%	46%	1%	6%	... 100%
Women	37	38	55	45	8	17	
<u>Education:</u>							
8 years or less	40%	43%	55%	44%	5%	13%	
9 years and more	34	43	54	52	2	5	
<u>Income (per month):</u>							
0 - 149 DM	44%	46%	50%	38%	6%	16%	
150 - 299 DM	37	44	59	46	4	10	
300 DM and more	37	41	59	52	4	7	
<u>City Size:</u>							
Under 2,000 pop.	40%	47%	53%	39%	7%	14%	
2,000 - 24,999	38	40	59	48	3	12	
25,000 and over	38	41	58	51	4	8	
<u>Age:</u>							
15 - 24 years	38%	34%	59%	55%	3%	11%	
25 - 59 years	38	43	58	46	4	11	
60 years and over	42	52	50	35	8	13	
<u>Party Preference:</u>							
SPD	34%	51%	63%	41%	3%	8%	
CDU/CSU	42	46	53	43	5	11	
FDP/LDP/DVP/BDV	46	52	52	44	2	4	
BP	56	49	42	47	2	4	
None of them	31	36	63	38	6	26	
No opinion	33	36	52	52	15	12	
<u>Origin:</u>							
Native	39%	40%	57%	48%	4%	12%	
Refugee	39	55	55	34	6	11	

In all the areas surveyed most of the respondents approving of a German army of an unspecified type focus upon security reasons for doing so - with or without mentioning Communism as a specific threat. Small minorities, however, bring forth a diversity of considerations, some dubious by democratic standards.

"There has been considerable talk recently about whether or not Western Germany should have an army. Are you for it or are you against it?"

If "For it": "Why are you for it?"

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

For security reasons - for an eventual defense (without mentioning Russia): In case of an attack we do not want to remain defenseless; to protect ourselves; otherwise we shall be ruined; that would be safer for us; if a war breaks out today the Americans will withdraw and therefore we must be able to defend ourselves; etc.

16% 27% 27%

As a protection against Russia and against Communism: In case of Russian aggression we should be able to defend ourselves; as a deterrent against the East; as security against Russia; we Germans must help to keep off the Russians; what's happening in Korea must not happen to us; because otherwise we will be occupied by the Russians; etc.

14 30 13

For the education of young people: To keep young people off the street; for educational reasons; as stricter means of education for the neglected youth; etc.

3 5 4

For the elimination of unemployment: To fight unemployment; many unemployed could become soldiers; etc.

3 3 4

Implies equal rights with other countries for Germany: No country can manage without military forces in the long run; we would have quite a different standing toward other countries; an army cannot do harm in any country; because we can only gain; a people without arms has no authority; etc.

3 2 3

Germans needed for the common defense of Europe: Germans are needed; German assistance is necessary for the defense of Europe; the Americans alone cannot defend themselves; because the Germans know more about the Russian tactics than the Americans do; to make the Americans realize that we want to take part in our defense; etc.

2 7 2

Germans would best defend West Germany: The Germans would defend their fatherland much better than foreigners would; because one defends one's own country best; etc.

1 2 1

To regain our homes: Because then we might be able to return home; everyone wants to return to his home country; my parents are living in the East under poor conditions, I hope that we can throw the Polish out; to attain our national rights (recovery of the Eastern provinces); we cannot live like that, they took away half of the country from us; etc.

1 1 1

Other opinions: There are many people who would be interested in it and who would enlist; if the Americans want it there must be a good reason for it; the German foot-soldier is the best; the infantry must gain ground, technical skill alone is of no value; then we will be able to drive the Americans out of the country; etc.

2 1 2

No opinion / No answer:

2 2 -
47% 80% 57%

*Some respondents gave more than one answer.

REASONS ADVANCED FOR DISAPPROVING GERMAN ARMY ...

The prevailing theme in the reasons of those who express disapproval of a German army of unspecified type, is a general weariness with war and the sacrifices it entails. Very few, it should be noted, argue that German remilitarization would provoke Russia, or contend that it would lead to a civil war.

There has been considerable talk recently about whether or not Western Germany should have an army. Are you for it or are you against it?

If "Against it": "Why are you against it?"

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

Antipathy toward war and military forces (have had enough): Because I do not want any more war; because I personally would not like to be a soldier again; we don't need it; I want quiet and peace; I am an antagonist of military things as a principle; two wars were enough for us; we have suffered enough and fought for nothing; swords should be forged into ploughs, as it is written in the Bible; etc.

15% 8% 17%

Fear for loved ones - loss of relatives in the last war: Men do not want to leave home; wives don't want to let their husbands go; we have had enough casualties; my husband is an invalid as the result of war; I would not let my sons go; have hardly any young people left, should we let the few die that are left; etc.

8 2 4

Germany not accorded the status prerequisite to an army: We do not have a peace treaty yet, how can we set up an army; I am just as opposed to it as the Americans were in 1945; we are not able to act according to our own free will, only after the withdrawal of all occupation powers; our military honor has been disparaged; the Americans have disarmed us, this time it is not our fault; the former German army was disarmed when fighting against Bolshevism; it would mean a violation of the Potsdam agreements; etc.

8 3 6

Army would only lead to certain war: Any military power leads to a war; as soon as Germany has an army war will break out again; I see a danger of war; etc.

7 4 6

No wish to be used as cannon fodder: We will only be cannon fodder for others; I am fed up, they would use us only as mercenary troops; if the German and the American soldiers would go to war together, the Germans would have to fight in the front lines and would have the greatest casualties; why should we poor people have to fight for capital, the big shots should knock out one another's brains themselves; etc.

4 3 4

Nothing good will come of it; it would lead to ruin and economic disaster: Germany is economically too weak; we would have to pay more taxes; an army of one's own would cost more than the occupation; the old generals would get the upper hand again; etc.

2 3 1

(cont'd on next page)

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

Would cause trouble with Russia: It would challenge the East; the time hasn't come yet - it would give the Communists stuff for propaganda; the Russians would march in immediately; etc.

2% 1% 1%

Could lead to civil war: A civil war must be avoided; that would be a reason for a civil war; etc.

1 1 -

German army alone of no value - too weak: It would be too late now in any case; our army alone couldn't do anything anyway; a West German army would have too little striking power because people would be too skeptical of success; because it is useless and it cannot hold the Russians back; etc.

1 1 1

Other opinions: One could solve the problem in a diplomatic way; they have practically an army in East Germany; it is not necessary; because an army would mean universal military training which God has forbidden through his Commandments; because we expect God's war in which no army will be of any help; set a good example for the Russians; etc.

1 1 2

No opinion / No answer:

*
49% ** 27% ** 42% **

* Less than one half of one per cent.

**Some people gave more than one answer.

Majority approval of West German remilitarization holds only for German participation in a general European army. Few Germans prefer and many will have no part of an independent German army. This fact emerges from the following:

- (1) When those who approved of a German army of unspecified type, were asked what kind of army it should be - an independent German army or one part of the forces of the Western powers - in the latest survey they voted approximately two to one for the latter.

"Should such an army be an independent German army or should it be part of the forces of the Western powers?"
(Asked of those who said "For it" to initial question).

ACD

	US ZONE			Berlin			Bremen		
	Nov '49	Apr '50	Aug '50	Nov '49	Apr '50	Aug '50	Nov '49	Apr '50	Aug '50
Independent German army	10%	15%	13%	21%	15%	19%	9%	17%	16%
Part of forces of the Western powers	12	21	24	25	33	50	13	14	32
Qualified replies and No opinion	<u>4</u> 26%	<u>3</u> 39%	<u>6</u> 43%	<u>2</u> 48%	<u>3</u> 51%	<u>4</u> 73%	<u>3</u> 25%	<u>4</u> 35%	<u>6</u> 54%

- (2) When those who expressed themselves as against a German army when the type was unspecified, are examined as to their answers on the idea of German participation in an European pact army, it is revealed that the largest proportion of them - almost half - approve an army of this specific kind.

ACD

	For German participation in an Atlantic Pact army	Against German participation in an Atlantic Pact army	No opinion
Against West German army	47%	37%	16% 100%
For West German army	87	5	8
No opinion	31	6	63

The implication is clear that among many Germans objections to an independent German army is so great that they refuse to approve of the idea of an army, unless it is clearly specified as of a general European type.

WHAT ABOUT A WEST GERMAN ARMY - WITHIN A EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK ?

GENERAL OPINION ...

The prior question has been of value in disclosing trends and nuances of German thinking in respect to the remilitarization issue, but it is the present question that reveals precisely where most West Germans in the US occupied areas stand in this matter. The present query asks specifically about German participation in a general European army within the framework of the Atlantic Pact. When the remilitarization issue is posed in this specific framework, the results are a clear majority approval of 63 per cent in the US Zone and an overwhelming approval of nine out of ten in Berlin. In Bremen 76 per cent expressed themselves in favor of such a proposal.*

"Several West European nations and America recently signed a defense pact, the so-called Atlantic Pact.

Suppose West Germany would join the Atlantic Pact and be asked in connection with it to participate in a general army for defense of Western Europe. Would you then be for or against such a participation in a defense army?"

ACD

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Yes, for it	65%	56%	63%	63%	90%	76%
No, against it	18	24	19	19	8	17
No opinion	17	20	18	18	2	7
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

- * It should not be overlooked that these figures are such that even if they were as much as 10 per cent in error in the US Zone - considerably more in Berlin and Bremen - the basic conclusion of majority approval on this question remains unaffected.

GROUP DIFFERENCES ...

Examination of the following group comparisons in the US Zone reveals that approval of an Atlantic Pact army is relatively greater among the more informed elements of the population - the better educated, the economically better situated, urban residents, and men. Except for the sex comparison, such a trend was distinctly not in evidence in the returns to the prior non-specific query on a German army.

A second general point of importance is that in no group examined does approval of an Atlantic Pact army fail to strongly exceed disapproval - more often than not with clear majorities. It is worth special note that whatever may be the opinions of party officials, US Zone Germans of SPD political preference firmly support the idea of German participation in a European army.

Finally, for the value it may have, the opinions of men in the militarily significant age range of 18 to 44 years are listed at the bottom of the table.

"Several West European nations and America recently signed a defense pact, the so-called Atlantic Pact.

Suppose West Germany would join the Atlantic Pact and be asked in connection with it to participate in a general army for defense of Western Europe. Would you then be for or against such a participation in a defense army?"

	Yes, for it	No, against it	No opinion	
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	72%	21%	7%	... 100%
Women	54	19	27	
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	61%	19%	20%	
9 years and more	72	22	6	
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	55%	19%	26%	
150 - 299 DM	66	19	15	
300 DM and more	69	21	10	
<u>City Size:</u>				
Under 2,000 population	61%	17%	22%	
2,000 - 24,999	59	21	20	
25,000 and over	68	22	10	
<u>Age:</u>				
15 - 24 years	58%	27%	15%	
25 - 59 years	63	20	17	
60 years and over	63	11	26	
<u>Party Preference:</u>				
SPD	72%	17%	11%	
CDU/CSU	73	12	15	
FDP/LDP/DVP/BDV	80	10	10	
BP	72	20	8	
None of them	43	18	39	
No opinion	54	27	19	
<u>Origin:</u>				
Native	61%	21%	18%	
Refugee	68	14	18	
<u>Men 18 to 44 years:</u>	69%	25%	6%	

GERMANS VIEW THE KOREAN OUTBREAK

III. Overall Opinions and Group Differences
in the US Occupied Areas

Classification cancelled
by authority of Leo P. Crespi
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28 September 1950

REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
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To keep abreast of developments in German opinion following the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs, has conducted regular surveys in Western Germany. The present report presents the findings from the latest and most extensive of these surveys to date, embracing a representative sampling of 1,500 cases in the US Zone, 300 in the three Western sectors of Berlin, and 200 in Bremen. In the present study, as was not priorily the case, the number of respondents is large enough to supplement overall views with a consideration of group differences in opinion in the US Zone population.

The present survey was in the field from August 8th through September 8th, 1950 - generally speaking after early fluctuations in opinions with the initial shifting fortunes of the Korean war, and before the major UN offensive that opened with UN forces landing at Inchon and elsewhere.

As usual the interviews were obtained from randomly selected respondents by a trained German staff under the general supervision of American survey officers. Detailed description of the sampling methods employed is available upon request. The analysis and interpretation of the data has been performed by the professional survey staff of the Office of Public Affairs.

OUTLINE OF HIGHLIGHTS

I. AWARENESS AND EVALUATION OF COMMUNIST ATTACK

- ... Despite heavy Communist propaganda to the contrary there is no doubt among Germans in the US occupied areas that the Communists were the aggressors in the Korean outbreak.
- ... Almost no one among the West Germans aware of the Communist attack felt that the action was justified.
- ... And, finally, almost all the Germans sampled who had opinions in the matter feel that the aggression in Korea was not instigated by the North Koreans on their own, but was prompted by Russia.

II. AWARENESS OF UN SUPPORT

- ... A majority in the US Zone - four out of five in Berlin - are aware of the fact that the American action in Korea has UN support.

III. EVALUATION OF KOREAN NEWS REPORTING

- ... The majority of Germans in the US occupied areas - particularly in Berlin - accept the news reports from the American side in Korea as even-handed in treatment.
- ... The few Germans in the US occupied areas who report having heard or read news from the Communist side on Korea almost unanimously accord superior reliability to the news emanating from the American side.

IV. EXTENT OF WLR APPREHENSIONS

- ... Preponderant opinion in all the areas surveyed is that the intention of the Communists in the Korean outbreak is not to start a new world war, but rather to test the power of the West.

- ... But on the larger question of the possibility of avoiding world war within the next ten years, a majority in the US and Berlin are pessimistic. Except in Berlin, however, the fact of Korea has not markedly increased the extent of war expectations over those prevalent in May 1950.
- ... Opinions rather evenly split in the US occupied areas as to whether the danger of a Korea-like conflict occurring in Germany is relatively great or small.
- ... A persistent theme of Communist propaganda in Germany has been "Amis go home". Western German approval of this theme - never really extensive - has with the example of Korea before it become even less. Currently three quarters in the US Zone - 85 per cent in Berlin - hold that Germany would not be in a politically secure condition if all the occupying powers withdraw.

V. EXTENT OF CONFIDENCE IN WEST

Prefatory note: All of the following measures of confidence were taken prior to (1) the UN offensive in Korea and (2) the Foreign Ministers Communique to West Germany. It seems reasonable to suppose that whatever the level of confidence found, it can only rise higher in response to these events.

- ... The Germans are far from considering the Communist aggression in Korea a complete disaster for the West. This is indicated by the findings that a majority in Berlin - and at least as many as feel otherwise in the US Zone and Bremen - hold as of the time of this survey that the political advantages to the West of being alerted and unified by the incident outweigh the military losses.
- ... Confidence in the ability of the Americans and the United Nations to defeat the North Korean aggressors has apparently become the majority feeling in the US occupied areas as of the time of the present survey. No more than one in ten anywhere sampled expressed the feeling that he was "not confident at all" of a successful outcome.
- ... American material and military superiority bulks largest among the reasons given by those who expressed confidence in ultimate victory by the Americans and the United Nations.
- ... A wide variety of reasons were advanced by those who were "less confident or "not confident at all" of American and UN victory, with the fact of repeated American withdrawal uppermost in the minds of many.
- ... The dominating sentiment in the US occupied areas - most particularly in Berlin - at the time of this survey, is that America is preparing as well as possible to meet all further international developments.
- ... West German confidence in America is also underscored by the strong majority conviction expressed in the US occupied areas, that America would take a firm stand in the event of a Communist aggression in Europe.
- ... West German confidence in American measures to meet the present world situation and determination to resist Communist aggression in Europe embraces also the majority belief that the Western powers would try to defend West Germany in the event of a war.

- ... A final notable vote of confidence in the West is that a majority in the US occupied areas feel that the Western powers are doing everything they should to insure the security of West Germany.
- ... The minority who believe otherwise suggest additional measures which in large part prove to be those subsequently accorded to the West Germans in the provisions of the Foreign Ministers' Communique.
- ... The implication is then, that with the establishment of the new security provisions satisfaction with the efforts of the Western powers to insure German security is likely to characterize the large bulk of the West German population.

VI. THE NEUTRALITY ISSUE

- ... The dominating opinion among Germans in the US occupied areas is still that in the present East-West struggle most Germans would prefer to side with the Western powers, rather than side with Russia or to remain completely out of the matter. However, the effect of Korea has apparently been to increase from a quarter to about a third the proportion of respondents in the US Zone who judge that most Germans would prefer to remain neutral.
- ... Since even among the minority who feel that most Germans would prefer to remain neutral only a negligible few believe that neutrality is possible, the issue of where the Germans stand in the East-West struggle really boils down to - would most Germans prefer to side with Russia or fight against her in the event of an invasion from the East? The answer is that a large majority everywhere sampled - a very large majority in Berlin - feel that under such circumstances most Germans would side with the West.

AWARENESS AND EVALUATION OF COMMUNIST ATTACK

WHO ATTACKED FIRST? ...

Despite heavy Communist propaganda to the contrary there is no doubt among Germans in the US occupied areas that the Communists were the aggressors in the Korean outbreak. Only a minuscule one per cent in the US Zone, Berlin and Bremen hold otherwise.

"As you probably have heard or read, an armed conflict has broken out between North- and South Korea. Can you tell me who attacked first in Korea?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
North Korea - Communists -						
Russia	62%	69%	60%	63%	89%	73%
South Korea	1	-	2	1	1	1
Others	1	2	1	1	-	1
No opinion and no answer	36	29	37	35	10	25
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Group differences in the US Zone exhibit the typical pattern of returns to an information type query, with the customarily more informed elements of the population - the men, the higher educated, the economically better situated, and the urban dwelling - manifesting more widespread awareness of the fact of North Korean aggression. It is a disturbing commentary on the political inertness of German women that as many as half had no answer to offer to such a significant contemporary political question.

	North Korea Communists Russia	South Korea	Others	No opinion No answer	Number of cases: *
US ZONE GROUPS					
Sex:					
Men	78%	1%	1%	20% ... 100%	716
Women	50	-	1	49	772
Education:					
8 years or less	58%	1%	1%	40%	1225
9 years and more	87	1	2	10	266
Income (per month):					
0 - 149 DM	54%	-%	1%	43%	412
150 - 299 DM	65	1	1	33	668
300 DM and more	74	1	2	23	354
City Size:					
Under 2,000 pop.	56%	-%	1%	43%	577
2,000 - 24,999	64	-	1	35	472
25,000 and over	72	2	2	24	439
Age:					
15 - 24 years	68%	1%	1%	30%	221
25 - 59 years	64	1	1	34	1024
60 years and over	56	1	1	42	243
Party Preference:					
SPD	77%	1%	-%	22%	289
CDU/CSU	60	-	1	39	282
(FDP/LDP/DVP/BDV)	91	-	1	8	(90)
(BP)	64	-	1	35	(78)
None of them	64	1	2	33	496
No opinion	38	-	2	60	212
Origin:					
Native	63%	1%	2%	34%	1224
Refugee	63	-	1	36	258

* These are the numbers of cases falling into the specific subgroups listed in this and subsequent similar tables. It should not be overlooked that the numbers for the two political categories parenthesized are too few for reliable conclusions. In these instances the results are shown merely for whatever suggestive value they may possess.

WAS ATTACK JUSTIFIED?....

Almost no one among the West Germans aware of the Communist attack felt that the action was justified.

"In your opinion, was the attack of the Communists justified or unjustified?" (Asked of those who answered "North Korea", "Communists" or "Russia" to preceding question.)

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Justified	1%	1%	-%	-%	1%	-%
Unjustified	53	53	50	53	84	65
No opinion	8	15	10	10	4	8
	62%	69%	60%	63%	89%	73%

No group tabulations need be shown as there were no important differences of opinion as to the lack of justification for the Communist attack.

WHO INSTIGATED ATTACK? ...

Finally it is evident that almost all the Germans sampled who had opinions in the matter feel that the aggression in Korea was not instigated by the North Koreans on their own, but was prompted by Russia.

"Do you believe that Communist North Korea started the war on its own or do you think the war was instigated by Russia?" (Asked of those who answered "North Korea", "Communists" or "Russia" to initial question.)

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Started war on its own	3%	2%	1%	2%	-%	2%
Was instigated by Russia	56	61	54	57	87	65
Others	-	1	-	1	-	1
No opinion	3	5	5	3	2	5
	62%	69%	60%	63%	89%	73%

Again the unanimity of opinion in this matter among US Zone population groups render presentation of comparisons unnecessary.

HAS THE AMERICAN ACTION UN BACKING? ...

A majority in the US Zone - four out of five in Berlin - are aware of the fact that the American action in Korea has UN support. Ignorance on this matter is, however, quite considerable, particularly among the typically less informed elements of the US Zone population.

"Can you tell me please, whether the UN, that is the United Nations, support the American measures in Korea or not?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Yes, does support	54%	69%	54%	58%	80%	77%
Does not support	6	2	4	4	2	2
No opinion	40	29	42	38	18	21
	100%	100%	100"	100%	100%	100%
	Does support		Does not support		No opinion	
US ZONE GROUPS						
<u>Sex:</u>						
Men	76%			5%	19%	... 100%
Women	41			4	55	
<u>Education:</u>						
8 years or less	52%			4%	44%	
9 years and more	85			5	10	
<u>Income (per month):</u>						
0 - 149 DM	46%			5%	49%	
150 - 299 DM	60			4	36	
300 DM and more	71			4	25	
<u>City Size:</u>						
Under 2,000 population	48%			5%	47%	
2,000 - 24,999	59			3	38	
25,000 and over	70			4	26	
<u>Age:</u>						
15 - 24 years	62%			4%	34%	
25 - 59 years	60			4	36	
60 years and over	45			7	48	
<u>Party Preference:</u>						
SPD	76%			3%	21%	
CDU/CSU	49			4	47	
FDP/LDP/BDV	87			2	11	
BP	55			6	39	
None of them	59			5	36	
No opinion	32			4	64	
<u>Origin:</u>						
Native	57%			4%	39%	
Refugee	61			4	35	

It is probable that a few above who say that the UN does not support American measures in Korea are aware of the fact of UN sponsorship of the action, but have interpreted the question as an opportunity to express a feeling that the extent of support is inadequate.

ARE NEWS REPORTS FROM THE AMERICAN SIDE UNBIASED? ...

Even if some courtesy to an American sponsored inquiry is discounted, it seems fairly clear that the majority of Germans in the US occupied areas - particularly in Berlin - accept the reports from the American side in Korea as even-handed in treatment.

"Do you have the impression that in general the reports from the American side about the conflict in Korea present the unfavorable as well as the favorable facts, or are only happenings favorable to Americans reported?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Unfavorable as well as favorable	69%	72%	69%	69%	80%	83%
Only favorable	10	8	8	9	5	7
No opinion	21	20	23	22	5	10
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

A favorable judgment on news reporting from the American side becomes even more definite in the fact that the more critical elements in the US Zone population, rather than the less critical, are the groups who more widely express the opinion that unbiased reports are being presented. Thus it may be seen below that the men, the higher educated, the better off, and the urban dwelling considerably exceed their counterpart groups in the proportions who believe that unfavorable as well as favorable facts to the Americans are presented.

"Do you have the impression that in general the reports from the American side about the conflict in Korea present the unfavorable as well as the favorable facts, or are only happenings favorable to Americans reported?"

US ZONE GROUPS	Unfavorable as well as favorable	Only favorable	No opinion
<u>Sex:</u>			
Men	78%	10%	12% ... 100%
Women	62	9	29
<u>Education:</u>			
8 years or less	65%	10%	25%
9 years and more	90	6	4
<u>Income (per month):</u>			
0 - 149 DM	61%	8%	31%
150 - 299 DM	69	11	20
300 DM and more	82	7	11
<u>City Size:</u>			
Under 2,000 population	63%	9%	28%
2,000 - 24,999	70	9	21
25,000 and over	78	10	12
<u>Age:</u>			
15 - 24 years	73%	9%	18%
25 - 59 years	72	9	19
60 years and over	58	9	33
<u>Party Preference:</u>			
SPD	78%	10%	12%
CDU/CSU	72	7	21
FDP/LDP/DVP/BDV	89	4	7
BP	69	10	21
None of them	68	11	21
No opinion	49	7	44
<u>Origin:</u>			
Native	70%	9%	21%
Refugee	68	9	23

WHAT ABOUT NEWS REPORTS FROM THE COMMUNIST SIDE? ...

Very few Germans in the US occupied areas indicate having heard or read news reported from the Communist side on Korea. However, among these few news reporting from the American side is almost unanimously accorded superior reliability.

"Have you also heard or read reports from the Communist side about the fight in Korea?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Yes	15%	17%	12%	15%	42%	23%
No	<u>85</u> 100%	<u>83</u> 100%	<u>88</u> 100%	<u>85</u> 100%	<u>58</u> 100%	<u>77</u> 100%

"Which news about the struggle in Korea is more reliable: that from the American or that from the Communist side?" (Asked of those who said "Yes" to previous question.)

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
From the American	12%	12%	10%	11%	37%	17%
From the Communist side	1	-	-	1	1	-
No opinion	<u>2</u> 15%	<u>5</u> 17%	<u>2</u> 12%	<u>3</u> 15%	<u>4</u> 42%	<u>6</u> 23%

DOES KOREA MEAN WORLD WAR? ...

Preponderant opinion in all the areas surveyed is that the intention of the Communists in the Korean outbreak is not to start a new world war, but rather to test the power of the West. However, a quarter in the US Zone - a third in Berlin - take the more serious view of the situation.

"Are you of the opinion that the Communists want to start a new world war through the Korean conflict or do you believe that the Korean conflict is only an experiment in order to test the power of the West?"

	Bayaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Communists want to start a new world war	35%	18%	26%	28%	34%	29%
Only a test	42	44	41	42	55	50
Neither/Nor	4	11	8	7	8	5
No opinion	21	27	25	23	3	16
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

The view that the Korean outbreak does not betoken a Communist intention to start a new world war is particularly prevalent among the more critical and informed levels of the US Zone population - the men, the better educated, the prosperous, and the urban dwellers.

"Are you of the opinion that the Communists want to start a new world war through the Korean conflict or do you believe that the Korean conflict is only an experiment in order to test the power of the West?"

Communists want to start a new world war	Only a test	Neither/Nor	No opinion
--	-------------	-------------	------------

US ZONE GROUPS

<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	25%	55%	9%	11% ... 100%
Women	30	31	4	35
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	30%	38%	5%	27%
9 years and more	17	64	11	8
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	30%	34%	5%	31%
150 - 299 DM	27	44	6	23
300 DM and more	26	54	7	13
<u>City Size:</u>				
Under 2,000 population	30%	37%	4%	29%
2,000 - 24,999	27	44	7	22
25,000 and over	26	48	9	17
<u>Age:</u>				
15 - 24 years	26%	43%	6%	25%
25 - 59 years	27	45	7	21
60 years and over	30	32	7	31
<u>Party Preference:</u>				
SPD	28%	53%	8%	11%
CDU/CSU	30	38	6	26
FDP/LDP/DVP/BDP	26	59	6	9
BP	32	48	1	19
None of them	27	43	8	22
No opinion	24	27	2	47
<u>Origin:</u>				
Native	28%	42%	7%	23%
Refugee	28	43	5	24

WORLD WAR WITHIN TEN YEARS? ...

But on the larger question of the possibility of avoiding a new world war within the next ten years a majority in the US Zone and Berlin are pessimistic. Except in Berlin, however, the fact of Korea has not markedly increased the extent of war expectations over that experienced in May 1950.

"Do you believe that a new world war will break out within the next ten years?"

ACD

	Bavaria		Hesse		W-Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	May	Aug	May	Aug	May	Aug	May	Aug	May	Aug	May	Aug
Yes	62%	63%	54%	49%	56%	52%	58%	57%	52%	63%	45%	49%
No	32	26	33	27	29	28	32	27	48	28	46	32
No opinion	6	11	13	24	15	20	10	16	-	4	9	19
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Breakdown tabulations in the US Zone make it evident that in no group examined does pessimism fail to outweigh optimism on the chances of avoiding a new world war within the next decade.

"Do you believe that a new world war will break out within the next ten years?"

US ZONE GROUPS	Yes	No	No opinion
<u>Sex:</u>			
Men	62%	25%	13% ... 100%
Women	52	28	20
<u>Education:</u>			
8 years or less	56%	27%	17%
9 years and more	60	25	15
<u>Income (per month):</u>			
0 - 149 DM	53%	28%	19%
150 - 299 DM	57	28	15
300 DM and more	64	24	12
<u>City Size:</u>			
Under 2,000 population	60%	23%	17%
2,000 - 24,999	54	28	18
25,000 and over	55	31	14
<u>Age:</u>			
15 - 24 years	57%	27%	16%
25 - 59 years	59	26	15
60 years and over	47	32	21
<u>Party Preference:</u>			
SPD	59%	30%	11%
CDU/CSU	57	27	16
FDP/LDF/DVP/BDV	61	26	13
BP	66	26	8
None of them	60	23	17
No opinion	44	25	28
<u>Origin:</u>			
Native	57%	27%	16%
Refugee	56	26	18

ANOTHER KOREA IN GERMANY? ...

Opinions split in the US occupied areas as to whether the danger of a Korea-like conflict occurring in Germany is relatively great or relatively small.

"Do you think that the danger that a conflict like the one in Korea will arise in Germany is very great, great, not so great or small?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Great to very great	44%	44%	40%	42%	52%	44%
Not so great to small	46	42	52	47	48	51
No opinion	10	14	8	11	-	5
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Among US Zone groups there is indication of a larger proportion of "not so great" to "small" estimates of the danger by the more informed levels of the population.

"Do you think that the danger that a conflict like the one in Korea will arise in Germany is very great, great, not so great or small?"

	Great to very great	Not so great to small	No opinion
US ZONE GROUPS			
<u>Sex:</u>			
Men	45%	49%	6% ... 100%
Women	40	44	16
<u>Education:</u>			
8 years or less	43%	44%	13%
9 years and more	39	58	3
<u>Income (per month):</u>			
0 - 149 DM	41%	41%	18%
150 - 299 DM	45	47	8
300 DM and more	41	53	6
<u>City Size:</u>			
Under 2,000 population	47%	40%	13%
2,000 - 24,999	40	50	10
25,000 and over	40	52	8
<u>Age:</u>			
15 - 24 years	34%	58%	8%
25 - 59 years	45	45	10
60 years and over	41	43	16
<u>Party Preference:</u>			
SPD	50%	47%	3%
CDU/CSU	43	49	8
FDP/LDP/DVP/BDV	40	58	2
BP	51	40	9
None of them	44	44	12
No opinion	29	44	27
<u>Origin:</u>			
Native	43%	46%	11%
Refugee	40	47	13

WOULD GERMANY BE SECURE IF OCCUPIERS WITHDRAW?

A persistent theme of Communist propaganda in Germany has been "Amis go home." Western German approval of this theme - never really extensive - has with the example of Korea before it become even less. Currently three quarters in the US Zone - 85 per cent in Berlin - hold that Germany would not be in a politically secure condition if all the occupying powers withdraw.

"What is your view - would Germany be in a politically secure position, in case the occupying powers withdraw from Germany?"

	Bavaria			Hesse			W-Baden		
	Nov '49	Apr '50	Aug '50	Nov '49	Apr '50	Aug '50	Nov '49	Apr '50	Aug '50
Yes	21%	19%	10%	24%	19%	11%	20%	16%	9%
No	61	70	75	55	67	69	63	70	76
No opinion	18	11	15	21	14	20	17	14	15
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	US ZONE			Berlin			Bremen		
	Nov '49	Apr '50	Aug '50	Nov '49	Apr '50	Aug '50	Nov '49	Apr '50	Aug '50
Yes	22%	19%	10%	23%	24%	13%	33%	21%	11%
No	60	69	74	73	75	85	60	66	78
No opinion	18	12	16	4	1	2	7	13	11
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Though apparent to the majority of all groups in the US Zone, the political insecurity attendant to four-power withdrawal at the present time is most obvious to the more informed elements of the US Zone population. This may be seen below:

"What is your view - would Germany be in a politically secure position, in case the occupying powers withdraw from Germany?"

US ZONE GROUPS	Yes	No	No opinion
<u>Sex:</u>			
Men	12%	80%	8%
Women	9	68	23
<u>Education:</u>			
8 years or less	10%	72%	18%
9 years and more	11	84	5
<u>Income (per month):</u>			
0 - 149DM	8%	69%	23%
150 - 299 DM	11	76	13
300 DM and more	11	79	10
<u>City Size:</u>			
Under 2,000 population	10%	70%	20%
2,000 - 24,999	11	73	16
25,000 and over	10	80	10
<u>Age:</u>			
15 - 24 years	13%	69%	18%
25 - 59 years	10	76	14
60 years and over	9	68	23
<u>Party Preference:</u>			
SPD	10%	84%	6%
CDU/CSU	7	78	15
FDP/LDP/DVP/BDV	9	84	7
BP	14	74	12
None of them	13	70	17
No opinion	6	58	36
<u>Origin:</u>			
Native	10%	74%	16%
Refugee	9	75	16

IS KOREA AIL LOSS ON THE WESTERN BALANCE SHEET? ...

The Germans are far from considering the Communist aggression in Korea a complete disaster for the West. This is indicated by the finding that a majority in Berlin - and at least as many as feel otherwise in the US Zone and Bremen - hold as of the time of this survey that the political advantages to the West of being alerted and unified by the incident outweigh the military losses.

"If you consider the situation in Korea, who is politically in the stronger position at the present time, - the Communist powers as a result of their military progress, or the Western powers, who have thus been alerted and unified in their counter-measures?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
The Communist powers	30%	37%	30%	32%	28%	29%
The Western powers	38	30	40	36	59	41
No opinion	32	33	30	32	13	30
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

The extent of "no opinion" revealed among some population groups by breakdown of the US Zone results indicates that the question poses a difficult judgment. The more informed levels, it may be seen below, tend to show a higher proportion than their counterparts of both judgments, i.e. that the Communists are in the politically stronger position because of Korea or that the Western powers hold the edge.

"If you consider the situation in Korea, who is politically in the stronger position at the present time, - the Communist powers as a result of their military progress, or the Western powers, who have thus been alerted and unified in their counter-measures?"

The Communist powers The Western powers No opinion

US ZONE GROUPS

Sex:

Men	42%	40%	18% ...100%
Women	22	33	45

Education:

8 years or less	30%	34%	36%
9 years and more	41	46	13

Income (per month):

0 - 149 DM	27%	29%	44%
150 - 299 DM	32	38	30
300 DM and more	40	41	19

City Size:

Under 2,000 population	28%	33%	39%
2,000 - 24,999	33	36	31
25,000 and over	36	41	23

Age:

15 - 24 years	30%	40%	30%
25 - 59 years	34	36	30
60 years and over	24	34	42

Party Preference:

SPD	33%	48%	19%
CDU/CSU	29	39	32
FDP/LDP/DVP/BDV	32	53	15
BP	38	35	27
None of them	39	32	29
No opinion	16	20	64

Origin:

Native	32%	36%	32%
Refugee	30	38	32

* It must be remembered that all of these measures of confidence in the West were taken prior to (1) the UN offensive in Korea and (2) the Foreign Ministers Communiqué to West Germany, with the various resultant security guaranties. It seems fair to assume that whatever the level of confidence found, it can only rise higher in response to these events.

WILL KOREAN AGGRESSORS BE DRIVEN OUT? ...

Confidence in the ability of the Americans and the United Nations to defeat the North Korean aggressors has apparently become the majority feeling in the US occupied areas at the time of the present survey. No more than one in ten anywhere sampled expressed the feeling that he was "not confident at all" of a successful outcome.

"Are you confident, less confident or not confident at all that within a reasonable length of time the Americans and the United Nations will succeed in driving the North Koreans out of South Korea?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Confident	52%	50%	49%	51%	73%	63%
Less confident	21	20	24	22	19	18
Not confident at all	9	8	9	9	6	7
No opinion	18	22	18	18	2	12
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Judgments of confidence and of less confidence both preponderate among the more informed levels of the US Zone population as their less informed counterparts tend more widely to take refuge in "no opinion."

"Are you confident, less confident or not confident at all that within a reasonable length of time the Americans and the United Nations will succeed in driving the North Koreans out of South Korea?"

	Confident	Less confident	Not confident at all	No opinion	
US ZONE GROUPS					
<u>Sex:</u>					
Men	57%	23%	11%	9%	... 100%
Women	44	20	8	28	
<u>Education:</u>					
8 years or less	50%	20%	9%	21%	
9 years and more	55	29	10	6	
<u>Income (per month):</u>					
0 - 149 DM	47%	19%	8%	26%	
150 - 299 DM	53	21	9	17	
300 DM and more	52	28	10	10	
<u>City Size:</u>					
Under 2,000 pop.	48%	19%	8%	25%	
2,000 - 24,999	52	21	8	19	
25,000 and over	54	25	11	10	
<u>Age:</u>					
15 - 24 years	48%	28%	8%	16%	
25 - 59 years	50	22	10	18	
60 years and over	55	14	7	24	
<u>Party Preference:</u>					
SPD	63%	19%	8%	10%	
CDU/CSU	53	24	6	17	
FDP/LDP/DVP/BDV	62	22	8	8	
BP	51	24	12	13	
None of them	45	26	12	17	
No opinion	38	-	2	60	
<u>Origin:</u>					
Native	49%	22%	10%	19%	
Refugee	55	20	6	19	

REASONS FOR CONFIDENCE IN ULTIMATE UN VICTORY ...

American material and military superiority bulk largest among the reasons given by those who expressed confidence in ultimate victory by Americans and the United Nations.

"Are you confident, less confident, or not confident at all that within a reasonable length of time the Americans and the United Nations will succeed in driving the North Koreans out of South Korea?"

If "Confident": "What is the basis for your opinion?"

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

America is materially and militarily superior to Korea (Communism): Because the economic power of America is greater; more reserves and the modern arms and equipment; because they have a tremendous power in the air; better and more war material; they have the technical superiority; they have the longer breath, the Americans have the necessary money for conducting a war; the superiority of the Americans in respect to war materials is getting more evident now; American armament potentialities are larger; small Korea cannot resist America in the long run; the material superiority of America is too great; the Americans are economically and militarily stronger after all; etc.

26% 34% 30%

General optimism and confidence in the American strategy: I think that the situation will suddenly change some day; if the Americans are willing they will certainly succeed; I am confident in the belief that the Americans will succeed; if the Americans act seriously they will solve this problem; America has not lost any war up to now, it also achieved the defeat of Germany; etc.

7 12 8

America unprepared and taken by surprise, but situation is improving (will improve) through troop reinforcements, supply shipments and successful counter-attacks: America is just sending suitable forces and reinforcements; there will be success when the reinforcements arrive; America was not prepared; gradually they will send troops and arms over there; it was only a surprise attack, when the machinery of the Americans gets started they will win nevertheless; the Americans were not prepared, but now they are getting started; they will succeed some day in overcoming the transportation difficulties; now the Americans have found the time for a better organization of their transports and reinforcements; the reinforcements are effective now and America gets the upper hand; the counter-attacks are succeeding now; etc.

7 6 9

America will be supported by the other nations of the UN: The United Nations will win because of their superiority; if the real strength of the UN has been started, it will help much; if all people stand together it must bring success; so many people will turn against North Korea by and by - that must have effects on the battles; because the UN is better equipped and most powers stand behind this organization; because the other powers such as the English, French, and Australians want to and have to help, too; because the entire Western world helps; etc.

5 11 6

(Cont'd on next page)

Americans must win for the maintenance of peace and freedom in the world: The Americans know that the whole world will be lost if they fail; it can and must not happen that the Communists gain a victory; it is their duty to succeed for the sake of peace; the Americans must win there or the same will be going on with us; because the Americans know that the freedom of the whole world depends upon them; Bolshevism might come here, too if they fail; in case of failure Stalin will think that he will have an easy match in other countries, too; etc.

2%

2%

4%

The right and the better cause will be victorious: Because the good will defeat evil and brutal violence at the end; who has the good and just on his side will always be victorious; up to now the aggressors have always lost; etc.

1

4

1

America may not give up Korea for reasons of prestige: The Americans must win not to make themselves ridiculous; it would be a poor show if the Americans don't succeed; etc.

1

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The Americans will succeed if Russia (other states) don't interfere: I think the Americans will succeed if the Russians keep out of this war; Russia does not want to bring about another war; the Communists will hesitate to act, everybody being against them; etc.

-

-

1

Other opinions: Because the Americans have a strong inclination to freedom; the Americans do it a hundred per cent or not at all; most people don't want Communism; the Americans will wait until the Communists are exhausted; etc.

1

1

3

No opinion:

$$\frac{2}{52\%*}$$

$$\frac{3}{74\%*}$$

$$\frac{1}{64\%*}$$

* Some respondents gave more than one answer.

REASONS FOR LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN ULTIMATE UN VICTORY ...

A wide variety of reasons were advanced by those who were "less confident" or "not confident at all" of American and UN victory with the fact of repeated American withdrawal uppermost in the minds of many.

"Are you confident, less confident, or not confident at all that within a reasonable length of time the Americans and the United Nations will succeed in driving the North Koreans out of South Korea?"

IF "Less confident" or "Not confident at all": "What is the basis for your opinion?"

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

Constant defeat and retreat of the Americans (according to press reports): general unfavorable developments: according to the developments the Americans are going to lose because they have only received hard blows so far; there is nowhere any success to see; one always hears that the Americans are retreating; because the Communists already had too much success in Korea; by the great victories of the North Koreans; the situation of the Americans is catastrophic at present; the military defeats are too great; judging from the present situation there is little hope of a favorable settlement by the Americans; according to the reports in the radio and newspapers; etc.

9% 5% 7%

Indirect support of North Korea by Russia (China) and menace of direct Russian (Chinese) interference: Russia supports North Korea with material; there are other forces in the game and not North Korea alone; the entire Asiatic people stand behind them; the Russians will continue to supply the North Koreans with arms and therefore it will last longer; the Americans have not taken care of counter-measures in China, the manpower now at their (North Korean) disposal is tremendous; China has turned communistic too; I believe that the Russians will interfere; etc.

5 5 5

North Korean superiority in number, war material and fighting morale: I believe that North Korea is strong enough to defeat the Americans; the North Koreans are throwing more and more men into the combat; North Korea has twice the strength; the North Koreans fight very fanatically after all; the North Koreans are superior in their fighting morale because too few Americans are in combat; there is too little war material and too few troops in action in Korea; by far too few heavy arms in Korea, and too few well-trained troops; etc.

5 5 5

Americans are not good soldiers, - or are no match for Asiatic methods of fighting: Americans are not good soldiers; the American is not as good a soldier as the Russian; because the American forces are too soft, have not good fighting morale; because of the conduct of the Americans when fighting man against man in the last war; the American soldier is no match for the Asiatic apathy toward danger and hardships; they lack experienced efficient foot-soldiers such as the Japanese and the Germans; etc.

3 2 2

(Cont'd on next page)

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

Military supply line of the Americans too long: The North Koreans have better supplies and were more prepared; America is too distant; North Korea has easier supply lines; probably supply difficulties; etc.

3% 3% 3%

Too great losses of territory - beachhead remaining too small for successful counter-attacks: They have already lost too much territory, have no more air-bases, soon they may no longer land any troops; the Communists have already advanced too much; the North Koreans have occupied almost the whole of South Korea; the Communists have pushed ahead too deeply, the Americans have only kept a very small space; because the UN-troops are pressed together in a very small space; one can no longer prepare any offensive; the beachhead of the Americans is getting narrower all the time so that offensive measures are impossible; etc.

2 2 1

Insufficient support by the UN-States: Because of the small contribution of men and material by the United Nations up to now; there is not yet any real cooperation between the United Nations; they need more help; the whole conflict rests only upon the shoulders of America; inefficient support by the UN; too little aid by the other countries; the US infantry cannot do it alone; etc.

2 1 1

American war machinery starts too slowly: It goes too slowly, the North Koreans have resolute measures, whereas the UN conducts too long negotiations all the time and is very slowly proceeding to counter-measures; they were not prepared; it is dubious whether the Americans will get strong enough in time; the Americans are too slow with everything and too late all the time; they have too long conferences; etc.

2 3 2

Probable long duration and great difficulties of the campaign before victorious conclusion possible: Because the Americans will need years if they should succeed at all; in the long run the strength of the Americans will be superior, but it may last a long time; I believe that it will last a long time before the Americans will have success; it costs many efforts if the Americans want to make up for their failures; etc.

1 1 -

Other opinions: Because South Korea is communistically infiltrated too; Communism will gain the upper hand in Korea anyhow, even if the Americans should regain some territory; it is an all-out crucial fight, therefore I cannot say for sure that the Americans will win; I have a feeling that the Americans won't put forth their utmost efforts; because material superiority is not decisive alone; it is strategically very difficult; etc.

1 3 2

No opinion:

$$\frac{1}{31\%} \quad \frac{-}{30\%} \quad \frac{1}{29\%}$$

* Some respondents gave more than one answer.

IS AMERICA FACING UP TO THE WORLD CRISIS? ...

The dominating sentiment in the US occupied areas - most particularly in Berlin - at the time of this survey, is that America is preparing as well as possible to meet all further international developments.*

"From what you have recently heard or read, do you think that America is preparing as well as possible to meet all further international developments?"

ACD

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Yes, as well as possible	80%	77%	84%	80%	95%	79%
No, not as well as possible	4	5	5	4	4	10
No opinion	<u>16</u> 100%	<u>18</u> 100%	<u>11</u> 100%	<u>16</u> 100%	<u>1</u> 100%	<u>11</u> 100%

Confidence in such a conclusion is heightened by the fact that the more critical and informed elements in the US Zone population, rather than their less critical counterparts, are the groups who express the larger proportion of such judgments.

"From what you have recently heard or read, do you think that America is preparing as well as possible to meet all further international developments?"

	Yes, as well as possible	No, not as well as possible	No opinion
US ZONE GROUPS			
<u>Sex:</u>			
Men	86%	6%	8% ... 100%
Women	75	2	23
<u>Education:</u>			
8 years or less	79%	3%	18%
9 years and more	89	7	4
<u>Income (per month):</u>			
0-149 DM	73%	4%	23%
150 - 299 DM	82	4	14
300 DM and more	87	4	9
<u>City Size:</u>			
Under 2,000 population	77%	3%	20%
2,000 - 24,999	81	3	16
25,000 and over	85	5	10
<u>Age:</u>			
15 - 24 years	84%	3%	13%
25 - 59 years	81	4	15
60 years and over	72	4	24
<u>Party Preference:</u>			
SPD	88%	3%	9%
CDU/CSU	84	3	13
FDP/LDP/DVP/EDV	92	3	5
BP	82	8	10
None of them	78	6	16
No opinion	64	2	34
<u>Origin:</u>			
Native	80%	4%	16%
Refugee	83	3	14

* It Should be noted that the conclusion in this and the following question holds even if on these questions bearing so directly upon American prestige a considerably discount is made for occasional respondents willing to stretch a point in order to give a favorable reply to an American sponsored inquiry.

WOULD AMERICA STAY FIRM IN EUROPE? ...

West German confidence in America is also underscored by the widespread conviction expressed in the US occupied areas that America would take a firm stand in the event of a Communist aggression in Europe. It should not be forgotten that all of these measures of confidence in the West were taken prior to the Foreign Ministers Conference with its resultant security guaranties.

"Considering the events in Korea, are you firmly convinced that America would take a firm stand in case of Communist aggression in West Europe, or are you less or not at all convinced of that?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Firmly convinced	75%	71%	74%	74%	92%	85%
Less convinced	12	11	10	11	6	7
Not at all convinced	3	4	2	3	1	3
No opinion	10	14	14	12	1	5
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Again it is the more critical and informed elements among US Zone population groups who more generally express confidence in America on this point.

"Considering the events in Korea, are you firmly convinced that America would take a firm stand in case of Communist aggression in West Europe, or are you less or not at all convinced of that?"

	Firmly convinced	Less convinced	Not at all convinced	No opinion
US ZONE GROUPS				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	79%	10%	4%	7% ... 100%
Women	68	13	3	16
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	72%	11%	3%	14%
9 years and more	81	12	3	4
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	70%	11%	4%	15%
150 - 299 DM	75	11	3	11
300 DM and more	79	11	2	8
<u>City Size:</u>				
Under 2,000 po.	72%	9%	3%	16%
2,000 - 24,999	72	13	4	11
25,000 and over	77	12	3	8
<u>Age:</u>				
15 - 24 years	71%	15%	4%	10%
25 - 59 years	74	12	3	11
60 years and over	72	6	4	18
<u>Party Preference:</u>				
SPD	82%	10%	2%	6%
CDU/CSU	78	10	2	10
FDP/LDP/DVP/BDV	87	5	1	7
BP	73	15	4	3
None of them	70	14	5	11
No opinion	60	9	2	29
<u>Origin:</u>				
Native	73%	11%	4%	12%
Refugee	76	11	1	12

WOULD WESTERN POWERS TRY TO DEFEND GERMANY? ...

General West German confidence in American measures to meet the present world situation and determination to resist Communist aggression in Europe appears to encompass also the majority belief that the Western powers would try to defend Western Germany. The events in Korea appear not to have greatly affected the extent of this belief in the US Zone except to throw into indecision a number who formerly were inclined to hold that West Germany in the event of a Communist attack would be left to its own resources.

"Do you believe that in case of war the Western powers would try to defend West Germany or leave West Germany to itself?"

	Bavaria		Hesse		W-Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Apr	Aug	Apr	Aug	Apr	Aug	Apr	Aug	Apr	Aug	Apr	Aug
	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150
Will try to defend West Germany	69%	71%	71%	70%	69%	71%	69%	70%	94%	95%	72%	78%
Will leave West Germany to itself	25	16	18	14	22	12	23	15	4	3	18	16
No opinion	6	13	11	16	9	17	8	15	2	2	10	6
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Group comparisons in the US Zone are not tabulated here as there were no important group differences in the opinions expressed on this issue.

ARE WESTERN POWERS DOING EVERYTHING THEY SHOULD IN GERMANY? ...

The last and perhaps most important item bearing on the extent of West German confidence in the Western powers is the question - are they doing everything they should to insure the security of West Germany. It constitutes a notable vote of confidence in the West that the response to such a direct and key question yields a majority affirmative in the US occupied areas. However, an appreciable minority, particularly among the more critical and informed elements of the population, take the stand that not everything is being done that should be done.

"Do you feel that the Western powers are doing everything that they should to insure the security of West Germany?"

AN 9

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Yes	64%	58%	59%	62%	68%	59%
No	24	25	29	25	29	30
No opinion	12	17	12	13	3	11
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	Yes	No	No opinion
US ZONE GROUPS			
<u>Sex:</u>			
Men	53%	38%	9% ... 100%
Women	69	14	17
<u>Education:</u>			
8 years or less	65%	21%	14%
9 years and more	45	48	7
<u>Income (per month):</u>			
0 - 149 DM	66%	18%	16%
150 - 299 DM	64	24	12
300 DM and more	52	38	10
<u>City Size:</u>			
Under 2,000 population	66%	15%	15%
2,000 - 24,999	61	25	14
25,000 and over	57	34	9
<u>Age:</u>			
15 - 24 years	67%	21%	12%
25 - 59 years	60	27	13
60 years and over	62	23	15
<u>Party Preference:</u>			
SPD	62%	30%	8%
CDU/CSU	70	20	10
FDP/LDP/DVP/BDV	58	38	4
BP	67	23	10
None of them	54	31	15
No opinion	68	7	25
<u>Origin:</u>			
Native	62%	25%	13%
Refugee	61	26	13

Study of the suggestions made by the respondents who feel more should be done for the security of West Germany reveals, interesting enough, that the bulk of the desires are those which are in fact now being accorded to the West Germans in the provisions of the Foreign Ministers Communiqué of the 19th of September, 1950. The implication is then, that with the establishment of the new security provision satisfaction with the efforts of the Western powers in this connection is likely to characterize the large bulk of the West German population.

"Do you feel that the Western powers are doing everything that they should to insure the security of West Germany?"

If "No": "What else should the Western powers do?"

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

More troops and war materials for Germany and Europe:

Station more occupation troops and war materials in Western Europe; the Western powers should send stronger troop units to West Germany; increase the number of occupation forces; send stronger armies to Germany; they should send off a couple of hundred air-planes to Germany; more British troops for Germany; more American troops would be necessary in Europe; station strongly armed troops and military means of power in Germany; provide arms in large quantities; occupation forces should not only sit behind their desks but act instead of talk; etc.

11% 8% 14%

Establishment of a West German army and reactivation of West German armament industries: Provide us with arms in order to defend ourselves; rearm Germany; own troops; because we will be able to defend our country far better than foreign troops can do; establish an army in the Federal Republic; form a German military guard; rearm Germany before it is too late; rearm the population so that they can defend themselves; Germany should be given the chance to activate armament industries; etc.

4 9 7

Peace treaty and equal rights for Germany - more freedom and no more defamation of Germans: They should conclude a peace treaty with us and recognize equal rights for Germany; we do not have a peace treaty yet; the Western powers should make attempts to understand the German mentality and give us more freedom of action; equal rights in the union of Europe; stop constant defamation of German officers and generals, otherwise we shall not side with the Western powers; we have been disparaged too much, this must become different to change the moral conceptions of the Germans; etc.

3 3 2

Stopping of dismantling and elimination of production limits; raising of our economic conditions: Stop dismantling; stop dismantling and indemnification; stop British dismantling; permit gasoline production; they should care for the improvement of our economic situation; create better living conditions for the large bulk of the population to prevent them from falling for Communism; etc.

3 3 2

(cont'd on next page)

Establishment of a West European army - with or without German assistance: Establish an all-European army immediately; German soldiers should be called upon for assistance, but no actual German army; without Germany Russia cannot be defeated; there should be a united Europe furnished with a powerful army but without German soldiers; unification of Europe, militarily and economically; German men should be called upon for aid but without arms; etc.

2% 1% 2%

Closer political and economic unification and cooperation of Western Europe: There should be a united Europe; doing away with national discrepancies to obtain an economic and political union in Europe; they should aim at cooperation among the people; a European parliament; etc.

2 1 1

Planning of a European defense at the Elbe River; creation of a defense line at the zonal border: In the case of an East-West conflict America should prepare her counter-measures not at the Elbe River but at the Rhine; joint defense at the East Zone border and not at the Rhine; to defend Europe at the Rhine is almost an invitation for the Russians to attack Germany; fortification lines at the East Zone border in West Germany; etc.

1 1 2

Stronger stand against Russia and Communism: Take stronger measures against Communism; stand up against the Russians - not only in Europe; but also in the UN; not wait until they get the upper hand; keep down Bolshevism; etc.

1 4 -

Negotiations and agreement with Russia: Negotiate with Russia; they should come to an agreement with their former allies; America should see to it that the Russians leave Germany without a war; etc.

1 - 1

Establishment of a federal police force: Create a strong police force; a police force equal to the people's police; qualified personnel for the police force; strengthen the police force; there should be at least a strong federal police; etc.

- 4 3

Other opinions: In America opinions about Germany are divided: some are for aid measures, some are against them; everything is senseless because the Russians will overrun Europe; whatever is done will provoke Russia; captivate in a real democratic way the non-Bolshevist parts; England and France should activate their armament industries; they should try to win the sympathies of the German people; etc.

1 1 1

No opinion:

2
31% 35% 35%

* Some respondents gave more than one answer.

The dominating opinion among Germans in the US occupied areas is still that in the present East-West struggle most Germans would prefer to side with the Western powers, rather than side with Russia or to remain completely out of the matter. However, the effect of Korea has apparently been to increase from a quarter to about a third the proportion of respondents in the US Zone who judge that most Germans would prefer to remain neutral. In Berlin, Korean events have had no observable effect, and now as before over four in five see most Germans as desiring to side with the West.

"What do you believe - what would most Germans prefer in the present East-West struggle; to remain completely out of it, to side with the Western powers, or to side with Russia?"

	Bavaria		Hesse		W-Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Apr '50	Aug '50	Apr '50	Aug '50	Apr '50	Aug '50	Apr '50	Aug '50	Apr '50	Aug '50	Apr '50	Aug '50
Stay completely out	26%	29%	27%	35%	23%	36%	25%	32%	11%	13%	26%	34%
Side with Western powers	71	64	68	53	74	57	71	59	87	85	72	59
Side with Russia	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
No opinion	2	7	5	12	3	7	3	9	2	2	2	6
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

The prevailing overall view that most Germans would prefer to side with the West is not controverted in any specific US Zone group, the breakdowns below reveal. However, it is apparent that a somewhat larger proportion among the more critical elements of the population are inclined to judge that most Germans would prefer to stay completely out of the conflict.

"What do you believe - what would most Germans prefer in the present East-West struggle; to remain completely out of it, to side with the Western powers, or to side with Russia?"

	Prefer to stay completely out	Prefer to side with Western powers	Prefer to side with Russia	No opinion
US ZONE GROUPS				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	35%	59%	-%	6%..100%
Women	29	60	-	11
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	29%	61%	-%	10%
9 years and more	46	50	-	4
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	23%	62%	1%	14%
150 - 299 DM	32	52	-	6
300 DM and more	41	55	-	4
<u>City Size:</u>				
Under 2,000 pop.	29%	62%	-%	9%
2,000 - 24,999	30	60	-	10
25,000 and over	38	56	-	6
<u>Age:</u>				
15 - 24 years	33%	62%	-%	5%
25 - 59 years	34	58	-	8
60 years and over	22	65	1	12
<u>Party Preference:</u>				
SPD	34%	64%	-%	2%
CDU/CSU	26	68	-	6
FDP/LDP/DVP/BDV	33	64	-	3
BP	23	73	-	4
None of them	40	51	-	9
No opinion	22	57	-	21
<u>Origin:</u>				
Native	33%	57%	2%	8%
Refugees	26	66	-	8

IS NEUTRALITY POSSIBLE? ...

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The question of preference posed in the preceding query is but of limited value in assessing where the Germans actually stand in the East-West struggle because it emphasizes wishful thinking rather than realistic judgments. This point is evident from a follow-up question put to the respondents who held that most Germans would prefer to remain out of the East-West struggle.

"Do you believe that it will really be possible for Western Germany to stay completely out of the East-West struggle?"
(Asked of those who answered "Stay completely out" to previous question.)

	Bavaria		Hesse		W. Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Apr	Aug	Apr	Aug	Apr	Aug	Apr	Aug	Apr	Aug	Apr	Aug
Yes	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150
No	5%	4%	5%	5%	2%	3%	4%	4%	2%	1%	4%	3%
No opinion	19	22	19	23	20	27	19	23	9	12	20	29
	2	3	3	7	1	6	2	5	1	1	2	2
	26%	29%	27%	35%	23%	36%	25%	32%	11%	13%	26%	34%

It is clear that very few indeed believe that in reality it is at all possible for Western Germany to remain neutral in the conflict between East and West.

FOR OR AGAINST RUSSIA IN EVENT OF INVASION? ...

Since even among those who feel that most Germans would prefer to remain neutral only a negligible few believe that neutrality is really possible, the issue of where the Germans stand in the East-West struggle boils down to - would most Germans prefer to side with Russia or fight against her in the event of an invasion from the East? The answer is clear in the results below.

"In view of the nearness of Russia and the possibility of a Russian invasion, do you think most Germans would prefer to side with Russia or fight against Russia?"

	Bavaria		Hesse		W. Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Apr	Aug	Apr	Aug	Apr	Aug	Apr	Aug	Apr	Aug	Apr	Aug
Side with Russia	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150
Fight against Russia	1%	1%	*	-	1%	2%	1%	1%	-	1%	*	1%
Neither/Nor	89	85	77	66	87	82	86	80	96	95	86	83
No opinion	7	7	17	23	9	8	10	10	2	3	6	12
	3	7	6	11	3	8	3	7	2	1	8	4
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

However conservatively these results may be interpreted it seems patent that a large majority everywhere sampled - a very large majority in Berlin feel that when the chips are down most Germans will be found in the camp of the West.

Group breakdowns for the US Zone are not shown, for when the issue was posed in this realistic vein no important differences of opinion showed up among the various elements of the US Zone population.

GERMAN YOUTH VIEW THE AMERICAN PROGRAM

I. Some General Evaluations

Report No. 38
Series No. 2
October 9, 1950

INTRODUCTION ...

In line with a sharpened American interest in the problems of the younger generation in Germany the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs, conducted during July 1950 an extensive survey of the attitudes of German youth toward various features of the American program including Reorientation, Exchange, Amerike Hauser, GYA, documentary films, covert publications, etc. The present report is the first of a series on these topics.

For these studies the usual random representative sample of Germans of all ages in the US occupied areas was supplemented with a special augmented sample of German youth (defined as from 15 to 25 years of age.) In toto the sampling included approximately 1,750 youths in the US Zone and 1,250 adults, 275 youths in Berlin and 225 adults, and 200 youths in Bremen with 175 adults. The purpose of the adult cases on the same issues was to provide the opportunity for youth-adult comparisons where such were desirable.

As usual the interviews were obtained from randomly selected respondents by a trained German staff under the general supervision of American survey officers. Detailed description of the sampling methods employed is available upon request. The analysis and interpretation of the data has been performed by the professional survey staff of the Office of Public Affairs.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS ...

- ... Both among youths and adults in the US occupied areas the majority feeling is that a combination of unemployment and lack of vocational training opportunities is the greatest difficulty facing youth in West Germany.
- ... Among youths and adults in the US Zone opinions split fairly evenly as to whether or not everything is being done today for youth in Western Germany that should be done. In Berlin, however, definitely more of the adults - though not of the youth - believe that at present aid to German youth is what it should be.
- ... Those who feel that present youth help is less than it should be focus largely upon economic aids when asked what additional measures should be taken. Provision of work and vocational training opportunities receives most frequent specific mention, and somewhat more often by youth than adults.
- ... Though preponderant opinion everywhere sampled is that youth affairs receive more attention in West Germany, appreciable minorities express the feeling that youth receives more attention in East Germany.
- ... Respondents who felt that youth affairs were given more attention in West Germany gave a variety of reasons for their judgment, the single most frequent of which was the provision of opportunities for freer development and greater rights than in East Germany.
- ... Clearly evident in the replies of those who felt that youth affairs receive greater attention in East Germany is that the kind of attention is often quite other than desirable.

- ... Only negligible proportions everywhere sampled could name any youth measures in the East Zone which they felt ought to be taken over by the West.
- ... Though the preponderant opinion is negative, a considerable proportion of both youth and adults in the US occupied areas feel that certain youth measures of the Third Reich could profitably be utilized in West Germany today. Particularly among older youth - as distinguished from teen-agers - is this point of view prevalent, with almost four in ten in favor of such a course.
- ... The Nazi youth measures most frequently suggested for emulation are the various labor service plans which functioned during the Third Reich - the Landjahr, the Fluchtjahr, and the Landdienst. This is one more indication to be added to the numerous others throughout this paper of an intense preoccupation among West German youth with economic problems in general and the employment problem in particular.
- ... Among the serious issues raised by the growth of the FDJ in the East Zone is the question of whether or not Germans are more drawn to the idea of a single youth organization than to the decentralization and diversity which is more in line with American thinking and which at present is characteristic of youth organizations in the US occupied areas. Much food for thought lies in the clear indication of the present study that both in the US Zone and Berlin a majority of youth and a majority of adults would be in favor of the establishment of a single youth organization in West Germany.
- ... Support for a unitary organization drops with education, group breakdowns of US Zone youth reveal, but approval outweighs opposition except at the highest education level.
- ... Among those who favor the establishment of a single youth organization in West Germany the larger proportion - both among youth and adults - disapproves of having the members in uniform. However, an appreciable minority, among US Zone youth (almost one in four among teen-agers) favors a unitary organization with uniforms.
- ... Favor of uniforms in a unitary youth organization is less among higher educated youth, US Zone breakdowns reveal, than among their less educated counterparts.

WHAT ARE YOUTH'S GREATEST DIFFICULTIES IN WEST GERMANY TODAY? ...

Both among youths and adults in the US occupied areas the majority feeling is that unemployment and lack of vocational training opportunities is the greatest difficulty facing youth in West Germany today.

It is notable too in the table below that a somewhat larger proportion of youths than adults stress economic handicaps as the greatest difficulty, whereas a larger proportion of adults than youth emphasize moral liabilities, unfavorable domestic condition, lack of ideals, disunity, and the like.

"What, in your opinion, are the greatest difficulties for youth in West Germany today?"

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y*	A*	Y	A	Y	A
<u>Unemployment and lack of vocational training opportunities:</u> Finding work; there are no training possibilities; no chance to find a job for young people that have left school; training and education on a large basis; working conditions are unfavorable; unemployment for youth after finishing education and training; no chance for farm youth to become independent; difficulties in finding suitable places for apprenticeship; the problem of existence; many young people can't learn the trade they want to; etc.	64%	57%	82%	71%	71%	62%
<u>Unfavorable financial situation leading to dearth of necessary goods and training possibilities:</u> Lack of money to give the children a reasonable education; children cannot receive the vocational training that would be necessary because the general income is too low; lack of money for clothing and housing; lack of money due to high living costs forces many young people to give up studying; lack of money causes underfeeding and diseases; the poverty of girls; the amusements that young people want are too limited because of lack of funds; etc.	10	7	16	4	5	8
<u>Moral liabilities; unfavorable domestic conditions; lack of ideals; disunity of youth:</u> No respect toward adults; their postwar education; youth is confused and spoiled by bad movies and lacking in education; they are left too much to themselves; they are in need of homes which many of them do not have at all; no family life; bad movies favor low thinking; many young people are used to not working; domestic troubles and unsound marriages; many parents do not have time enough for their children because they are working; black market business; girls are being spoiled by Americans and Negroes; young people do not know what to do with their freedom; they don't believe in anything; materialistic ideologies can give more of what youth needs; there should be more homes for growing children; fatherless children as the consequence of war; etc.	9	22	6	14	11	23

(cont'd on next page)

* "Y" and "A" in these tables denote youth (15-25) and adults (25+) respectively.

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
<u>Danger of a coming war and youth's recruitment for military service:</u> That a war will break out again; that the youth will have to go through another war; political situation; possibility of a war; etc.	4%	2%	*	1%	-	1%
<u>Housing shortage and difficulties in obtaining legal residence:</u> Poor housing conditions; separation of parents and children through housing shortage and immigration difficulties; crowded rooms; etc.	4	4	1	*	4	5
<u>General uncertain future for youth:</u> No secure future for youth; the young people have a black future ahead of them; we are all afraid that the future will destroy our plans; that is discouraging; bad political and economic prospects; youth has no future, just like old people; they cannot marry; the economic uncertainty; etc.	3	4	2	-	2	2
<u>Youth is taken an unfair advantage of; not supported enough by the authorities:</u> War orphans should be supported by the government; youth refugees; the authorities don't support the youth enough; the young people are being taken advantage of and they don't earn enough money; rural young people have to work too hard from early childhood on; the young people are getting less pay than the adults; etc.	3	2	1	-	4	2
<u>Unsatisfactory school conditions; lack of teachers, school buildings and means of instruction:</u> Insufficient supply of instruction material in the schools; afternoon classes; not enough classes; many schools are destroyed; lack of good books; no youth libraries; shortage of good teachers; frequent change of teachers tires the children; separation in the schools according to religious adherence; etc.	1	2	2	6	1	1
<u>Opposition and competition between old and young:</u> In the political parties only the old members claim the right to decide; contrasts between old and young; young people are not given a chance, we are thought to be too young; etc.	1	*	-	-	-	1
<u>Close alliance to Nazi ideas and Nazi education:</u> It is due to Nazism that young people are so hard to educate; brutalization of the youth through the Third Reich; recovery from Nazi ideas, democratic education; to get rid of Nazi ideas; etc.	*	2	-	*	-	-
<u>No particular difficulties:</u> None; there are no specific difficulties; as far as I can see in the short time I have been here, young people are leading a decent life, they are having enough to eat; we are under no pressure; etc.	2	1	2	2	3	-
<u>Other opinions:</u> Young people don't have much fun these days; young boys are too weak to work; too much work; influence of the SED across the borders; prevention of emigration; zonal borders; social questions; to provide a dowry for the daughter; she hasn't as nice a life as we had; endangering of youth through Communism; not enough men in Germany; no possibilities for travelling; hardly any international meetings; no international exchange; girls are afraid of sex criminals; that the refugees cannot return home; etc.	1	2	2	5	1	1
<u>No opinion / No answer:</u>	16	17	4	5	10	10
	**118*	122*	**104*	**108*	**112*	**116*

* Less than one half of one per cent.

** Some respondents gave more than one answer.

IS HELP FOR WEST GERMAN YOUTH ALL THAT IT SHOULD BE? ...

Both among youths and among adults in the US Zone opinions split fairly evenly as to whether or not everything is being done today for youth in Western Germany that should be done. In Berlin, however, definitely more of the adults - though not of the youth - believe that at present aid to German youth is what it should be.

When youths are subdivided into teen-agers and older youth, in the table below, it is to be noted that a distinct difference in opinion comes to light. The preponderant opinion among the younger youth is that everything that should be done is being done for youth; the preponderant opinion among the older youth is that such is not the case.

"Is everything being done for youth in West Germany today that should be done or not?"

	Bavaria		Hesse		W-Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
Yes, everything is done	41%	41%	44%	43%	40%	42%	41%	42%	48%	54%	44%	39%
No, not everything done	45	41	41	40	44	41	44	40	45	35	44	50
No opinion	<u>14</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>11</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	US ZONE		
	15-19	20-25	25+
Yes, everything is done	46%	37%	42%
No, not everything done	38	50	40
No opinion	<u>16</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>18</u>
	100%	100%	100%

Group breakdowns reveal, first of all, that it is the typically more critical and informed elements among US Zone youth - the men, the better educated, the economically better situated, and the urban dwelling - who more often feel that not everything is being done for West German youth that should be done. This is distinctly the majority sentiment among youth with more than 8 years of education.

A second point of note is that an appreciably larger proportion of unemployed youth in the US Zone feel that help for youth is less than what it should be. Finally, it may be seen that among refugee youth also, as compared to native residents, the same point holds.

"Is everything being done for youth in West Germany today that should be done or not?"

	Yes, everything is done	No, not everything is done	No opinion	Number of cases:*
US ZONE YOUTH (15-25)				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	39%	50%	11%...100%	776
Women	43	39	18	964
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	43%	41%	16%	1421
9 - 11 years	32	39	9	253
12 years and more	32	36	2	(50)
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 99.99 DM	40%	37%	23%	180
100 - 249.00 DM	41	44	15	722
250 - 399.99 DM	44	46	10	447
400 DM and more	38	52	10	268
<u>City Size:</u>				
Under 1,000 population	44%	36%	20%	392
1,000 - 1,999	44	36	20	295
2,000 - 4,999	42	42	16	267
5,000 - 9,999	40	52	8	171
10,000 - 24,999	40	51	9	117
25,000 - 99,999	35	55	10	182
100,000 - 249,999	31	57	12	116
250,000 and over	44	47	9	202
<u>Employment Status:</u>				
Employed or apprenticed	42%	44%	14%	1426
Unemployed	33	58	9	137
Not employed (Students, dependents)	37	33	30	(63)
Housowives	43	39	18	116
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	41%	44%	15%	966
Protestants	42	43	15	747
All others	29	68	3	(28)
<u>Origin:</u>				
Natives	42%	43%	15%	1416
Refugees	37	51	12	326

* These are the numbers of cases falling into the specific subgroups listed in this and subsequent similar tables. The numbers parenthesized are too few for reliable conclusions, but particularly in the case of education provide a valuable indication of trend.

Those who feel that present youth help is less than it should be focus largely upon economic aids when asked what additional measures should be taken. Provision of work and vocational training opportunities receives most frequent specific mention, and somewhat more often by youth than adults.

"Is everything being done for youth in West Germany today that should be done or not?"

If "No, not everything is being done": "What measures should, in your opinion, be taken to help the youth of today?"

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
<u>Provision of work and vocational training opportunities:</u> More places for apprenticeship; more work; jobs should be reserved for youth who leave school; remove unemployment; better vocational training opportunities; workshops and factories should be forced to employ apprentices; find jobs to keep the youth off the street; the state should provide apprenticeship places; etc.	20%	16%	20%	10%	15%	15%
<u>Establishment of youth homes and hostels, homes for apprentices and youth villages:</u> Gather young people in homes; building of youth homes; more youth hostels; recreation centers connected with school lessons; youth villages should be established which would be helpful in reconstruction; more youth villages for orphans; homes where young people are looked after and receive training; houses instead of refugee camps where young and old people live together; etc.	7	7	6	4	9	9
<u>Better cultural care for youth; youth libraries; scholarships; adult education:</u> The government should support the vocational schools financially; the costs of attendance at Volkshochschulen should be made cheaper; scholarships for war-orphans; financial support for education; create youth libraries; youth training organizations; training courses in the evening; etc.	6	5	7	6	3	9
<u>Establishment of youth organizations and youth unions:</u> Non-political and inter-confessional youth organizations should be established in which young people are educated to comradeship; young people should be gathered in youth unions; bring youth together but eliminate FDJ influence; youth needs political leadership; etc.	4	3	5	5	5	2
<u>Stricter control and education at home and protection against evil influences:</u> Youth should be looked after more carefully; young people below the age of 18 should not be permitted to attend movies; better education by the parents; elimination of trashy literature and trashy movies; one should keep young people busy in their spare time; etc.	3	7	1	3	1	3

(cont'd on next page)

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
<u>Introduction of a labor service: Establishing of a labor service on a non-military basis; create volunteer labor service on a volunteer basis; gathering young people together as in the former "Arbeitsdienst" and "Pflichtjahr"; non-political labor service to keep the youth busy; etc.</u>	2%	3%	3%	5%	7%	9%
<u>Equivalent payment for equivalent work; equalization of youth and adults: Young people should be paid on the same level as adults; employment without class distinctions; youth are at a disadvantage compared with adults; etc.</u>	2	1	2	-	1	*
<u>Physical training: Sport groups; provision of sporting equipment and grounds; creation of sport associations; building of play grounds and gymnasiums; sponsoring sporting events; etc.</u>	2	2	3	3	5	6
<u>Better social care: Help for poor people; more support for unemployed juveniles; the government should take better care of juveniles; reduction of taxes; better welfare service; the government should be more understanding; greater financial support; trade unions should take care of youth; etc.</u>	2	3	3	-	-	2
<u>Improvement of school conditions, building of schools; more and better teachers and instruction materials; better teaching methods: Build more schools; better training; the children should have more lessons and better books; stir up the children's interest in school and education; smaller classes, better teachers; youth should receive more practical training in the schools, not only theoretical; remove the unity schools (Einheitsschulen); reestablish old school system; more schools in the country; district vocational schools should be established; etc.</u>	1	2	1	4	2	2
<u>Other opinions: Progressive education; more suitable youth leaders in homes and clubs; children should be taught a universal language (Esperanto); trade unions should be prevented from interfering with youth work too much; young people should be led to world citizenship; political training; Christian education; no narrow-mindedness like the Catholics are teaching; lack of young people in the government; inform the youth about the humiliating conditions in Germany; more possibilities for social gatherings, theater, dances, etc.; protection from Communist and Nazi influence; keep country youth from going to the city; etc.</u>	2	4	1	2	2	2
<u>No opinion / No answer:</u>	17 68%**70%**	17	8 60%**53%**	11	16 66%**73%**	14

* Less than one half of one per cent.

** Some respondents gave more than one answer.

DOES EAST GERMANY GIVE YOUTH MORE ATTENTION? ...

Though preponderant opinion everywhere sampled is that youth affairs receive more attention in West Germany, appreciable minorities express the feeling that youth receives more attention in East Germany. Particularly among Berliners is this latter point of view evident, with almost four out of ten both among the youth and among the adults expressing such an opinion.

Within US zone youth it is the older among them rather than the teenagers, who more frequently feel that greater attention is paid to youth affairs in the East.

"Where are youth affairs given more attention, in West Germany or in East Germany?"

	Bavaria		Hesse		W-Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N
In West Germany	49%	41%	47%	35%	55%	42%	50%	40%	52%	46%	41%	36%
In East Germany	20	23	18	24	20	16	19	22	39	38	24	25
No opinion	31	36	35	41	25	42	31	38	9	16	35	39
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	US ZONE		
	15-19	20-25	25+
In West Germany	53%	46%	40%
In East Germany	15	24	22
No opinion	32	30	38
	100%	100%	100%

US Zone breakdowns reveal that the belief that more attention is paid to youth affairs in East Germany than in West Germany is more frequent among the critical and informed elements of US Zone youth.

"Where are youth affairs given more attention, in West Germany or in East Germany?"

In West Germany In East Germany No opinion

US ZONE YOUTH
(15-25)

<u>Sex:</u>			
Men	48%	26%	26% ... 100%
Women	51	15	34
<u>Education:</u>			
8 years or less	51%	16%	33%
9 - 11	43	37	20
12 years and more	28	50	22
<u>Income (per month):</u>			
0 - 99.99 DM	49%	10%	41%
100 - 249.99 DM	49	18	33
250 - 399.99 DM	53	21	26
400 DM and more	48	50	22
<u>City Size:</u>			
Under 1,000 population	49%	13%	38%
1,000 - 1,999	46	13	41
2,000 - 4,999	50	21	29
5,000 - 9,999	52	23	25
10,000 - 24,999	55	17	28
25,000 - 99,999	52	23	25
100,000 - 249,999	48	31	21
250,000 and over	49	30	21
<u>Employment Status:</u>			
Employed or apprenticed	49%	20%	31%
Unemployed	48	19	33
Not employed (Students, dependents)	47	13	40
Housewives	55	18	27
<u>Religion:</u>			
Catholics	51%	19%	30%
Protestants	48	20	32
All others	46	36	18
<u>Origin:</u>			
Natives	50%	18%	32%
Refugees	49	24	27

Respondents who felt that youth affairs were given more attention in West Germany gave a variety of reasons for their judgment, the single most frequent of which was the provision of opportunities for freer development and greater rights than in East Germany.

"Where are youth affairs given more attention, in West Germany or in East Germany?"

If "In West Germany": "In what respects are youth affairs given more attention in West Germany?"

US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Y____A	Y____A	Y____A

Freer development and greater rights for youth; no pressure and misuse as in East Germany; democratic education: Youth is free; young people are free to do what they please; they are educated to self-confidence; they are educated in a democratic manner; they are not forced into political organizations; the parents have some influence on their children; the government cannot misuse youth for political aims; the state has an interest in a healthy wholesome youth, much more than in the East; West German youth has more rights; in the East they live under pressure; they are not taught to hate here; they are given freedom and ideals; here the youth is treated with more consideration; etc. 13% 8% 15% 12% 7% 9%

Establishment of recreation centers, youth homes, youth hostels, play grounds and camps: Building of youth homes; youth hostels; youth is taken care of in homes and not neglected as in the East; there are youth hostels and holiday-camps; many sport activities; more attention is paid to their health status; etc. 6 5 9 11 0 5

American efforts; establishments for West German youth (YA, Exchange and American Information Centers): American Information Centers give German youth an educational chance; the Americans care more for the German young people than the Russians do; the Americans are more honest with youth; the Americans have established youth clubs; there are American youth homes; they are taught shorthand, music, sewing, languages etc; youth exchange; etc. 5 5 3 4 9 5

Procurement of labor and vocational training possibilities: Youth receives systematic vocational training; labor offices are interested in providing work for juveniles; vocational guidance and education possibilities; the rebuilding of Germany provides new working possibilities; apprenticeship places; etc. 4 2 6 6 * 3

Establishment of (free and non-political) youth organizations: Youth associations and youth unions; in youth groups people are given much consideration, they can participate in trips, excursions; etc; establishing of youth organizations without pressure; associations to gather young people; etc. 4 2 7 3 6 2

(cont'd on next page)

Better social welfare; food support and adequate aid by the government: Youth receives greater support by the government; social welfare offices; high officials and authorities take a greater interest in youth problems; better care with regard to nutrition; no underfeeding as in East Germany; young people don't have to work so hard; better living and housing conditions; etc.

US ZONE
Y A

Berlin
Y A

Bremen
Y A

4% 4% 6% 2% 5%

General comments on greater efforts in youth work and care: More is being done here; in my opinion they are taking better care of young people here than in East Germany; there is quite a different policy here concerning youth; they get more support; the West Zone is better than the East Zone; the Russians don't care as much about youth as the West Germans and the Americans do; Germany sets her hopes in her youth; etc.

3 2 2 1 4 1

Youth receives better school and cultural training: They are educated in a more civilized manner; better schools, better education; cultural education; decent teachers who give their best; better education for life; etc.

2 3 5 5 4 2

Youth is supported by the Church and is educated in a Christian way: On the part of the church; young people are educated in a Christian way; the various denominations take great interest in the youth in opposition to the East; they are taught to lead a Christian life; education on a Christian basis; the Home Mission is doing its utmost for youth in a religious way; religious education from early childhood on; the Catholic church takes care of the children; Christian associations; etc.

2 4 - * 1 1

Greater efforts are made in bringing up youth as respectable people and protecting them against demoralization: Better care is taken of youth, young people are neglected in East Germany; they are taught good manners and good behaviour; good movies to keep youngsters off the street; here young people are trained to independence; in East Germany young people are taught to hate and to destroy; one tries to make respectable and decent people out of them; etc.

1 3 2 4 3 2

Other opinions: Scholarships for talented students; young people need not take part in political demonstrations; they are protected from Communism; youth leaders of the trade unions give youth problems greater considerations; they need not fear slave labor; propaganda and stupefying methods (Volksverdummung) in the East Zone; etc.

1 1 * * - 2

No opinion / No answer:

11 5 8 4 5 4
56% 41% 63% 57% 47% 11%

* Less than one half of one per cent.

** Some respondents gave more than one answer.

Clearly evident in the replies of those who felt that youth affairs receive greater attention in East Germany is that the kind of attention is often quite other than desirable. Only small percentages both among youth and adults spoke of greater attention in a way that could be judged to indicate that the respondent believed such attention to be desirable in nature.

"Where are youth affairs given more attention, in East Germany or in West Germany?"

If "In East Germany": "In what respects are youth affairs given more attention in East Germany?"

US ZONE		Berlin		Breme	
Y	A	Y	A	Y	A

MORE ATTENTION OF AN UNDESIRABLE NATURE

Misuse of youth for political aims; (force, without mentioning the FDJ): Pressure and slogans; through slogans youth is politically misused and confused; propaganda and Communism are poisoning the youth; they are misused for political purposes; East Germany tries to take advantage of the youth under pressure; they are being trained in the wrong way, etc.

2%	3%	7%	9%	2%	2%
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Through militaristic training (without mentioning the FDJ): They receive militaristic training; young people are not left in peace, they are forced to march again; they are put into uniforms; military-like organizations; etc.

1	2	1	2	1	1
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By forcing them into the FDJ (youth organizations): By force they receive militaristic training in the FDJ; they are forced to join the FDJ; they are imbued with political conceptions in a very negative manner by the FDJ; etc.

1	2	8	3	-	2
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Through compulsory work (forced labor, police, etc.): They are forced into the police and into youth organizations; forced labor and "organization" for everything; they are forced to join party organizations; they have to work in the mines; and those who refuse are sent to Siberia; etc.

1	1	1	1	-	1
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Comparison with the Nazi time (Hitler youth): In East Germany the youth is trained for mass-murder, just like in the Nazi time; in the East Zone young people are forced into youth organizations just like in the Nazi time. political training like in the Hitler youth organization of the FDJ and of the HJ are alike; youth is used for political aims like in the Nazi time; etc.

1	2	*	2	1	-
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(cont'd on next page)

US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Y A	Y A	Y A

MORE ATTENTION OF AN INDETERMINATE NATURE

Political and Communist education: The Communists are doing their utmost to win the young people; they try to influence the youth politically; attempts are made to get them involved in politics, more than in the West; the Russians are more interested in the youth; the youth receive political training; etc.

6% 7% 15% 16% 13% 11%

Organizing the youth in the FDJ (youth organizations); Whitsunday meeting, etc.: Youth is fired through contests and marches, etc; youth gatherings like the Berlin May meeting; they are more organized; they are all integrated into a single state-sponsored youth movement; etc.

4 4 1 2 3 5

MORE ATTENTION OF A DESIRABLE NATURE

Better working and education possibilities: East Zone youth is given better job possibilities; they are provided with apprenticeship and working places; keeps them away from unemployment; no juvenile unemployment; youth has, even if under pressure, an occupation; young people in the East Zone are not spoiled; the government is intent on giving young people adequate training, there are workshops; they are better trained for work; the youth in East Germany is educated much more strictly, and since everybody has to join the FDJ youngsters are kept off the street; etc.

3 22 3 2 1 2

Better cohesion of the youth: Youth is held together better, therefore greater capacity for work, sports, etc.; the FDJ has theater and sport unions and clubs, evening meetings which the West does not have; they are getting utmost support in every respect, being members of a political youth organization; etc.

1 1 5 4 1 1

General better care and welfare: In every respect; in West Germany no political party is interested in the youth; youth problems are given more consideration than in West Germany; the government has the means to support a youth movement; etc.

* * * 1 2 1
20%* 21%* 11%* 12%* 21%* 26%*

* Less than one half of one per cent.

** Some respondents gave more than one answer.

SHOULD ANY EAST GERMAN YOUTH MEASURES BE EMULATED? ...

Only negligible proportions everywhere sampled could name any youth measures in the East Zone which they felt ought to be taken over by the West. The majority in the US Zone, however, - both among youth and adults - preferred to express no opinion in the matter rather than to give a definite negative answer.

"Could you name any measures or institutions for the East German youth which should be taken over by West Germany?"

	Bavaria		Hesse		W-Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N
Yes	3%	3%	4%	3%	5%	2%	4%	3%	6%	4%	5%	3%
No, none should be taken over	37	38	52	54	30	29	39	40	63	63	51	58
No opinion	60	59	44	43	67	69	57	57	31	33	44	39
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	US ZONE		
	15-19	20-25	25+
Yes	3%	4%	3%
No, none should be taken over	35	43	40
No opinion	62	53	57
	100%	100%	100%

With so few recommending emulation of East Zone youth measures, group breakdowns or detailed tabulations of reasoning need not be pursued. However, it is of some interest to note that among the few who felt that some East Zone measures should be adopted, the idea of a single youth organization - similar to the FDJ but on a democratic basis - received most frequent mention. This idea will be subjected to more direct attention below.

SHOULD ANY NAZI YOUTH MEASURES BE EMULATED? ...

Though the preponderant opinion is negative, a considerable proportion of both youth and adults in the US occupied areas feel that certain youth measures of the Third Reich could profitably be utilized in West Germany today. Particularly among older youth - as distinguished from teenagers - is this point of view prevalent, with almost four in ten in favor of such a course.

"Could you name any measures or institutions of the Third Reich for youth which should be taken over?"

	Bavaria		Hesse		W-Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N
Yes	33%	31%	27%	26%	33%	29%	32%	29%	33%	31%	30%	29%
No, none should be taken over	41	46	49	55	41	45	43	48	48	54	46	54
No opinion	26	23	24	18	26	25	25	23	19	15	24	17
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	US ZONE		
	15-19	20-25	25+
Yes	24%	39%	29%
No, none should be taken over	41	44	48
No opinion	35	17	23
	100%	100%	100%

The Nazi youth measures most frequently suggested for emulation are the various labor service plans which functioned during the Third Reich - the Landjahr, the Pflichtjahr, and the Landdienst. This is one more indication to be added to the numerous others throughout this paper of an intense preoccupation among West German youth with economic problems in general and the employment problem in particular.

"Can you name any measures or institutions of the Third Reich for youth which should be taken over?"

If "Yes": "Which?"

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
<u>Labor service (Land Year, Duty Year, and Land Service):</u> Pflichtjahr and labor service; volunteer labor service for boys and girls; non-political labor service; non-military labor service; the Landjahr for girls; etc.	12%	17%	13%	19%	15%	18%
<u>Youth groups similar to the Hitler youth (HJ) and association of German girls (BDM):</u> Gather young people in unions and associations; HJ-like youth organizations to keep the youth off the street; youth organizations where they are taught obedience; something like the HJ and BDM; etc.	7	4	8	5	7	3
<u>Youth homes, youth camps, holiday camps, recreation centers, etc.:</u> holiday camps; establishing of craft shops; trips and tours as we had in the BDM; evening training courses; KDF (Strength through Joy) with its cheap travel possibilities; etc.	6	4	8	2	3	3
<u>Furthering of sport activities in school:</u> Sport and play associations to keep the youth from loitering about; sport clubs; better sport training in school; sport contests; sport festivities; etc.	3	2	2	2	2	1
<u>General furthering through procurement of labor; procurement of jobs; apprenticeship places, etc.:</u> Procurement of labor for young people; establishment of apprenticeship places; vocational training homes; better salary for young workers; etc.	2	2	1	2	1	3
<u>Protection of the youth through government and law:</u> Laws for the protection of youth; children off the street; youngsters below the age of 14 or 18 should be prohibited to attend movies; police raids in bars; etc; the work-house for lungers; etc.	2	*	*	*	-	-
<u>Child welfare (Kinderlandverschickung, NSV, etc.):</u> Courses for Child-Care; the NSV for mother and child; program of sending children to the country for vacation; etc.	1	1	3	1	3	-
<u>Better and stricter education of the youth (General):</u> Stricter education; more discipline; teach young people how to work through better education and training; more severe punishment in the schools; etc.	1	1	-	1	-	1

(cont'd on next page)

US ZONE

Berlin

Bremen

Y Y Y General aid to material and spiritual welfare:

Financial support for young people; financial support for youth associations; furthering of talented children; etc.

1% 1% * - - 1%

Other opinions: Working associations; keep the children off the street; political education centers regardless of their political background and opinion; thorough indoctrination toward one aim: today Christian belief; etc.*
35%** 33%** 33% 33% 31%** 31%**

* Less than one half of one per cent.

** Some respondents gave more than one answer.

Breakdowns of US Zone youth groups disclose that particularly among the higher educational levels is the feeling prevalent that certain Nazi youth measures could be profitably adopted for current West German use. Unemployed youth do not differ significantly from employed in the frequency of such an opinion, but among the refugee youth there is a suggestion of somewhat greater partiality to such an idea than among native residents.

"Could you name any measures or institutions of the Third Reich for youth which should be taken over?"

	Yes	No, none should be taken over	No opinion	
US ZONE YOUTH (15-25)				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	34%	47%	19%	...
Women	30	40	30	100%
<u>Educations:</u>				
8 years or less	28%	43%	29%	
9 - 11 years	46	44	10	
12 years and more	50	44	6	
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 99.99 DM	24%	40%	36%	
100 - 249.99 DM	31	40	29	
250 - 399.99 DM	34	47	19	
400 DM and over	39	47	14	
<u>City Size:</u>				
Under 1,000 population	23%	42%	35%	
1,000 - 1,999	25	43	32	
2,000 - 4,999	33	41	26	
5,000 - 9,999	34	40	26	
10,000 - 24,999	39	44	17	
25,000 - 99,999	44	37	19	
100,000 - 249,999	32	49	19	
250,000 and over	37	51	12	
<u>Employment Status:</u>				
Employed or apprenticed	31%	44%	25%	
Unemployed	34	40	26	
Not employed (Students, dependents)	33	30	37	
Housewives	32	49	19	
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	30%	43%	27%	
Protestants	33	42	25	
All others	36	60	4	
<u>Origin:</u>				
Natives	30%	45%	25%	
Refugees	36	36	28	

IS A SINGLE YOUTH ORGANIZATION PREFERRED BY GERMANS? ...

Among the serious issues raised by the growth of the FDJ in the East Zone is the question of whether or not Germans are more drawn to the idea of a single youth organization than to the decentralization and diversity which is more in line with American thinking and which at present is characteristic of youth organizations in the US occupied areas. Much food for thought lies in the clear indication of the present study that both in the US Zone and Berlin a majority of youth and a majority of adults would be in favor of the establishment of a single youth organization in West Germany.

"Would you be for or against the establishment of a single youth organization in West Germany?"

	Bavaria		Hesse		W-Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y ____		Y ____		Y ____		Y ____		Y ____		Y ____	
Yes, for it	61%	60%	56%	49%	57%	57%	60%	56%	62%	77%	46%	43%
No, against it	27	25	28	32	33	30	28	27	34	22	25	41
No opinion	12	17	14	19	10	13	12	17	4	1	9	16
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	US ZONE		
	15-19	20-25	25+
Yes, for it	62%	57%	56%
No, against it	25	31	27
No opinion	13	12	17
	100%	100%	100%

Much more study is needed of course to ascertain exactly what German youths have in mind in their answers to this question. Does it mean, for one thing, that they would wish a single organization instead of the numerous ones now extant in West Germany, or does it mean that they would like such a unitary group over and above those now in existence. Moreover, what kind of reasoning lies behind the opinions expressed on this issue? All these questions must be investigated to establish the precise significance of the present findings.

Support for a unitary organization drops with education, group breakdowns of US Zone youth reveal, but approval outweighs opposition except at the highest educational level. Of considerable interest, though its significance is not entirely clear, is the fact that both among unemployed youth as contrasted with employed, and among refugee youth as contrasted with natives there is greater support for the idea of establishing a single youth organization in West Germany.

"Would you be for or against the establishment of a single youth organization in West Germany?"

Yes, for it No, against it No opinion

**US ZONE YOUTH
(15-25)**

Sex:

	Yes, for it	No, against it	No opinion	...	100%
Men	60%	31%	9%		100%
Women	59	26	15		

Education:

8 years or less	61%	25%	14%
9 - 11 years	55	40	5
12 years and more	38	62	-

Income (per month):

0 - 99.99 DM	59%	23%	16%
100 - 249.99 DM	60	27	13
250 - 399.99 DM	65	28	9
400 DM and more	57	37	6

City Size:

Under 1,000 population	57%	23%	20%
1,000 - 1,999	60	22	18
2,000 - 4,999	62	30	8
5,000 - 9,999	62	28	10
10,000 - 24,999	71	22	7
25,000 - 99,999	65	28	7
100,000 - 249,999	55	40	7
250,000 and over	50	43	7

Employment Status:

Employed or apprenticed	59%	29%	12%
Unemployed	69	23	8
Not employed (Students, dependents)	59	22	19
Housewives	65	22	15

Religion:

Catholics	60%	27%	15%
Protestants	59	30	11
All others	50	43	7

Origin:

Natives	57%	30%	15%
Refugees	68	22	10

WITH OR WITHOUT UNIFORMS? ...

Among those who favor the establishment of a single youth organization in West Germany the larger proportion - both among youth and adults - disapproves of having the members in uniform. However, an appreciable minority, among US Zone youth (almost one in four among teen-agers) favor a unitary organization with uniforms.

"Should this youth organization be a uniformed one?" (Asked of those who answered "Yes, for it" to previous question.)

	Bavaria		Hesse		W-Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N
Yes	25%	17%	19%	9%	15%	8%	21%	13%	13%	18%	18%	13%
No	34	39	37	38	41	45	37	40	49	58	23	27
No opinion	$\frac{2}{61\%}$	$\frac{4}{60\%}$	$\frac{2}{58\%}$	$\frac{2}{49\%}$	$\frac{1}{57\%}$	$\frac{4}{57\%}$	$\frac{2}{60\%}$	$\frac{3}{56\%}$	$\frac{-}{62\%}$	$\frac{1}{77\%}$	$\frac{5}{46\%}$	$\frac{3}{43\%}$

	US ZONE		
	15-19	20-25	25+
Yes	23%	19%	13%
No	37	36	40
No opinion	$\frac{2}{62\%}$	$\frac{2}{57\%}$	$\frac{3}{56\%}$

Favor of uniforms in a unitary youth organization is less among higher educated youth, US Zone breakdowns show, than among their less educated counterparts. It is also less at the higher income levels. Unemployed youth do not apparently favor uniforms to any significantly greater extent than do employed youth. Among refugee youths, however, there is a small but reliable indication of wider appeal in the idea of a uniform, than among native youths.

"Should this youth organization be a uniformed one?" (asked of those who answered "Yes, for it" to previous question.)

	Yes	No	No opinion	Total asked
US ZONE YOUTH				
(15-25)				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	21%	37%	2%	60%
Women	21	36	2	59
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	22%	37%	2%	61%
9 - 11 years	18	36	1	55
12 years and more	8	28	2	38
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 99.99 DM	26%	50%	3%	59%
100 - 249.99 DM	23	35	2	60
250 - 399.99 DM	21	41	1	63
400 DM and more	17	40	-	57
<u>City Size:</u>				
Under 1,000 pop.	24%	30%	3%	57%
1,000 - 1,999	20	58	2	60
2,000 - 4,999	22	38	2	62
5,000 - 9,999	23	36	3	62
10,000 - 24,999	26	44	1	71
25,000 - 99,999	24	40	1	65
100,000 - 249,999	15	37	1	53
250,000 and over	14	36	-	50
<u>Employment Status:</u>				
Employed or apprenticed	21%	36%	2%	59%
Unemployed	25	42	2	69
Not employed (Students, dependents)	14	45	-	59
Housewives	23	37	3	63
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	22%	36%	2%	60%
Protestants	20	37	2	59
All others	11	39	-	50
<u>Origin:</u>				
Natives	20%	36%	1%	57%
Refugees	27	38	3	68

R E S T R I C T E D

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ERP INFORMATION

PROGRAM IN WESTERN GERMANY

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Report No. 39

Series No. 2

October 12, 1950

DECLASSIFIED

by authority of

W. J. F. F. F. F.

Chief,

PUB: Research Staff

This study on public awareness of, and attitudes toward, the Marshall Plan was made in August 1950 as part of a larger survey by the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs, HICOG. As in all surveys made by RAS, a representative randomly selected sample of residents of the US Zone, West Berlin, and Bremen were interviewed in their homes by trained German interviewers supervised by American Surveys Officers. In all, 1500 persons in the US Zone, 287 in West Berlin and 206 in Bremen were interviewed. The analysis and the reporting of the data were prepared by the professional staff at Bad Nauheim headquarters.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...

The findings of this study strongly suggest the need for a more vigorous and imaginative information campaign regarding the Marshall Plan. Such a campaign to be successful should be more popular in tone and content than presumably has been the case heretofore. What is apparently needed is a grass-roots information program.

The fact that more than seven in ten US Zone Germans claim to have heard or read of ERP should not be taken as a contradiction of the foregoing statement. The figure derives from the public's ability merely to recognize the term Marshall Plan or ERP. Other studies have shown that in somewhat deeper probes many fewer people are able to apply anyone of the popular designations to American aid when asked to do so. Moreover, even on the basis of bare recognition, in almost two years time there has been no appreciable increase in awareness of ERP among the US Zone population as a whole. Analysis further shows that in 1950, almost precisely the same groups within the population were ignorant of Marshall Plan aid as were ignorant in 1948. (Comparative tables on page 2 of this report.)

The public itself recommends more information, with almost half saying that the West German people are not sufficiently informed. They recommend more concrete details about ERP, and a more popular tone in order that the general public may be reached.

Bearing out their opinions on the need for more information is the fact that six in ten do not know that it is planned to terminate ERP in 1952.

On the interesting question of what the German people consider the aid - a loan or a gift - six in ten of those aware of the Marshall Plan hold that American aid to Europe is in the nature of a loan, but one in ten feel it is a gift, and about as many say it is partly a gift or a loan, or say it has been already paid for by dismantling etc.. Two in ten could volunteer no opinion in the matter.

Marshall Plan aid is welcomed and appreciated by a majority of Germans who know of it. More than half would like to see it continue beyond 1952, two-thirds feel it benefits West Germany as a whole and not only special groups, and almost two-thirds believe it has stimulated a real rather than an illusory recovery of the German economy. The need for a more effective information campaign is again highlighted by the greater tendency of the groups which bulk largest in the US Zone German population - the lesser educated, the small town people, and those of lower income - to say that certain groups, rather than the public as a whole, receive the benefits of ERP. Comments made by respondents, and recorded in this report, also show that those whose opinions are unfavorable on certain aspects of ERP are more likely than not to base their judgments on misconceptions of the purposes and results of American aid.

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R E S T R I C T E D

AWARENESS OF MARSHALL PLAN AID ...

In August 1950, three-fourths of the residents of the US Zone and more than nine in ten residents of West Berlin and of Bremen claimed they had heard or read something about Marshall Plan aid.

"Have you ever heard or read something about the Marshall Plan or the European recovery program, the so-called ERP?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W. Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Yes	74%	83%	73%	76%	95%	97%
No	23	13	23	20	5	2
No opinion	3	4	4	4	-	1
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

It would be a mistake, however, to be at all complacent about these US Zone awareness figures even though they are relatively high. For one thing, examination of the trend of replies to this question shows that despite some fluctuations during the past year and a half or more there has been no real increase in the extent of awareness in the US Zone as a whole.

	1948					1949		1950
	Feb	June	Aug	Sept	Dec	July	Nov	Aug
Aware of Marshall Plan aid	68%	67%	71%	76%	83%	77%	71%	76%
Not aware	32	33	29	24	17	23	29	24
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Moreover, it must be understood that the phrasing of this question admits of the maximum number of affirmative replies, requiring as it does merely recognition rather than the task of recall. If ability actually to cite some sort of correct appellation of American aid to Europe is taken to be an indication of an awareness that exceeds the barely marginal, extent of indicated familiarity drops considerably. This fact is evident for the US Zone in the figures below. Also demonstrated is that when measured through recall, as when measured through recognition, there is little indication over the past many months of any appreciable gain in familiarity with Marshall Plan aid. *

"Do you know whether there is any plan by which America aids Europe with money and food?"
If "Yes": "What is it called?"

	Aug 1949	Nov 1949	May 1950
Know there is a plan and can designate it as Marshall Plan, ERP, ECA, etc.	53%	53%	57%
Cannot name plan or do not know of plan	47	47	43
	100%	100%	100%

* See report # 149, "Trends and Present Attitudes on the Marshall Plan", (10 Dec 1948), for discussion of trends through September 1948, and report # 190, "The Marshall Plan and Western Germany", (17 October 1949).

R E S T R I C T E D

The fact that no appreciable inroads have been made over the past year and a half among the elements of the US Zone population who were yet unaware of the Marshall Plan, is more graphically revealed when the overall zonal figure is broken down among constituent population groups.

	Per cent Unaware of Marshall Plan	
	<u>Sept 1948</u>	<u>August 1950</u>
US Zone as a whole:	24%	24%
US Zone Länder:		
Bavaria	25%	25%
Hesse	22	17
Württemberg-Baden	25	27
US Zone Population Groups:		
<u>Sex:</u>		
Men	10%	12%
Women	33	34
<u>Education:</u>		
8 years or less	26%	28%
9 years and more	3	3
<u>Age:</u>		
15 - 24 years	31%	27%
25 - 59 years	22	22
60 years and over	27	28
<u>City Size:</u>		
Under 1,000 population	37%	33%
1,000 - 1,999	30	32
2,000 - 4,999	27	27
5,000 - 9,999	17	20
10,000 - 99,999	14	13
100,000 - 24,999	11	15
250,000 and over	9	12

It is evident above that if any special efforts have been made to bring the Marshall Plan story to the particular groups that the '48 survey revealed to be most in ignorance, these efforts have not met with any discernable success. The extent of unawareness among particular US Zone groups is almost identical in the August '50 survey with that found almost two years before.

There is of course a saturation point in any informational campaign, beyond which impractically great efforts are needed to influence marginal elements in the population. It may be that such a point has been reached in Western Germany in regard to ERP publicity. But on the other hand it is equally possible that substantial gains in awareness could yet be realized if vigorous and imaginative programs are pursued. It does not seem likely that the limit of absorption of Marshall Plan information has been reached in the US Zone when 43% as of May 1950 cannot even come up with any one of the various names of the program, and 24% as of August 1950 confess that they have never heard or read of such an undertaking.

RESTRICTED

SOURCES OF INFORMATION ...

Most frequently mentioned source of information about the Marshall Plan are newspapers, with radio following in second place. Relatively few mention posters and magazines as media of information. Both of the latter are mentioned more infrequently than conversation with friends or acquaintances.

"Where did you happen to hear about this plan?" (Asked of those who answered "Yes" to previous question.)

	Bavaria	Hesse	W. Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Newspaper	60%	73%	62%	63%	73%	80%
Radio	44	53	33	44	55	61
Magazines	2	5	2	3	*	2
Posters	4	16	3	7	6	4
Acquaintances and friends	10	13	5	9	11	11
Others	6	5	8	6	9	12
No opinion	-	-	1	*	4	2
	126%	165%	114%	132%	153%	172%

* Less than one half of one per cent.

It will be noted in the table above that most people name more than one source of information. Also as comparison with the preceeding table on awareness indicates, in regions where the extent of awareness is greatest more sources of information are mentioned.

R E S T R I C T E D

GROUP DIFFERENCES IN SOURCES OF INFORMATION ...

As demonstrated in the following table newspapers lead among all population groups as a source of information. Also the groups most likely to be informed — the men, the better educated, the economically better off, and urban residents — name more sources than do their opposite groups.

"Where did you happen to hear about the Plan?"

	News- papers	Radio	Maga- zines	Fosters	Friends	Others	No opinion	
US Zone Groups:								
<u>Sex:</u>								
Men	79%	52%	4%	11%	8%	8%	1%	163%
Women	49	35	2	3	11	14	-	104
<u>Education:</u>								
8 years or less	58%	38%	2%	5%	9%	4%	-	116%
9 years and more	89	68	8	15	13	14	-	207
<u>Income (per month):</u>								
0 - 149 DM	56%	28%	1%	4%	12%	4%	-	105%
150 - 299 DM	63	47	3	7	7	7	-	134
300 DM and more	75	57	6	9	12	9	1	169
<u>City Size:</u>								
Under 2,000 pop.	52%	32%	1%	3%	8%	5%	1%	102%
2,000 - 24,999	67	46	3	8	10	5	-	139
25,000 and over	75	57	6	11	10	9	-	168
<u>Age:</u>								
15 - 24 years	51%	46%	3%	6%	7%	14%	1%	128%
25 - 59 years	66	47	3	7	11	6	-	140
60 years and over	64	28	2	5	6	2	1	108
<u>Party Preference:</u>								
SPD	75%	50%	3%	9%	10%	8%	1%	156%
CDU/CSU	55	41	3	4	11	5	-	119
FDP/LDP/EDV	91	58	4	11	10	12	-	186
BP	61	43	1	5	11	7	-	128
None of them	68	48	3	7	8	6	-	140
<u>Origin:</u>								
Native	63%	45%	3%	7%	9%	7%	-	134%
Refugee	63	39	3	5	9	5	-	124

(Percentages add to more than 100 because more than one source was mentioned.)

R E S T R I C T E D

ERP AS A TOPIC OF CONVERSATION ...

Four in ten of the people in the US Zone who are aware of the Marshall Plan claim it has been a subject of conversation between them and friends and acquaintances. This would appear to be a relatively high proportion. It will be recalled, however, that only nine per cent of the people who know there is such a thing as the European Recovery Program say they learned of it from acquaintances.

"Does it sometimes happen that the Marshall Plan is mentioned in conversation with your friends and acquaintances?"

	<u>US ZONE</u>
Yes	40%
No	60
	<u>100%</u>

As the following table shows, the likelihood of mentioning the plan is greater in those places and among those groups where awareness of it is the greater.

"Does it happen sometimes that the Marshall Plan is mentioned in conversation with your friends and acquaintances?"

	Yes	No	No opinion	
US Zone Leader:				
Bavaria	34%	66%	*	... 100%
Hesse	49	51	*	
W. Baden	42	58	*	
Berlin	44	56	*	
Bremen	44	56	*	
US Zone Population Groups:				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	49%	51%	-	
Women	29	70	1%	
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	36%	63%	1%	
9 years and more	52	48	-	
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	31%	68%	1%	
150 - 299 DM	38	61	1	
300 DM and more	51	49	-	
<u>City Size:</u>				
Under 2,000 population	35%	64%	1%	
2,000 - 24,999	41	58	1	
25,000 and over	44	56	-	
<u>Age:</u>				
15 - 24 years	24%	76%	-	
25 - 59 years	44	55	1	
60 years and over	36	64	-	
<u>Party Preference:</u>				
SPD	45%	55%	-	
CDU/CSU	33	66	1	
FDP/LDP/BDV	56	43	1	
None of them	43	56	1	
<u>Origin:</u>				
Native	39%	60%	1%	
Refugees	41	58	1	

* Less than one half of one per cent.

R E S T R I C T E D

MORE PUBLICITY NEEDED ...

That the public should be told more about the Marshall Plan is the opinion of almost half the US Zone public. Less than three in ten feel that people are sufficiently informed and only a negligible three per cent say there has been too much talk about it already, although the wording of the question encourages the expression of such a sentiment if it exists.

"Do you believe that the West German people are sufficiently informed about the Marshall Plan, or should they have more information or are you of the opinion that the Marshall Plan has been discussed too much already?"

US ZONE

Sufficiently informed	28%
Should have more information	49
Already discussed too much	3
No opinion	20
	<u>100%</u>

... Opinions on the sufficiency of Marshall Plan publicity do not vary greatly among the Laender or in Berlin and Bremen, though Bavarians are somewhat more inclined to say more information should be forthcoming. Nor are the differences marked within the various population groups, except that the groups which are customarily better informed tend more often to voice an opinion than those who are usually less well informed. Thus for example while men and the better educated are more likely than women and the lesser educated to say that there should be more information, more of them than of their opposites also say people are well enough informed. But as is apparent in the table on the following page, the predominant opinion among all groups is that more information is needed.

RESTRICTED

"Do you believe that the West German people are sufficiently informed about the Marshall Plan, or should they have more information - or are you of the opinion that the Marshall Plan has been discussed too much already?"

	Sufficiently informed	Should have more information	Has been discussed too much	No opinion
US Zone Laender:				
Bavaria	24%	53%	3%	20%..10
Hesse	30	42	3	25
W. Baden	35	46	4	15
Berlin	31	45	2	22
Bremen	29	42	5	24
US Zone Population Groups:				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	29%	54%	4%	13%
Women	26	42	2	30
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	26%	48%	3%	23%
9 years and more	34	51	4	11
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	20%	48%	3%	29%
150 - 299 DM	29	51	2	18
300 DM and more	30	47	5	18
<u>City Size:</u>				
Under 2,000 pop.	25%	45%	2%	25%
2,000 - 24,999	27	48	4	21
25,000 and over	28	53	4	15
<u>Age:</u>				
15 - 24 years	35%	37%	6%	22%
25 - 59 years	26	52	3	19
60 years and over	28	46	2	24
<u>Party Preference:</u>				
SPD	29%	53%	5%	13%
CDU/CSU	27	50	2	21
FDP/LDP/BDV	33	53	2	12
None of them	27	48	5	20
No opinion	22	34	-	44
<u>Origin:</u>				
Native	28%	47%	4%	21%
Refugee	25	54	3	18

RESTRICTED

... Reasons advanced by the groups which think there should be more information regarding the Marshall Plan vary in specificity and reference, but they are all add up to similar recommendations; more detailed information should be given and a greater effort should be made to gear this information to the broad public.

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

The majority is not informed about the particulars of the Marshall Plan - one should know details about it; (general): Our people are not thoroughly enough informed, only superficially; I myself wouldn't know much to say about it; we don't know enough about it; more illustrations; particularly the women know too little about it; it would be better to know it; everybody should know about it; etc.

24% 27% 31%

The majority of people do not know anything about the Marshall Plan (general statements): Many people don't know anything definite about it; hardly anybody understands the meaning of it; most people - just like me - don't know what it is about; certain groups of the population are not informed about it yet; many people don't know about it; the broad masses have no inkling of its meaning; etc.

20 7 17

Information campaign insufficient and not detailed enough: Posters and newspaper reports are not detailed enough; the newspapers write this to-day and that tomorrow - nobody knows what to believe; more illustrations and radio-broadcasts; to inform the population, especially the women, about what is going on; the Russian propaganda is better than the American propaganda; information campaigns in factories, trade unions etc. no information except from radio broadcasts; they should speak about it more in public forums; information can't do harm; etc.

17 15 10

Insufficient information - not geared to the lower classes (laborers and rural population): The Marshall Plan should be spoken about in much simpler and easier to understand terms; especially the working class is insufficiently informed, otherwise they would not complain so much; the rural population hardly knows anything about it; the little newspapers hardly write anything about it; in the villages no one reads newspapers or listens to radio broadcasts; many people don't understand what is written in the newspapers; abbreviations and foreign words should be avoided; newspapers should be cheaper - poor people can't afford to buy them; etc.

10 13 6

(cont'd on next page)

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

Only a few realize the importance of this aid:
The common worker is not informed thoroughly enough about the importance of the plan; to make everybody realize the meaning of it; to make more people realize that the Americans are helping us; many people don't know where their food comes from; people should know more about it to appreciate the aid; a lot depends for us on the Marshall Plan; etc.

10% 6% 14%

People should be informed about purpose and aim of the Marshall Plan (where the money comes from and how it is used): People should know what the money is being used for; the present government uses the money as it pleases, one doesn't know about it; the people should know what they are at; to make all classes understand the purpose of the Marshall Plan; we know too little about the exchange of goods and the conditions; people should know where everything comes from and when it will end; etc.

9 9 5

The little interest is apparent: General lack of interest; many people are still behind in this matter and don't care for anything; the people hardly talk about it anymore; lack of receptivity still continues to prevail among people; the indigenous population is completely indifferent; for reasons of morale it is necessary to influence those who are not interested; etc.

6 9 7

Most people are misinformed and unable to form own judgments: Wherever one goes people are of the opinion that everything is a gift; to make it impossible for the opponents of the plan to work against it; most Germans think the Marshall Plan is only for the good of the Americans in Germany; otherwise people wouldn't talk nonsense like the Marshall Plan being unfavorable for us; much ignorance and unfounded rejection, (comparison with the East); etc.

3 12 9

Other Opinions: They would get afraid of the power; how can they force dried plums on us in the value of \$ 500.000; etc.

$\frac{1}{100\%}$ $\frac{2}{100\%}$ $\frac{4}{103\%}$

* Percentages add up to more than 100 because some people gave more than one answer.

The leading argument of those who claim the public is sufficiently informed about the Marshall Plan is that so much about it appears constantly in the press and is heard over the radio.

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

Constant information about the Marshall Plan through the press and radio: Daily reports about it in the newspapers and broadcasts over the radio; there is so much written about it in the newspapers and the people read newspapers; everywhere they speak and write about it; large majorities of the people who read newspapers are informed; every time a new building is planned the newspapers write about it; everybody reads the newspapers and is interested in reconstruction; there is so much written about it in the newspapers; those who are interested in it read it - the others can't be helped; because we always read what the Marshall Plan means for Germany; if we women know about it the men must know even more; everywhere one can read about it and the ERP-train comes around; etc.

49%

36%

43%

Large majorities are informed about the Marshall Plan (general): The large majority is definitely informed; there has been a lot of information about the Marshall Plan and most of the people know what it is; everybody is informed and has his own view; people have formed a conception of it - apparently they are all informed; in Berlin we are sufficiently informed, how it is in West Germany I do not know; etc.

13

14

14

It is talked about a lot among the population - (one often hears about it): Many people talk about it; it is generally being talked about so that everybody should be informed; I believe that everybody has heard about it; so much has been said about it so that everybody can get an idea; it is mentioned again and again; from experience; we often talk about it; they all talk about it; apparently everybody is informed; I was in West Germany recently and everybody talked about it; the word "Marshall Plan" is mentioned frequently in conversations; for years they have spoken about it; because I myself have heard about it too; since the Marshall Plan has existed quite a time it has been talked about enough; etc.

10

19

17

Those who are interested already know - disinterested cannot be reached: Those who derive profit from it know about it; the others are not interested; men know more about it, women are not interested in politics; people don't want to know more about it, are not interested; the rural population is not interested in politics; we common people don't understand much about it; the West Germans take the greatest interest in it since they want to build up everything; since the Americans want to re-build West Germany the West Germans take a special interest in it; for their own good they will get informed about it; the great majority knows about it, who does not know about it proves that he is not interested; etc.

10

7

12

R E S T R I C T E D

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

People realize obvious improvement of conditions: People more and more see the good effects; everyone knows that through our own power we would never have made it; since the Marshall Plan has helped us, the people must know where the goods come from; everybody knows about it through own experience; everyone knows where the food come from; it is quite obvious that the USA has helped a lot; conditions have improved since the Marshall Plan started; because the West German population sees what the ERP money is being used for; etc.

7%	19%	10%
----	-----	-----

Other Opinions: We have only heard good things about it but should last longer; too much talk and not enough action; etc.

2	2	-
---	---	---

No Opinion:

$\frac{11}{102\%}$ *	$\frac{6}{103\%}$ *	$\frac{10}{106\%}$ *
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* Percentages add up to more than 100 because some people gave more than one answer.

DURATION OF ERP AID ...

Six in ten of the persons in the US Zone who know there is a Marshall Plan do not know how long it is to last — a clear confirmation of the predominant view that more information about American aid should be forthcoming. The question and answers are:

"Can you please tell me for how long a time the Marshall Plan is supposed to last?"

	US ZONE
Correct - 1952	40%
Incorrect	14
No opinion	46
	<u>100%</u>

No opinion and incorrect replies are very large among all population groups, rising to more than three quarters among US Zone women and youth, and two-thirds of the lesser educated. More likely than others to know that Marshall aid is to terminate in 1952 are the men, the better educated, and the more prosperous groups.

Regionally, Hessians are far better informed than people in other places. Contrary to the usual rule on information questions, West Berliners are least well informed in this matter.

R E S T R I C T E D

R E S T R I C T E D

"Can you please tell me for how long a time the Marshall Plan is supposed to last?"

	Right (1952)	Wrong	No opinion	
US Zone Laender:				
Bavaria	35%	14%	50%	... 100%
Hesse	52	16	32	
W. Baden	37	16	47	
Berlin	31	10	59	
Bremen	45	18	37	
US Zone Population Groups:				
Sex:				
Men	52%	15%	33%	
Women	24	14	62	
Education:				
8 years or less	34%	14%	52%	
9 years and more	59	14	27	
Income (per month):				
0 - 149 DM	31%	14%	55%	
150 - 299 DM	39	14	47	
300 DM and more	48	14	38	
City Size:				
Under 2,000 population	37%	12%	51%	
2,000 - 24,999	37	15	48	
25,000 and over	46	16	38	
Age:				
15 - 24 years	26%	14%	60%	
25 - 59 years	43	14	43	
60 years and over	36	18	46	
Party Preference:				
SPD	40%	14%	46%	
CDU/CSU	30	14	56	
FDP/LDF/BDV	58	12	30	
None of them	46	17	37	
Origin:				
Native	39%	14%	47%	
Refugee	42	15	43	

SHOULD CONTINUE LONGER THAN 1952 ...

Majority opinion is that Marshall Plan aid ought to continue after 1952. This was ascertained by responses to a query preceded by an informative statement on the proposed date for the expiration of American aid.

"Should the Marshall Plan last longer than 1952 or not?"

	US ZONE
Yes, longer	54%
No, not longer	17
No opinion	29
	100%

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REGIONAL AND GROUP OPINIONS ...

West Berliners are more likely than people in other regions to say Marshall Plan aid should be continued beyond 1952. As to population groups in the US Zone, more inclined than others to advocate an extension of aid beyond 1952 are men, the better educated, more prosperous and the urban groups. Persons who express preference for the Social Democratic party and for the FDP are also more likely than followers of the Christian Democrats to say aid should be continued.

"Should the Marshall Plan last longer than 1952, or not?"

	Yes	No	No opinion	
US Zone Laender:				
Bavaria	52%	19%	29%	... 100%
Hesse	52	17	31	
W. Baden	59	14	27	
Berlin	66	19	15	
Bremen	57	18	25	
US Zone Population Groups:				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	58%	21%	21%	
Women	48	12	40	
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	51%	17%	32%	
9 years and more	60	18	22	
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM.	48%	15%	37%	
150 - 299 DM.	57	17	26	
300 DM and more	55	19	26	
<u>City Size:</u>				
Under 2,000 population	47%	20%	33%	
2,000 - 24,999	53	15	32	
25,000 and over	60	17	23	
<u>Age:</u>				
15 - 24 years	43%	25%	32%	
25 - 59 years	55	16	29	
60 years and over	55	19	26	
<u>Party Preference:</u>				
SPD	69%	16%	15%	
CDU/CSU	45	17	38	
FDP/LDP/BDV	67	21	12	
None of them	49	18	33	
<u>Origin:</u>				
Native	52%	18%	30%	
Refugee	56	15	29	

R E S T R I C T E D

REASONS WHY ERP SHOULD CONTINUE BEYOND 1952 ...

In all the places sampled, the leading reasons for advocating a prolongation of ERP is the general idea that Germany will not be economically independent by 1952. Other arguments advanced frequently are that more help will be needed to achieve German or European security; and that aid will be needed to bring living standards up.

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

Because Germany needs aid, cannot yet stand on her own feet (general): By that time we will not be so far along that we can continue on alone; Germany cannot stand on her own feet for the present; we need aid longer to be able to live; by 1952 many of the things that are needed won't yet be available in Germany; the plan will not come to full success by 1952; etc.

28% 41% 39%

In order to stimulate German (European) economy: Then we will be economically more secure; our economic situation will not be stabilized by 1952 without American aid; for further development of the economy; it will be necessary for the European economy; industry cannot yet stand on its own feet; insufficient export; would be favorable for trade and exchange of goods; we lack too many raw materials; etc.

23 19 16

To secure living standards and food supply: Because then our food supply will be secured; so that shortages do not occur again in Germany; it would be better, people are already buying like mad; our living conditions will become more free and cheaper; the living standard would go down again; because the food deliveries are necessary for us; etc.

15 2 24

The Marshall Plan is a great help for us (general): We have had good results so far; the aid helps us to get started; it would help 100%; to finish something that has been started; conditions will get worse if the aid ceases; otherwise we shall be finished; etc.

13 7 9

Germany is overpopulated and needs aid (refugees and loss of Eastern territories): The problem of the refugees cannot be solved by 1952; because we even then cannot support ourselves alone; the best areas are lost; too many people whom we cannot feed alone; through the loss of our Eastern territories we still need this aid; etc.

7 - 3

For reasons of political security for all participant countries: To strengthen Europe; if the critical situation doesn't improve; otherwise we shall come under Communism; if the situation remains uncertain it will be necessary; because Germany is still split into East and West and the West alone is helpless; etc.

6 9 4

(cont'd on next page)

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US ZONE Berlin Bremen

Germany needs financial aid (also for reconstruction): Because we still are financially behind-hand; we need financial aid for rebuilding; we need long term loans on low interest; until our rebuilding program will be stabilized, to back up the Federal government; everything is still very destroyed; etc.

6% 18% 2%

To stop unemployment: Without the Marshall Plan aid the number of unemployed would increase tremendously; with lasting unemployment we cannot recover on our own power; to secure employment until we shall have achieved some national property again; etc.

1 8 1

Other Opinions: Through our debts we are united with America; within the near future there will be additional expenditures for military purposes; to make it clear to us that the Allies want to make everything good for us again; except for America nobody will help us; to maintain a certain order and regulation; because there is still poverty; many poor people are helped by the Marshall Plan; one does not know if everything will have been done by 1952; etc.

4 2 3

No opinion:

$\frac{2}{105\%}$ $\frac{-}{106\%}$ $\frac{-}{101\%}$

* Percentages add up to more than 100 because some people gave more than one answer.

MARSHALL PLAN AID - LOAN OR GIFT? ...

Almost two-thirds of those in the US Zone who are aware of the aid plan say that the aid given is a loan. Less than one in ten consider it a gift and similar proportion give qualified answers.

"Can you please tell me whether the goods and money delivered to West Germany through the Marshall Plan are a gift from America, a loan, or something else?"

US ZONE

Gift	8%
Loan	64
Something else: Partly gift, partly loan; paid for by dismantling, patents, etc; US citizens pay for it by taxes; not decided whether it is a gift or a loan; etc.	9
No opinion	$\frac{19}{100\%}$

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Members of those groups which are customarily better informed — men, the better educated, higher income, and urban groups — tend to say more frequently than others that Marshall aid is a loan, not a gift.

On the average about two-thirds of the people in all of the geographical areas except West Berlin indicate the opinion that the American aid is in the nature of a loan. In West Berlin, 76% hold this view.

"Can you please tell me whether the goods and the money delivered to West Germany through the Marshall Plan are a gift from America, a loan, or something else?"

	A gift	A loan	Something else	No opinion
<u>US Zone Laender:</u>				
Bavaria	64%	9%	10%	17% ...100%
Hesse	67	5	4	24
W. Baden	62	11	9	18
Berlin	76	11	4	9
Bremen	68	7	6	19
<u>US Zone Population Groups:</u>				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	9	68%	9%	14%
Women	7	60	8	25
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	9%	62%	8%	21%
9 years and more	7	74	9	10
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	11%	58%	5%	26%
150 - 299 DM	8	65	8	19
300 DM and more	6	71	12	11
<u>City Size:</u>				
Under 2,000 population	7%	60%	10%	23%
2,000 - 24,999	10	65	6	19
25,000 and over	8	69	9	14
<u>Age:</u>				
15 - 24 years	14%	60%	7%	19%
25 - 50 years	7	66	9	13
60 years and over	7	64	7	22
<u>Party Preference:</u>				
SPD	12%	66%	9%	13%
CDU/CSU	9	60	4	27
FDP/LDP/EDV	10	71	6	13
None of them	6	68	9	17
<u>Origin:</u>				
Native	8%	65%	9%	18%
Refugee	10	62	7	21

PLAN BENEFITS ALL ...

The Marshall Plan benefits all of Germany and not only certain groups in the opinion of two-thirds of those who have heard of it. But a quarter feel it only helps certain groups, and one in ten have no opinion.

"Are you of the opinion that all Germans or only certain groups benefit by Marshall Plan aid?"

	<u>US ZONE</u>
All Germans	65%
Certain groups	24
No opinion	<u>11</u>
	100%

It is the better educated persons, those with higher incomes, and urban residents who are more likely to feel that all Germans rather than only certain groups benefit by ERP. It is also interesting to note that youth tend more often than older people to hold this view.

Regionally, people in West Berlin and Bremen more frequently than US Zone residents express the opinion that all Germans are benefitted by American aid.

There is some indication — as examination of the following table will reveal — that the lesser educated, less well-off, and small town people feel certain groups profit by ECA rather than the country as a whole. Also of interest is that no more men than women say all Germans benefit, though more men than women claim only certain groups gain.

R E S T R I C T E D

"Are you of the opinion that all Germans or only certain groups of the population benefit by the Marshall Plan aid?"

	All Germans	Certain Groups	No opinion	
US Zone Laender:				
Bavaria	64%	25%	11%	...100%
Hesse	67	29	14	
W-Baden	65	27	8	
Berlin	75	23	2	
Bremen	78	14	8	
US Zone Population Groups:				
Sex:				
Men	65%	27%	8%	
Women	64	21	15	
Education:				
8 years or less	62%	25%	13%	
9 years and more	74	22	4	
Income (per month):				
0 - 149 DM	57%	28%	15%	
150 - 299 DM	66	24	10	
300 DM and more	70	23	7	
City Size:				
Under 2,000 population	62%	24%	14%	
2,000 - 24,999	62	27	11	
25,000 and over	71	21	8	
Age:				
15 - 24 years	70%	22%	8%	
25 - 59 years	65	25	10	
60 years and over	61	22	17	
Party Preference:				
SPD	75%	20%	5%	
CDU/CSU	66	21	13	
FDP/LDP/EDV	79	17	4	
None of them	57	30	13	
Origin:				
Native	64%	25%	11%	
Refugees	67	22	11	

AID IS REAL CONTRIBUTION TO RECONSTRUCTION ,...

More than seven in ten US Zone residents who know of the European Recovery Program believe it has been a real contribution to German reconstruction.

"Do you believe that the Marshall Plan has actually stimulated the reconstruction of West Germany or in your opinion has it only brought on a temporary illusion (of recovery) in Germany?"

	<u>US ZONE</u>
Actually stimulated	73%
Temporary illusion	11
No opinion	16
	<u>100%</u>

West Berliners are more likely (91%) than respondents in other places to give the Marshall Plan credit for stimulating West German reconstruction, but in all areas large majorities hold this opinion.

Attitudes of the various population groups follow much the same pattern as in the other aspects of the Marshall Plan as it applies to West Germany - that is the men, the better educated higher income, and urban groups tending more frequently than their counterparts to hold a favorable view.

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"Do you believe that the Marshall Plan has actually stimulated the reconstruction of West Germany or in your opinion, has it only brought on a temporary illusion (of recovery) in Germany?"

	Actually stimulated	Temporary illusion	No opinion	
US Zone Laender:				
Bavaria	73%	11%	16%	... 100%
Hesse	69	12	19	
W. Baden	77	10	13	
Berlin	91	6	3	
Bremen	78	8	14	
US Zone Population Groups:				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	77%	13%	10%	
Women	67	9	24	
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	72%	11%	17%	
9 years and more	77	13	10	
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	69%	9%	22%	
150 - 299 DM	74	12	14	
300 DM and more	75	13	12	
<u>City Size:</u>				
Under 2,000 population	72%	10%	18%	
2,000 - 24,999	70	12	18	
25,000 and over	75	12	13	
<u>Age:</u>				
15 - 24 years	71%	11%	18%	
25 - 59 years	72	12	16	
60 years and over	76	7	17	
<u>Party Preference:</u>				
SPD	80%	10%	10%	
CDU/CSU	77	6	17	
FDP/LDP/BDV	81	7	12	
None of them	66	17	17	
<u>Origin:</u>				
Native	72%	11%	17%	
Refugee	75	11	14	

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R E S T R I C T E D

The arguments of the very few who claim that the Marshall Plan has brought about only a sham, not a real, economic recovery are listed in order of frequency of mention. (The number of cases are too few to warrant percentaging.)

1. Unnatural stimulation of German economy; retrogression with cessation of Marshall Plan aid: Artificial restoration of the economy which can't go on the long run; economic standards will go down and unemployment will increase; because the West German economy will not be able to keep up its momentary standard when the Marshall Plan ends; if the aid stops everything will retrogress here; because it is only a temporary aid; if foreign aid ceases everything will become worse again; etc.
2. Indebtedness: Because we shall have to pay it back; it costs too much in the long run; we shall be indebted to America too much; etc.
3. Americans only following own interests; economic and political aims: Sugar-coating for dismantling; to win the population for the Americans; we are being taken advantage of and afterwards we shall be just as poor as before; it is the general opinion that the Americans only want to attain certain political aims and will drop us afterwards; etc.
4. Wrong use of Marshall Plan loans: Because it is not being used for real support of the economy; because money probably flows only into heavy industry, who hoard and profiteer; the money of the Marshall Plan is spent in the wrong places; etc.
5. Marshall Plan aid insufficient: With all the problems we have to solve, the aid is only a drop in the bucket; we can't yet stand on our own feet; I can't imagine that we really have recovered the way it seems; etc.
6. Miscellaneous: Everything is already becoming more expensive; after all is said we shall have to help ourselves alone, they don't really like us that well, etc.

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APPENDIX

The analysis in the foregoing report is based only on replies of those persons who claimed they had heard or read about the Marshall Plan. However, everyone, including the unaware, was asked the series of questions following an explanatory statement to this effect: "Europe including West Germany is aided by America with money and food, and especially so in connection with what is called the Marshall Plan or ERP." The following tables give total replies of all respondents.

"Do you believe that the West German people are sufficiently informed about the Marshall Plan, or should they have more information - or are you of the opinion that the Marshall Plan has been discussed too much already?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Sufficiently informed	19%	26%	26%	22%	30%	28%
Should have more information	45	38	44	43	44	42
Already discussed too much	3	3	3	3	2	5
No opinion	33	33	27	32	24	25
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

"Does it sometimes happen that the Marshall Plan is mentioned in conversations with your friends and acquaintances?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Yes, is mentioned	25%	42%	31%	31%	42%	43%
No, is not mentioned	71	52	66	65	57	55
No opinion	4	6	3	4	1	2
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

"Can you please tell me for how long a time the Marshall Plan is supposed to last?"*

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Right (1952)	26%	43%	27%	30%	30%	44%
Wrong	12	14	12	12	9	18
No opinion	62	43	61	58	61	38
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

* Respondents who gave wrong answers or had no opinion to above question were given the following information:
America plans to continue Marshall Plan aid until 1952.

"Should the Marshall Plan last longer than 1952 or not?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Should last longer	44%	44%	50%	46%	65%	55%
Should not last longer	17	15	12	15	19	18
No opinion	39	41	38	39	16	27
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

"Can you tell me please whether the goods and the money delivered to West Germany through the Marshall Plan are a gift from America, a loan, or something else?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Gift	8%	4%	10%	8%	12%	7%
Loan	53	58	52	54	73	67
Something else	9	7	8	8	5	5
No opinion	<u>30</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>21</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

"Are you of the opinion that all Germans or only certain groups of the population benefit by the Marshall Plan aid?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
For the benefit of all Germans	56%	58%	57%	57%	74%	76%
Certain groups benefit most	22	17	24	21	22	14
No opinion	<u>22</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>10</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

"Do you believe that the Marshall Plan has actually stimulated reconstruction of West Germany or in your opinion has it only brought on a temporary illusion (of recovery) in Germany?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Actually stimulated	64%	59%	67%	63%	89%	76%
Temporary illusion	9	10	9	10	7	8
No opinion	<u>27</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>16</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

GERMAN YOUTH VIEW THE AMERICAN PROGRAM

II. American Reorientation Efforts

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R E S T R I C T E D

OFFICE OF THE U S HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR GERMANY

OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF

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INTRODUCTION

In line with a sharpened American interest in the problems of the younger generations in Germany the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs, conducted during July 1950 an extensive survey of the attitudes of German youth toward various features of the American program. The present study is the second in a series of reports on the findings.

For these studies the usual random representative sample of Germans of all ages in the US occupied areas was supplemented with a special augmented sample of German youth (defined as from 15 to 25 years of age.) In toto the sampling included approximately 1,750 youths in the US Zone and 1,250 adults, 275 youths in Berlin and 225 adults, and 200 youths in Bremen with 175 adults. The purpose of the adult cases on the same issue was to provide the opportunity for youth-adult comparisons where such were desirable.

As usual the interviews were obtained from randomly selected respondents by a trained German staff under the general supervision of American survey officers. Detailed description of the sampling methods employed is available upon request. The analysis and interpretation of the data has been performed by the professional survey staff of the Office of Public Affairs.

Attitudes toward the reorientation program of a representative sample of Germans in US occupied areas have been earlier studied in January 1950.* Trend comparisons are not pursued in the present study as they would unnecessarily complicate the presentation, which has as its objective the comparative attitudes of German youths versus German adults, and the comparative attitudes of various strata of German youth.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS

ARE AMERICAN DEMOCRATIZATION EFFORTS WELCOMED?

- ... Though the preponderant sentiment in the US occupied areas is to welcome American efforts to familiarize the Germans with democratic ideas, it is clear that German youth welcome such efforts less than do German adults. Less than a majority of German youth in the US Zone look favorably upon American democratization efforts, and among teen-agers the proportion who approve is not reliably greater than the proportion who feel that any such efforts should be left up to the Germans themselves.
- ... Whatever lack of favor there is of American democratization efforts, it is least among the more critical and informed elements of US Zone youth.
- ... The comments of those who do not welcome American democratization efforts suggest that as many question the end as question the means. Questioning the end, however, may in many cases indicate no more than an objection to having the form of government fixed in advance and by non-Germans. Such objections do not preclude these respondents from desiring or accepting some sort of democracy developed by Germans themselves.

*Germans View the U.S. Reorientation Program - I. Extent of Receptivity to American Ideas, Report No. 10, Series No. 2, 30 March 1950. - II. Reactions to American Democratization Efforts, Report No. 11, Series No. 2, 30 March 1950.

HAVE DEMOCRATIZATION EFFORTS HAD MUCH SUCCESS TO DATE?

- ... Only one out of four among US Zone youth - one out of three among adults - believe that American efforts to familiarize the Germans with democratic ideas have achieved any great success up to now. Berliners - both youth and adults - take a somewhat more favorable view, but still less than reliable majorities see much success in past democratization efforts.
- ... The clearest trend disclosed by US Zone youth breakdowns is the association of negative views with education. Among youths with 12 years or more education 84 per cent see little or no success to date in American democratization efforts.
- ... Quite a variety of explanations are advanced by the respondents who feel that American democratization efforts have achieved little or no success to date. Though some stress alleged American faults as the major explanation, a larger proportion focus upon German deficiencies, German traditions or adverse economic conditions as the primary explanation for the lack of success in democratization.
- ... Respondents who are inclined to see much success in American democratization efforts to date stress as explanations the restoration of civil liberties, the aid and example of Americans, and the lesson of the past.

HAVE YOUTH OR OLDER PEOPLE BEEN MORE RECEPTIVE TO DEMOCRATIZATION?

- ... Among respondents who feel that American efforts to democratize the Germans have had some success, however little, the preponderance of opinion both among youth and adults is that success has been relatively greater among German youth than among their elders. In Berlin particularly, and also in the US Zone, youths are more inclined to express such a judgment than are older people.
- ... The higher educational and income levels among US Zone youth - and urban dwellers also - evince a considerably greater inclination than do their counterpart groups to judge that young people rather than older have been more receptive to the American democratization efforts.
- ... The dominating arguments advanced by those who feel that American democratization efforts have had more success with younger people is that youth is inherently more receptive to new ideas, more capable of enthusiasm and less bound by conservatism.
- ... Respondents who contend that the older Germans have been the more receptive to American democratization efforts either in the main tend to argue that the elders have experienced democracy before the Nazi period and hence could better appreciate the faults of Nazism, or to argue more generally in terms of the asserted greater judiciousness, maturity, and experience of the adults.

IN WHAT FIELDS CAN GERMANS LEARN FROM AMERICANS?

- ... The field in which the smallest proportion of US Zone respondents feel that Germans have anything to gain from American teachings is that of social welfare. Only one out of five US Zone adults - one out of four among the youth - indicate the belief that Germans have much or something to learn from Americans in this area.

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- ... Such results rather strongly suggest a very low regard among Germans for American social welfare practices. If such a state of mind is as prevalent as it seems to be, Germans are more than mildly vulnerable to Communist propaganda themes which are already being widely promulgated to the effect that America is a land where the rich are very rich and the poor are very poor and Wall Street capitalists wouldn't buy their fellow citizens a crust of bread.
- ... Certainly the findings suggest the desirability of some concerted efforts on the part of American informational and reorientational agencies to develop among the Germans a more favorable view of America's efforts to provide for the care of its less fortunate citizens.
- ... US Zone youth breakdowns underscore the need for such a campaign in their indication that the opinion leading elements - the men, the higher educated, the high income and the urban dwelling - manifest no more favorable a conception of American social welfare practices than do their counterpart groups.
- ... In the field of fine arts - just as in the field of social welfare - West Germans hold American achievements in very low regard. Only 28 per cent among US Zone youth - 23 per cent among adults - indicate that the Germans have much or something to learn from Americans in this area. In all regions surveyed the preponderant opinion is that Germans have "nothing" to learn from Americans in cultural pursuits as art, music, and literature.
- ... The predominately negative attitude of both West German youth and adults to American cultural achievements presents another vulnerable point that anti-American groups both of the right and of the left can exploit to undermine the effectiveness of American reorientation efforts in Germany. Communists have been busily capitalizing upon the situation with their reiterated propaganda to the effect that American cultural life is low and degenerate. It goes without saying that whatever American efforts can be made to improve German conceptions and appreciation of American artistic capabilities and achievements should be pursued with vigor.
- ... Not a little difficulty in such reorientation efforts will arise from the fact that it is the more educated and informed elements in the US Zone youth population who more widely feel that Germans have nothing to learn from Americans in artistic pursuits.
- ... Though held in not quite so low a regard as social welfare and fine arts, but still third from the bottom of ten fields given to the respondents to evaluate, was the field of education. Only one out of three US Zone youths - even fewer adults - indicated that they felt that Germans had much or something to learn from Americans in the educational area.
- ... These results taken all together cannot be looked upon as heartening. It is evident that despite a long continued American interest in educational reform only a comparatively small minority are willing to express the judgment that Germans have even "something" to learn from Americans in educational matters. Only a moderate proportion, it is true, outrightly state that Germans have "nothing" to learn, but it would be a mistake to overlook the negative factors in the extensive expression of "no opinion." At best this means that the American theses on educational reform have quite failed to get over to a large proportion of the West German population. But more probably these expressions of "no opinion" are unfavorable reactions rather than neutral, for even in the absence of specific information it would certainly be the easiest and most reasonable course to say that the Germans have something to learn since indeed who has not "something" to learn from practically anybody.

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- ... The trend in US Zone youth breakdowns are in a favorable direction with larger proportions of the better educated, the economically better situated, and the urban dwelling, indicating that Germans have much or something to learn from Americans in the field of education.
- ... When those who stated that Germans had something to learn from Americans in education were asked - what might the Germans learn - their replies indicated that among this group at least there is a varied appreciation of a number of features of the US educational system that Americans have been endeavoring to introduce into German educational practices.
- ... Feeling among West Germans that America has something to teach is not so low in politics as it has been for social welfare and fine arts particularly, and for education. But certainly receptivity to American political ideas cannot be considered widespread when definitely less than a majority in the US Zone - both among youth and among adults - feel that Germans have much or something to learn from Americans in the field. In Berlin, the results clearly show, responsiveness to American political teachings is very considerably greater with almost half of both youth and adults holding that Germans have "much" to learn from the Americans.
- ... The encouraging trend emerges from US Zone youth breakdowns that the more critical and informed levels of the population - the men, the better educated, the better off, and the urban dwelling - are considerably more inclined than are their counterparts to believe that Germans have much or something to learn from Americans in the political area.
- ... In regard to remaining fields it may be pointed out in a general way that industry and technology scores particularly high with two out of three or more youth and adults in all the regions surveyed saying that Germans have much or something to learn from Americans in this area. Agriculture scores just about as high in the US Zone, though as might be expected, receptivity in such an area is somewhat lower in urban centers like Berlin and Bremen. Science and radio come next with a fair amount of support and then press and sports with appreciably less.

R E S T R I C T E D

ARE AMERICAN DEMOCRATIZATION EFFORTS WELCOMED?

GENERAL COMPARISONS ...

Though the preponderant sentiment in the US occupied areas is to welcome American efforts to familiarize the Germans with democratic ideas, it is clear that German youth welcome such efforts less than do German adults. Less than a majority of German youth in the US Zone look favorably upon American democratization efforts, and among teen-agers the proportion who approve is not reliably greater than the proportion who feel that any such efforts should be left up to the Germans themselves.

"Do you welcome the Americans trying to familiarize the Germans with democratic ideas or should that be left up to us Germans ourselves?"

	Bavaria		Hesse		W. Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y*	A*	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
Welcome it	44%	55%	47%	55%	54%	59%	47%	56%	67%	77%	52%	63%
Should be left up to us Germans	37	26	32	29	32	26	35	27	30	21	29	23
No opinion	$\frac{19}{100\%}$	$\frac{19}{100\%}$	$\frac{21}{100\%}$	$\frac{16}{100\%}$	$\frac{14}{100\%}$	$\frac{15}{100\%}$	$\frac{18}{100\%}$	$\frac{17}{100\%}$	$\frac{3}{100\%}$	$\frac{2}{100\%}$	$\frac{19}{100\%}$	$\frac{14}{100\%}$

	US ZONE		
	15-19	20-25	over 25
Welcome it	42%	51%	56%
Should be left up to us Germans	36	34	27
No opinion	$\frac{22}{100\%}$	$\frac{15}{100\%}$	$\frac{17}{100\%}$

The above findings are certainly more favorable than unfavorable to the American mission in Germany. But they do indicate that if German youth is a primary target of American democratization efforts, certain resistances must be anticipated.

* "Y" and "A" in these tables denote youth (15-25) and adults (over 25) respectively.

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GROUP DIFFERENCES AMONG YOUTH ...

Whatever lack of favor there is of American democratization efforts, it is least among the more critical and informed elements of US Zone youth. This fact is clearly revealed in the breakdowns below which show that somewhat more of the men, and considerably more of the higher educated, the economically better situated and the urban dwelling welcome American efforts to bring democracy to the Germans.

"Do you welcome the Americans trying to familiarize the Germans with democratic ideas or should that be left up to us Germans ourselves?"

	Welcome it	Should be left up to us Germans ourselves	No opinion	Number of cases
US ZONE YOUTH (15-25)				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	50%	36%	14%...100%	776
Women	44	34	22	964
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	44%	35%	21%	1421
9 - 11 years	57	36	7	253
12 years and more	80	18	2	50
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 99.99 DM	34%	35%	31%	180
100 - 249.99 DM	44	35	21	722
250 - 399.99 DM	52	36	12	447
400 DM and more	62	32	6	268
<u>City Size:</u>				
Under 1,000 pop.	35%	37%	28%	392
1,000 - 1,999	40	35	25	295
2,000 - 4,999	47	36	17	267
5,000 - 9,999	53	32	15	171
10,000 - 24,999	59	36	5	117
25,000 - 99,999	54	37	9	182
100,000 - 249,999	50	37	13	116
250,000 and over	62	26	12	202
<u>Employment Status:</u>				
Employed or apprenticed	47%	35%	18%	1426
Unemployed	47	34	19	137
Not employed (Students, dependents)	37	38	25%	63
Housewives	58	27	15	116
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	44%	36%	20%	966
Protestants	50	34	16	747
All others	71	18	11	28
<u>Origin:</u>				
Natives	48%	34%	18%	1416
Refugees	45	38	17	326

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REASONS FOR NOT WELCOMING AMERICAN EFFORTS ...

It is very important to ascertain if those who favor leaving democratization up to the Germans are only questioning the desirability of Americans, as Americans, working at democratization among the Germans, or whether they are questioning the desirability of democratization itself. The latter of course would have to be considered a much more serious state of affairs. It appears from the comments below that among those who do not welcome American democratization efforts, at least as many question the end as question the means. Questioning the end, it should be noted however, may in many cases indicate no more than an objection to having the form of government fixed in advance and by non-Germans. Such objections do not preclude these respondents from desiring or accepting some sort of democracy developed by the Germans themselves.

"Do you welcome the Americans trying to familiarize the Germans with democratic ideas or should that be left up to us Germans ourselves?"

If "Should be left up to us Germans ourselves": "Why should it be left up to us?"

US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Y A	Y A	Y A

Germany should be granted own decision about form of government, policy, and educational affairs: Every people wants to choose its form of government by itself and not that of another people; the Americans themselves have said that no state should interfere in the affairs of other states; because the Americans want to be their own masters in their country too; we don't want to be influenced, we have our pride too; other peoples should realize that we don't want to be guided all the time, five years of reeducation ought to be enough; it was good to do so in the beginning, but I think that America interferes too much in German affairs and that isn't good; many Germans don't like the dependence on America in this regard; we should have a say too and not always be held in tutelage; we have been an independent people for centuries and what is forced upon one from abroad can't keep its validity for a longer time anyhow; I fear foreign influences; Germans should form their own policy, our former enemies must not do that; these are German affairs; etc.

10% 7% 9% 7% 4% 4%

We Germans can do that equally well or even better (general answers): We could do it better; the German people have become mature enough to do it themselves through their experiences; we are alone capable of building up a democracy; we are intelligent enough ourselves; the Germans are equally fit for that; we shall do by ourselves what is within human power; I don't know whether the Americans are able to do so; the Germans can do that themselves for sure; people dislike being talked into something—we know as much as the Americans do; because we should feel more satisfied if we were allowed to do it ourselves; etc.

7 7 6 4 8 7

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US ZONE

Berlin
Y ABremen
Y A

Americans understand too little about Germany; Y A
Germans know better how to deal with their compatriots
and what is most suitable for them; Germans are
 more fit to judge what is suitable for us;
 because Germans know better how to deal with
 Germans; the Americans can't understand our
 people and should leave us alone therefore; the
 Germans know their compatriots much better; the
 German politicians know the German people best;
 every people should educate its own population;
 etc.

4% 3% 2% 2% 1% 2%

Conditions, attitudes, mentality and men are quite
different in America; their kind of democracy not
possible here; The Americans have entirely different
attitudes in different respects than we have; every
nation has her national pride and a different way
of life; the German conditions produce entirely
different attitudes; the Germans have their own
manners and opinions; I think that our way of life
is quite different from the American one, we need
different forms; German is German, the American
mentality doesn't suit us; we are an entirely
different breed of men; etc.

3 4 4 4 6 7

The Germans must find the path to democracy by themselves,
forcing it upon them would be a psychological mistake;
That must grow out of their own garden and should not
come from the outside; democracy can't be inculcated
but must grow out of the people; the German can and must
find the path to democracy by himself; democracy thrives
best if not forced in its development; the Germans must
learn and work for democracy by themselves and shouldn't
always listen to others' commands; Germans would rather
accept something that a good German democrat tells
them than what the occupation authorities say, and
would really adopt it then; a real absorption might
be achieved rather by inner conversion to democracy
growing in ourselves; etc.

3 2 5 2 2 1

We have only a pseudo-democracy of a dictatorial
character here; coercion by the Americans: The
Americans bring democracy in a dictatorial form, that
is not good; we live in a democracy that ought not
to permit any foreign control; the Americans exert a
certain coercion after all; because the Americans
don't practice what they preach anyway; they build
up a kind of democracy as they want it; etc.

1 1 1 1 1 1

American interference disturbs concord and cooperation
with one another; American interference causes only
quarrelling; the Americans foster the many parties
and cause discord by doing so; cooperation would be
better than; concord might be brought about more
easily here; etc.

1 * 1 * - -

Other opinions: We want to have a peace-treaty first;
the Germans shall do something by themselves or
their defense morale will be paralyzed; the Germans
are more democratic than the Americans as our
social welfare system shows; many cooks spoil the
broth; our democracy as we had in 1918-1933 wasn't
bad either; etc.

1 1 - 1 1 -

No opinion / No answer:

5 2 2 3 1
35% 27% 30% 21% 29% 23%

*Less than one half of one per cent.

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R E S T R I C T E D

HAVE DEMOCRATIZATION EFFORTS HAD MUCH SUCCESS TO DATE?

GENERAL COMPARISONS ...

Only one out of four among US Zone youth - one out of three among adults - believe that American efforts to familiarize the Germans with democratic ideas have achieved any great success up to now. Berliners, - both youth and adults - take a somewhat more favorable view, but still less than reliable majorities see much success in past democratization efforts.

"Do you believe that American efforts to familiarize the Germans with democratic ideas have had much, little or no success up to now?"

	Bavaria		Hesse		W. Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
Much success	24%	35%	20%	28%	26%	34%	24%	33%	53%	57%	27%	34%
Little success	39	29	30	34	48	38	39	32	35	32	30	33
No success	7	8	6	9	4	4	6	7	1	4	4	8
No opinion	<u>30</u> 100%	<u>28</u> 100%	<u>44</u> 100%	<u>29</u> 100%	<u>22</u> 100%	<u>24</u> 100%	<u>31</u> 100%	<u>28</u> 100%	<u>11</u> 100%	<u>7</u> 100%	<u>39</u> 100%	<u>25</u> 100%

	US ZONE		
	15-19	20-25	over 25
Much success	23%	25%	33%
Little success	33	44	32
No success	6	6	7
No opinion	<u>38</u> 100%	<u>25</u> 100%	<u>28</u> 100%

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GROUP DIFFERENCES AMONG YOUTH ...

The clearest trend disclosed by US Zone youth breakdowns is the association of negative views with education. Among youths with 12 years or more education 84 per cent see little or no success to date in American democratization efforts. There are similar tendencies, though not quite so strong, for the high income youth and the urban dwelling to express pessimism as to the degree of success achieved by the democratization program up to now.

"Do you believe that American efforts to familiarize the Germans with democratic ideas have had much, little or no success up to now?"

	Much success	Little or no success	No opinion
US ZONE YOUTH			
(15-25)			
<u>Sex:</u>			
Men	28%	48%	24% ... 100%
Women	20	42	38
<u>Education:</u>			
8 years or less	24%	40%	36%
9 - 11 years	23	63	14
12 years and more	14	84	2
<u>Income (per month):</u>			
0 - 99.99 DM	16%	42%	42%
100 - 249.99 DM	24	41	35
250 - 399.99 DM	29	44	27
400 DM and more	24	59	17
<u>City Size:</u>			
Under 1,000 population	19%	36%	45%
1,000 - 1,999	19	39	42
2,000 - 4,999	29	43	28
5,000 - 9,999	29	40	31
10,000 - 24,999	27	46	27
25,000 - 99,999	27	53	20
100,000 - 249,999	17	66	17
250,000 and over	27	52	21
<u>Employment Status:</u>			
Employed or apprenticed	23%	45%	32%
Unemployed	30	42	28
Not employed (Students, dependents)	21	44	35
Housewives	28	44	28
<u>Religion:</u>			
Catholics	24%	45%	31%
Protestants	23	44	33
All others	21	57	22
<u>Origin:</u>			
Natives	24%	44%	32%
Refugees	25	47	28

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WHY LITTLE OR NO SUCCESS? ...

It will be observed below that quite a variety of explanations are advanced by the respondents who feel that American democratization efforts have achieved little or no success to date. In studying the reasons it will be noted that though some stress alleged American faults as the major explanation, a larger proportion focus upon German deficiencies, German traditions or adverse economic conditions as the primary explanation for the lack of success in democratization.

"Do you believe that American efforts to familiarize the Germans with democratic ideas have had much, little or no success up to now?"
If "Little success" or "No success": "Why do you think so?"

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
<u>The conduct and the measures of the occupation authorities (especially of the Americans) hinder the establishment of democracy here: Because the Americans have made many blunders (dismantling); they have given too little freedom to the German government; the theory of the Americans is not identical with their practices; the Americans have proven to be bad democrats by sponsoring denazification; America has promised too much and hasn't kept any promises; requisitioning of houses is undemocratic and has unfavorable effects; one hears that the Americans don't behave so well; they are only talking all the time about it, but they are not democratic themselves, either; because we are no democracy but a colony; because the Americans claim privileges for themselves; etc.</u>	114	118	5%	4%	4%	9%
<u>The Germans are hard to influence and to reeducate (too distrustful, don't adopt others' teachings):</u> The Germans may not be influenced, especially not the older people; people are not interested in that; we Germans may not be talked into something; most people don't care for that; we are too apathetic; the Germans don't preoccupy themselves very much with politics; many people don't believe in what the Americans tell them; Germans are distrustful; the Germans don't want to learn anything; the Germans don't listen to that; we don't want to learn something about that; etc.	9	8	5	7	9	2
<u>General negative answers (Don't do enough, not enough success as yet):</u> Their efforts are not intense enough; too little success as yet; too little is done about it; one doesn't see any major aid; there is not much evidence of it, especially not with authorities; things don't work so fast; one doesn't see any progress; they are only seeking to make profits; etc.	6	5	3	2	2	2

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	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
<u>The traditions of our people makes democratization difficult (other ways of thinking, other conceptions and mentality, no aptitude):</u> The past is too deep-rooted in us; one was accustomed to other things and ought to grow into that from childhood on; the democratic way of thinking is lacking in many; the German is accustomed to being commanded; the German people have the Prussian military drill right down to their bones; the German is not accustomed to freedom; the Germans are not fit for democracy; fundamental conditions are quite different here; the German mentality needs more time for such a thing; the Germans so far have always been used to dictatorship; that cannot be realized so easily because we are not used to that; they are not able to teach us what we as Germans understand by democracy; etc.						
	5%	4%	7%	9%	8%	11%
<u>Distressed economic conditions (unemployment hinders expansion of democracy:</u> People are too much occupied with their cares and worries relating to their bodily needs; as economic conditions are so distressed, nobody is enthusiastic about it; many people are discontented because they are unemployed and therefore they turn their backs on democracy; the social misery disturbs the development of democracy; people are not well off economically, and therefore this propaganda has no influence; etc.						
	2	3	1	1	1	2
<u>Nazi attitudes (militaristic attitudes) hinder democratization:</u> Most Germans are still too fanatically patriotic; those who favored Hitler in former times are still malicious; too many people in essential positions still cling to the Hitler regime in their minds; most Germans are still too much trapped by conceptions of the Hitler regime; etc.						
	2	2	2	1	1	1
<u>Disunity and quarrelling are still too great:</u> The Germans are too much split up in parties; the Germans are still quarrelling too much; the splitting up of Germany is too much an obstacle; etc.						
	1	1	3	1	1	2
<u>The influence of Communism is still too great:</u> There are still too many Communists; Communist influences are still too strong; etc.						
	1	-	-	1	-	1
<u>General ambiguous answers:</u> We have already made some progress in all fields; people have already become somewhat more democratic; we attach now more value to democratic principles; much has become better; on behalf of the freedom we enjoy many people have been won over to democracy; the Americans have had some success by these efforts; up to now nothing has gotten worse; we are all fed up with dictatorship; etc.						
	2	3	5	6	4	6
<u>Other opinions:</u> No peace-treaty with Germany has been concluded as yet; they stabbed the wrong beast in 1945; etc.						
	1	1	2	1	-	-
<u>No opinion / No answer:</u>						
	6	2	3	5	4	6
	46%**	40%**	36%	38%**	34%	42%**

* Less than one half of one per cent.

** Some respondents gave more than one answer.

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WHY MUCH SUCCESS? ...

Respondents who are inclined to see much success in American democratization efforts to date stress as explanations the restoration of civil liberties, the aid and example of Americans, and the lesson of the past,

"Do you believe that American efforts to familiarize the Germans with democratic ideas have had much, little or no success up to now?"

If "Much success": "Why do you think so?"

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
The fundamentals of democracy are restored (freedom of speech, free elections, democratic government): Our form of living has changed from a dictatorial one into a freedom-minded democracy; the entire governmental system is built up in a democratic way; there are human rights for us too now; the election results show it as the democratic parties are much stronger than the others are; one can express one's opinion freely now; one can say what one thinks now and vote freely; we have got freedom of speech and opinion; it is entirely different from the Nazi regime, now one dares again to express one's opinion freely; one is no more as much afraid as in former times, we have become freer; the freedom of individuals is a reality after all; etc.	6%	7%	16%	7%	6%	4%
The aid and the example of the Americans exert a great influence: We have been aided in the development of our democracy; they have helped the Germans, through food etc.; the various parties have adopted much from the Americans in regard to their views; the Americans have favored our cause and helped us very often; they put forth all possible efforts; people know that we would be bad off now if we hadn't had the Americans; the Americans have induced the Germans to more thorough thinking and to cooperation; their efforts in our behalf is considered a good example of their democratic attitude; the Americans have carried it out in an unobtrusive manner and without coercion; we already tackle many things the way they do it in America; etc.	5	8	8	18	7	10
The Germans have become more democratic (past taught them a lesson): People don't want to be Nazis any longer; the Germans are no longer so nationalistically minded, they are more considerate of the whole of humanity; a great percentage of people learned a lesson under the Nazi regime; etc.	4	6	15	13	1	11

(cont'd on next page)

R E S T R I C T E D

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
<u>General favorable answers:</u> People realize that democracy is the right thing for us; we want democracy; we are all rightist-minded and no adherents of a "people's democracy"; a democracy is better than a dictatorship; a sensible thinking man must realize that democracy is the right form of living; most people are sensible and acknowledge the general progress; much has improved with us here, it is evident in all fields; quite a different spirit has come upon men, in our factory also there is a much better companionship today; etc.						
	3%	6%	2%	7%	5%	5%
<u>The Communist danger has furthered democratization (Contrast between East-West):</u> The common aim, defense against Communism has converted people to democracy; Communism threatens us too much; we see the striking contrasts between East and West; everybody knows today what democracy gives us in comparison with the East; we prefer democracy to Communism; the Russian system which is similar to the Nazi system is generally despised; etc.						
	2	2	6	6	3	3
<u>Improvement of the general economic conditions and of the standard of living prove it:</u> It is evident in the general reconstruction and its good effects; the economic situation has improved; I know people who have become sensible of their value because of the improved economic conditions; people see that there is much progress; etc.						
	*	1	-	1	1	*
<u>Youth is strongly influenced by these efforts:</u> Quite naturally there is progress in this respect; youth is now being educated correspondingly; today's youths are imitating all that, they are enthusiastic about the American manners; etc.						
	*	*	1	-	1	2
<u>Other opinions:</u> Denazification has made much progress; one scarcely hears anybody inveigh against the Americans; after the war the Germans might not have built democracy alone; the results show it; etc.						
	-	1	1	1	1	-
<u>No opinion:</u>						
	$\frac{4}{24\%}$	$\frac{2}{33\%}$	$\frac{4}{53\%}$	$\frac{4}{57\%}$	$\frac{2}{27\%}$	$\frac{-}{35\%**}$

* Less than one half of one per cent.

** Some respondents gave more than one answer.

RESTRICTED

HAVE YOUTH OR OLDER PEOPLE BEEN MORE RECEPTIVE TO DEMOCRATIZATION?

GENERAL COMPARISONS ...

Among respondents who feel that American efforts to democratize the Germans have had some success, however little, the preponderance of opinion both among youth and adults is that success has been relatively greater among German youth than among their elders. In Berlin particularly, and also in the US Zone, youths are more inclined to express such a judgment than are older people.

"And among whom, do you think, have the Americans had more success in their efforts to familiarize the Germans with democratic ideas, - among the young people up to 25 years or the older people?"
(Asked of those who answered "Much" or "Little success" to previous question.)

	Bavaria		Hesse		W. Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
Among young people	41%	31%	24%	22%	44%	32%	38%	29%	61%	37%	32%	31%
Among older people	12	19	11	16	20	22	14	19	15	32	11	14
qualified replies	4	8	5	9	6	9	5	9	6	14	3	9
No opinion	<u>6</u> 63%	<u>6</u> 64%	<u>10</u> 50%	<u>15</u> 62%	<u>4</u> 74%	<u>9</u> 72%	<u>6</u> 63%	<u>8</u> 65%	<u>6</u> 88%	<u>6</u> 89%	<u>11</u> 57%	<u>13</u> 67%

	US ZONE		
	15-19	20-25	over 25
Among young people	35%	40%	29%
Among older people	12	15	19
qualified replies	3	6	9
No opinion	<u>6</u> 56%	<u>7</u> 68%	<u>8</u> 65%

GROUP DIFFERENCES AMONG YOUTH ...

The higher educational and income levels among US Zone youth - and urban dwellers also - evince a considerably greater inclination than do their counterpart groups to judge that young people rather than older have been more receptive to the American democratization program.

"And among whom, do you think, have the Americans had more success in their efforts to familiarize the Germans with democratic ideas, - among young people up to 25 years or among older people?" (Asked of those who answered "Much" or "Little success" to previous question.)

	US ZONE YOUTH (15-25)	Among young people	Among older people	Qualified replies	No opinion	
<u>Sex:</u>						
Men		39%	18%	5%	7%	69%
Women		36	10	5	6	57
<u>Education:</u>						
8 years or less		33%	13%	5%	7%	58%
9 - 11 years		52	16	5	7	80
12 years and more		64	18	6	4	92
<u>Income (per month):</u>						
0 - 99.99 DM		33%	11%	3%	5%	52%
100 - 249.99 DM		37	13	4	6	60
250 - 399.99 DM		36	18	6	7	67
400 DM and more		49	13	7	7	76
<u>City Size:</u>						
Under 1,000 population		31%	10%	3%	6%	50%
1,000 - 1,999		27	14	5	7	53
2,000 - 4,999		38	16	6	7	67
5,000 - 9,999		37	14	4	7	62
10,000 - 24,999		40	19	8	2	69
25,000 - 99,999		47	13	6	6	72
100,000 - 249,999		48	12	4	9	73
250,000 and over		48	14	5	8	75
<u>Employment Status:</u>						
Employed or apprenticed		37%	14%	4%	7%	62%
Unemployed		34	21	4	7	66
Not employed (Students, dependents)		35	8	9	3	55
Housewives		48	6	6	5	65
<u>Religion:</u>						
Catholics		39%	11%	5%	6%	61%
Protestants		35	16	5	7	63
All others		50	3	3	11	67
<u>Origin:</u>						
Natives		38%	12%	5%	6%	61%
Refugees		36	19	4	8	67

R E S T R I C T E D

REASONS FOR SAYING YOUNG MORE RECEPTIVE ...

The dominating arguments advanced by those who feel that American democratization efforts have had more success with younger people is that youth is inherently more receptive to new ideas, more capable of enthusiasm and less bound by conservatism.

"And among whom, do you think, have the Americans had more success in their efforts to familiarize the Germans with democratic ideas, - among young people up to 25 years or among older people?"

If "Among younger people": "Why do you think so?"

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
<u>Youth more receptive to new ideas and more capable of enthusiasm, whereas older people are too conservative to be receptive: They are more receptive to new ideas; youth are more easily persuaded; they are more capable of enthusiasm for a good cause; youths think along more progressive lines; youth are more docile; a young man may more easily be reeducated than an older man; the soil of youth is fertile for anything new; older people are mentally too inert; the old folks are fed up with things like that; old people are too apathetic; the old have already turned apathetic and don't care for politics; are more interested in how their future looks; etc.</u>	26%	22%	50%	31%	24%	22%
<u>Youths are inexperienced and don't know anything other than democracy: Youths are inexperienced; they are still ideological vacuums; they don't know anything else; it is something new, they lack opportunities to compare; etc.</u>	3	3	4	3	3	7
<u>The Americans take more care of youth; youth has more contact with Americans than older people: Youths are educated in the American way now; the youngsters get along better with the Americans; by GYA activities; they have made themselves popular by their food relief program for school children and their assistance in sport activities; the Americans have done much for youth; they have more lures for the youths; because many girls made friends with American soldiers; many Americans have married Germans; correspondence with American youths; etc.</u>	3	2	4	3	6	4
<u>Youth anticipate more from democracy and the American way of life: Youth anticipate more from democracy; youth expect more personal freedom from democracy; etc.</u>	2	1	3	1	-	-
<u>Older people cannot free themselves of Nazi conceptions as yet: The older people cannot free themselves from Nazi conceptions in their minds; the oldsters are too narrow-minded, their thoughts are still in the Third Reich; etc.</u>	1	-	1	-	-	*
<u>Other opinions: Youths can more easily forget; many older people are already convinced democrats; youth strives more for freedom and a certain aim; etc.</u>	1	1	-	-	-	-
<u>No opinion:</u>	2 38%	29%	62% ^{**}	38% ^{**}	33% ^{**}	33% ^{**}

* Less than one half of one per cent.

** Some respondents gave more than one answer.

R E S T R I C T E D

REASONS FOR SAYING ELDERS MORE RECEPTIVE ...

Respondents who contend that the older Germans have been the more receptive to American democratization efforts either in the main tend to argue that the elders have experienced democracy before the Nazi period and hence could better appreciate the faults of Nazism, or to argue more generally in terms of the asserted greater judiciousness, maturity, and experience of the adults.

"And among whom, do you think, have the Americans had more success in their efforts to familiarize the Germans with democratic ideas, - among young people up to 25 years or among older people?"

If "Among older people": "Why do you think so?"

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
<u>Older people already know democracy by experience and learned a lesson under the Nazis, whereas youths are still under the influence of Nazism:</u>						
<u>They knew this kind of government in former times, whereas youth must learn it as something new; older people knew our former democracy; youth has grown up under a dictatorship and must change their indoctrinated views, the older folks have already experienced democracy previously; older people have been more strongly subject to Nazi coercion; they got more insight into politics than youths through the Nazi era; they got fed up with Hitler; they have seen through the implication of dictatorship better; youth is too much indoctrinated, especially in Western Germany; youths are still too much influenced by National Socialism; etc.</u>	6%	7%	6%	9%	7%	6%
<u>Older people are more mature, judicious and have more experience, whereas youths are inexperienced and not so clear-sighted: Older people can think in a wider range, have more intelligence; older people are more sensible; they are better thinkers; they are more mature; because youths indulge too much in illusions; youth has not yet a general view; youth has taken everything too easy up to now; youth has not yet understood the new ideas; youth first learn from their parents and then imitate the example of their parents; etc.</u>	4	8	7	20	4	7
<u>Older people are more interested in politics than younger people: Older people deal more with political problems; they are more interested; youth is not interested in political things; younger people are not so much interested in that; youths are not yet so much interested and don't think it over as much as the elders do as yet; I know only a few youngsters who are on the side of the Americans; we youngsters are still skeptics; youths don't care for such efforts; etc.</u>	3	4	3	2	-	1
<u>Other opinions: Older people talk more about democracy, at least; the Nazis have apostasized and gone over to democracy, youths don't understand that very well; the Americans have seen to it that the democratic trade unions are set up again; etc.</u>	1 14%	1 20%	1 16%	1 32%	1 12%	1 14%

*Some respondents gave more than one answer.

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IN WHAT FIELDS CAN GERMANS LEARN FROM AMERICANS?

The most generalized approach to German receptivity to American ideas was embodied in a detailed question as to whether the Germans believed they had much, something, or nothing to learn from Americans in each of various specific fields of endeavor.* Some of the more provocative findings are discussed individually below, with the remaining tabulations listed in an appendix to this paper.

CAN GERMANS LEARN FROM AMERICANS IN THE FIELD OF SOCIAL WELFARE? ...

The field in which the smallest proportion of US Zone respondents feel that Germans have anything to gain from American teachings is that of social welfare. Only one out of five US Zone adults - one out of four among the youth - indicate the belief that Germans have much or something to learn from Americans in this area. Attitudes in Berlin are somewhat more favorable, but in Bremen hit the lowest point with only 12 per cent among the adults indicating that anything is to be learned from Americans in regard to social welfare.

Germans can learn from Americans in Social Welfare:

	Bavaria		Hesse		W-Baden		US. ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
Much	9	6	6	4	4	5	7	6	18	17	5	6
Something	18	15	15	13	24	15	19	14	21	18	13	6
Nothing	32	45	34	45	39	46	34	45	30	40	44	59
No opinion	41	34	45	38	33	34	40	35	31	25	38	29
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

	US ZONE		
	15-19	20-25	over 25
Much	6	8	6
Something	19	18	14
Nothing	27	40	45
No opinion	48	34	35
	100	100	100

One has only to think about the implications of the above findings to realize their seriousness. Such results rather strongly suggest a very low regard among Germans for American social welfare practices. If such a state of mind is as prevalent as it seems to be, Germans are more than mildly vulnerable to Communist propaganda themes which are already being widely promulgated to the effect that America is a land where the rich are very rich and the poor are very poor and Wall Street capitalists wouldn't buy their fellow citizens a crust of bread.

Certainly the findings suggest the desirability of some concerted efforts on the part of American informational and reorientational agencies to develop among the Germans a more favorable view of America's efforts to provide for the care of its less fortunate citizens.

*As listed in the following order on a card handed to the respondents: "In the scientific field, in the artistic field as music, literature and art, in agriculture, in the industrial and technical field, in social welfare, in politics, in press, in radio, in the sports field, in education."

RESTRICTED

US Zone youth breakdowns underscore the need for such a campaign in their indication that the opinion leading elements - the men, the higher educated, the high income and the urban dwelling - manifest no more favorable a conception of American social welfare practices than do their counterpart groups. Somewhat more of them it is true say there is much or something to learn, but on the other hand more of them also say there is "nothing" to learn from Americans in this field.

Germans can learn from the Americans in Social Welfare:

	Much	Something	Nothing	No opinion	
US ZONE YOUTH (15-25)					
<u>Sex:</u>					
Men	8%	19%	39%	34%	... 100%
Women	7	18	30	45	
<u>Education:</u>					
8 years or less	6%	17%	33%	44	
9 - 11 years	13	22	38	27	
12 years and more	12	24	48	16	
<u>Income (per month):</u>					
0 - 99.99 DM	7%	13%	31%	49%	
100 - 249.99 DM	6	17	32	45	
250 - 399.99 DM	8	23	36	33	
400 DM and more	12	21	40	27	
<u>City Size:</u>					
Under 1,000 pop.	6%	14%	29%	51%	
1,000 - 1,999	4	18	28	50	
2,000 - 4,999	5	17	38	40	
5,000 - 9,999	5	21	42	32	
10,000 - 24,999	4	15	45	36	
25,000 - 99,999	13	19	32	36	
100,000 - 249,999	10	21	40	29	
250,000 and over	13	29	33	25	
<u>Employment Status:</u>					
Employed or apprenticed	7%	18%	34%	41%	
Unemployed	8	27	31	34	
Not employed (Students, dependents)	8	14	29	49	
Housewives	11	10	43	36	
<u>Religion:</u>					
Catholics	8%	19%	32%	41%	
Protestants	7	18	35	40	
All others	14	24	38	24	
<u>Origin:</u>					
Natives	7%	18%	34%	41%	
Refugees	9	19	34	38	

R E S T R I C T E D

CAN GERMANS LEARN FROM AMERICANS IN THE CULTURAL FIELD? ...

In the field of fine arts - just as in the field of social welfare - West Germans hold American achievements in very low regard. Only 28 per cent among US Zone youth - 23 per cent among adults - indicate that the Germans have much or something to learn from Americans in this area. In all the regions surveyed the preponderant opinion is that Germans have "nothing" to learn from Americans in cultural pursuits as art, music, and literature.

Germans can
learn from
Americans in
Fine Arts:

	Bayaria		Hesse		W. Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
Much	3 ⁴	6 ⁴	3 ⁴	2 ⁴	3 ⁴	3 ⁴	3 ⁴	4 ⁴	- ⁴	11 ⁴	11 ⁴	6 ⁴
Something	28	20	18	16	23	18	25	19	30	28	20	17
Nothing	43	42	43	43	49	46	44	43	48	46	40	51
No opinion	26	32	36	39	25	33	28	34	22	15	29	26
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	US ZONE		
	15-19	20-25	over 25
Much	3 ⁴	3 ⁴	4 ⁴
Something	25	24	19
Nothing	39	50	43
No opinion	33	23	34
	100%	100%	100%

The predominately negative attitude of both West German youth and adults to American cultural achievements presents another vulnerable point that anti-American groups both of the right and of the left can exploit to undermine the effectiveness of American reorientation efforts in Germany. Communists have been busily capitalizing upon the situation with their reiterated propaganda to the effect that American cultural life is low and degenerate. It goes without saying that whatever American efforts can be made to improve German conceptions and appreciation of American artistic capabilities and achievements should be pursued with vigor.

Not a little difficulty in such reorientation efforts will arise from the fact that it is the more educated and informed elements in the US Zone youth population who more widely feel that Germans have nothing to learn from Americans in artistic pursuits.

Germans can learn from the Americans in Fine Arts:

US ZONE YOUTH (15-25)	Much	Something	Nothing	No opinion
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	3%	25%	46%	26% ... 100%
Women	3	24	44	29
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	3%	25%	40%	32%
9 - 11 years	2	22	64	12
12 years and more	-	22	68	10
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 99.99 DM	3%	23%	32%	42%
100 - 249.99 DM	4	26	40	30
250 - 399.99 DM	2	28	47	23
400 DM and more	3	20	59	18
<u>City Size:</u>				
Under 1,000 pop.	3%	24%	32%	41%
1,000 - 1,999	2	30	34	34
2,000 - 4,999	4	18	50	28
5,000 - 9,999	2	31	48	19
10,000 - 24,999	1	19	55	25
25,000 - 99,999	2	23	53	22
100,000 - 249,999	7	22	62	9
250,000 and over	5	27	50	18
<u>Employment Status:</u>				
Employed or apprenticed	3%	24%	45%	28%
Unemployed	4	34	37	25
Not employed (Students, dependents)	5	17	46	32
Housewives	3	19	54	24
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	3%	27%	42%	28%
Protestants	3	22	47	28
All others	3	10	66	21
<u>Origin:</u>				
Natives	3%	24%	45%	28%
Refugees	3	27	42	28

CAN GERMANS LEARN FROM AMERICANS IN THE FIELD OF EDUCATION? ...

Though held in not quite so low a regard as social welfare and fine arts, but still third from the bottom of ten fields given to the respondents to evaluate, was the field of education. Only one out of three US Zone youths - even fewer adults - indicated that they felt that Germans had much or something to learn from Americans in the educational area. The situation was more favorable in Berlin where 55 per cent of the youth and 48 per cent of the adults voiced such a judgment.

Germans can
learn from
Americans in
Education:

	Bavaria		Hesse		W. Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
Much	16%	13%	11%	6%	16%	12%	14%	11%	35%	29%	19%	17%
Something	20	14	16	13	23	16	20	14	20	19	13	11
Nothing	23	21	20	20	20	21	22	21	13	14	21	22
No opinion	41	52	53	61	41	51	44	54	32	38	47	50
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	US ZONE		
	15-19	20-25	over 25
Much	14%	15%	11%
Something	19	20	14
Nothing	21	22	21
No opinion	46	43	54
	100%	100%	100%

These results taken all together cannot be looked upon as heartening. It is evident that despite a long continued American interest in educational reform only a comparatively small minority are willing to express the judgment that Germans have even "something" to learn from Americans in educational matters. Only a moderate proportion, it is true, outrightly state that Germans have "nothing" to learn, but it would be a mistake to overlook the negative factors in the extensive expression of "no opinion." At best this means that the American theses on educational reform have quite failed to get over to a large proportion of the West German population. But more probably these expressions of "no opinion" are unfavorable reactions rather than neutral, for even in the absence of specific information it would certainly be the easiest and most reasonable course to say that the Germans have something to learn since indeed who has not "something" to learn from practically anybody.

The trends among US Zone youth are favorable with larger proportions of the better educated, the economically better situated, and the urban dwelling, indicating that Germans have much or something to learn from Americans in the field of education.

Germans can learn from the Americans in Education:

US ZONE YOUTH (15-25)	Much	Something	Nothing	No opinion
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	17%	19%	20%	44%
Women	13	20	23	44
... 100%				
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	10%	19%	22%	49%
9 - 11 years	30	22	20	28
12 years and more	22	38	26	14
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 99.99 DM	12%	17%	22%	49%
100 - 249.99 DM	13	19	21	47
250 - 399.99 DM	17	20	21	42
400 DM and more	18	25	23	34
<u>City Size:</u>				
Under 1,000 pop.	10%	15%	22%	53%
1,000 - 1,999	10	19	21	50
2,000 - 4,999	12	17	23	48
5,000 - 9,999	15	22	22	41
10,000 - 24,999	16	19	18	47
25,000 - 99,999	14	25	28	33
100,000 - 249,999	22	28	20	30
250,000 and over	27	21	18	34
<u>Employment Status:</u>				
Employed or apprenticed	15%	20%	21%	44%
Unemployed	15	24	25	36
Not employed (Students, dependents)	13	17	17	53
Housewives	15	18	21	46
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	14%	19%	23%	44%
Protestants	15	19	20	46
All others	24	31	21	24
<u>Origin:</u>				
Natives	14%	20%	22%	44%
Refugees	16	20	20	44

When those who stated that Germans had something to learn from Americans in education were asked - what might the Germans learn* - their replies indicated that among this group at least there is a varied appreciation of a number of features of the US educational system that Americans have been endeavoring to introduce into German educational practices.

"In your opinion, can the Germans learn much, something, or nothing in the following fields?"

If "Much" or "Something" in connection with Germans learning from Americans in the educational field: "What might the Germans learn from the Americans in education?"

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
<u>Freer and more friendly relations between teachers and pupils:</u> In the education of youth which is much freer in America and gives youth the chance to recommend improvements; the participation of pupils in the formation of the curriculum; that the pupils have more right to take part directly in the performance of the lessons and that they are given more psychological consideration than with us; children should be treated more generously and more freely, not with German coercion; the practical democracy in schools, their schools are much freer there; the American children are very early practically familiarized with the conception of freedom; the pupils are not so much under coercion in the lessons; a more friendly relationship and a better contact between teachers and pupils, children are considered as personalities; teachers are good comrades there; that the children can behave themselves more easy-going toward the school teachers; that the teachers pay more attention to the needs of the children, that they are more interested in that; better education conditioned by a more liberal teacher-pupil relationship; the teachers should be more like friends as in America; etc.						
	10%	9%	27%	20%	18%	18%
<u>More progressive and comprehensive education:</u> The Americans are more progressive and have better instruction material; more comprehensive education to familiarize youth with many problems; the pupils there have more subjects than we have; the progress in education; the Germans should learn more languages as the Americans do; I have been informed by acquaintances over there that the schools are much better there; more languages and higher standards in the grammar schools; I only know that schools in America are much more modern; the Americans learn more in their schools; better vocational training; scientifically they are more advanced than we are; the Americans seem to learn more; the modern methods in education, the college system; not to stick to stereotyped monotonous teaching; they all attend school for more years, Americans are more in favor of schools than the Germans are; etc.						
	7	4	12	12	6	6

(cont'd on next page)

*The educational field was subjected to this additional question as part of an extensive program of inquiry about German educational attitudes now being carried out by the Reactions Analysis Staff.

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
<u>Practical orientation in education:</u> That children learn more practical things by methods almost felt as good entertainment; education more adjusted to practical life; build-up of schools according to practical points of view, preparation for the practical life; instructions in technical things and at machines; to learn what one needs in practical life; the schools should not only deal with scientific subjects but with all fields of practical knowledge; much for the practical life; extension of instructions by pre-vocational training; etc.	4%	1%	5%	3%	1%	1%
<u>Tuition-free education; scholarships financed by private subsidies:</u> Generosity with scholarships; the same education for everybody, education tuition-free for all; that the schools are generously supported by rich people; etc.	2	1	2	2	1	2
<u>Furthering of physical training in schools; physical examination of school-children:</u> In regard to hygiene; generous establishments for physical examination of youths; medical care in the schools; to further school sports; to give swimming lessons at a very early age; more sports; that youth is more encouraged to learn and to practise sports; etc.	1	1	2	1	1	-
<u>The absence of confessional schools and the presence of religious tolerance:</u> No separation according to religious adherence, more freedom; no confessional schools; tolerance in regard to religion; etc.	*	1	-	-	-	-
<u>Other opinions:</u> How to build adequate schools and to arouse joy in learning; how to build beautiful schools; not to overcrowd class rooms and to build more school space; that schoolwork is done in school instead of at home; school-children have more spare time there; that youth is interested in politics; that one shall not talk about politics in school; they may learn the American language; almost all the Americans speak German but few Germans speak English; not to discriminate in political respects; educational films, they are much more aided by radio; etc.	3	3	7	3	1	1
<u>No opinion / No answer:</u>	$\frac{9}{36}$	$\frac{7}{27}$	$\frac{6}{61}$	$\frac{9}{50}$	$\frac{4}{32}$	$\frac{4}{32}$

* Less than one half of one per cent.

** Some respondents gave more than one answer.

R E S T R I C T E D

CAN-GERMANS-LEARN FROM AMERICANS IN THE FIELD OF POLITICS? ...

A final important area in which the current findings pose somewhat of a problem for American reorientation efforts, is the field of politics. Feeling among West Germans that America has something to teach is not so low in this area as it has been for social welfare and fine arts particularly, and for education. But certainly receptivity to American political ideas cannot be considered widespread when definitely less than a majority in the US Zone - both among youth and among adults - feel that Germans have much or something to learn from Americans in the field. In Berlin, it should be noted below, responsiveness to American political teachings is very considerably greater with almost half of both youth and adults holding that Germans have "much" to learn from the Americans.

Germans can
learn from
Americans in
Politics:

	Bavaria		Hesse		W. Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
Much	18%	22%	20%	22%	14%	15%	17%	20%	46%	46%	24%	31%
Something	25	21	23	24	31	29	25	24	27	29	19	22
Nothing	18	14	14	15	18	16	17	15	8	7	14	14
No opinion	39	43	43	39	37	40	40	41	19	18	43	33
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	US ZONE		
	15-19	20-25	over 25
Much	15%	20%	20%
Something	23	28	24
Nothing	16	19	15
No opinion	46	33	41
	100%	100%	100%

Just as in the field of education, the heavy "no opinion" apparent in the above tabulation among US Zone residents is better interpreted as negative than neutral. Any respondent in Germany today who refuses to say that Germans have even "something" to learn in the political field from Americans is certainly giving more indication of a value-judgment than a lack of information.

R E S T R I C T E D

The encouraging trend emerges from US Zone youth breakdowns that the more critical and informed levels of the population - the men, the better educated, the better off, and the urban dwelling - are considerably more inclined than are their counterparts to believe that Germans have much or something to learn from Americans in the political area.

Germans can learn from the Americans in Politics:

US ZONE YOUTH (15-25)	Much	Something	Nothing	No opinion	
<u>Sex:</u>					
Men	24%	30%	17%	29%	... 100%
Women	12	22	18	48	
<u>Education:</u>					
8 years or less	16%	23%	17%	44%	
9 - 11 years	23	35	18	24	
12 years and more	36	38	18	8	
<u>Income (per month):</u>					
0 - 99.99 DM	14%	18%	20%	48%	
100 - 249.99 DM	14	25	18	43	
250 - 399.99 DM	20	30	16	34	
400 DM and more	27	27	17	29	
<u>City Size:</u>					
Under 1,000 pop.	13%	19%	16%	52%	
1,000 - 1,999	14	25	15	46	
2,000 - 4,999	13	27	21	39	
5,000 - 9,999	16	28	19	37	
10,000 - 24,999	23	25	15	37	
25,000 - 99,999	19	30	18	33	
100,000 - 249,999	24	27	21	28	
250,000 and over	27	31	18	24	
<u>Employment Status:</u>					
Employed or apprenticed	18%	25%	17%	40%	
Unemployed	17	32	13	33	
Not employed (Students, dependents)	10	19	25	46	
Housewives	17	25	21	37	
<u>Religion:</u>					
Catholics	17	25%	20%	38%	
Protestants	18	26	14	42	
All others	28	34	14	24	
<u>Origin:</u>					
Natives	17%	25%	18%	40%	
Refugees	21	26	16	37	

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APPENDIX

CAN GERMANS LEARN FROM AMERICANS IN THE REMAINING FIELDS? ...

Detailed tabulations of the results for the remaining fields are appended in the following pages. It may be pointed out here in a general way that industry and technology scores particularly high with two out of three or more youth and adults in all the regions surveyed saying that Germans have much or something to learn from Americans in this area. Agriculture scores just about as high in the US Zone, though as might be expected, receptivity in such an area is somewhat lower in urban centers like Berlin and Bremen. Science and radio come next with a fair amount of support and then press and sports with appreciably less.

RESTRICTED

Germans can
learn from
Americans in
Industry and
Technology:

	Bavaria		Hesse		W. Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
Much	36%	34%	29%	29%	37%	36%	35%	33%	63%	61%	51%	45%
Something	32	32	33	31	36	28	33	31	27	20	25	26
Nothing	17	16	14	16	13	19	15	17	5	12	9	13
No opinion	15	18	24	24	14	17	17	19	5	7	15	16
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	US ZONE		
	15-19	20-25	over 25
Much	33%	36%	33%
Something	34	32	31
Nothing	13	18	17
No opinion	20	14	19
	100%	100%	100%

Germans can learn from the Americans in Industry and Technology:

	Much	Something	Nothing	No opinion
US ZONE YOUTH (15-25)				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	41%	34%	15%	10% ... 100%
Women	30	32	15	23
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	30%	34%	16%	20%
9 - 11 years	55	25	13	7
12 years and more	62	30	8	-
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 99.99 DM	24%	30%	18%	28%
100 - 249.99 DM	34	32	15	19
250 - 399.99 DM	39	36	15	10
400 DM and more	41	35	16	8
<u>City Size:</u>				
Under 1,000 population	27%	28%	18%	27%
1,000 - 1,999	26	37	15	22
2,000 - 4,999	30	37	15	18
5,000 - 9,999	38	31	19	12
10,000 - 24,999	35	34	19	12
25,000 - 99,999	39	37	14	10
100,000 - 249,999	52	27	12	9
250,000 and over	51	33	9	7
<u>Employment Status:</u>				
Employed or apprenticed	35%	33%	15%	17%
Unemployed	40	34	17	9
Not employed (Students, dependents)	30	27	10	33
Housewives	29	36	18	17
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	34%	32%	17%	17%
Protestants	35	34	14	17
All others	52	34	-	14
<u>Origin:</u>				
Natives	35%	33%	15%	17%
Refugees	35	35	14	16

Germans can
learn from
Americans in
Agriculture:

	Bavaria		Hesse		N. Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
Much	31%	31%	29%	28%	38%	35%	32%	32%	39%	41%	38%	37%
Something	32	32	32	35	36	29	33	32	33	24	25	25
Nothing	20	14	14	13	12	15	17	14	15	16	6	12
No opinion	17	23	25	24	14	21	18	22	13	19	31	26
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

US ZONE

	15-19	20-25	over 25
Much	29%	35%	32%
Something	34	32	32
Nothing	15	18	14
No opinion	22	15	22
	100%	100%	100%

Germans can learn from the Americans in Agriculture:

	Much	Something	Nothing	No opinion
US ZONE YOUTH (15-25)				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	38%	34%	16%	12%
Women	27	33	17	23
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	28%	34%	18%	20%
9 - 11 years	51	30	8	11
12 years and more	40	42	10	8
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 99.99 DM	18%	35%	18%	29%
100 - 249.99 DM	31	33	18	18
250 - 399.99 DM	34	33	16	17
400 DM and more	43	33	12	12
<u>City Size:</u>				
Under 1,000 pop.	22%	33%	21%	24%
1,000 - 1,999	25	30	21	24
2,000 - 4,999	30	39	17	14
5,000 - 9,999	39	30	16	15
10,000 - 24,999	34	37	9	20
25,000 - 99,999	41	36	11	12
100,000 - 249,999	37	28	13	22
250,000 and over	45	31	10	14
<u>Employment Status:</u>				
Employed or apprenticed	32%	33%	16%	19%
Unemployed	28	40	19	13
Not employed (Students, dependants)	24	30	22	24
Housewives	40	28	16	16
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	29%	33%	19%	19%
Protestants	34	33	14	19
All others	42	38	3	17
<u>Origin:</u>				
Natives	33%	33%	16%	18%
Refugees	29	34	17	20

R E S T R I C T E D

Germans can
learn from
Americans in
Science:

	Bavaria		Hesse		W. Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
Much	12%	16%	14%	13%	15%	17%	14%	16%	38%	40%	36%	25%
Something	42	37	31	31	44	38	39	36	39	32	29	30
Nothing	24	20	21	20	19	17	22	19	16	20	15	24
No opinion	22	27	34	36	22	28	25	29	7	8	20	21
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

US ZONE

	15-19	20-25	over 25
Much	13%	14%	16%
Something	39	40	36
Nothing	19	25	19
No opinion	29	21	29
	100%	100%	100%

Germans can learn from the Americans in Science:

	Much	Something	Nothing	No opinion
US ZONE YOUTH (15-25)				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	17%	41%	24%	18% ... 100%
Women	11	38	21	30
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	11%	39%	21%	29%
9 - 11 years	22	43	27	8
12 years and more	32	44	24	-
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 99.99 DM	11%	30%	18%	41%
100 - 249.99 DM	12	39	23	26
250 - 399.99 DM	14	45	22	19
400 DM and more	21	43	23	13
<u>City Size:</u>				
Under 1,000 pop.	8%	35%	20%	37%
1,000 - 1,999	13	38	17	32
2,000 - 4,999	12	37	27	24
5,000 - 9,999	16	44	22	18
10,000 - 24,999	14	40	25	21
25,000 - 99,999	14	36	30	20
100,000 - 249,999	25	49	16	10
250,000 and over	18	47	22	13
<u>Employment Status:</u>				
Employed or apprenticed	13%	40%	22%	25%
Unemployed	20	38	22	20
Not employed (Students, dependents)	13	27	24	36
Housewives	11	39	24	26
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	12%	41%	22%	25%
Protestants	15	38	22	25
All others	14	52	17	17
<u>Origin:</u>				
Natives	13%	41%	21%	25%
Refugees	17	34	24	25

R E S T R I C T E D

Germans can
learn from
Americans in
Radio:

	Bavaria		Hesse		W. Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
Much	23%	22%	17%	13%	23%	23%	22%	20%	54%	44%	40%	38%
Something	30	25	25	25	36	26	30	25	23	26	22	22
Nothing	19	13	17	19	17	15	18	15	13	14	13	16
No opinion	28	40	41	43	24	36	30	40	10	16	25	24
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

US ZONE

	15-19	20-25	over 25
Much	19%	24%	20%
Something	31	30	25
Nothing	17	18	15
No opinion	33	28	40
	100%	100%	100%

Germans can learn from the Americans in Radio:

	Much	Something	Nothing	No opinion
US ZONE YOUTH (15-25)				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	26%	31%	18%	25% ... 100%
Women	18	29	18	35
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	18%	31%	18%	33%
9 - 11 years	36	26	18	20
12 years and more	48	18	22	12
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 99.99 DM	17%	23%	15%	45%
100 - 249.99 DM	20	29	17	34
250 - 399.99 DM	25	33	18	24
400 DM and more	30	31	23	16
<u>City Size:</u>				
Under 1,000 pop.	15%	27%	16%	42%
1,000 - 1,999	13	31	17	39
2,000 - 4,999	22	31	18	29
5,000 - 9,999	24	29	22	25
10,000 - 24,999	31	31	15	23
25,000 - 99,999	24	36	18	22
100,000 - 249,999	35	24	17	24
250,000 and over	32	33	20	15
<u>Employment Status:</u>				
Employed or apprenticed	22%	30%	18%	30%
Unemployed	22	30	20	28
Not employed (Students, dependants)	11	29	17	43
Housewives	22	28	17	33
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	21%	30%	19%	30%
Protestants	23	30	16	31
All others	41	31	14	14
<u>Origin:</u>				
Natives	21%	30%	18%	31%
Refugees	25	29	17	29

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Germans can
learn from
Americans in
Press:

	Bavaria		Hesse		W. Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
Much	20%	19%	13%	13%	17%	13%	18%	16%	44%	40%	31%	32%
Something	28	24	26	23	31	32	28	25	26	25	23	22
Nothing	16	13	15	14	15	16	15	14	12	13	16	15
No opinion	36	44	46	50	37	39	39	45	18	22	30	31
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

US ZONE

	15-19	20-25	over 25
Much	14%	21%	16%
Something	28	28	25
Nothing	15	16	14
No opinion	43	35	45
	100%	100%	100%

Germans can learn from the Americans in Press:

	Much	Something	Nothing	No opinion
US ZONE YOUTH (15-25)				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	22%	28%	16%	34%
Women	14	28	15	43
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	15%	27%	15%	43%
9 - 11 years	29	34	13	24
12 years and more	40	32	16	12
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 99.99 DM	11%	23%	16%	50%
100 - 249.99 DM	16	27	15	42
250 - 399.99 DM	21	33	16	30
400 DM and more	23	32	16	29
<u>City Size:</u>				
Under 1,000 pop.	10%	23%	15%	52%
1,000 - 1,999	13	23	17	47
2,000 - 4,999	15	28	15	42
5,000 - 9,999	14	33	17	36
10,000 - 24,999	21	32	13	34
25,000 - 99,999	25	30	20	25
100,000 - 249,999	30	27	12	31
250,000 and over	28	38	12	22
<u>Employment Status:</u>				
Employed or apprenticed	18%	28%	15%	39%
Unemployed	20	28	15	37
Not employed (Students, dependants)	11	21	17	51
Housewives	16	27	15	42
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	17%	27%	16%	40%
Protestants	18	29	14	39
All others	31	31	17	21
<u>Origin:</u>				
Natives	17%	27%	16%	40%
Refugees	19	30	14	37

Germans can
learn from
Americans in
Sports:

	Bavaria		Hesse		W. Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
Much	26%	24%	18%	14%	23%	16%	24%	20%	42%	47%	20%	11%
Something	32	23	31	26	34	25	19	24	28	26	15	14
Nothing	25	22	24	21	28	28	32	23	23	17	36	28
No opinion	17	31	27	39	15	31	25	33	7	10	29	47
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

US ZONE

	15-19	20-25	over 25
Much	24%	23%	20%
Something	33	31	24
Nothing	22	29	23
No opinion	21	17	33
	100%	100%	100%

Germans can learn from the Americans in Sports:

Much Something Nothing No opinion

US ZONE YOUTH
(15-25)

<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	23%	36%	29%	12% ... 100%
Women	24	29	22	25
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	23%	32%	24%	21%
9 - 11 years	28	32	31	9
12 years and more	12	42	36	10
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0. - 99.99 DM	18%	23%	24%	35%
100 - 249.99 DM	26	32	23	19
250 - 399.99 DM	24	37	26	13
400 DM and more	21	34	35	10
<u>City Size:</u>				
Under 1,000 pop.	22%	29%	22%	27%
1,000 - 1,999	18	34	22	26
2,000 - 4,999	24	36	22	13
5,000 - 9,999	30	26	28	16
10,000 - 24,999	26	33	26	15
25,000 - 99,999	21	28	33	13
100,000 - 249,999	20	38	29	13
250,000 and over	33	36	25	6
<u>Employment Status:</u>				
Employed or apprenticed	23%	32%	26%	19%
Unemployed	29	38	22	11
Not employed (Students, dependants)	21	22	22	35
Housewives	19	28	32	21
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	23%	34%	25%	18%
Protestants	23	30	27	20
All others	35	31	17	17
<u>Origin:</u>				
Natives	23%	32%	26%	19%
Refugees	24	33	24	19

GERMAN YOUTH VIEW THE AMERICAN PROGRAM

III. THE VOICE OF AMERICA AND GENERAL RADIO
DISSEMINATING AMONG YOUTH

Report No. 41

Series No. 2

October 23, 1950

Classification cancelled
by authority of Leo P. Crespi
PUB/RAS.

R E S T R I C T E D

OFFICE OF THE U. S. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR GERMANY
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF

INTRODUCTION ...

The present report is the third of a series based upon an extensive survey of the attitudes of German youth toward the major elements of the American programs in Germany. The survey was conducted during July 1951 by the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs.

For these studies the usual random representative sample of Germans of all ages in the US occupied areas was supplemented with a special augmented sample of German youth (defined as from 15 to 25 years of age). In total the sampling included approximately 1,750 youths in the US Zone and 1,250 adults, 275 youths in Berlin and 225 adults, and 200 youths in Bremen with 175 adults. The purpose of the adult cases on the same issues was to provide the opportunity for youth-adult comparison where such were desirable.

As usual the interviews were obtained from randomly selected respondents by a trained German staff under the general supervision of American survey officers. Detailed description of the sampling methods employed is available upon request. The analysis and interpretation of the data has been performed by the professional survey staff of the Office of Public Affairs.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS ...

- ... About four in ten US Zone youth and adults customarily listen to VOA broadcasts.
- ... But since youth are more likely (64%) than adults (57%) to be radio listeners, VOA obtains a smaller share of the total youth radio audience than it does of the adult radio audience.
- ... The better educated, urban and higher income youth tend more frequently than others to hear the Voice programs.
- ... Dislike of the programs or of the U.S. is seldom given as a reason for not listening. Lack of interest or time are mentioned more frequently.
- ... Majority opinions among young people as well as older persons are that VOA broadcasts are interesting to youth.
- ... The few people who claim the Voice is uninteresting to youth give a variety of reasons to support their views. Overemphasis on politics and what amounts to a restatement of the allegation of lack of interest are the two cited most frequently.
- ... On a more general query regarding quality, a majority of both youth and adults rate VOA programs as "good." Scarcely anyone says they are "poor," though a sizable minority grants them only a "fair" rating.
- ... Assertions that the broadcasts lack interest, are biased, superficial or too political are frequently made by those who rate VOA only fair or poor.
- ... Adults are just as likely as youth to listen to programs designed especially for young people. None of the individual broadcasts — school, youth, and children's programs — obtains as large a share of the radio audience as does the Voice of America.

VOA AUDIENCE — YOUTH AND ADULTS COMPARED ...

Proportionately about as many youth as adults listen to the Voice of America programs in the US occupation areas. But as scrutiny of the table below reveals, this is only a partial statement of the fact, because young people tend more than older people to be radio listeners. Thus in all regions except in West Berlin, VOA obtains a smaller share of the total youth radio audience than it does of the adult audience. *

	Bavaria		Hesse		W-Baden		TOTAL US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y**	A**	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>LISTENING HABITS:</u>												
Usually listen 7 p.m., and to VOA	36	37	37	42	41	40	37	38	60	49	54	59
Usually listen 7 p.m., only sometimes to VOA	11	10	10	6	10	6	10	8	8	5	13	7
Never hear VOA	18	11	14	10	15	7	17	11	14	16	21	13
(Total Radio Audience)	(55)	(58)	(61)	(58)	(63)	(53)	(54)	(57)	(82)	(70)	(88)	(79)
Non Radio listeners	<u>35</u> <u>100</u>	<u>42</u> <u>100</u>	<u>39</u> <u>100</u>	<u>42</u> <u>100</u>	<u>34</u> <u>100</u>	<u>47</u> <u>100</u>	<u>36</u> <u>100</u>	<u>43</u> <u>100</u>	<u>18</u> <u>100</u>	<u>30</u> <u>100</u>	<u>12</u> <u>100</u>	<u>21</u> <u>100</u>

... Comparative proportions of youth and adult radio listeners hearing VOA broadcasts may be more clearly seen in the following table:

	VOA Listeners as % of Youth Radio Audience	VOA Listeners as % of Adult Radio Audience
TOTAL US ZONE	73%	81%
Bavaria	72	79
Hesse	76	84
W-Baden	78	84
Berlin	82	78
Bremen	76	84

* The figures in the above tables were obtained from a series of questions as follows: "Do you listen to the radio?" If Yes, regularly or occasionally, "Do you regularly or sometimes listen at 7 o'clock in the evening?" If Yes, "What program do you usually hear?" If VOA not mentioned, "Do you ever listen to the Voice of America?" If Yes, "Do you know what time it is broadcast?" In the first table, "Usually listen at 7 p.m. and to VOA" includes those persons who say they are regular and occasional listeners and usually or sometimes listen at 7 p.m. and name VOA as the program usually heard. The category "7 p.m., only sometimes to VOA," includes the 7 p.m. listeners who upon further query say they sometimes hear VOA and can correctly state the 7 p.m. broadcast time. "Never hear VOA" includes all other regular and occasional radio listeners.

** The abbreviations Y and A on column headings are for youth and adults respectively.

GROUP DIFFERENCES IN THE AUDIENCE OF VOA ...

Examination of group differences among youth in the US Zone VOA audience bears out the generalization previously made*that the variations within youth population groups are much greater than those of youth vis-a-vis adults. Also, though the range of difference within the various groups is not as great as in Amerika Hauser awareness and patronage, it remains true here too that youth in the upper socio-economic levels are more likely than their opposites to be reached by this medium.

VOA LISTENERSNON-LISTENERS

US ZONE YOUTH (15-25)

In City Size Groups:

Under 1,000	20%	80% ... 100%
1,000 - 1,999	25	75
2,000 - 4,999	31	69
5,000 - 9,999	43	57
10,000 - 24,999	55	45
25,000 - 99,999	54	46
100,000 - 249,999	51	49
250,000 and over	60	40

In Employment Status Groups:

Employed or apprenticed	36%	64%
Unemployed	47	53
Not employed (student, dependent, etc.)	40	60
Housewife	47	53

In Income Groups:

Under 99,99 DM	19%	81%
100 - 249,99 DM	34	66
250 - 399,99 DM	46	54
400 DM and more	52	48

In Sex Groups:

Men	43%	57%
Women	33	67

In Education Groups:

Elementary only	34%	66%
Middle	60	40
Diploma & University**	52	48

In Place of Origin Groups:

Native	39%	61%
Refugee	38	62

In Religious Groups:

Catholic	35%	65%
Protestant	40	60

* See, "German Youth and the American Program, III. Awareness and Patronage of Amerika Hauser among Youth," Report No. 41, Series 2.

** Percentages must be interpreted with caution because they are based on less than 100 cases.

REASONS FOR NOT LISTENING TO VOA...

Radio listeners who claim never to hear the Voice broadcasts were queried as to their reasons for not doing so. Since only a few members of the radio audience claim never to hear VOA, their replies cannot be quantified, and are listed here simply in order of frequency of mention. It will be noted that few of the stated reasons express outright dislike of the program or of the U.S., though possibly some of the statements are rationalizations of such attitudes. Youth do not differ greatly from adults on this query, nor do important regional differences occur.

1. No interest: No interest and also no time; etc.
2. Still working at this time: At this time we are working; from 18, 0 hours on I have to work in the bakery; I'm not at home at this time but in business; I'm in the stable; etc.
3. No time at 7 o'clock: I don't listen to the radio when VOA is broadcast because I'm together with friends or with my girl friend; I get home late; at this time I have to take care of the child and to prepare supper; no radio listening possible because of unfavorable conditions to use the radio; etc.
4. Listen only to music: I listen only to music; I'm only interested in dance music; I listen only to music, I'm not interested in lectures; I don't pay any attention to the talking; etc.
5. Don't like VOA or the U.S.: I don't like the voices and the way it is arranged; I hate everything about America since I remember my time as POW there; the exchange of POW's as it was carried out by the Americans stinks to high heaven; I was subject to extradition and had to work in a mine; America ought to publicize the number of German POW's that have been extradited to Russia, France, Belgium, etc.; I have not forgotten the shameful air raids; etc.
6. Don't know of the VOA: I don't know that there is such a program; I don't know which station it is broadcast from; etc.
7. Other opinions: I'm semi-deaf and have to put my ear close to the radio, therefore I listen only to the daily news; we can receive only the Suedwestfunk; etc.

VOA INTERESTING TO YOUTH ...

Young people join with older people in voicing a majority opinion that VOA programs are "interesting enough" to persons up to the age of twenty-five. The table below shows the close correspondence of views on this query:

"Do you believe that the Voice of America programs are interesting enough to young people up to the age of 25?"
(Asked only of VOA listeners.)

	Bavaria		Hesse		W-Baden		TOTAL US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes	71	69	71	70	82	75	74	70	84	72	75	72
No	17	16	13	14	11	13	15	15	10	22	8	7
No opinion	12	15	16	16	7	12	11	15	6	6	17	21
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Few differences occur within the various youth population groups on the estimate of the interest of the programs to youth.

REASONS WHY VOA CONSIDERED INTERESTING TO YOUTH ...

Both youth and adults are in general agreement regarding their reasons why the VOA broadcasts can be considered interesting to young people. The reason ranked first by both groups is that the programs are instructive, full of variety and easily understood. Second most frequently mentioned reason is that they present a picture of American life. Third largest mention is the concern shown in the broadcasts for the problems of youth and their depictions of American youth affairs. Replies tabulated in order of frequency follow.

"Why do you think so?" (Asked of those answering "Yes, they are interesting enough")

	US Zone		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
<u>VOA is generally interesting, instructive, easily understood, full of variety:</u> Because its program is voluminous and full of variety, it is entertaining; they can learn from it; material is actual and understandable; it is many-sided and therefore it brings something for everyone; is entertaining and informing; is so comprehensive and thorough that everyone can understand it; it describes everything in many different colors; etc.	30%	36%	46%	54%	40%	39%
<u>VOA gives a good picture of the manner of life customs and frame of mind of the Americans:</u> Because one can learn everything that is worthwhile to know about America; many things about the situation in American are presented; youth can form a better picture for themselves about America; young people are more interested in America than older ones; one can take a look into American private life; because all or most want to hear something about America; through the VOA one comes closer to America; especially Fridry's "So lebt man in Amerika"; etc.	28	15	24	8	19	15

(cont'd on next page)

US Zone	Berlin	Bremen
Y A	Y A	Y A

The broadcasts deal often with youth and are especially pertinent and exciting to youth: All questions concerning youth are discussed; it gives pictures which are designed to inform youth; the style of the broadcast is especially suited to youth; there are interesting discussions, which deal with youth problems; many broadcasts are mainly for youth like the reports about students; the reports correspond with the opinions of young people; it gives a true picture about young people, who accomplished something extraordinary; etc.

8%	11%	13%	7%	9%	7%
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The answers to listeners mail are appreciated very much: One can write about what he wants to know; answers questions; the exchange of letters; etc.

4	2	3	2	1	1
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There are interesting broadcasts about political, economic, and social problems: Many political views are given; because they broadcast about investigations and social problems; because there are food broadcasts about economic questions; it brings many things about economics and this is instructive for youth; etc.

5	3	2	-	2	3
---	---	---	---	---	---

Some people are interested in the broadcasts about technics and inventions: Many technical things are brought and people like this; many new things from technical fields are broadcast; youth is interested in the inventions which are made over there; etc.

3	2	6	2	-	1
---	---	---	---	---	---

The agricultural broadcasts are extremely interesting: I am interested in broadcasts about agriculture and those with doctors are also interesting; one hears so many new things about young farmers; the developments of a farm are described; etc.

2	1	3	2	-	-
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The musical part of VOA is liked: Sometimes there is music which I like; I like the broadcasts, especially the music; the Saturday music program, because new jazz like sambas are played; etc.

2	*	2	2	-	-
---	---	---	---	---	---

Other remarks: One learns things which are good to introduce here; they broadcast practical things for life; it broadcasts the full truth about the East; youth is shown free reporting; youth is interested in emigration and gets good information about America; one hears much about other people; sometimes interesting but much too self-conscious; etc.

1	2	1	-	1	3
---	---	---	---	---	---

No opinion:

$\frac{3}{86\%}$	$\frac{4}{76\%}$	$\frac{3}{103\%}$	$\frac{1}{78\%}$	$\frac{3}{75\%}$	$\frac{6}{75\%}$
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(Percentages total more than the proportion saying "interesting" because some people gave more than one reason.)

R E S T R I C T E D

REASONS WHY VOA NOT CONSIDERED INTERESTING TO YOUTH ...

The few people who claim the VOA broadcasts are uninteresting to youth give a variety of reasons to support their views. Overemphasis on politics and what amounts to restatement of the allegation of lack of interest are the two cited most frequently.

"Why do you think so?" (Asked of those who said "No, is not interesting enough.")

	US Zone		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
<u>Not interesting enough (general):</u> I have listened to it for some time, I am not interested very much any more; they bring things which are not interesting, like novels (unbelievable); I noticed that the most of them tune off the radio or don't listen to it at all because it is not interesting to youth; etc.	3%	3%	1%	4%	2%	2%
<u>Too much politics:</u> Because they talk too much about politics; the broadcasts are influenced too much by politics; too political, they lie in the same way as the others do; youth has suffered enough up to now, they are not concerned with politics in any way; too much about democracy; etc.	3	3	2	2	2	1
<u>Not enough for youth:</u> They don't concern themselves enough with the interests of youth; because the broadcasts, too narrowly bound to special fields, are of little interest to youth and will interest older people more; not lively enough for youth, only for older people who have higher thinking ability; etc.	2	4	1	7	-	-
<u>Presentation and/or contents poor:</u> Should have more interviews; youth wants a vivid description of the main points; too tiring, everything is demonstrated in such a way that it seems ridiculous; the program is too dry; it should be more lively; one has the feeling that they make just theoretical speeches from the green table and they don't have their feet on the ground; sometimes they bring a lot of nonsense; etc.	2	1	3	2	2	-
<u>Presents only one side:</u> It is just pure propaganda; I don't believe everything that is told there, according to it America is supposed to be so beautiful; much is given which can be recognized as propaganda right away; etc.	2	1	-	-	1	2
<u>Too difficult to understand:</u> For people with ability to compare things it may be acceptable, but not for people without experience; lectures are not thoroughly enough explained; even for adults it is often too difficult to understand; there are many things we younger people don't yet understand; etc.	1	2	1	4	1	-
<u>Too professional:</u> Youth is not interested enough in some fields, as agriculture, cattle breeding, and civil service; etc.	1	1	-	3	-	1
<u>Other opinions:</u> Too much variety; they should bring more about the American youth; German youth doesn't want to hear those streetsongs all the time; there are no possibilities for comparison between the countries, the differences are too great; etc.	$\frac{1}{15\%}$	$\frac{1}{16\%}$	$\frac{2}{10\%}$	$\frac{2}{24\%}$	$\frac{-}{8\%}$	$\frac{1}{7\%}$

(Some of the percentages total more than the proportion saying "Not interesting" because a few people gave more than one reason.)

R E S T R I C T E D

VOA PROGRAMS GOOD ...

On a more general query regarding quality, a majority of both youth and adult respondents rate the VOA programs as "good." Scarcely anyone gives them a grade of "poor," though sizable minorities grant them only a "fair" rating. But in the two regions where the Voice has its largest youth and adult audience -- West Berlin and Bremen -- the tendency to rate programs as good is most frequent.

It will be noted that in the US Zone, adults tend somewhat more often than youth to evaluate VOA programs as good.

"Do you consider these broadcasts good, fair or poor?"

	Bavaria		Hesse		W-Baden		TOTAL US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Good	55	60	61	70	61	70	59	65	80	78	67	66
Fair	35	32	24	24	31	26	30	28	17	18	17	21
Poor	3	3	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	-	3	2
No opinion	7	5	13	5	6	2	9	5	2	4	13	11
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

REASONS FOR CONSIDERING PROGRAMS GOOD ...

Two main reasons are given by both youth and adults for rating VOA broadcasts as good. They are: first, that they are interesting, instructive, and have variety; and second, they inform listeners about the U.S. The catalogued comments follow, listed in order of frequency on the next page.

R E S T R I C T E D

If "Good": "Why do you consider them good?"

	US Zone		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
<u>The broadcasts are interesting, instructive, clarifying and rich in variety:</u> Recently very interesting, correspond more to our taste; it brings up what is worthwhile; I learn many things and see that they advocate good opinions in the United States; because you hear so much about things you never would come to know; actually it brings something for everybody; it is many-sided; you hear many a thing useful to know; it appeals to everybody at once; etc.	30%	36%	44%	54%	41%	37%
<u>They acquaint listeners with American living conditions; contribute to international understanding:</u> You become familiar with customs of other countries; useful for bringing about understanding between nations; people are able to enlarge their knowledge about America; furthers understanding between nations and improves relations; you get an idea of America; you see the difference between America and Germany and you can think of how to make improvements; etc.	23	18	28	17	18	21
<u>They are actual, informative:</u> It brings actual American opinions of world events; broadcasts are picked out from daily life; you always hear the latest news and much is broadcast you won't find in newspapers; you learn much about democracy; etc.	3	9	8	9	4	4
<u>They are objective:</u> They speak honestly about everything, that's what I like; they present it in a positive and credible way; not tendentious; etc.	2	2	2	3	1	2
<u>Interesting lectures; good cultural broadcasts:</u> Experts talk over the radio, therefore the broadcasts are valuable; often you hear something about art, theater, things in which I am interested; etc.	2	2	2	-	-	1
<u>Questions are answered:</u> Partly the broadcast is chosen according to German listeners' point of view, (reply to listeners' letters); questions are answered, that's always interesting; etc.	2	2	*	2	2	3
<u>Others:</u> Americans are not afraid of the Russians, they speak freely and openly; they don't discuss much policy, that's what I like; I like American popular songs; the music is always beautiful; I like modern music; etc.	1 53%	2 71%	1 85%	2 87%	- 55%	2 70%

R E S T R I C T E D

REASONS VOA PROGRAMS CONSIDERED ONLY FAIR OR POOR ...

Minority opinions both among youth and adults are that the VOA broadcasts are only fair or poor in quality. Reasons assigned by both groups are very similar, including such assertions as they lack interest, are biased, superficial, too political and so on.

"Why do you consider these broadcasts fairly good, (poor)?"
(Asked of those who answered "Fairly good" or "Poor" to previous question.)

	US Zone		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
<u>No interest; only partly interesting and good:</u> Sometimes it is interesting and sometimes less, not everything appeals to us; because there are so often unimportant things among it; sometimes they bring good things and sometimes nonsense; because I don't like everything that they broadcast; etc.	12%	9%	5%	3%	3%	3%
<u>Topics and presentation of the broadcasts not appealing:</u> They often broadcast about agriculture in the U.S. in which nobody is interested; the program is too much split up in details and the topics are not appealing; more talks instead of questions and answers; not detailed enough; too short and too shallow; people with high standards cannot be satisfied with this broadcast; etc.	5	3	4	7	5	3
<u>Too political:</u> They talk too much about politics, I am only interested in general things; I don't like too much politics; it is perhaps meant for those who are in politics; etc.	5	3	4	-	3	4
<u>Not objective; too much propaganda:</u> A little too much propaganda; they are only talking about the good in America and don't want to admit the bad; it is only a propaganda broadcast, not everything can be as rosy as is depicted; the American propaganda is always shining through; the American standpoint is too much emphasized, and the German standpoint too little taken into consideration; etc.	4	4	3	1	2	8
<u>American conditions do not interest the Germans; the broadcast is not adjusted to the German mind:</u> I am only interested in the broadcasts about Germany, I cannot judge about anything else; a lot of junk because the Americans are not able to place themselves in our position; some things don't interest us Germans at all; etc.	1	4	1	1	2	-
<u>Broadcasts are sometimes too presumptuous; American superiority complex:</u> Sometimes they act as if we were completely ignorant; it is sometimes presumptuous, one is annoyed about their mocking Germany; etc.	1	1	-	2	1	1
<u>Other opinions:</u> Everything is so ridiculously presented and pronounced; because they bring only a few political broadcasts; the stories about experiences are good; listeners' letters are not good; because the radio magazine "Suedfunk" takes a stand against it and writes that most people turn out this broadcast; I doubt whether this broadcast really comes from New York; etc.	4 32%	5 39%	4 21%	4 18%	2 18%	4 23%

(Percentages total more than the proportion saying "fair" or "poor" because some people gave more than one reason.)

RADIO LISTENERSHIP OF YOUTH PROGRAMS ...

Adults, it appears, are just as likely to listen to radio programs designed for younger people as are youth — except in Berlin where proportionally more of the youth claim to tune in on one or more broadcasts of this type.

"Do you sometimes hear youth broadcasts?" (Asked of regular and occasional radio listeners.)

	Bavaria		Hesse		W-Baden		TOTAL US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
School program	16	16	25	22	22	22	20	19	40	25	35	27
Youth program	25	22	15	15	28	19	23	20	32	21	28	23
Children's program	6	9	12	8	7	12	7	9	8	11	6	5
No	29	25	29	28	25	22	28	25	28	30	45	43
Question not asked	35	42	39	42	34	47	36	43	18	30	12	21
	111	114	120	115	116	122	114	116	126	117	126	119

(Percentages add to more than 100 per cent because some of the radio audience listen to more than one program.)

... There is little or no difference between teen-agers and older youth in listening habits in respect to youth programs.

GENERAL RADIO LISTENING AMONG YOUTH ...

Already mentioned in connection with VOA listening is the fact that youth more frequently than their elders say they listen to the radio regularly or occasionally. This is shown in the following table:

"Do you listen to the radio?"

	Bavaria		Hesse		W-Baden		TOTAL US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes, regularly or occasionally	65	58	61	58	66	53	64	57	82	70	88	79
No, seldom, never	35	42	39	42	34	47	36	43	18	30	12	21

The table on the next page gives the proportion within various population groups of youth who listen to the radio and who generally listen at 7 o'clock in the evening, the hour when VOA is broadcast to Germany.

It will be again noted that proportionately more of the better educated, the upper income, urban residents, and young men, as is the case with all media, are in the radio audience.

R E S T R I C T E D

PROPORTION WITHIN YOUTH POPULATION GROUPS WHO ARE:

	<u>Radio Listeners</u>	<u>Listeners at 7 o'clock</u>
<u>In Education Groups:</u>		
Elementary only	60%	36%
Middle	82	63
Diploma and University	84	55
<u>In Income Groups:</u>		
Under 99,99 DM	42%	22%
100 - 249,99 DM	60	38
250 - 399,99 DM	72	42
400 DM and over	82	56
<u>In City Size Groups:</u>		
Under 1,000	45%	24%
1,000 - 1,999	52	28
2,000 - 4,999	65	35
5,000 - 9,999	72	46
10,000 - 24,999	74	55
25,000 - 99,999	80	53
100,000 - 249,999	87	55
250,000 and over	83	63
<u>In Employment Status Groups:</u>		
Employed or apprenticed	64%	40%
Unemployed	66	50
Not employed (students, dependents, etc.)	68	49
Housewife	63	51
<u>In Age Groups:</u>		
15 - 19 years	60%	36%
20 - 25 years	67	46
<u>In Place of Origin Groups:</u>		
Native	65%	41%
Refugee	59	43
<u>In Religious Groups:</u>		
Catholic	62%	40%
Protestant	66	43
<u>In Sex Groups:</u>		
Men	64%	48%
Women	60	36

GERMAN YOUTH VIEW THE AMERICAN PROGRAM

IV. Awareness and Patronage of Amerika Hauser among Youth

Classification cancelled
by authority of Leo P. Crespi
PUB/RAS.

Report No. 42
Series No. 2
October 25, 1950

R E S T R I C T E D

OFFICE OF THE U. S. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR GERMANY
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF

INTRODUCTION ...

The present report is the fourth of a series based upon an extensive survey of the attitudes of German youth toward the major elements of the American program in Germany. The survey was conducted during July 1950 by the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs.

For these studies the usual random representative sample of Germans of all ages in the US occupied areas was supplemented with a special augmented sample of German youth (defined as from 15 through 25 years of age). In toto the sampling included approximately 1,750 youths in the US Zone and 1,250 adults, 275 youths in Berlin and 225 adults, and 200 youths in Bremen with 175 adults. The purpose of the adult cases on the same issues was to provide the opportunity for youth-adult comparisons where such were desirable.

As usual the interviews were obtained from randomly selected respondents by a trained German staff under the general supervision of American survey officers. Detailed description of the sampling methods employed is available upon request. The analysis and interpretation of the data has been performed by the professional survey staff of the Office of Public Affairs.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS ...

- ... West German youth are more likely than adults to know that the U.S. maintains Amerika Hauser (U.S. Information Centers) and Reading Rooms in cities throughout West Germany. But the extent of awareness is high also among adults.
- ... Relatively more younger persons than older persons are able to support their statement of awareness by naming one or more of the facilities offered the public at the Information Centers.
- ... About twice as many youth as adults on the average say they have visited an Amerika Haus or a Reading Room at least once.
- ... Youth not only differ from adults both in awareness and patronage of Amerika Hauser, but they differ even more among themselves. Proportionately very many more of the better educated, upper income, and urban youth than of their counterparts know about and have visited the Centers.

AWARENESS OF US INFORMATION CENTERS ...

The fact that the United States maintains Information Centers and Reading Rooms in cities throughout the US Zone is better known to German youth than to their elders, though among the latter groups also the extent of awareness is remarkably high. Majorities ranging from 71% of youth in Bavaria to 86% in West Berlin and Bremen reply, "Yes, have heard," to the query: "Have you heard that in the large cities there is a so-called Amerika Haus, and in smaller cities, an American Reading Room?"

Comparative figures for youth and adults are shown below, for the three Laender and for West Berlin and Bremen. *

PROPORTION AWARE OF AMERIKA HAUSER AND READING ROOMS

	<u>Youth</u>	<u>Adults</u>
Total US Zone	73%	64%
Bavaria	71	62
Hesse	80	72
W-Baden	71	63
Berlin	86	76
Bremen	86	83

... More older than younger youths in the US Zone know of the Information Centers. Among teen-agers (15-19 years), 68%, and among older youth (20-25 years), 77% are informed.

* See also, "Trends in Awareness and Patronage of the US Information Centers in the US Zone, West Berlin and Bremen," Report # 31, Series 2, (8 Aug, 1950).

DIFFERENCES OF AWARENESS WITHIN YOUTH POPULATION GROUPS ...

Youths not only differ from their elders in extent of awareness of Amerika Haesuser, but they differ even more among themselves, as is clearly demonstrated in the table which follows below. Indeed, the range of variations is far greater within groups than between youth and adults, as such. The range of difference, for example, in the US Zone between rural youth and urban, lesser educated and well educated, lower end upper income, averages thirty per cent -- in contrast to a 9% difference between youths and adults in the Zone -- on extent of awareness of the Information Centers. As will subsequently be indicated, differences of similar range occur within youth groups on all aspects of media impact. In other words, the concept of a homogeneous age group, collectively designated YOUTH is brought into considerable question by these findings.

	<u>Know there are Centers</u>	<u>Do not know</u>
US ZONE YOUTH (15-25)		
<u>In City Size Groups:</u>		
Under 1,000	60%	40% ... 100%
1,000 - 1,999	52	48
2,000 - 4,999	58	32
5,000 - 9,999	79	21
10,000 - 24,999	84	16
25,000 - 99,999	89	11
100,000 - 249,999	97	3
250,000 and over	94	6
<u>In Educational Groups:</u>		
Elementary only	68	32
Middle	96	4
Diploma & University	98	2
<u>In Sex Groups:</u>		
Men	76%	24%
Women	70	30
<u>In Employment Status Groups:</u>		
Employed & apprenticed	73	27
Unemployed	74	26
Not employed (student, dependent)	70	30
Housewife	79	21
<u>In Income Groups:</u>		
Under 99,99 DM	51%	49%
100 - 249,99 DM	70	30
250 - 399,99 DM	77	23
400 DM and over	88	12
<u>In Place of Origin Groups:</u>		
Native residents	74%	26%
Refugees	70	30
<u>In Religious Groups:</u>		
Catholic	71	29%
Protestant	75	25

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KNOWLEDGE OF FACILITIES .,.

In order to discover whether youth know anything about the Information Centers beyond their official designation, they were further asked to mention one or more of the facilities offered there. Some of course cannot do so, but the majority of those who claim awareness support their claim by naming Amerika Haus offerings. In this respect, too, they do better than older persons, -- in all areas, more youth than adults can specify facilities.

"Do you know what the public is offered there?" (Asked of those who said they had heard of Amerika Hauser)*

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y**	A**	Y	A	Y	A
Know facilities	47%	40%	73%	49%	72%	69%
Do not know facilities	23	22	12	24	14	15
<u>Facilities are:</u>						
Library periodicals	36%	33%	48%	35%	55%	52%
Lectures, discussions	26	22	53	33	42	40
Films, plays	22	14	50	27	39	29
Concerts, recitals	14	11	21	11	20	18
American literature	8	7	11	5	21	10
Language lessons	8	6	3	2	13	12
Exhibitions, art	6	6	20	9	10	9
Other	8	4	5	4	6	3
Question not asked	30	38	15	27	14	16

* Those who had heard only of Reading Rooms as well as those who had heard of neither Amerika Hauser nor Reading Rooms were not asked this question.

** Throughout this report, the abbreviations Y for youth, and A for adults is used in column headings.

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PATRONAGE OF INFORMATION CENTERS ...

About twice as many youths as adults on the average say that they have visited an American House or Reading Room, at least once.* As will be noted below, claimed patronage both for youth and adults is greatest in Bremen, and least in Bavaria.

PROPORTION PATRONIZING AMERIKA HAUSER AND/OR READING ROOMS

	<u>Youth</u>	<u>Adults</u>
Total US Zone	17%	9%
Bavaria	15	9
Hesse	20	11
W-Baden	17	10
Berlin	24	12
Bremen	36	16

... It is worthy of note that whereas more older than younger youth know of the existence of the Centers, the same is not true for the proportion who visit them, as these US Zone figures reveal:

... 19% of persons ages 15 through 19 years and

... 15% of those from 20 through 25 years, say they have visited an Amerika Haus and/or Reading Room.

* Persons who said they know there were Amerika Hauser and/or Reading Rooms, and could specify their offerings were asked this question: "Have you ever visited one of them?"

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GROUP DIFFERENCES IN ATTENDANCE ...

Claimed patronage of Amerika Hauser varies to even a greater extent among German youth than does awareness of them. For instance, six times as many youth in the better educated groups than of those in the lesser educated groups state they have visited one of the Centers. And while the ranges of difference are not equally wide among other groups, they are nevertheless generally marked, as will be noted in the following table:

	<u>Visited Center</u>	<u>Not Visited</u>	<u>Not aware of Centers</u>
US ZONE YOUTH (15-25)			
<u>In City Size Groups:</u>			
Under 1,000	6%	54%	40% ... 100%
1,000 - 1,999	4	48	8
2,000 - 4,999	10	58	32
5,000 - 9,999	16	63	21
10,000 - 24,999	25	58	16
25,000 - 99,999	27	62	11
100,000 - 249,999	37	60	3
250,000 and over	40	54	6
<u>In Education Groups:</u>			
Elementary only	11%	55%	23%
Middle	35	61	4
Diploma & University *	68	30	2
<u>In Sex Groups:</u>			
Men	21%	55%	24%
Women	13	57	30
<u>In Income Groups:</u>			
Under 99,999 DM	7%	45%	48%
100 - 249,99 DM	14	56	30
250 - 399,99 DM	19	58	23
400 DM & over	29	59	12
<u>In Place of Origin Groups:</u>			
Native	17	57	26
Refugee	15	55	30
<u>In Religious Groups:</u>			
Catholic	15	56	29
Protestant	18	56	24

* Percentages must be interpreted with caution because they are based on less than 100 cases.

GERMAN YOUTH VIEW THE AMERICAN PROGRAM

V. Audience of US Over-Sea Magazines and US Documentary Film Program

Report No. 43
Series No. 2
October 25, 1950

R E S T R I C T E D

OFFICE OF THE U S HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR GERMANY
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF

INTRODUCTION ...

The present report is the fifth of a series based upon an extensive survey of the attitudes of German youth toward the major elements of the American program in Germany. The survey was conducted during July 1950 by the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs.

For these studies the usual random representative sample of Germans of all ages in the US occupied areas was supplemented with a special augmented sample of German youth (defined as from 15 to 25 years of age). In toto the sampling included approximately 1,750 youths in the US Zone and 1,250 adults, 275 youths in Berlin and 225 adults, and 200 youths in Bremen with 175 adults. The purpose of the adult cases on the same issues was to provide the opportunity for youth-adult comparisons where such were desirable.

As usual the interviews were obtained from randomly selected respondents by a trained German staff under the general supervision of American survey officers. Detailed description of the sampling methods employed is available upon request. The analysis and interpretation of the data has been performed by the professional survey staff of the Office of Public Affairs.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS ...

- ... More than half of the US Zone youth and about three quarters of those in West Berlin and Bremen say they read magazines. They are more likely than their elders to make this claim.
- ... But relatively few (11% in the US Zone) state that they read youth periodicals. Religious periodicals for youth are the type most frequently mentioned by those who do claim to read magazines for younger people.
- ... The US overt publications -- Heute, Amerikanische Rundschau and Der Monat -- appear to be read somewhat more frequently by people under 25 years than by those above 25 years, but the differences are slight. Both among youth and adults relatively few people read the US publications.
- ... The illustrated magazine Quick has more readers than Heute, which appears to have the largest readership of any of the US overt periodicals.
- ... As to the US documentary film program, about three times as many youth as adults in the US Zone say they have seen at least one of the US sponsored documentaries. The comparative attendance figures are 17% for youth and 6% for adults.
- ... More rural than urban young people say they have seen such documentary film showings, as do more of the better than lesser educated youth.
- ... About one fourth of US Zone teen-agers in contrast to one in ten youth in their early twenties have attended the showings.
- ... The documentaries are judged "good" by about seven in ten of the people who have seen them. Best liked about them is that they are interesting and scientifically instructive, or they offer an opportunity to become acquainted with American life, as it "really is."

- 2 -

I. YOUTH AND US OVERT MAGAZINES

READERSHIP OF YOUTH MAGAZINES ...

Relatively few young people claim they read youth magazines, as is shown in replies to the question, "Do you read magazines or newspapers for youth?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W. Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Yes	12%	7%	10%	11%	14%	9%
No	<u>33</u> 100%	<u>93</u> 100%	<u>90</u> 100%	<u>89</u> 100%	<u>86</u> 100%	<u>91</u> 100%

Whether this finding results from disinterest in such publications or their unavailability cannot be demonstrated from the data on hand. That unavailability may be the more important factor is suggested by previous studies where lively interest in youth publications was revealed.*

As would be expected somewhat more of the teen-agers (14% in the US Zone) than older youth (3%) claim to read youth magazines.

TYPES OF YOUTH MAGAZINES READ ...

Religious magazines for youth is the largest single type named. Figures for the different categories follow:

	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Type of youth magazines:			
Religious	5%	6%	3%
Popular, general	2	2	2
Educational and technical	1	3	1
Other	<u>3</u> 11%	<u>3</u> 14%	<u>3</u> 9%

READERSHIP OF OTHER MAGAZINES ...

The fact that few young people read youth magazines does not mean that they are not magazine readers. More than half of US Zone youth and about three quarters of those in Berlin and Bremen claim they read magazines other than those specifically designed for youthful readers. They also tend more frequently than their elders to say they read magazines.

"And do you read (other) magazines and illustrated journals?"

	Bavaria		Hesse		W. Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y**	A**	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
Yes	51%	43%	52%	39%	58%	44%	53%	42%	79%	56%	73%	58%
No	<u>49</u>	<u>57</u>	<u>48</u>	<u>61</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>56</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>58</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>42</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

... Older youth (58%) are more likely than younger youth (48%) to say they read magazines.

* See "German Youth in Five Cities Give their Impression of the Supplement 'Jugend in der freien Welt'." Report # 24, Series 2, (30 June 1950).

**In this and succeeding tables, "Y" refers to Youth and "A" to Adults.

READERSHIP OF OVERT US MAGAZINES , , ,

The overt US publications -- Heute, Neue Auslese,⁺ Amerikanische Rundschau, and Der Monat -- appear to be read somewhat more frequently by youth than older people, though the differences are too slight to warrant a categorical statement to this effect. West Berlin youth show a marked preference for Das Beste aus Readers Digest, but it is also mentioned fairly frequently by both youth and adults in the US Zone Laender.

The illustrated magazine Quick has more readers than Heute among both youth and their elders. In Bremen, Konstanze appears to be particularly popular.

"Do you read (other) magazines and illustrated journals?"
(If "Yes") "Which?"

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
Das Beste aus Readers Digest	5%	3%	13%	6%	5%	6%
Neue Auslese	2	1	1	*	1	-
Amerikanische Rundschau	1	1	1	-	1	1
Heute	11	9	9	5	19	19
Der Monat	1	*	2	1	*	*
Quick	21	16	19	14	28	20
Konstanze	9	7	5	4	31	28
Others	42	34	71	51	55	45
	92%**	71%**	121%**	81%**	140%**	119%**

* Less than one half of one per cent.

** Percentages are greater than the proportion claiming to read magazines because some people mentioned more than one.

... Little or no difference occurs between youth of different ages regarding their choice of magazines.

+ The survey was done prior to the discontinuance of Neue Auslese.

R E S T R I C T E D

FREQUENCY OF MENTION OF US MAGAZINES ...

Mentions of the US sponsored magazines come more often from the better educated and city youth than from their opposite numbers. Among other population groups there is little difference in respect to the US magazines.

The following table shows the frequency with which the US magazines (including "Das Beste" with the US overt publications) are cited in various youth population groups as contrasted with mention of all other magazines.

It is important to note that this table does not present readership figures, but frequency of mention figures. Since some youth name more than one magazine, the figures presented below are larger than readership figures would be.

Frequency of Mention of:				
	US Magazines	All other Magazines	None	
<u>In Education Groups:</u>				
Elementary only	9%	49%	42%	... 100%
Middle	26	63	11	
Diploma & University	29	65	6	
<u>In City Size Groups:</u>				
Under 1,000	7%	36%	57%	
1,000 - 1,999	5	36	59	
2,000 - 4,999	13	47	40	
5,000 - 9,999	11	60	29	
10,000 - 24,999	15	63	22	
25,000 - 99,999	18	64	18	
100,000 - 249,999	18	71	11	
150,000 and over	25	63	12	
<u>In Income Groups:</u>				
Under 99.99 DM	12%	36%	52%	
100 - 249.99 DM	15	46	39	
250 - 399.99 DM	14	57	29	
400 DM and over	18	66	16	
<u>In Employment Status Groups:</u>				
Employed or Apprenticed	14%	52%	34%	
Unemployed	13	56	31	
Not employed (student, dependent, etc.)	17	44	39	
Housewife	14	52	34	
<u>In Place of Origin Groups:</u>				
Native	13%	53%	34%	
Refugee	14	51	35	
<u>In Religious Groups:</u>				
Catholic	12%	51%	37%	
Protestant	16	54	30	

R E S T R I C T E D

II. YOUTH AND AMERICAN DOCUMENTARY FILMS

WHO ATTENDS DOCUMENTARY FILM SHOWINGS? ...

About three times as many youth as adults in the US Zone of Germany claim to have seen at least one American-sponsored documentary movie. About the same number of youth as adults are aware that such types of movies are shown but have not attended any of the performances.

"The Americans have showings of documentary movies for the German people. The performances don't take place in the usual theatres and they are without charge. Have you ever attended such a performance?"

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
Yes	17%	6%	10%	3%	14%	6%
No, but heard of them	30	31	34	41	36	38
No, have not heard of them	53	63	56	56	50	56
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

More of the youth in towns under 1,000 have seen a documentary film than those in larger cities. Also, more of the better educated than their counterpart groups have attended such a movie. Only a small proportion of the better educated are unaware that such movies are shown.

... "Have you ever attended such a performance?"

	Yes	No, but heard of them	No, have not heard of them	
<u>In Education Groups:</u>				
Elementary only	15%	27%	53%	... 100%
Middle	27	34	39	
Diploma & University *	20	60	20	
<u>By Income Groups:</u>				
Under 99,99 DM	12%	25%	63%	
100 - 249,99 DM	16	28	56	
250 - 399,99 DM	19	32	49	
400 DM and more	22	31	47	
<u>In City Size Groups:</u>				
Under 1,000	24%	26%	50%	
1,000 - 1,999	16	25	59	
2,000 - 4,999	14	28	58	
5,000 - 9,999	16	28	56	
10,000 - 24,999	19	26	55	
25,000 - 99,999	15	45	40	
100,000 - 249,999	15	45	40	
250,000 and over	14	26	60	
<u>In Employment Status Groups:</u>				
Employed or Apprenticed	18%	30%	52%	
Unemployed	16	26	58	
<u>In Sex Groups:</u>				
Male	22%	30%	48%	
Female	13	29	58	

* Figures should be interpreted with caution because of small number of cases.

FREQUENCY OF ATTENDANCE . . .

Among the youth who have seen American-sponsored documentaries, about half have seen one or two performances (8%), with 9% having seen three or more.

"How many of these showings have you already attended?"
(Asked of those saying they attended a movie in the preceding question.)

	US ZONE	
	Y	A
One	5%	2%
Two	3	1
Three	3	1
Four	2	-
Five	1	1
Six and more	3	1
	<u>17%</u>	<u>6%</u>

* Figures for Berlin and Bremen are not presented in this and succeeding tables, as too few people were asked the questions to be quantitatively significant.

TEEN-AGERS VERSUS OLDER YOUTH . . .

About one fourth of the teen-agers in the US Zone - more than twice as many as the youth in their early twenties - say that they have seen such an American sponsored documentary.

... "Have you ever attended such a performance?"

	US ZONE		
	15-19	20-25	over 25
Yes	24%	10%	6%
No, but heard of them	26	34	31
No, have not heard of them	50	56	63
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Not only have a larger percentage of teen-agers than youth in their early twenties seen at least one American documentary, but the teen-agers have also attended more performances.

"How many of these showings have you already attended?"

	US ZONE		
	15-19	20-25	over 25
One	6%	3%	2%
Two	5	2	1
Three	4	2	1
Four	2	1	-
Five	2	1	1
Six and more	5	1	1
	<u>24%</u>	<u>10%</u>	<u>6%</u>

R E S T R I C T E D

MOST CONSIDER MOVIES "GOOD" ...

Seven in ten of the youth who have seen American documentary films judge the movies to be good. A minority consider them to be fair, and a handful, poor.

"In general, did you consider the films good, fair or poor?"
(Asked of those who attended movies.)

	US ZONE	
	Y	A
Good	72%	68%
Fair	23	28
Poor	3	4
No opinion	2	-
	100%	100%

Teen-age youth and those between 20 and 25 have essentially the same opinion on this question.

WHAT IS LIKED ABOUT THE MOVIES? ...

Those who thought the movies were good were asked what they liked about them. The largest number answered generally that they were interesting or scientifically instructive, or that they offered an opportunity to become acquainted with American life "as it really is."

Reasons given for considering the movies "good":

Movies are interesting; instructive; scientific; Very informative and scientifically interesting; was beautiful; because scientific movies are always very clear and informative; they are very entertaining and very instructive; interesting - you saw the sky-scrapers and also animals from America; there were new inventions in which I am very much interested; I particularly liked the movie about mines; etc.

US ZONE
Y A

25% 32%

Provide chance to become acquainted with American life and people; Showed instructive details about American life; you get acquainted with America by scenic pictures; the movie about the election was very interesting; brought pictures of American life; because one sees pictures of the country in America itself; it is a cross section of American life; you get a good impression of the country and people in America; you see how life is in America; because they showed the hard struggle for the daily bread; you get acquainted with America's good sides; etc.

20 14

R E S T R I C T E D

US ZONE
Y A

Provides chance to become acquainted with American agriculture: The many innovations in agricultural fields; because this movie shows very accurately the method of cultivation in American agriculture; because the farmers had it so good in this film; you see in that movie the whole development of American farms; etc.

11% 6%

They show different countries and nations: Because they showed us how it is like in other countries; because they bring a bit from everything; different nations, dances, culture and science; we are very much interested in it, because all that was strange to us; because they are going deeper into details; they dealt with economy of different countries very thoroughly; etc.

6 4

They are technically good: The photo-technic was excellent; because they were interesting and were shown unsynchronized; etc.

5 3

They are instructive cultural movies: The movies are instructive and cultural; as cultural movies they are really of high value; etc.

3 3

Other answers: You can learn more from these movies than from the radio and the press; you saw animals, then something about sport; everything dealt with a sound economy; they are objective and true; etc.

4 4

No opinion:

$$\frac{3}{77\%} \quad \frac{6}{72\%}$$

* Some respondents gave more than one answer.

WHAT IS DISLIKED? ...

Comments of the people who were unfavorably impressed with the movies were too few to report quantitatively. But those displeased generally did not like the subject covered in the film, considered them too propagandistic, or technically left something to be desired.

Didn't like subject: "Industrial movies are not interesting for rural population;" "I'm not interested in films dealing with agriculture and farmers;" "the Micky Mouse films are not instructive;" "they showed how pottery is made, which is nonsense;" "movies about war were shown - how cities were destroyed by bombs;" "the movies are called cultural movies, but they often don't deal with culture;" etc.

Movies have propaganda tendency: "Some movies have a marked tendency and show everything from the best side only;" "too untrue;" "too propagandistic for America - as if everything would be all right;" "America is so favorably depicted, one thinks Germany is lagging far behind;" etc.

Technical difficulties: "In the Munich Amerika Haus, the acoustic is bad;" "they are badly synchronized;" "they usually showed silent films;" etc.

R E S T R I C T E D

THE HICOG SURVEYS

Volume II

Reports 44 - 75

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GERMAN YOUTH VIEW THE AMERICAN PROGRAM

VI. The German-American Exchange Program

Report No. 44

Series No. 2

October 30, 1950

DECLASSIFIED

by authority of

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PUB: Research Staff

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OFFICE OF THE U. S. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR GERMANY
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF

R E S T R I C T E D

INTRODUCTION ...

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As usual the interviews were obtained from randomly selected respondents by a trained German staff under the general supervision of American survey officers. Detailed description of the sampling methods employed is available upon request. The analysis and interpretation of the data has been performed by the professional survey staff of the Office of Public Affairs.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS ...

- ... A majority of both youth and adults in the US Zone - more than seven in ten in Berlin and Bremen - say they have heard about the U.S. Exchange Program. Teen-agers are less likely than older youth to report awareness.
- ... The predominant opinion among all groups - youth and adults alike - is that the U.S. established the exchange program in order "to further understanding between the two countries." Only relatively small minorities attach what could be considered dubious motives for America's establishment of the program.
- ... Very few youth or adults appear to share the occasionally expressed apprehension that German participants in the exchange program come unduly under American influence as a result.
- ... Better educated youth, those in the higher income brackets, and city dwellers - that is youth who generally constitute the better informed groups - tend more often than their counterparts both to be aware of the exchange program and to impute good motives to America as reasons for establishing it.

- 2 -

R E S T R I C T E D

AWARENESS OF THE GERMAN-AMERICAN EXCHANGE PROGRAM ...

A majority of both youth and adults in the US Zone - approximately three quarters in Berlin and Bremen - indicate that they have heard about a German-American exchange program. Extent of awareness is greatest in the US Zone among older youth, and least among teen-agers with somewhat less than half of this latter group reporting some familiarity.

"Have you ever heard anything about a German-American Exchange Program? "

	Bavaria		Hesse		W. Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
Yes	56%	59%	54%	60%	64%	59%	57%	59%	73%	81%	72%	72%
No	44	41	46	40	36	41	43	41	27	19	28	28
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	US ZONE		
	15-19	20-25	over 25
Yes	46%	67%	59%
No	54	33	41
	100%	100%	100%

Though it is outside the scope of the present report to discuss trend comparisons, it may be reported here that the present figures indicate large gains in extent of German awareness of the exchange program since previously measured in January 1950. See Report No. 12, Series No. 2, 30 March 1950, entitled: GERMANS VIEW THE U.S. REORIENTATION PROGRAM - III. Opinions on the Cultural Exchange Program.

- * For the purpose of further questions all who indicated that they had not heard of a German-American exchange program were told about it in these terms: "There is such a program which enables experts and students to visit America and in turn enables American experts to visit Germany."

Group breakdowns among US Zone youth reveal, as might be anticipated, more widespread awareness of the exchange program among the typically more informed levels of the population - the higher educated, the men, the economically better situated, and the urban dwelling. The differences in extent of awareness are very great among US Zone youth, especially between different educational levels. Awareness of the existence of such a program seems to be least among the lowest income youth and among those dwelling in towns of less than 2,000 population. If these youth are of any special interest to the program the indication is that increased efforts are called for to reach these segments of the US Zone youth population.

"Have you ever heard anything about a German-American Exchange Program?"

	Yes	No	Number of cases:
US ZONE YOUTH			
(15-25)			
<u>Sex:</u>			
Men	62%	38%...100%	776
Women	53	47	964
<u>Education:</u>			
3 years or less	49%	51%	1421
9 - 11 years	63	12	253
12 years and more	98	2	50
<u>Income (per month):</u>			
0 - 99.99 DM	40%	60%	130
100 - 249.99 DM	52	46	722
250 - 399.99 DM	62	38	447
400 DM and more	74	26	268
<u>City Size:</u>			
Under 1,000 population	42%	58%	392
1,000 - 1,999	41	59	295
2,000 - 4,999	54	46	267
5,000 - 9,999	64	36	171
10,000 - 24,999	70	30	117
25,000 - 99,999	74	26	182
100,000 - 249,999	73	27	116
250,000 and over	75	25	202
<u>Employment Status:</u>			
Employed or apprenticed	56%	44%	1426
Unemployed	58	42	137
Not employed (Students, dependents)	60	40	63
Housewives	68	32	116
<u>Religion:</u>			
Catholics	53%	47%	966
Protestants	61	39	747
All others	79	21	28
<u>Origin:</u>			
Natives	56%	44%	1416
Refugees	60	40	326

R E S T R I C T E D

WHAT ARE AMERICAN MOTIVES IN THE EXCHANGE PROGRAM? ...

Much of the value of the German-American exchange program depends of course on what motives Germans conceive Americans to have in establishing such a program. To ascertain whether most Germans see good motives or doubtful motives in America's sponsoring of such an undertaking the respondents were asked to indicate which two of a series of six statements comes closest to what they believe to be America's reasons for instituting an exchange program.

Even if considerable allowance is made for some possible courtesy bias in an American sponsored poll on such a question, it is evident that only a relatively small minority in the US Zone - even fewer in Berlin and Bremen - are inclined to attach any dubious intentions to America's establishment of an exchange program. The predominant opinion everywhere sampled - both among youth and adults - is that America's intention in such a program is "to further understanding between the two countries."

"There are different opinions about the reason for the establishment of the Exchange Program by the Americans. Would you please name two of the following which, in your opinion, are closest to American intentions concerning the Exchange Program? "

- A. To bring the Germans closer to democratic ideas.
- B. To americanize Germany.
- C. To further understanding between the two countries.
- D. To influence Germany's leading classes for the benefit of America.
- E. To make America's economic achievements available to Germans.
- F. To use German experience and knowledge for America's purposes.

	Bavaria		Hesse		W. Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
C.	65%	67%	62%	50%	70%	72%	66%	66%	37%	33%	64%	66%
A.	36	37	40	46	42	41	35	40	50	53	47	54
E.	32	34	32	34	39	40	34	35	41	40	29	31
F.	22	15	13	10	19	14	19	14	12	5	7	6
D.	7	5	7	4	7	4	7	5	4	3	9	12
B.	5	4	6	3	6	2	7	3	2	1	4	3
No opinion	16	19	20	22	9	13	15	19	3	6	20	14
	186%	181%	180%	176%	192%	186%	186%	182%	199%	196%	180%	186%

	US ZONE		
	15-19	20-25	over 25
C.	63%	68%	66%
A.	33	43	40
E.	32	34	35
F.	20	19	14
D.	7	8	5
B.	5	6	3
No opinion	19	11	19
	182%	189%	182%

(All percentages approach 200 because most people gave two answers as requested.)

- * Three of the statements embody intentions which Germans would certainly accept as good in two instances (C and E) and at least as entirely proper in a third (A). The remaining three statements assign motives which to most Germans would be dubious (B, D, F). The alternatives as listed are in the order they were presented to the respondents. In the tabulations the alternatives are presented in order of frequency of choice by youth in the US Zone.

R E S T R I C T E D

Analysis of group differences among US Zone youth reveals that the more critical and informed levels - the higher educated youth, the high income, and the urban dwelling impute good motives to the exchange program considerably more often rather than less often than do their counterpart groups.

Reasons for Exchange Program:

- A. To bring the Germans closer to democratic ideas.
- B. To americanize Germany.
- C. To further understanding between the two countries.
- D. To influence Germany's leading classes for the benefit of America.
- E. To make America's economic achievements available to Germans.
- F. To use German experience and knowledge for America's purposes.

US ZONE YOUTH (15-25)	C.	A.	E.	F.	D.	B.	No opinion	
<u>Sex:</u>								
Men	66	40	37	19	8	7	13	190
Women	65	36	31	20	6	7	13	133
<u>Education:</u>								
8 years or less	63	35	32	20	3	7	13	133
9 - 11 years	76	50	40	20	5	5	4	200
12 years and more	74	53	34	10	12	2	6	196
<u>Income (per month):</u>								
0 - 99.99 DM	52	23	32	20	11	7	26	176
100 - 249.99 DM	63	36	32	20	6	7	13	182
250 - 399.99 DM	72	41	35	20	7	8	9	192
400 DM and more	73	46	34	20	9	5	7	194
<u>City Size:</u>								
Under 1,000 pop.	56	27	20	24	0	7	24	176
1,000 - 1,999	53	33	25	19	6	9	24	177
2,000 - 4,999	72	36	35	23	9	4	11	190
5,000 - 9,999	73	41	37	13	7	6	12	189
10,000 - 24,999	70	35	35	21	6	9	13	179
25,000 - 99,999	66	49	36	13	5	10	9	193
100,000 - 249,999	69	50	42	15	7	4	7	194
250,000 and over	75	52	36	14	6	6	7	196
<u>Employment Status:</u>								
Employed or apprenticed	65	37	34	20	8	7	15	186
Unemployed	69	40	33	13	1	9	16	186
Not employed (Students, dependents)	71	36	32	11	5	5	21	181
Housewives	63	45	31	21	6	9	14	189
<u>Religion:</u>								
Catholics	64	35	33	22	7	8	15	184
Protestants	67	40	35	16	7	6	15	186
All others	62	59	34	21	21	3	-	200
<u>Origin:</u>								
Natives	66	38	33	19	7	7	16	186
Refugees	67	40	33	20	3	3	12	188

* All these percentages approach 200 because most people gave two answers as requested.

R E S T R I C T E D

~~ARE EXCHANGERS BROUGHT TOO MUCH UNDER AMERICAN INFLUENCE? ...~~

The occasional thought has been expressed that Germans who go to America in connection with the exchange program are likely to get too much under American influence, thus presumably impairing their judgment and independence of action. That very few Germans share such an apprehension, either among youth or their elders, is evident in the following findings:

"Do you believe that many of the Germans who go to America in connection with the Exchange Program, are brought too much under American influence?"

	Bavaria		Hesse		W-Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
Yes	8%	7%	7%	5%	9%	5%	3%	6%	5%	6%	5%	4%
No	66	63	63	70	73	75	67	70	38	87	72	75
No opinion	26	25	30	25	18	20	25	24	7	7	23	21
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	US ZONE		
	15-19	20-25	over 25
Yes	8%	3%	6%
No	62	71	70
No opinion	30	21	24
	100%	100%	100%

Denial that German exchangees are likely to be too much under American influence is particularly widespread among the more critical and informed elements of US Zone youth - the higher educated, the higher income, and the urban dwelling.

"Do you believe that many of the Germans who go to America in connection with the Exchange Program, are brought too much under American influence?"

US ZONE YOUTH (15-25)	Yes	No	No opinion
<u>Sex:</u>			
Men	84	70	22 ... 100
Women	8	65	27
<u>Education:</u>			
8 years or less	84	63	29
9 - 11 years	7	83	10
12 years and more	6	92	2
<u>Income (per month):</u>			
0 - 99.99 DM	11	47	42
100 - 249.99 DM	8	65	27
250 - 399.99 DM	7	74	19
400 DM and more	7	79	14
<u>City Size:</u>			
Under 1,000 population	10	53	37
1,000 - 1,999	7	56	37
2,000 - 4,999	5	71	24
5,000 - 9,999	7	75	18
10,000 - 24,999	9	75	16
25,000 - 99,999	6	79	15
100,000 - 249,999	13	72	15
250,000 and over	7	81	12
<u>Employment Status:</u>			
Employed or apprenticed	7	63	25
Unemployed	9	65	26
Not employed (Students, dependents)	13	57	30
Housewives	10	66	24
<u>Religion:</u>			
Catholics	84	64	28
Protestants	7	71	22
All others	7	82	11
<u>Origin:</u>			
Natives	7	67	26
Refugees	10	67	23

R E S T R I C T E D

The reasons of the small minority who see too great an American influence on exchangees are listed below:

"Do you believe that many of the Germans who go to America in connection with the Exchange Program, are brought too much under American influence?"

If "Yes": "In what respect?"

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
<u>Influence is too one-sided: They talk only about that what they have heard; they get one-sidedly instructed and tell their impressions in the same way; they try to copy what they have seen; only those are interested in the exchange program who tend toward America and they get deeply influenced, that is the purpose of their trip; they get americanized; because they see the good sides only; today's youth wear American clothes and chow gum; etc.</u>	3%	2%	2%	3%	4%	2%
<u>The novelty has great appeal (general): Everybody can easily be influenced; the novelty has a great influence; the foreign country influences too much; one can't ignore any influence, either a positive or a negative one; etc.</u>	2	2	1	2	1	1
<u>They will meet better conditions there: They will be impressed by the political, economic and cultural achievements; they meet a better standard of living and will not forget it; they get the conviction that life in America is better than it is in the old Europe; etc.</u>	1	1	-	-	-	-
<u>Because they want to remain in America: They would like to remain there and forget our misery over here; because they find a good life there, they will remain there and we are losing them; etc.</u>	*	-	1	1	-	-
<u>No opinion:</u>	$\frac{2}{8\%}$	$\frac{1}{6\%}$	$\frac{1}{5\%}$	$\frac{-}{6\%}$	$\frac{-}{5\%}$	$\frac{1}{4\%}$

*Less than one half of one per cent.

TREND IN OPINION ON WEST GERMAN REMILITARIZATION

Report No. 45

Series No. 2

October 31, 1950

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OFFICE OF THE U. S. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR GERMANY

OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF

INTRODUCTION ...

For the past several months the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs, has been devoting careful attention to the complex issue of West German remilitarization. The most recent report in this area* presented basic German reactions on the remilitarization issue as of August 8th to September 8th, the period immediately preceding the Washington Foreign Ministers' conference. The present brief report brings the basic trend of approval-disapproval in the US occupied areas down through the end of September, a period bracketing the release of the Foreign Ministers' communique on security plans for West Germany.

Since an October survey just now nearing completion in the field includes in addition to the basic trend question extensive reference to "why's and wherefore's", detailed discussion of trend indications will be postponed until these data are in.

The present findings derive from a survey conducted in the US occupied areas of Germany in the period between September 5th and October 4th, 1950. Interviewed in the study was a representative random sample of approximately 1,500 cases in the US Zone, 300 in Berlin, and 200 in Bremen. As usual the interviews were obtained from randomly selected respondents by a trained German staff under the general supervision of American survey officers. Detailed description of the sampling methods employed is available upon request. The analysis and interpretation of the data has been performed by the professional survey staff of the Office of Public Affairs.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS ...

- ... Most probably as a reaction to mounting Korean successes support for German participation in an European defensive army has shaded off somewhat in the US Zone in September as compared with August 1950.
- ... Support, however, still greatly outweighs opposition with 58 per cent approving as compared with 26 per cent disapproving.
- ... In Berlin support of German participation in an European army has apparently remained at substantially the same high level, with the slight decrease in approval figures not large enough to be reliably beyond chance.
- ... In September, as priorly in August, it remains true that approval of German participation in an European army is relatively greater among the more critical and informed levels of the US Zone population.
- ... Further revealed by the US Zone breakdowns is that almost all of the net drop in support for German participation has occurred among the women. The change between August and September among men is not reliably beyond chance.
- ... Finally, the September breakdowns show that among Protestants, as is not the case for Catholics, an appreciable rise has occurred in the proportion who are opposed to German participation in an European army.
- ... It is not unlikely that the increase in opposition among Protestants is related to the widely aired controversy on the remilitarization issue between Chancellor Adenauer and Heinsmann, his minister of defense (a leading Protestant figure).

*The question of Remilitarization in Western Germany, Report No. 36, Series No. 2, 15 September 1950.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

- ... Preponderant opinion among US Zone respondents is that German public opinion supports German participation in an European army.
- ... However, as many as three out of ten judge (erroneously, from RAS studies) that most Germans are opposed to German participation in an European army. It is likely that many in this group are prompted or reinforced in their own opposition by their erroneous conception of German public opinion.
- ... September findings pile up increasing evidence that there is no majority support in the US Zone for German participation in other than a specifically European type of army. From a fairly even split of pro and con in August, reliably more US Zone respondents (48%) are currently opposed to an army - when the type is not specifically indicated to be European - than approve (40%).

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN AN EUROPEAN ARMY ...

Sentiment in favor of German participation in an Atlantic Pact army has weakened somewhat in the US Zone in September as compared with August 1950. Support however, still greatly outweighs opposition with 53 per cent approving as compared with approximately one in four disapproving.

In Berlin approval of German participation in an European defensive army has apparently remained substantially at the same high level, with the slight drop in the approval figures not large enough to be reliably beyond chance. A considerable drop in extent of approval would seem to have occurred in Bremen between August and September. But in view of the limited number of cases gathered there it is better to wait for the October results before coming to any firm conclusion.

"Several West European Nations and America recently signed a defense pact, the so-called Atlantic Pact.

Suppose West Germany would join the Atlantic Pact and be asked in connection with it to participate in a general army for defense of Western Europe. Would you then be for or against such participation in a defense army?"

	Bavaria		Hesse		W-Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Aug	Sep	Aug	Sep	Aug	Sep	Aug	Sep	Aug	Sep	Aug	Sep
	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150
Yes, for it	65%	65%	56%	49%	63%	54%	63%	58%	90%	86%	76%	57%
No, against												
it	18	20	24	32	19	29	19	26	3	11	17	29
No opinion	17	15	20	19	18	17	18	16	2	3	7	14
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

It may be noted above that whatever loss in support has occurred in the US Zone for German participation in an European army is localized in Wuerttemberg-Baden and in Hesse. Bavarian returns are almost identical for August and September.

The very favorable September turn of events in Korea (the Inchon landings occurred on the 15th) is of course the obvious explanation for the above changes in attitudes. With mounting Western successes in Korea German feelings of threat and insecurity would tend to decrease, with a consequent decreased interest among some in contributing soldiers for European defense.

GROUP DIFFERENCES IN THE US ZONE ...

The slight overall drop in support for German participation in an European army has apparently not seriously affected the pattern of relationships among sub-groupings in the US Zone. In September as priorly in August, it remains true that approval of an Atlantic Pact army is relatively greater among the more informed elements of the population. However, the second August generalization - that in no group does approval of an Atlantic Pact army fail to strongly exceed disapproval - does not entirely bear up in the current findings. Among youth (15 through 24 years) the preponderance of approval over disapproval has dropped to a bare 10 per cent. And among respondents who indicate that they prefer none of the present political parties, approval and disapproval are now almost even - 44 and 42 per cent respectively. The change from no opinion to negative responses among these individuals is rather considerable in the August returns, and they will hence have to be closely studied in the more extensive October survey to see if any explanation is available in the event the trend change persists.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

But probably the most important single disclosure of the US Zone breakdown tabulations derives from the comparisons of the returns for men as compared with women. The figures show that almost all of the drop in support for German participation in an European army that has occurred in the US Zone has taken place among women. The change between August and September among males is not reliably beyond chance.

A final comparison that may be highlighted from the tabulations below relates to religion. It can be observed that among the Protestants, as is not true among the Catholics, an appreciable rise has occurred in the proportion who are against German participation in an European army. It is not unlikely that this increase in opposition is related to the widely aired controversy between Chancellor Adenauer and Heinemann, his minister of defense (a leading Protestant figure). Heinemann has frequently expressed himself as opposed to any German remilitarization and has taken public exception (leading finally to resignation) to Adenauer's asserted by-passing of his views in dealing with the remilitarization issue. In this connection and because of recent speeches by Pastor Niemöller the October trends on the remilitarization issue among Protestant respondents will be of particular significance.

"Several West European Nations and America recently signed a defense pact, the so-called Atlantic Pact.

Suppose West Germany would join the Atlantic Pact and be asked in connection with it to participate in a general army for defense of Western Europe. Would you then be for or against such participation in a defense army? "

	Yes, for it		No, against it		No opinion		Number of cases: *
	Aug '50	Sep '50	Aug '50	Sep '50	Aug '50	Sep '50	
<u>Sex:</u>							
Men	72%	71%	21%	24%	7%	5%..100%	642
Women	54	49	19	27	27	24	862
<u>Education:</u>							
8 years or less	61%	57%	19%	25%	20%	18%	1252
9 years and more	72	66	22	26	6	6	247
<u>Income (per month):</u>							
0 - 149 DM	55%	55%	19%	21%	26%	24%	403
150 - 299 DM	66	59	19	29	15	12	646
300 DM and more	69	66	21	24	10	10	394
<u>City Size:</u>							
Under 2,000 pop.	61%	55%	17%	25%	22%	20%	566
2,000 - 24,999	59	61	21	24	20	15	471
25,000 and over	65	60	22	23	10	12	447

(cont'd on next page)

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	Yes, for it		No, against it		No opinion		Number of cases:
	Aug '50	Sep '50	Aug '50	Sep '50	Aug '50	Sep '50	
<u>Occupation:</u>							
Professional and semi-professional	74%	76%	26%	14%	4%	10%...100%	42
Business, executive and managerial	73	76	21	15	6	9	71
Clerical	71	65	20	28	9	7	123
Skilled workers	69	62	25	34	6	4	203
Semi-skilled workers	69	53	19	32	12	15	66
Unskilled workers	74	68	13	21	13	11	47
Service and protective	58	49	22	26	20	25	72
Farmers	63	67	16	18	21	15	174
No occupation, retired, students, etc.	60	61	14	18	26	21	188
Unemployed	73	70	22	30	5	-	37
Housewives	52	47	20	28	28	25	481
<u>Age:</u>							
15 - 24 years	58%	45%	27%	35%	15%	20%	226
25 - 59 years	63	45	20	31	17	24	1017
60 years and over	63	43	11	23	26	29	261
<u>Party Preference:</u>							
SFD	72%	66%	17%	26%	11%	8%	345
CDU/CSU	73	67	12	17	15	16	343
FDP/LDP/DVP/BDV	80	74	10	22	10	4	92
BP	72	71	20	20	8	9	94
None of them	43	44	18	42	39	14	301
No opinion	54	43	27	20	19	37	286
<u>Religion:</u>							
Catholics	63%	62%	18%	22%	19%	16%	833
Protestants	62	53	20	31	18	16	628
All others	56	67	31	21	13	12	43
<u>Origin:</u>							
Natives	61%	57%	21%	27%	18%	16%	1194
Refugees	68	65	14	19	18	16	309
<u>Family Status:</u>							
Married		60%		26%		14%	964
Unmarried		58		27		15	359
Widowed		48		20		32	158
Divorced		65		26		9	23

*It should be noted that in many of the breakdown categories the number of cases are far too few for reliable comparisons. In such instances comparative figures are shown only for whatever suggestive value they may have.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

RESPONDENTS' ESTIMATE OF GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION ON REMILITARIZATION ...

It is an important psychological fact that many people's opinions on an issue are influenced considerably in the direction of what they think the majority of their fellows believe. It may be of some interest therefore in interpreting German reactions on the remilitarization issue to obtain the respondents' conceptions of general German opinion as a basis for judging in what way such a factor may be affecting German attitudes.

The tabulations below reveal that 46 per cent in the US Zone judge German public opinion to be generally favorable to the idea of West German participation in an Atlantic Pact army. The proportion voicing such a judgment might be considered unexpectedly large in view of the rather widespread suggestion emanating from the German press and other sources during September to the effect that West Germans were opposed to remilitarization. However, there is still a substantial proportion of three out of ten in the US Zone who judge that most Germans oppose the participation of West Germany in an European army. Such a judgment is not a correct one* and it may be of more than minor value to consider ways of disabusing these people of their erroneous conception of public opinion since their belief, in the present connection, probably operates either to instigate or reinforce opposition to what has come to be the American position on the remilitarization issue. So as the situation now stands extent of opposition to German participation in an European defensive army can reasonably be assumed to be somewhat inflated - how much cannot be said - as a consequence of frequently held erroneous conceptions of general public antagonism to the idea.

"What do you believe, are most Germans for or against the participation of West Germany in an European defense army?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
For it	54%	36%	36%	46%	79%	48%
Against it	26	35	35	30	12	29
No opinion	20	29	29	24	9	23
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

*As far as indicated by repeated studies by the Reactions Analysis Staff.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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WEST GERMAN ARMY - TYPE UNSPECIFIED ...

German hesitancy about remilitarization when the type of army is unspecified - and hence may allow of a German national army - is increasingly underscored in the September results. From a fairly even split of pro and con in August, reliably more US Zone respondents (48%) are currently opposed to an army - when type is not specifically spelled out - than approve (40%). These findings pile up increasing evidence that in regard to German remilitarization there is no majority support in the US Zone for German participation in other than a specifically European type of army. The reasons for such a preference are being examined in the October survey.

"There has been considerable talk recently about whether or not Western Germany should have an army. Are you for it or are you against it?"

	US ZONE				Berlin				Bremen			
	Nov '49	Apr '50	Aug '50	Sep '50	Nov '49	Apr '50	Aug '50	Sep '50	Nov '49	Apr '50	Aug '50	Sep '50
For it	26%	39%	43%	40%	48%	51%	73%	68%	25%	35%	54%	44%
Against it	62	56	45	43	50	48	26	23	69	59	41	47
No opinion	12	5	12	12	2	1	1	4	6	6	5	9
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	Bavaria				Hesse				W. Baden			
	Nov '49	Apr '50	Aug '50	Sep '50	Nov '49	Apr '50	Aug '50	Sep '50	Nov '49	Apr '50	Aug '50	Sep '50
For it	32%	47%	48%	48%	16%	29%	31%	34%	22%	29%	43%	28%
Against it	56	49	44	42	71	65	50	52	69	66	46	60
No opinion	12	4	8	10	13	6	19	14	9	5	11	12
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

The August to September increase in opposition to an unspecified type of army, it should be noted above, is largely localized in Wuerttemberg-Baden. The more extensive October survey may yield clues as to why this should be so.

GROUP DIFFERENCES ...

Disregarding instances where the number of cases are too limited to be reliable, there appears to be only a few prominent departures from August results among US Zone sub-groups. There is a very marked shift of opinion among people who report a preference for none of the present political parties. This has already been commented upon in connection with the European army question and will be checked in the October survey. There is also increase in opposition among Protestants for the possible reasons that have already been indicated. The remaining changes worthy of note are increases in opposition to an unspecified type of army among SPD adherents and among refugees. Those who studied the prior report may remember that these were the two groups in which the greatest decreases in opposition had occurred between April and August 1950. The suggestion is then that some of these people are not firmly crystallized in their views, and having been prompted to shift toward support of German remilitarization probably because of Korea-induced apprehensions, are readily influenced to shift back as the Korean situation improves.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

"There has been considerable talk recently about whether or not Western Germany should have an army. Are you for it or are you against it?"

	For it		Against it		No opinion		Number of cases:
	Aug '50	Sep '50	Aug '50	Sep '50	Aug '50	Sep '50	
Sex:							
Men	43%	43%	46%	48%	6%	4%...100%	642
Women	38	35	45	48	17	17	862
Education:							
8 years or less	43%	41%	44%	47%	13%	12%	1252
9 years and more	43	39	52	55	5	6	247
Income (per month):							
0 - 149 DM	46%	41%	38%	42%	16%	17%	403
150 - 299 DM	44	40	46	51	10	9	646
300 DM and more	41	43	52	52	7	5	394
City Size:							
Under 2,000 pop.	47%	42%	39%	42%	14%	16%	586
2,000 - 24,999	40	40	48	51	12	9	471
25,000 and over	41	38	51	54	8	8	447
Occupation:							
Professional and semi-professional	51%	38%	49%	57%	-	5%	42
Business, executive and managerial	46	48	47	46	7	6	71
Clerical	39	38	54	53	7	9	123
Skilled workers	40	40	56	56	4	4	203
Semi-skilled workers	48	36	44	56	8	8	66
Unskilled workers	53	58	29	38	13	4	47
Service and protective	48	35	37	48	15	17	72
Farmers	45	52	44	38	11	10	174
No occupation, retired, students, etc.	49	44	36	37	15	19	168
Unemployed	58	54	38	41	4	5	37
Housewives	36	33	46	52	18	15	431
Age:							
15 - 24 years	34%	37%	55%	54%	11%	9%	226
25 - 59 years	43	39	46	50	11	11	1017
60 years and over	52	47	35	39	13	14	261
Party Preference:							
SPD	51%	47%	41%	49%	8%	4%	345
CDU/CSU	46	49	43	41	11	10	343
FDP/LDP/DVP/BDV	52	41	44	53	4	6	92
BF	49	52	47	43	4	5	94
None of them	36	28	38	60	26	12	301
No opinion	36	31	52	43	12	26	286
Religion:							
Catholics	45%	43%	44%	45%	11%	12%	833
Protestants	42	36	46	53	12	11	628
All others	25	49	66	42	9	9	43
Origin:							
Natives	40%	39%	43%	50%	12%	11%	1194
Refugees	55	43	34	43	11	14	309
Family Status:							
Married	40%		51%		9%		964
Unmarried	41		46		13		359
Widowed	33		39		28		158
Divorced	65		35		-		23

*It should be noted that in many of the breakdown categories the number of cases are far too low for reliable comparisons. In such instances comparative figures are shown only for whatever suggestive value they may have.

GERMANS VIEW THE REMILITARIZATION ISSUE

Urban Opinion in Western Germany

Report No. 46

Series No. 2

November 10, 1950

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OFFICE OF THE U. S. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR GERMANY
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF

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- ✓ Are Germans For or Against Participation in an European Army? ...
- ✓ Are Western Powers Doing All They Should For German Security? ...
- Are Germans Satisfied With French Efforts Toward German Security? ...
- Are Germans Aware of Western Powers' Security Guarantee? ...
- ✓ Have Germans Right to be Defended If They Refuse to Participate in European Army? ...
- Who Has Most to Gain from German Participation in European Army? ...
- ✓ Will Germans be Defended If They Refuse to Participate in European Army? ...
- ✓ Has German Military Been Good or Bad Influence in Past German History? ...
- ✓ Would German Defense Participation Impair German Democracy? ...
- Should German Generals be Used If Germany Participates in European Army? ...
- Should People or Bundestag Decide on German Participation? ...
- Do Germans Think Catholics and Protestants Differ on Participation? ...
- Are Germans Satisfied with Adenauer's Handling of the Remilitarization Issue? ...

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INTRODUCTION ...

The current report is another in the series of studies being conducted by the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs, to keep abreast of developments in German thinking on the complex issue of West German remilitarization.

The present findings are based upon an urban sample of Western Germany as a whole, i.e. inclusive of the British and French as well as the American zones. The results were gathered on October 31st and November 1st through the operation of a 48-hour "flash" survey embracing a representative urban quota sample of 640 cases drawn from among Western German cities 50,000 and over in population and a 200 case quota sample in the three Western sectors of Berlin.

Because of the importance of as much information as possible on German thinking about remilitarization, simple group breakdowns are presented for the urban West German returns even though the limited number of cases necessitated in a high speed survey is not ideal for such use.

Future reports in the remilitarization series will present West German urban returns on additional questions, and will present in addition more intensive analysis of the most significant issues as based upon full-scale random sampling in the US occupied areas.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS ...

- ... Approval of German participation in an European Atlantic Pact army is still the predominant sentiment in urban West Germany as of the time of the present survey. Majorities both in the British and US Zone - almost nine in 10 in Berlin - express themselves in favor of such participation. Changes since mid-August 1950 have been negligible with only slight additions to both pro and con figures as some of the "no opinion" group make up their minds.
- ... Similarity between the findings of the earlier and the present survey characterizes not only the overall results but the group comparisons also. Currently, as in mid-August, the same general group trend manifests itself, a tendency for the leadership levels - the men, the better educated and the higher socio-economic levels - to be more in favor of German participation in a West European army.
- ... Despite the Heinemann-Adenauer contretemps, and Pastor Niemöller's widely published strictures against German remilitarization, Protestants in urban West Germany do not currently seem to be any more opposed to German military participation than are Catholics.
- ... The marked similarity of returns on the present issue over a period so replete with significant events relating to German security, tends to suggest a certain measure of stability in the pattern of reactions on this question among West German urban dwellers.
- ... Currently the predominant opinion among West German city dwellers is that the Western powers are doing everything they should to insure the security of West Germany. This marks a departure from the even split of pro and con opinion obtained in mid-August of 1950.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

- ... When specifically French efforts toward German security are examined, instead of the efforts of the three Western powers combined, German judgments are quite different. Almost two out of three West German city dwellers state that they are dissatisfied with what the French are doing for the defense of West Germany. One third of the dissatisfied group hold that in their opinion the French are doing "nothing at all" for West German defense.
- ... Negative evaluation of French efforts toward German security are more frequent among the leadership levels - the men, the better educated, and respondents of higher socio-economic status.
- ... Currently awareness of the German security guarantee which was announced by the Washington Foreign Ministers' conference is considerable but not complete. A third still say that they do not know of any promise by the Western powers to defend West Germany, or believe that no such promise has been given.
- ... The preponderance of urban West Germans believe that West Germany has the right to expect to be defended even if she should refuse to participate in a West European army.
- ... Such a point of view is not calculated to strengthen German interest in participating in their own defense. Judged in this connection the recently propounded statement of HICOG officials - that the American people are not likely to stand for a policy of defending West Germany if the Germans themselves refuse to help - would appear to be well advised.
- ... The preponderant opinion in urban West Germany is also that West Germany will be defended even if she refuses to participate in a West European army.
- ... The preponderant judgment in urban West Germany is that Western Europe as a whole or all the Western nations would profit equally from German participation in a West European army. But among those who think otherwise it is significant to note that three times as many believe that America would gain the most as believe that Western Germany would be the greatest gainer. Such an attitude must of course be considered a problem for American policy in West Germany.
- ... Not a few German commentators have stated that Germans object to participation in a European army largely as a result of a long continued criticism of the German military by the West. The present survey reveals that despite what the Western powers may have had to say on the subject, a preponderance of West German urbanites believe that in general over the past fifty years the German military has been a good rather than a bad influence on the German people.
- ... Only 14 per cent among West German urbanites feel that German participation in an European army is likely to have an injurious influence upon German democracy. The largest proportion hold that the resulting influence would be good.
- ... So it becomes rather clear that if there is any really widespread objection to German participation in an European army it is not likely to derive in any large part from concern about possible injurious repercussions to democratic processes in Germany.

- c -

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

- ... A definite majority in urban West Germany express the opinion that generals of the former Wehrmacht rather than newly developed leaders should be used to command German units in the event Germany participated in an European army. Only in Berlin does the idea of developing new military commanders attract any appreciable support. So if it is the intention of Western policy makers to pursue this latter course they must be prepared to encounter, it would seem, a considerable amount of adverse opinion.
- ... It is additionally significant that support for utilization of former Wehrmacht generals is considerably greater among the more educated and informed levels of the West German urban population rather than among their less informed counterparts.
- ... Considerable discussion has occurred in German circles as to whether the question of German participation in an European army should be decided by the Bundestag or directly through a plebiscite by the people themselves. Public opinion among West German urbanites is strongly in favor of this latter course.
- ... The better educated and the higher status individuals appear to have a somewhat greater trust in their elected representatives. But strong majorities among all groups favor a direct vote of the people on the remilitarization issue.
- ... One of the questions raised by the recently widely published criticism of German remilitarization by influential Protestant leaders (Niebuhr and Heinemann particularly) is the extent to which Germans have come to believe that Protestants differ from Catholics in their attitudes toward German participation in an European army. The predominant opinion in urban West Germany, as of the time of the present survey, is that the Catholics and Protestants have similar attitudes on the remilitarization issue. But among those who believe otherwise the view that Catholics are more in favor exceeds the contrary by three to one.
- ... In urban West Germany as a whole approximately as many people are dissatisfied as are satisfied with Chancellor Adenauer's handling of the rearmament issue. The same situation holds true for the British Zone taken singly. In the American Zone, however, dissatisfaction appears to predominate, though the difference may not be entirely reliable with the limited number of cases. Only in Berlin does satisfaction with Adenauer's actions attain majority status.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ARE GERMANS FOR OR AGAINST PARTICIPATION IN AN EUROPEAN ARMY? ...

Approval of German participation in an European Atlantic Pact army is still the preponderant sentiment in urban West Germany as of the time of the present survey. Majorities both in the British and US Zone - almost nine in 10 in Berlin - express themselves in favor of such participation. Changes since mid-August 1950 have been negligible with only slight additions to both pro and con figures as some of the "no opinion" group make up their minds.

ACD
"Several West European Nations and America recently signed a defense pact, the so-called Atlantic Pact.

Suppose West Germany would join the Atlantic Pact and be asked in connection with it to participate in a general army for the defense of West Europe. Would you then be for or against such participation in a defense army?"

	WEST GERMANY*		British Zone		US Zone		Berlin	
	Aug 15-17	Oct-Nov 31-1	Aug 15-17	Oct-Nov 31-1	Aug 15-17	Oct-Nov 31-1	Aug 15-17	Oct-Nov 31-1
For it	61%	63%	59%	61%	67%	65%	66%	39%
Against it	27	30	29	31	21	29	12	6
No opinion	$\frac{12}{100\%}$	$\frac{7}{100\%}$	$\frac{12}{100\%}$	$\frac{8}{100\%}$	$\frac{12}{100\%}$	$\frac{6}{100\%}$	$\frac{2}{100\%}$	$\frac{3}{100\%}$

* The West German sample used in this survey includes a proportionate allotment of respondents from French Zone cities of 50,000 or more population and from Bremen. However, the number of cases that result for these two areas are too few to permit reliable separate tabulations of their results. Hence only the British Zone with 416 cases, the US Zone with 162, and Berlin with 200 are separately tabulated for comparisons.

Similarity between the findings of the two surveys characterizes not only the overall results but the group comparisons also. Currently, as in mid-August, it will be observed below, the same general group trend manifests itself, a tendency for the leadership levels - the men, the better educated and the high statused - to be more in favor of German participation in an European pact army. It is interesting to note too that despite the Heinemann-Adenauer contretemps, and Pastor Niemoller's widely published strictures against German remilitarization, Protestants in urban West Germany do not currently seem to be any more opposed to German participation than are Catholics.*

"Several West European Nations and America recently signed a defense pact, the so-called Atlantic Pact.

Suppose West Germany would join the Atlantic Pact and be asked in connection with it to participate in a general army for the defense of West Europe. Would you then be for or against such participation in a defense army?"

	For it		Against it		No opinion		Number of cases:
	Aug	Oct-Nov	Aug	Oct-Nov	Aug	Oct-Nov	
	<u>15-17</u>	<u>31-1</u>	<u>15-17</u>	<u>31-1</u>	<u>15-17</u>	<u>31-1</u>	
WEST GERMANY							
Sex:							
Men	68%	69%	28%	29%	4%	2%..100%	286
Women	54	58	28	31	18	11	354
Education:							
Elementary school	53%	59%	30%	31%	17%	10%	347
Beyond elementary school	70	67	25	29	5	4	292
Socio-economic Status:							
Lower class	55%	58%	29%	32%	16%	10%	323
Upper class to lower middle	66	68	26	28	8	4	317
Age:							
Under 40 years	62%	60%	28%	33%	10%	7%	291
40 years and over	60	64	27	28	13	8	349
Religion:							
Catholics	62%	60%	29%	33%	9%	7%	221
Protestants	63	64	25	29	12	7	361

The marked similarity of the mid-August and late October returns on the present issue does not of course mean that fluctuations in opinions may not have occurred between the two surveys. But the similarity over a period so replete with significant events relating to German security does tend to suggest a certain measure of stability in the pattern of reactions on this issue among West German urban dwellers.

* This current finding for urban West Germany differs somewhat from the slightly greater Protestant disapproval that was found in the US Zone (both rural and urban sampling) as of September 1950. See Report No. 45, Series No. 2, (October 31, 1950) entitled: Trend in Opinion on West German Remilitarization.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ARE WESTERN POWERS DOING ALL THEY SHOULD FOR GERMAN SECURITY? ...

Currently the propenderant opinion among West German city dwellers is that the Western powers are doing everything they should to insure the security of West Germany. This marks a departure from the even split of pro and con opinion obtained in mid-August of 1950. Approval of Western efforts is greater in the US Zone with 56 per cent expressing such a view, than in the British Zone. In Berlin approval has risen from 59 per cent in August to a current figure of three out of four.

"Do you feel that the Western powers are doing everything that they should to insure the security of West Germany?"

WEST GERMANY		British Zone		US Zone		Berlin	
Aug	Oct-Nov	Aug	Oct-Nov	Aug	Oct-Nov	Aug	Oct-Nov
15-17	31-1	15-17	31-1	15-17	31-1	15-17	31-1

Yes, do everything	43%	50%	40%	46%	53%	56%	59%	77%
No, do not do everything	43	35	45	35	33	3	35	21
No opinion	<u>14</u> 100%	<u>15</u> 100%	<u>15</u> 100%	<u>16</u> 100%	<u>9</u> 100%	<u>12</u> 100%	<u>3</u> 100%	<u>2</u> 100%

There is an indication in the West German group breakdowns that the more educated are less convinced of the zealousness of Western efforts to insure German security. Also there is some suggestion that among the Protestants, as compared with Catholics, slightly fewer feel that everything is being done by the Western powers that should be done.

"Do you feel that the Western powers are doing everything that they should to insure the security of West Germany?"

	Yes, do every- thing	No, do not do everything	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	53%	41%	6% ... 100%	236
Women	48	30	22	354
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	50%	31%	19%	347
Beyond elementary school	50	40	10	293
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	48%	33%	19%	323
Upper class to lower middle	52	37	11	317
<u>Ages:</u>				
Under 40 years	47%	36%	17%	291
40 years and over	53	34	13	349
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	56%	31%	13%	221
Protestants	48	35	17	361

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ARE GERMANS SATISFIED WITH FRENCH EFFORTS TOWARD GERMAN SECURITY? ...

When specifically French efforts toward German security are examined, instead of the efforts of the three Western powers combined, German judgments are quite different. Almost two out of three West German city dwellers state that they are dissatisfied with what the French are doing for the defense of West Germany. One third of the dissatisfied group held that in their opinion the French are doing "nothing at all" for West German defense. Opinions are rather similar in the US and British Zones but are not quite so negative toward the French in the three Western sectors of Berlin.

"In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with what the French are doing for the defense of Western Germany?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Satisfied	10%	12%	6%	23%
Dissatisfied	64	63	67	53
(Doing nothing at all)	(22)	(21)	(25)	(8)
No opinion	$\frac{26}{100\%}$	$\frac{25}{100\%}$	$\frac{27}{100\%}$	$\frac{24}{100\%}$

Group breakdowns of West German opinion show clearly that negative evaluation of French efforts toward German security are more frequent among the leadership levels - the men, the better educated, and respondents of higher socio-economic status.

"In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with what the French are doing for the defense of Western Germany?"

	Satisfied	Dis- satisfied	(Doing nothing at all)	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY					
<u>Sex:</u>					
Men	12%	76%	(25%)	12%...100%	285
Women	9	53	(20)	38	354
<u>Education:</u>					
Elementary school	10%	57%	(20%)	33%	347
Beyond elementary school	11	71	(24)	18	292
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>					
Lower class	12%	55%	(20%)	33%	323
Upper class to lower middle	9	71	(23)	20	316
<u>Age:</u>					
Under 40 years	10%	64%	(23%)	26%	291
40 years and over	10	64	(21)	26	343
<u>Religion:</u>					
Catholics	13%	61%	(18%)	26%	221
Protestants	9	64	(23)	27	361

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ARE GERMANS AWARE OF WESTERN POWERS' SECURITY GUARANTEE? ...

One of the products of the Washington Foreign Ministers' Conference in September 1950 was a security guarantee for West Germany to the effect that any attack on West Germany would be taken as an attack upon the Western powers. Currently, awareness of such a guarantee among West German city dwellers is considerable but far from complete. A third still say that they do not know of any promise by the Western powers to defend West Germany, or believe that no such promise has been given.

"Could you tell me please, whether the Western powers have promised to defend West Germany in case of an attack or haven't they given such a promise?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Have promised	63%	64%	60%	77%
Have not promised	10	10	12	3
Don't know	27	26	28	20
	100%	100%	100%	100%

The possibility should not be overlooked that a few of these respondents above who do not state that the Western powers have promised to defend West Germany may be aware of the German security provision in the Foreign Ministers' communique but are not inclined to interpret it as a promise to actually defend the geographical confines of West Germany.

Group breakdowns of Western German returns reveal, as might be expected, that the men, the better educated, and the higher socio-economic levels are more aware of the German security guarantee than are their counterpart groups.

"Could you tell me please, whether the Western powers have promised to defend West Germany in case of an attack or haven't they given such a promise?"

	Have promised	Have not promised	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	75%	12%	13% ... 100%	265
Women	53	9	33	353
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	51%	11%	38%	345
Beyond elementary school	76	10	14	293
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	50%	11%	39%	321
Upper class to lower middle	76	10	14	317
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	63%	9%	28%	269
40 years and over	63	11	26	349
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	62%	8%	30%	221
Protestants	65	11	24	359

C O N F I D E N T I A L

HAVE GERMANS RIGHT TO BE DEFENDED IF THEY REFUSE TO PARTICIPATE IN EUROPEAN ARMY?...

It is significant to discover that the preponderance of urban West Germans believe that West Germany has the right to expect to be defended even if she should refuse to participate in a West European army.

"Suppose West Germany refuses to participate in a West European army; do you think that in spite of this refusal West Germany has the right to expect to be defended by the Western powers or doesn't she have this right?"

ACD

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Has the right	51%	52%	47%	53%
Hasn't the right	34	32	39	40
No opinion	15	16	14	7
	100%	100%	100%	100%

The dominating point of view above is of course not one calculated to strengthen German interest in participating in their own defense. Judged in this connection the recently propounded view - that the American people are not likely to stand for a policy of defending West Germany if the Germans themselves refuse to help - would appear to be well advised.

That German attitudes on the present point are not likely to be easily changed is suggested by the fact that it is the leadership elements among West German urban residents, rather than their counterparts, who more widely hold that West Germany has the right to expect to be defended even though she should refuse to participate in a West European army.

"Suppose West Germany refuses to participate in a West European army; do you think that in spite of this refusal West Germany has the right to expect to be defended by the Western powers or doesn't she have this right?"

	Has the right	Hasn't the right	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	57%	35%	8% ... 100%	286
Women	46	34	20	354
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	44%	35%	21%	347
Beyond elementary school	60	33	7	293
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	47%	33%	20%	323
Upper class to lower middle	55	35	10	317
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	51%	34%	15%	291
40 years and over	51	35	14	349
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	53%	33%	9%	221
Protestants	50	32	18	361

* See the NEUE ZEITUNG, Nov 4, 1950.

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WILL GERMANS BE DEFENDED IF THEY REFUSE TO PARTICIPATE IN EUROPEAN ARMY? ...

Even more interesting and certainly even more a problem to American policy - is the fact that the preponderant opinion in urban West Germany is that West Germany will be defended even if she refuses to participate in a West European army.

"Suppose West Germany refuses to participate in a West European army; do you think that in spite of this refusal the Western powers will defend West Germany or not?"

ACD

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Will defend	53%	53%	53%	79%
Will not	27	27	27	16
No opinion	20	20	20	5
	100%	100%	100%	100%

And again it is the more educated and informed groups, rather than the less, who more widely hold the kind of opinion which can hardly act but to weaken the sense of necessity Germans feel to contribute manpower to their own defense.

"Suppose West Germany refuses to participate in a West European army; do you think that in spite of this refusal the Western powers will defend West Germany or not?"

	Will defend	Will not	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	62%	24%	14%...100%	256
Women	45	28	27	
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	45%	31%	24%	347
Beyond elementary school	62	21	17	293
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	46%	30%	24%	323
Upper class to lower middle	59	24	17	317
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	57%	23%	20%	291
40 years and over	49	30	21	349
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	59%	26%	15%	221
Protestants	49	27	24	361

C O N F I D E N T I A L

WHO HAS MOST TO GAIN FROM GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN ARMY? ...

The preponderant judgment in urban West Germany is that Western Europe as whole or all the Western nations would profit equally from German participation in a West European army. But among those who think otherwise it is significant to note that three times as many believe that America would gain the most as believe that Western Germany would be the greatest gainer. Such an attitude must of course be considered a problem for American policy in West Germany.

"If West Germany should participate in a West European army, who do you think would, in general, have the most to gain from this in case of an attack?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
All the Western nations	23%	22%	26%	41%
Western Europe as a whole	23	22	25	25
America	22	24	22	11
Western Germany	7	8	7	10
Western Europe (without West Germany)	10	10	7	3
qualified replies	2	2	1	5
No opinion	13	12	12	5
	100%	100%	100%	100%

There is no indication among the group breakdowns of any greater inclination among the leadership levels to judge that America would be the greatest gainer from any German participation in European defense. There is a slight suggestion, however, that Catholics hold such a viewpoint more widely than do Protestants.

"If West Germany should participate in a West European army, who do you think would, in general, have the most to gain from this in case of an attack?"

	All the Western nations.	Western Europe as a whole	America	Western Germany	Western Europe without West Germany	qualified replies	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY								
<u>Sex:</u>								
Men	24%	27%	24%	3%	11%	2%	4%	256
Women	23	20	20	7	3	1	21	354
<u>Education:</u>								
Elementary school	24%	18%	23%	7%	9%	1%	18%	347
Beyond elementary school	23	29	22	7	10	2	7	293
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>								
Lower class	23%	19%	21%	9%	9%	2%	17%	323
Upper class to lower middle	24	27	24	6	10	1	8	317
<u>Age:</u>								
Under 40 years	22%	26%	22%	6%	8%	2%	14%	291
40 years and over	24	21	22	9	11	1	12	349
<u>Religion:</u>								
Catholics	25%	24%	27%	8%	8%	2%	8%	221
Protestants	21	25	18	8	10	2	16	361

C O N F I D E N T I A L

HAS GERMAN MILITARY BEEN GOOD OR BAD INFLUENCE IN PAST GERMAN HISTORY? ...

Not a few German commentators have stated that Germans object to participation in a European army largely as a result of a long continued criticism of the German military by the West. But whether this point is made seriously or only in sarcasm it fails to hold up in the present survey. The figures reveal that despite what the Western powers may have had to say on the subject, a preponderance of West German urbanites believe that in general over the past fifty years the German military has been a good rather than a bad influence on the German people.

"Are you of the opinion that during Germany's history of the last 50 years the German military in general has had a good or bad influence on the German people?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Good influence	53%	55%	45%	53%
Bad influence	20	18	25	34
No influence	3	6	11	6
Qualified replies	6	6	9	4
No opinion	11	12	10	3
	100%	100%	100%	100%

While it isn't clear from the breakdowns below that leadership levels are any more inclined to see a good influence emanating from the past German military, it is certainly clear that they are no less inclined to make such a judgment.

"Are you of the opinion that during Germany's history of the last 50 years the German military in general has had a good or bad influence on the German people?"

	Good influence	Bad influence	No influence	Qualified replies	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY						
<u>Sex:</u>						
Men	56%	21%	10%	9%	4%...100%	236
Women	50	20	6	7	17	354
<u>Education:</u>						
Elementary school	50%	22%	3%	5%	15%	347
Beyond elementary school	56	19	3	10	7	292
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>						
Lower class	51%	22%	3%	6%	13%	323
Upper class to lower middle	55	19	3	9	9	317
<u>Age:</u>						
Under 40 years	51%	20%	3%	9%	12%	291
40 years and over	54	21	3	6	11	349
<u>Religion:</u>						
Catholics	53%	22%	7%	8%	10%	221
Protestants	53	19	7	3	13	361

C O N F I D E N T I A L

WOULD GERMAN DEFENSE PARTICIPATION IMPAIR GERMAN DEMOCRACY? ...

Asked more directly about the current situation it is found that only 14 per cent among West German urbanites feel that German participation in an European army is likely to have an injurious influence upon German democracy. The largest proportion see no effect one way or the other in such a course, and the next largest proportion hold that the resulting influence would be good.

"In your opinion, if West Germany participates in a West European army, would this have an influence on democracy in West Germany or wouldn't it have any influence?"

If "Yes": "Would this be a good or bad influence?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
No influence	36%	39%	32%	37%
Good influence	23	21	24	33
Bad influence	14	13	16	8
No opinion	27	27	28	22
	100%	100%	100%	100%

So it becomes even clearer that if there is any really widespread objection to German participation in an European army it is not likely to derive in any large part from concern about possible injurious repercussions to democratic processes in Germany.

The leadership levels in West Germany, the breakdowns below indicate, are more likely than their counterparts to anticipate no influence one way or another on German democracy as a result of any German participation in an European army.

"In your opinion, if West Germany participates in a West European army, would this have an influence on democracy in West Germany or wouldn't it have any influence?"

If "Yes": "Would this be a good or bad influence?"

	No influence	Good influence	Bad influence	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY					
<u>Sex:</u>					
Men	44%	26%	17%	13%...100%	286
Women	29	20	10	41	354
<u>Education:</u>					
Elementary school	30%	22%	13%	35%	347
Beyond elementary school	43	23	14	20	292
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>					
Lower class	32%	19%	14%	35%	323
Upper class to lower middle	40	26	13	21	317
<u>Age:</u>					
Under 40 years	35%	20%	16%	29%	291
40 years and over	36	25	11	28	349
<u>Religion:</u>					
Catholics	37%	26%	11%	26%	221
Protestants	36	20	13	31	361

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SHOULD GERMAN GENERALS BE USED IF GERMANY PARTICIPATES IN EUROPEAN ARMY? ...

A definite majority in urban West Germany express the opinion that generals of the former Wehrmacht rather than newly developed leaders should be used to command German units in the event Germany participated in an European army. Only in Berlin does the idea of developing new military commanders attract any appreciable support. So if it is the intention of Western policy makers to pursue this latter course they must be prepared to encounter, it would seem, a considerable amount of adverse opinion.

"Suppose West Germany would participate in a West European army. In your opinion, should generals of the former Wehrmacht then be used to command the German units or should, as far as possible, other men be trained for this?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Generals	61%	62%	59%	53%
Other men	19	17	24	39
qualified replies	2	2	-	5
No opinion	18	19	17	3
	100%	100%	100%	100%

It is additionally significant that support for utilization of former Wehrmacht generals is considerable greater among the more educated and informed levels of the West German urban population rather than among their less informed counterparts. Also for whatever reasons, support for development of substitute leaders appears to be somewhat greater among Catholics than among Protestant respondents.

"Suppose West Germany would participate in a West European army. In your opinion, should generals of the former Wehrmacht then be used to command the German units or should, as far as possible, other men be trained for this?"

	Generals	Other men	qualified replies	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY					
<u>Sex:</u>					
Men	69%	18%	2%	11%...100%	236
Women	55	19	1	25	354
<u>Education:</u>					
Elementary school	52%	24%	1%	23%	347
Beyond elementary school	72	13	3	12	293
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>					
Lower class	53%	23%	1%	23%	323
Upper class to lower middle	70	14	3	13	317
<u>Age:</u>					
Under 40 years	59%	17%	2%	22%	291
40 years and over	63	19	2	16	349
<u>Religion:</u>					
Catholics	57%	26%	1%	16%	221
Protestants	65	14	2	19	361

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SHOULD PEOPLE OR BUNDESTAG DECIDE ON GERMAN PARTICIPATION? ...

Considerable discussion has occurred in German circles as to whether the question of German participation in an European army should be decided by the Bundestag or directly through a plebiscite by the people themselves. Public opinion among West German urbanites, the following figures show, is strongly in favor of the latter course. Reasons advanced by respondents for their decision on this and many of the prior questions will be studied in a projected full-scale survey.

"Now, in your opinion, should the decision be made about West Germany's participation in a West European army?" (CARD)

WEST GERMANY British Zone US Zone Berlin

Through a vote of the elected representatives of the people in the Bundestag	16%	13%	11%	11%
Through a vote of all the West German people	80	78	36	85
No opinion	$\frac{4}{100\%}$	$\frac{4}{100\%}$	$\frac{3}{100\%}$	$\frac{4}{100\%}$

The better educated and the higher status individuals appear to have a somewhat greater trust in their elected representatives. But strong majorities among all groups favor a direct vote of the people on the re-militarization issue.

"Now, in your opinion, should the decision be made about West Germany's participation in a West European army?" (CARD)

	Through a vote of the elected representatives of the people in the Bundestag	Through a vote of all the West German people	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	14%	83%	3%...100%	286
Women	17	77	6	354
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	11%	81%	8%	347
Beyond elementary school	21	78	1	293
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	11%	81%	8%	323
Upper class to lower middle	20	79	1	317
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	14%	81%	5%	291
40 years and over	16	79	5	349
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	18%	80%	2%	221
Protestants	15	80	5	361

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DO GERMANS THINK CATHOLICS AND PROTESTANTS DIFFER ON PARTICIPATION? ...

One of the questions raised by the recently widely published criticism of German remilitarization by influential Protestant leaders (Niemöller and Heinemann particularly) is the extent to which Germans have come to believe that Protestants differ from Catholics in their attitudes toward German participation in an European army. The predominant opinion in urban West Germany, as of the time of the present survey, is that the Catholics and Protestants have similar attitudes on the remilitarization issue. But among those who believe otherwise the view that Catholics are more in favor exceeds the contrary by three to one.

"Do you think that the attitude of Protestants and Catholics toward the question of West Germany's participation in a West European army is the same, or are the attitudes of Protestants and Catholics different on this question?"

If "Different": "In your opinion, who in general is more in favor of West Germany's participation in a West European army: the Protestants or the Catholics?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
The same	48%	50%	45%	45%
Protestants more in favor	7	8	6	16
Catholics more in favor	21	20	24	10
No opinion	<u>24</u> 100%	<u>22</u> 100%	<u>25</u> 100%	<u>29</u> 100%

It should not be overlooked above that largely Protestant Berlin departs somewhat from the West German pattern of replies on this query.

Leadership groups are more inclined to express an opinion on the present question, group breakdowns reveal, which results in both a larger proportion of them saying "no difference" and saying that Catholics are more in favor of German participation in an European army. Most of the differences, however, are too small to be entirely reliable.

	The same	Protestants more in favor	Catholics more in favor	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY					
Sex:					
Men	49%	3%	25%	13%...100%	236
Women	47	6	18	29	354
Education:					
Elementary school	44%	8%	19%	29%	347
Beyond elementary school	53	7	24	16	292
Socio-economic Status:					
Lower class	43%	8%	18%	31%	323
Upper class to lower middle	53	6	24	17	317
Age:					
Under 40 years	49%	10%	18%	23%	291
40 years and over	47	5	24	24	349
Religion:					
Catholics	51%	5%	25%	19%	221
Protestants	47	9	18	26	361

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ARE GERMANS SATISFIED WITH ADENAUER'S HANDLING OF THE REMILITARIZATION ISSUE...

In urban West Germany as a whole approximately as many people are dissatisfied as are satisfied with Chancellor Adenauer's handling of the rearmament issue. The same situation holds true for the British Zone taken singly. In the American Zone, however, dissatisfaction appears to predominate, though the difference may not be entirely reliable with the limited number of cases. Only in Berlin does satisfaction with Adenauer's actions attain majority status.

"In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way Federal Chancellor Adenauer is handling the issue of West Germany's rearmament?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Satisfied	37%	40%	32%	61%
Dissatisfied	41	40	45	18
No opinion	22	20	23	21
	100%	100%	100%	100%

Among population groupings in West Germany dissatisfaction is definitely more widespread among men than among women, and possibly though not conclusively, somewhat more widespread among the better educated.

"In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way Federal Chancellor Adenauer is handling the issue of West Germany's rearmament?"

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	37%	51%	12%...100%	234
Women	37	33	30	354
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	37%	37%	26%	347
Beyond elementary school	35	44	18	291
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	35%	35%	27%	323
Upper class to lower middle	39	44	17	315
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	36%	40%	24%	290
40 years and over	35	41	21	348
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	42%	35%	23%	220
Protestants	37	41	22	361

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GERMANS VIEW THE REMILITARIZATION ISSUE

Further Findings and some Limitations on Majority Approval

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

INTRODUCTION ...

The present report continues the series of studies being conducted by the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs, to keep abreast of developments in German thinking on the remilitarization issue.

The present findings are based upon an urban sample of Western Germany as a whole, i.e. inclusive of the British and French as well as the American zones. The results were gathered on November 9th and 10th through the operation of a 48-hour "flash" survey embracing a representative urban quota sample of 640 cases drawn from among Western German cities 50,000 and over in population and a 200 case quota sample in the three Western sectors of Berlin.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS ...

I. TREND ON GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN ARMY

- ... The latest measurement of urban West German reactions to German participation in an European army still indicates a strong preponderance of approval over disapproval. However, there is an increasing indication in the US Zone, since mid-August, that opposition has risen somewhat.

II. CURRENT REACTIONS TO KOREA

- ... The prevailing opinion in urban West Germany is that the fact of Chinese intervention in Korea has considerably increased the danger of a new world war.
- ... Apprehensions of a Korean parallel occurring in Germany are almost as great currently as they were in mid-August during some of the most threatening stages of the Korean conflict. Two out of three in urban West Germany see the present danger as great to fairly great.

III. REACTIONS TO PROJECTED WESTERN POWER REINFORCEMENTS

- ... Apparently by no means all of the West Germans are happy about the projected plan of the Western powers to bring additional troops into West Germany. The majority are in favor of such a course, but a substantial minority express themselves as opposed.
- ... A definite majority among West German urbanites do not feel that it would be right to have West Germany contribute to the payment of any additional costs incident to reinforcing Western power troops in Germany.
- ... Even more widespread is the objection to allowing any additional housing to be requisitioned in Germany for the use of the projected troop reinforcements. Only one in ten in West Germany would countenance such a course. And in Berlin despite an 85 per cent approval of Western power reinforcements, three out of four would be opposed to any requisitioning of German houses for the use of additional troops. (Question was asked not because any such requisitioning is being contemplated, but as some measure of German readiness to impose sacrifices upon themselves in the interest of defense).

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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- ... It begins to become clear therefore, that whatever the German interest in security, the majority are definitely not in the mood to contribute either toward the costs or the housing of any Western power troop reinforcements that may be sent to Germany. The suggestion emerges too - which will be subjected to further study - that not a few Germans are opposed to such reinforcements for fear they will have to contribute in some way to their support.

IV. REACTIONS TO A DRAFT FOR MILITARY SERVICE

- ... A clear majority of urban West Germans hold that in their judgment the West German Federal government should not have the right to draft men for military service.
- ... This finding becomes very significant in view of the additional fact that less than one in ten say they would volunteer for military service in the event that West Germany should participate in an European army. Among those who are eligible for military service the preponderance state that they would serve only if drafted, and almost four out of ten indicate that they would refuse to serve even if they were subjected to a draft.
- ... The importance of the above findings should not be overlooked. Clearly if (1) the majority of Germans oppose a draft and (2) a majority of able-bodied German men indicate that they would serve only if drafted - with most of the others refusing altogether - the prospects of recruiting any large number of German soldiers for an European army would appear to be far from encouraging.
- ... These facts strongly suggest that despite the majority approval of German participation in an European army, there is considerably less than majority support of the kind of measures and actions needed to realize such a plan.
- ... A similar reluctance to back approval with concrete sacrifices has already been observed in connection with the question of Western troop reinforcements for German defense. Though the majority approved such reinforcements, large majorities, it will be remembered, opposed contributing to such reinforcements with either funds or housing.

V. GERMAN STATUS AMONG COMMANDERS OF EUROPEAN ARMY

- ... West German city dwellers are very clear in their opinion that German military leaders in any projected European army should have as much to say about the command of the forces as the leaders of any other nation.
- ... However, only one in five in West Germany believe that German military leaders will in actuality have as much to say as leaders of other nations, in the event Germany participates in an European army.

VI. INFLUENCE OF MILITARY ON GERMAN POLITICS

- ... Though it is the preponderant view, considerably less than majority of West German urbanites voice the opinion that over the past 100 years, the military has had too much influence on German politics.
- ... The 37 per cent who hold that the German military in recent history has been overly influential on German politics is best interpreted in conjunction with an earlier reported finding to the effect that only a 20 per cent minority held that the German military has been a bad influence on the German people over the past 50 years. This combination of results shows first that for a number of Germans (the difference between 37 and 20 per cent) any overly great influence of the military in recent history has been presumably offset by virtues to the extent that it is not to be

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termed a bad influence on the German people. But more relevantly in the present connection, the findings suggest that whatever may be occasioning German hesitancy about remilitarization, it is quite unlikely to derive in any major part from the kind of apprehensions about the German military with which the Western powers would be sympathetic.

- ... That concern about a possible renaissance of German militarism plays little part in German thinking about remilitarization is additionally indicated by the fact that only one in ten (12%) among West German urbanites advance the judgment that the military might come to have too much influence on German politics if Germany should participate in an European army.

VII. PREFERENCES AS TO TIME AND METHOD OF DECIDING REMILITARIZATION QUESTION

- ... West German city dwellers are preponderantly of the opinion that the question of German participation in an European army should be decided soon, rather than more time being taken for consideration.
- ... Even when given the alternative of electing new Bundestag members to decide the issue, the large majority of West German urbanites still indicate a preference for a plebiscite on whether or not West Germany should participate in an European army.

VIII. THE POSSIBLE DANGER OF A PLEBISCITE TO ATTAINMENT OF AMERICAN POLICY OBJECTIVES

- ... The very strong support for a plebiscite poses definite complications for American policy on the German remilitarization issue. In spite of the majority support for German participation in an European army found in repeated RAS surveys of representative samples in the US Zone and in representative urban samples in West Germany as a whole, it would be entirely possible to obtain majority opposition in a plebiscite. Such an apparent anomaly derives from the fact that many West Germans are in favor of German military contributions only when they are being thought of rather than emotional and hence in a mood to appreciate stern necessities. If the remilitarization issue is by wording of the question or its general context posed in such a way as to draw upon emotions and inclinations rather than sober judgments, majority opposition to German participation in an European army could easily be the outcome.
- ... This situation has been capitalized upon by anti-participation elements in the German press who have run a spate of so-called polls - usually a travesty on correct methodology - cutting the issues in emotionally biased ways and injecting anti-participation biases in associated discussions and pictorial illustrations.
- ... There are recent indications that the Communists may be considering the possibility of beating the drums for or outrightly sponsoring a plebiscite on remilitarization in West Germany. If they proceed with such plans one may be certain that they will make every effort to inject as much anti-participation bias as possible in the way the issue is posed. With the German partiality toward a plebiscite that RAS surveys have disclosed, and the widespread emotional susceptibility to anti-participation propaganda, it behooves American policy makers to devote serious considerations at this time to whatever counter-measures may be advantageously taken in the event of a Communist inspired campaign for a West German plebiscite.

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I. TREND ON GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN ARMY

IS PREPONDERANT OPINION STILL APPROVAL OF PARTICIPATION? ...

The latest measurement of urban West German reactions to German participation in an European army still indicates a strong preponderance of approval over disapproval. However, there is an increasing indication in the US Zone, since mid-August, that opposition has somewhat increased. Berlin, as usual exhibits widespread approval of German participation, though the latest figure is not quite so high as it has been.

Several West European nations and America recently signed a defense pact, the so-called Atlantic Pact.

Suppose West Germany would join the Atlantic Pact and be asked in connection with it to participate in a general army for the defense of West Europe. Would you then be for or against such participation in a defense army? "

	WEST GERMANY*			US Zone			Br. Zone			Berlin		
	Aug	Oct-Nov		Aug	Oct-Nov		Aug	Oct-Nov		Aug	Oct-Nov	
	15-17	31-1/9-10		15-17	31-1/9-10		15-17	31-1/9-10		15-17	31-1/9-10	
For it	61%	63%	53%	67%	65%	57%	59%	61%	59%	86%	89%	80%
Against it	27	30	32	21	29	32	29	31	31	12	8	16
No opinion	12	7	10	12	6	11	12	8	10	2	3	4
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

- * The West German sample used in this survey includes a proportionate allotment of respondents from French Zone cities of 50,000 or more population and from Bremen. However, the number of cases that result for these two areas are too few to permit reliable separate tabulations of their results. Hence only the British Zone with 416 cases, the US Zone with 162, and Berlin with 200 are separately tabulated for comparisons.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Group differences in the latest survey continue to manifest the same pattern as before, a tendency for the leadership levels - the men, the better educated, and the economically better situated - to more widely favor German participation in an European army. And again too it is found that Catholics and Protestants show no evidence of having developed different patterns of reactions on the remilitarization issue.

"Several West European nations and America recently signed a defense pact, the so-called Atlantic Pact.

Suppose West Germany would join the Atlantic Pact and be asked in connection with it to participate in a general army for the defense of West Europe. Would you then be for or against such participation in a defense army?"

	Aug 15-17	Oct-Nov 31-1/9-10	Aug 15-17	Oct-Nov 31-1/9-10	Aug 15-17	Oct-Nov 31-1/9-10	Aug 15-17	Oct-Nov 31-1/9-10	Number of cases:	
WEST GERMANY										
<u>Sex:</u>										
Men	68%	69%	64%	28%	29%	31%	4%	2%	5%/100%	253
Women	54	50	53	26	31	32	15	11	15	352
<u>Education:</u>										
Elementary school	53%	59%	51%	30%	31%	35%	17%	10%	14%	336
Beyond elementary school	70	67	69	25	29	27	5	4	4	250
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>										
Lower class	55%	58%	43%	29%	32%	36%	16	10	16	322
Lower middle to upper class	66	63	63	26	23	27	3	4	5	233
<u>*Income(per month):</u>										
0 - 149 DM			43%			42%			15%	106
150 - 299 DM			52			34			14	254
300 DM and more			71			24			5	270
<u>Age:</u>										
Under 40 years	62%	60%	58%	23%	33%	24%	10%	7%	13%	313
40 years and over	60	64	61	27	23	21	13	3	13	350
<u>Religion:</u>										
Catholics	62%	60%	57%	29%	33%	30%	9%	7%	13%	215
Protestants	63	64	59	25	29	32	12	7	9	363

* Income figures were not obtained in the earlier two surveys.

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II. CURRENT REACTIONS TO KOREA

HAS CHINESE INTERVENTION UPPED DANGER OF NEW WORLD WAR? ...

The prevailing opinion in urban West Germany is that the fact of Chinese intervention in Korea has considerably increased the danger of a new world war. Only a small minority are optimistic enough to believe that such a danger has not been increased by this event.

AD. "Do you believe that the intervention of Communist China in Korea has considerably increased, somewhat increased or not increased the danger of a new world war?"

	WEST GERMANY	US Zone	Br. Zone	Berlin
Considerably increased	45%	42%	46%	52%
Somewhat increased	29	36	25	20
Not increased	14	15	15	21
No opinion	12	7	14	7
	100%	100%	100%	100%

Apprehensions of danger are more widespread among the more intelligent and informed levels of the urban West German population - the men, the better educated and the higher socio-economic groups.

	Considerably increased	Somewhat increased	Not increased	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY					
<u>Sex:</u>					
Men	51%	26%	17%	4%...100%	265
Women	40	30	11	19	352
<u>Education:</u>					
Elementary school	39%	29%	14%	18%	336
Beyond elementary school	53	30	14	3	246
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>					
Lower class	39%	28%	15%	18%	322
Lower middle to upper class	51	30	13	6	313
<u>Income (per month):</u>					
0 - 149 DM	29%	27%	18%	26%	106
150 - 299 DM	46	23	13	13	254
300 DM and more	51	31	13	5	270
<u>Age:</u>					
Under 40 years	44%	34%	12%	10%	238
40 years and over	46	25	15	14	350
<u>Religion:</u>					
Catholics	43%	31%	11%	10%	218
Protestants	44	28	15	13	363

* Respondents who did not indicate an awareness of Chinese intervention in a preceding exploratory inquiry were told prior to putting the present question: "The fact is that red-Chinese troops have intervened on the North Korean side in the battle against the UN troops".

C O N F I D E N T I A L

WHAT IS CURRENT TREND ON DANGER OF A KOREA IN GERMANY? ...

Apprehensions of a Korean parallel occurring in Germany are almost as great currently as they were in mid-August during some of the most threatening stages of the Korean conflict. Two out of three in urban West Germany see the present danger as great to fairly great. In Berlin perturbation is not quite so widespread with four out of ten currently assessing the danger of a Korean repetition in Germany to be slight.

"Do you think that the danger that a conflict like the one in Korea will arise in Germany is great, fairly great or slight?"

	WEST GERMANY		US Zone		Br. Zone		Berlin	
	Aug 14-15	Nov 9-10	Aug 14-15	Nov 9-10	Aug 14-15	Nov 9-10	Aug 14-15	Nov 9-10
Great	41%	37%	45%	33%	34%	38%	46%	34%
Fairly great	31	27	31	29	35	26	30	19
Slight	22	29	18	30	26	28	23	41
No opinion	6	7	6	8	5	8	1	6
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Group breakdowns reveal that women are somewhat more fearful than men in the present connection, and lower income respondents somewhat more fearful than people of higher incomes.

	Great	Fairly great	Slight	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY					
<u>Sex:</u>					
Men	32%	26%	35%	9% ... 100%	288
Women	42	27	23	9	352
<u>Education:</u>					
Elementary school	37%	26%	28%	9%	386
Beyond elementary school	36	29	30	5	250
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>					
Lower class	36%	24%	29%	11%	322
Lower middle to upper class	37	31	28	4	318
<u>Income (per month):</u>					
0 - 149 DM	40%	22	21	17	106
150 - 299 DM	38	27	29	6	254
300 DM and more	34	31	30	5	270
<u>Age:</u>					
Under 40 years	36	27	30	7	288
40 years and over	37	28	28	7	350
<u>Religion:</u>					
Catholics	36%	28%	28%	8%	218
Protestants	38	27	29	6	363

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III. REACTIONS TO PROJECTED WESTERN POWER REINFORCEMENTS

DO GERMANS AFFLUD WESTERN POWER REINFORCEMENTS FOR GERMANY? ...

Apparently by no means all of the West Germans are happy about the projected plan of the Western powers to bring additional troops into West Germany. The majority are in favor of such a course, but a substantial minority express themselves as opposed.

"Are you in favor of or opposed to more troops of the Western powers being brought to West Germany?"

	WEST GERMANY	US Zone	BR Zone	Berlin
In favor of	59%	56%	59%	65%
Opposed to	31	36	29	14
No opinion	10	8	12	1
	100%	100%	100%	100%

More educated respondents and the higher socio-economic levels are more widely in favor of reinforcements, group breakdowns reveal.

	In favor of	Opposed to	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	60%	35%	5%...100%	263
Women	57	29	14	352
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	55%	33%	12%	386
Beyond elementary school	64	30	6	250
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	53%	34%	13%	322
Lower middle to upper class	63	29	8	318
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	52%	34%	14%	106
150 - 299 DM	55	33	12	254
300 DM and more	66	28	6	270
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	60%	33%	7%	288
40 years and over	58	30	12	350
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	62%	26%	12%	218
Protestants	53	33	9	363

The amount of opposition to Western power reinforcements indicated in the above figures might be considered surprising in the light of the probable German awareness of the Communist threat to their security. Some clues to interpretation will be evident in the results to the two following questions. The point is being pursued more intensively in a study now in the field.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

SHOULD GERMANY CONTRIBUTE TOWARD COSTS OF REINFORCEMENTS? ...

A definite majority among West German urbanites do not feel that it would be right to have West Germany contribute to the payment of any additional costs incident to reinforcing Western power troops in Germany. In Berlin opinions split with the affirmative view getting the nod (though not reliably beyond chance).

"If more troops of the Western powers were brought to West Germany, would you consider it right that West Germany contributes to the payment of additional costs?"

	WEST GERMANY	US Zone	Br. Zone	Berlin
Right	29%	29%	30%	53%
Not right	65	66	64	44
No opinion	6	5	6	3
	100%	100%	100%	100%

The more educated levels in West Germany, and individuals of higher socio-economic status tend somewhat more often than their counterparts to feel that German contributions to additional costs would be proper. At all levels, however, opposition to such a view strongly preponderates.

	Right	Not right	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	32%	65%	3%	213
Women	26	66	3 ... 100%	352
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	24%	68%	8%	356
Beyond elementary school	36	62	2	250
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	25%	67%	3%	322
Lower middle to upper class	32	64	4	318
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	22%	63%	15%	106
150 - 299 DM	27	70	3	254
300 DM and more	34	62	4	270
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	20%	65%	6%	235
40 years and over	26	66	6	350
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	32%	63%	5%	213
Protestants	27	67	6	363

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SHOULD WESTERN POWERS HAVE RIGHT TO REQUISITION ADDITIONAL HOUSING? ...

Even more widespread is the objection to allowing any additional housing to be requisitioned in Germany for the use of the projected troop reinforcements. Only one in ten in West Germany would countenance such a course. And in Berlin despite an 85 per cent approval of Western power reinforcements, three out of four would be opposed to any requisitioning of German houses for the use of additional troops.

The present question was asked not because any such requisitioning is being contemplated but as some measure of German readiness to impose sacrifices upon themselves in the interest of defense.

"If it is thought necessary to requisition additional German houses when more troops of the Western powers arrive in West Germany, would you consider this right or not?"

	WEST GERMANY	US Zone	Br. Zone	Berlin
Right	11%	13%	10%	26%
Not right	86	86	86	73
No opinion	3	1	4	1
	100%	100%	100%	100%

It begins to become clear therefore, that whatever the German interest in security, the majority are definitely not in the mood to contribute either toward the costs or the housing of any Western power troop reinforcements that may be sent to Germany. The suggestion emerges too - which will be subjected to further study - that not a few Germans are opposed to such reinforcements for fear that they will have to contribute in some way to their support.

Group breakdowns among West German respondents show that there is very little difference of opinion on the question of possible requisitioning of additional German housing for troop reinforcements. An overwhelming negative response characterizes every grouping examined.

WEST GERMANY	Right	Not right	No opinion	Number of cases:
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	12%	85%	3% ... 100%	238
Women	10	86	4	352
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	9%	87%	4%	336
Beyond elementary school	13	85	2	250
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	11%	85%	4%	322
Lower middle to upper class	11	86	3	316
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	14%	78%	8%	106
150 - 299 DM	11	86	3	254
300 DM and more	10	88	2	270
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	11%	86%	3%	236
40 years and over	11	86	3	350
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	12%	87%	1%	216
Protestants	11	85	4	363

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IV. REACTIONS TO A DRAFT FOR MILITARY SERVICE

SHOULD FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAVE RIGHT TO DRAFT? ...

A clear majority of urban West Germans hold that in their judgment the West German Federal government should not have the right to draft men for military service. In Berlin opinions split on this issue with approval of Federal draft rights running slightly - though not significantly - ahead of disapproval.

"In your opinion, should the West German Federal government have the right to draft men for military service or not?"

	WEST GERMANY	US Zone	Br. Zone	Berlin
Yes	32%	35%	31%	52%
No	60	59	58	46
No opinion	8	6	11	2
	100%	100%	100%	100%

Approval of Federal draft rights runs somewhat higher among leadership levels in West Germany - the men, the better educated and the better off - but in all groups is strongly outweighed by disapproval.

	WEST GERMANY	Yes	No	No opinion	Number of cases:
<u>Sex:</u>					
Men		36%	59%	5% ... 100%	263
Women		25	60	12	352
<u>Education:</u>					
Elementary school		26%	63%	11%	386
Beyond elementary school		39	56	5	250
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>					
Lower class		25%	63%	12%	322
Lower middle to upper class		35	57	5	318
<u>Income (per month):</u>					
0 - 149 DM		25%	60%	15%	106
150 - 299 DM		27	64	9	254
300 DM and more		35	56	6	270
<u>Age:</u>					
Under 40 years		31%	63%	6%	265
40 years and over		32	57	11	350
<u>Religion:</u>					
Catholics		30%	61%	9%	218
Protestants		33	60	7	363

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WOULD GERMANS VOLUNTEER FOR SERVICE? ...

The preceding results become very significant in view of the finding below that less than one in ten say they would volunteer for military service in the event that West Germany should participate in an European army. Among those who are eligible for military service the preponderance state that they would serve only if drafted, and almost four out of ten indicate that they would refuse to serve even if they were subjected to a draft.

REN "If West Germany should participate in a West European army, would you then volunteer, - would you serve only if you were drafted, - or would you refuse any kind of military service?"

	WEST GERMANY	US Zone	Br. Zone	Berlin
* Would volunteer	7% (9%)	6% (8%)	8% (10%)	20% (26%)
Only if drafted	33 (43)	46 (57)	35 (44)	38 (50)
Would refuse service	30 (38)	27 (33)	32 (40)	17 (23)
Undecided	4 $\frac{(5)}{(100%)}$	2 $\frac{(2)}{(100%)}$	5 $\frac{(6)}{(100%)}$	1 $\frac{(1)}{(100%)}$
Ineligible for service	$\frac{21%}{100%}$	$\frac{19%}{100%}$	$\frac{20%}{100%}$	$\frac{24%}{100%}$

* Percentages in parenthesis are based on the men who do not indicate that they ineligible for service.

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No important group differences appear on this issue among the various West German strata.

"If West Germany should participate in a West European army, would you then volunteer, - would you serve only if you were drafted, - or would you refuse any kind of military service?"

	Volunteer	Only if drafted	Would refuse service	Ineligible for service	Un- decided	Number of cases:
<u>WEST GERMAN MEN</u>						
<u>Education:</u>						
Elementary school	7%	38%	28%	23%	4%...100%	163
Beyond elementary school	7	35	33	18	4	123
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>						
Lower class	7%	35%	31%	21%	3%	140
Lower middle to upper class	7	39	29	20	5	148
<u>*Income (per month):</u>						
* 0 - 149 DM						
150 - 299 DM	7%	39%	34%	16%	4%	117
300 DM and more	7	42	25	19	4	135
<u>Age:</u>						
Under 40 years	13%	39%	31%	12%	5%	111
40 years and over	4	38	29	26	3	175
<u>Religion:</u>						
Catholics	8%	43%	27%	19%	3%	98%
Protestants	6	37	30	21	4	157

* Percentages on this group were omitted since only 34 men fell into this income category.

The importance of the above findings should not be overlooked. Clearly if (1) the majority of Germans oppose a draft and (2) a majority of able-bodied German men indicate that they would serve only if drafted - with most of the others refusing altogether - the prospects of recruiting any large number of German soldiers for an European army would appear to be far from encouraging. These facts rather strongly suggest that despite the majority approval of German participation in an European army there is considerably less than majority support of the kind of measures and actions needed to realize such a plan.

A similar reluctance to back approval with concrete sacrifices has already been observed in connection with the question of Western troop reinforcements for German defense. Though the majority approved such reinforcements, large majorities, it will be remembered, opposed contributing to such reinforcements with either funds or housing.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

V. GERMAN STATUS AMONG COMMANDERS OF EUROPEAN ARMY

SHOULD GERMAN COMMANDERS HAVE AS MUCH TO SAY AS OTHERS? ...

West German city dwellers are very clear in their opinion that German military leaders in any projected European army should have as much to say about the command of the forces as the leaders of any other nation. Fewer than one in ten take the position that Germans deserve a lesser say.

"If West Germany participates in a West European army, in your opinion, should Germany have as much to say as the other nations about the command of the West European army, or not?"

	WEST GERMANY	US Zone	Br. Zone	Berlin
As much as	86%	83%	84%	89%
Not as much as	6	5	8	6
No opinion	8	7	8	3
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

The only discernable difference among West German population groups is a slightly greater support for equal German influence among the better educated and better off, as their less informed counterparts more frequently express no opinion in the matter.

	As much as	Not as much as	No opinion	Number of cases:
<u>WEST GERMANY</u>				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	85%	3%	7% ... 100%	263
Women	86	5	8	352
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	83%	7%	10%	336
Beyond elementary school	90	7	3	250
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	81%	7%	12%	322
Lower middle to upper class	91	6	3	313
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	79%	6%	13%	106
150 - 299 DM	85	6	9	254
300 DM and more	90	6	4	270
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	81%	7%	12%	322
40 years and over	91	6	3	313
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	88%	7%	5%	218
Protestants	86	6	8	363

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WILL GERMANS BE LIKELY TO HAVE AS MUCH TO SAY? ...

However, only one in five in West Germany believe that German military leaders will in actuality have as much to say as leaders of other nations, in the event Germany participates in an European army. In Berlin, a larger proportion foresees equal status under such circumstances, but the preponderance believes otherwise.

"If West Germany participates in a West European army, do you think it is likely that the Germans will have as much to say as the commanders of the other nations about the direction of the European army, or will they not have as much to say?"

	WEST GERMANY	US Zone	Br. Zone	Berlin
As much to say	15%	16%	17%	34%
Not as much to say	67	69	67	59
No opinion	15	15	16	7
	100%	100%	100%	100%

The leadership levels of West German opinion - the men, the better educated, and the better off - judge more widely than do their counterparts that in the event of German participation in an European army, German leadership will have less authority than the commanders of other nations.

	As much to say	Not as much to say	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	19%	72%	9%... 100%	265
Women	16	64	20	352
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	17%	63%	20%	336
Beyond elementary school	17	75	8	250
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	16%	63%	21%	322
Lower middle to upper class	19	72	9	313
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	21%	51%	26%	106
150 - 299 DM	15	72	13	254
300 DM and more	19	69	12	270
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	16%	71%	13%	265
40 years and over	19	65	16	350
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	16%	67%	17%	216
Protestants	16	69	13	363

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VI. INFLUENCE OF MILITARY ON GERMAN POLITICS

HAS PAST GERMAN MILITARY OVERLY INFLUENCED GERMAN POLITICS? ...

Though it is the preponderant view, considerably less than a majority of West German urbanites voice the opinion that over the past 100 years, the military has had too much influence on German politics.

"When you look back on German history during the last 100 years, would you say that by and large the military has had too much, too little or about the right influence on German politics?"

	WEST GERMANY	US Zone	Br. Zone	Berlin
Too much	37%	44%	35%	36%
Too little	7	8	7	11
About right	22	21	22	32
No opinion	34	27	36	21
	100%	100%	100%	100%

Judgments of too much military influence bulk larger among the leadership levels of the West German population, but in no group does such a viewpoint attain majority status.

	Too much	Too little	About right	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY					
<u>Sex:</u>					
Men	43%	12%	22%	18% ... 100%	258
Women	29	4	21	46	352
<u>Education:</u>					
Elementary school	32%	7%	20%	41%	336
Beyond elementary school	47	8	24	21	250
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>					
Lower class	30%	6%	20%	44%	322
Lower middle to upper class	45	8	23	24	313
<u>Income (per month):</u>					
0 - 149 DM	24%	7%	19%	50%	106
150 - 299 DM	35	5	24	36	254
300 DM and more	46	10	21	23	270
<u>Age:</u>					
Under 40 years	36%	7%	21%	36%	258
40 years and over	39	7	22	32	350
<u>Religion:</u>					
Catholics	39%	7%	20%	34%	218
Protestants	36	8	23	33	363

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The 37 per cent who hold that the German military in recent history has been overly influential on German politics is best interpreted in conjunction with an earlier reported finding* to the effect that only a 20 per cent minority held that the German military has been a bad influence on the German people over the past 50 years. This combination of results shows first that for a number of Germans (the difference between 37 and 20 per cent) any overly great influence of the military in recent history has been presumably offset by virtues to the extent that it is not to be termed a bad influence on the German people. But more relevantly in the present connection, the findings suggest that whatever may be occasioning German hesitancy about remilitarization, it is quite unlikely to derive in any major part from the kind of apprehensions about the German military with which the Western powers would be sympathetic.

WOULD MILITARY BE LIKELY TO BE OVERLY INFLUENTIAL IN FUTURE? ...

That concern about a possible renaissance of German militarism plays little part in German thinking about remilitarization is additionally indicated by the fact that only one in ten (12%) among West German urbanites advance the judgment that the military might come to have too much influence on German politics if Germany should participate in an European army.

"If West Germany participates in a West European army, do you think it likely that the German military will have too much, too little or about the right influence on West German politics?"

	WEST GERMANY	US Zone	Br. Zone	Berlin
Too much	12%	10%	13%	10%
Too little	12	13	13	5
About right	29	32	27	56
No opinion	47	45	47	29
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

* See Report No. 46, Series No. 2, GERMANS VIEW THE REMILITARIZATION ISSUE
- Urban Opinions in Western Germany - November 10, 1950.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

There is no clear indication of the more informed levels being any more apprehensive than their counterparts as to the possibilities of too great military influence on German affairs in the event of German participation in an European army.

"If West Germany participates in a West European army, do you think it likely that the German military will have too much, too little or about the right influence on West German politics?"

	Too much	Too little	About right	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY					
<u>Sex:</u>					
Men	15%	16%	33%	36%	288
Women	11	10	25	54	352
<u>Education:</u>					
Elementary school	12%	12%	24%	52%	366
Beyond elementary school	14	13	37	36	250
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>					
Lower class	13%	12%	21%	54%	322
Lower middle to upper class	12	13	37	38	316
<u>Income (per month):</u>					
0 - 149 DM	8%	8%	22%	62%	106
150 - 299 DM	13	14	26	47	254
300 DM and more	14	13	36	37	270
<u>Age:</u>					
Under 40 years	14%	12%	29%	45%	288
40 years and over	12	12	29	47	350
<u>Religion:</u>					
Catholics	11%	11%	27%	51%	218
Protestants	12	14	31	43	363

C O N F I D E N T I A L

VII. PREFERENCES AS TO TIME AND METHOD OF DECIDING REMILITARIZATION QUESTION

SHOULD ISSUE BE QUICKLY DECIDED OR MORE TIME TAKEN? ...

West German city dwellers are preponderantly of the opinion that the question of German participation in an European army should be decided soon, rather than more time being taken for consideration. In Berlin, eight in ten press for an early decision.

"Do you think it necessary that a final decision about West Germany's participation in a West European army be made soon, or should more time be taken?"

	WEST GERMANY	US Zone	Br. Zone	Berlin
Should be made soon	59%	59%	59%	81%
More time should be taken	22	21	26	12
No opinion	<u>19</u> 100%	<u>20</u> 100%	<u>15</u> 100%	<u>7</u> 100%

Support for a quick decision, rather than further consideration, is considerably more widespread among the opinion leading elements of the West German urban population.

	Should be made soon	More time should be taken	No opinion	Number of cases:
<u>WEST GERMANY</u>				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	68%	23%	9%...100%	288
Women	53	21	26	352
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	52%	23%	25%	386
Beyond elementary school	71	20	9	250
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	49%	25%	26%	322
Lower middle to upper class	71	19	10	318
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	43%	25%	32%	106
150 - 299 DM	52	25	23	254
300 DM and more	74	17	9	270
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	58%	24%	18%	288
40 years and over	61	21	18	350
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	63%	18%	19%	218
Protestants	53	24	18	363

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HOW SHOULD PARTICIPATION ISSUE BE DECIDED? ...

Even when given the additional alternative of electing new Bundestag members to decide the issue, the large majority of West German urbanites still indicate a preference for a plebiscite on whether or not West Germany should participate in an European army.

"How, in your opinion, should the decision be made about West Germany's participation in a West European army?" (CARD)

	WEST GERMANY		US Zone		Br. Zone		Berlin	
	Oct-Nov	Nov	Oct-Nov	Nov	Oct-Nov	Nov	Oct-Nov	Nov
	<u>31-1</u>	<u>9-10</u>	<u>31-1</u>	<u>9-10</u>	<u>31-1</u>	<u>9-10</u>	<u>31-1</u>	<u>9-10</u>
Through a vote of the elected representatives of the people in the Bundes- tag	16%	13%	11%	15%	16%	13%	11%	12%
The Bundestag should be newly elected and the newly elected representatives should decide this question*	-	5	-	6	-	5	-	7
Through a vote of all the West German people	80	75	86	74	73	74	85	72
No opinion	$\frac{4}{100\%}$	$\frac{7}{100\%}$	$\frac{3}{100\%}$	$\frac{5}{100\%}$	$\frac{4}{100\%}$	$\frac{8}{100\%}$	$\frac{4}{100\%}$	$\frac{9}{100\%}$

* In the preceding survey this alternative was not given to the respondents.

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Support for decision by Bundestag representatives is somewhat greater among opinion leading elements of the West German urban population, but among all groups choice of a plebiscite is in heavy majority.

"How, in your opinion, should the decision be made about West Germany's participation in a West European army?" (CARD)

	By vote of present Bundestag	By vote of newly elected Bundestag	By plebiscite	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY					
<u>Sex:</u>					
Men	16%	7%	74%	3%..100%	288
Women	11	3	76	10	352
<u>Education:</u>					
Elementary school	10%	3%	78%	9%	386
Beyond elementary school	18	8	71	3	250
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>					
Lower class	8%	3%	79%	10%	322
Lower middle to upper class	18	8	71	3	318
<u>Income (per month):</u>					
0 - 149 DM	10%	1%	69%	20%	106
150 - 299 DM	9	3	83	5	254
300 DM and more	18	9	70	3	270
<u>Age:</u>					
Under 40 years	9%	4%	83%	4%	288
40 years and over	17	6	69	8	350
<u>Religion:</u>					
Catholics	16%	5%	73%	6%	218
Protestants	12	4	77	7	363

C O N F I D E N T I A L

VIII. THE POSSIBLE DANGER OF A PLEBISCITE TO ATTAINMENT OF
AMERICAN POLICY OBJECTIVES

From the point of view of democratic reorientation it is difficult to decide whether the German interest in a plebiscite on the question of German participation in an European army is encouraging as an indication of rank and file democracy, or discouraging as a symptom of widespread distrust of duly elected representatives. But in any case the very strong support for a plebiscite poses definite complications for American policy on the German remilitarization issue. In spite of the majority support for German participation in an European army found in repeated RAS surveys of representative samples in the US Zone and in representative urban samples in West Germany as a whole, it would be entirely possible to obtain majority opposition in a plebiscite. Such an apparent anomaly derives from the fact that many West Germans are in favor of German military contributions only when they are being thoughtful rather than emotional and hence in a mood to appreciate stern necessities. There is no evidence whatsoever of any appreciable enthusiasm for such a course; on the contrary there are numerous indications that German personal inclinations and emotions are against any military efforts, largely as a consequence of a profound weariness with the sacrifices demanded by military preparations and war.

For the above reason if the remilitarization issue is by wording of the question or its general context posed in such a way as to draw upon emotions and inclinations rather than sober judgments, majority opposition to German participation in an European army could easily be the outcome.

This situation has been capitalized upon by anti-participation elements in the German press who have run a spate of so-called polls - usually a travesty on correct methodology - cutting the issues in emotionally biased ways and injecting anti-participation biases in associated discussions and pictorial illustrations.

There are recent indications that the Communists may be considering the possibility of beating the drums for or outrightly sponsoring a plebiscite on remilitarization in West Germany. If they proceed with such plans one may be certain that they will make every effort to inject as much anti-participation bias as possible in the way the issue is posed. With the German partiality toward a plebiscite that RAS surveys have disclosed, and the widespread emotional susceptibility to anti-participation propaganda, it behooves American policy makers to devote serious considerations at this time to whatever counter-measures may be advantageously taken in the event of a Communist inspired campaign for a West German plebiscite.

AN ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE DETERMINANTS OF OPPOSITION
TO GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

OFFICE OF THE U.S. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR GERMANY
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF

C O N F I D E N T I A L

INTRODUCTION ...

One of the most important - and most difficult - problems in the analysis of German thinking about possible remilitarisation is to ascertain what precisely are the considerations that are influencing the West Germans who oppose German participation in a West European defensive army; America espouses such participation and it is only through thorough understanding of the reasons for opposition that effective efforts can be taken to deal with the problem.

The obvious task in gaining such an understanding is to ask West Germans who are opposed to German military participation why they take this stand. This is a useful approach and it is being utilised. It is limited, however, for a number of reasons. Respondents cannot generally express all their reasons in any one simple answer, or cannot remember many of their reasons without more particular inquiries, or may be somewhat hesitant about boldly coming out with considerations that are determining their judgement.

A subtler approach which minimizes many of the above difficulties is to compare in the important matters related to remilitarisation, the answers of those who approve and those who disapprove of German participation in an European army.

Wherever statistically reliable differences arise in those comparisons one is in a position to infer a possible determinant of basic pro or con attitudes in the remilitarization issue.

- Most of the data upon which the present analysis is based were gathered in the surveys of urban West Germany which were conducted on October 31st and November 1st and on November 9th and 10th respectively. In each instance the sampling embraced a representative urban quota sample of 610 cases drawn from among Western German cities 50,000 and over in population. In the few instances information was utilised from a regular representative random sample of the US Zone conducted during August 1950 and embracing approximately 1,500 cases.

HIGHLIGHTS

-On the basis of the present findings opposition to German participation in the European army is most strongly related to an inclination to remain neutral in the East-West conflict.
-There is no evidence that opposition to, as compared to support of German rearmament, derives to any significant extent from any greater inclinations to let the Western powers carry the burdens of defense.
-There is no evidence that opposition derives to any significant extent from a lesser apprehension of danger facing Germany in the present world situation.
-Concern over a possible renaissance of German militarism appears to play some, but not a major role in rendering opposition to German rearmament.

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... Other factors related in a minor way to opposition are:

- (1) a somewhat lesser confidence in Western resolve to defend West Germany.
- (2) a slightly greater feeling that the Western powers are not doing all they should for German defense, and
- (3) somewhat greater apprehensions that German rearmament may provoke a Russian attack.

SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICAN POLICY PROJECTION ...

The most significant disclosure of the present analysis - from the point of view of effective projection of American policy - is that German opposition to participation in a European army is primarily influenced by an inclination to remain neutral in the East-West struggle, not by an inclination to obtain a free ride on defense at the expense of the Western powers. If this is true it is somewhat premature to stress the theme that public opinion at home will not allow the Western powers to defend a country that will not defend itself - when the target group is thinking in terms of neutrality rather than of defense. So what seems indicated as the first order of business in any effort to diminish German opposition to European military participation is an attack upon neutralism rather than parasitism.

Secondly disclosed by the present findings is that a campaign to win over opponents to German rearmament would apparently profit little from any efforts to build up the urgency of the dangers that threaten West Germany in the present world situation. Opponents of rearmament are just as well aware of these dangers as supporters, so the decisive determinants of their rearmament attitudes clearly lie in other considerations.

Third, the indication is that assurances of democratic safeguards on any new German military would be important in diminishing opposition among some Germans. But the general evidence is that despite Western power teachings against the evils of German militarism apprehensions on this score do not weigh heavily in the minds of most Germans.

Finally the results suggest that any campaign to reduce opposition to German rearmament would be aided in minor ways by whatever could be done to (1) increase confidence in Western resolve to defend West Germany, (2) increase the feeling that the Western powers are doing all they should for German defense and (3) diminish the belief that German rearmament would be likely to provoke a Russian aggression.

NOTE: Study of the role of the remilitarization issue in the Hesse and Wuertemberg-Baden Landtag elections is now in process. If, as seems likely, a considerable number of Germans have been swayed from approval to disapproval of German rearmament under the pressure of SPD campaigning and the heavy anti-rearmament stress in the German press, it is possible that their reasons for opposition will differ somewhat from those disclosed in the present study. However, the present suggestions as to the most effective themes for American projection will still hold for the more important core elements in the opposition group.

I. TO WHAT EXTENT IS OPPOSITION RELATED TO A LESSER APPREHENSION OF DANGER?

One obvious hypothesis in endeavoring to account for opposition among some West Germans to participation in a West European defensive army, is that this group has less apprehension of the dangers that lie in the present international situation. Comparisons on the two questions below of West Germans who favor and those who oppose German military participation provides a test of this line of reasoning.

"Do you think that the danger that a conflict like the one in Korea will arise in Germany is great, fairly great or small?"

	Great	Fairly great	Small	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY (Nov 9-10)					
For participation in a European army	39%	23%	28%	5% ... 100%	372
Against participation in a European army	32	30	29	9	202

"Do you believe that the intervention of Communist China in Korea has considerably increased, somewhat increased or has not increased the danger of a new world war?"

	Considerably increased	Somewhat increased	Not increased	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY (Nov 9-10)					
For participation in a European army	51%	30%	11%	8%...100%	372
Against participation in a European army	35	29	20	13	202

The results show clearly that apprehension of danger is not a major differentiating factor in accounting for support or opposition to German rearmament. In both groups approximately two out of three judge the danger of a Korea-like conflict arising in Germany to be great to fairly great. Somewhat more of the pro-participation group believe that the Chinese intervention has considerably increased the danger of a new world war, but the difference though statistically reliable is not large enough to be considered really material.

As far as the present findings indicate, the first conclusion must be that opposition to German rearmament is not in any major way related to a lesser awareness of the present day threat to West German security.

* Respondents who did not indicate an awareness of Chinese intervention in a preceding exploratory inquiry were told prior to putting the present question: "The fact is that red Chinese troops have intervened on the North Korean side in the battle against the UN troops."

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II. TO WHAT EXTENT IS OPPOSITION RELATED TO
A GREATER CONCERN OVER A POSSIBLE REBIRTH OF GERMAN MILITARISM?

Not a few German commentators have suggested that opposition to rearmament is the only attitude that could be expected in view of five years of Western power teachings about the evils of German militarism. While such an assertion is probably more often made in sarcasm than in a serious vein, it is very important to ascertain what role distrust of German militarism plays in engendering opposition to a renewed German military. If such a feeling is the major concern among opponents of rearmament the Western powers must of course look upon these misgivings with sympathy, and in their efforts to win Germans over to the American policy, would be well advised to heavily stress safeguards to German democratic development.

The results to the first two questions below reveal that definitely less than a majority of Germans opposed to rearmament adversely evaluate the past German military - thus indicating that such a consideration cannot be a dominant one in engendering opposition. However, the fact that 21 per cent more of those who oppose than of those who support German rearmament judge the German military to have been a "bad influence" over the past 50 years, does tend to suggest that distrust of German militarism plays some part in influencing West Germans against rearmament.

DCD
"Are you of the opinion that during Germany's history of the last 50 years the German military in general has had a good or bad influence on the German people?"

	Good influence	Bad influence	No influence	quali- fied replies	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY (Oct - Nov) 31-1						
For participation in a European army	62%	14%	6%	9%	9%..100%	400
Against participation in a European army	41	35	10	4	10	194

"When you look back on German history during the last 100 years, would you say that by and large the military has had too much, too little or about the right influence on German politics?"

	Too much influence	Too little influence	About the right influence	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY (Nov 9-10)					
For participation in a European army	39%	8%	27%	26%..100%	372
Against participation in a European army	45	7	14	34	202

Comparative returns of supporters and opponents of rearmament on four more questions throw additional light in the present connection. If West Germans are opposed to rearmament because they are more worried than are supporters of such a course about a possible renaissance of German militarism, they should reveal their greater concern most clearly and directly in judgments about the future German military, in the event of German participation in a European army. What are the facts?

"In your opinion, if West Germany participates in a West European army, would this have an influence on democracy in West Germany or wouldn't it have any influence?"

If "Yes": "Would this influence be good or bad?"

	No influence	Good influence	Bad influence	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY (Oct-Nov) 31-1					
For participation in a European army	42%	40%	4%	15% ... 100%	400
Against participation in a European army	45	31	1	23	194

"If West Germany participates in a West European army, do you think it likely that the German military will have too much, too little, or about the right influence on West German politics?"

	Too much influence	Too little influence	About the right influence	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY (Nov 9-10)					
For participation in a European army	64	13%	42%	37%...100%	372
Against participation in a European army	24	13	12	51	202

"Suppose West Germany would participate in a West European army. In your opinion, should generals of the former Wehrmacht then be used to command the German units or should, as far as possible, other men be trained for this?"

	Generals	Other men	qualified replies	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY (Oct-Nov) 31-1					
For participation in a European army	74%	15%	1%	10%...100%	400
Against participation in a European army	43	27	4	26	194

"In your opinion, should the Germans have as much to say about the command of the West European army, or not?"

	As much as	Not as much as	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY (Nov 9-10)				
For participation in a European army	92%	6%	2% ... 100%	372
Against participation in a European army	77	10	13	202

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Taken all together the above comparisons show that opponents of German rearmament are somewhat more concerned about possible militarism in a future German military, but not to any really considerable extent.

Though 16 per cent more among opponents than among supporters of rearmament held that the German military would be likely to have too much influence on German politics - in the event of German participation in an European army - only one per cent in the opposed group expressed the opinion that any military influence on democracy in West Germany would be bad. Only 13 per cent more opposers than supporters of rearmament indicated that they thought that other men rather than the former German generals should be used to command German units. There was also more "no opinion" among the opposed group on this issue, but this can hardly be interpreted as any forceful expression of concern.

Finally only 15 per cent fewer opposers than supporters of German rearming indicate that they feel that Germans should have as much to say about the command of a West European army as other nations - thus demonstrating that whatever their trepidation about a future German military, except for a few it does not go so far as to recommend less influential positions for German commanders in any European army.

All the present evidence taken together seems to suggest as a fair conclusion that concern about a possible renaissance of German militarism plays some but considerably less than a dominant role in influencing Germans to oppose participation in an European army.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

III. TO WHAT EXTENT IS OPPOSITION RELATED TO GREATER EVIDENCE OF AN INCLINATION TO LET THE WESTERN POWERS CARRY THE BURDENS OF GERMAN DEFENSE?

In endeavoring to account for the reasons for German opposition to participation in a European army, one is obliged to examine the possibility that such opposition may in large part spring from an inclination to let the Western powers carry the burden of German defense. The Western powers have already indicated that an attack on Germany would be considered an attack on them and have announced their intention to reinforce their troops in Germany.

If German opponents of rearmament were being motivated by the idea that they could get a free ride on the defense efforts of the Western powers, they should (1) be much more inclined than supporters to say Germans have a right to be defended, despite refusal to participate in a European army, and (2) be much more inclined to feel that Germans would be defended despite any refusal to participate. Neither of these considerations are borne out in the results below.

"Suppose West Germany refuses to participate in a West European army. Do you think that in spite of this refusal West Germany has the right to expect to be defended by the Western powers or doesn't she have this right?"

	Has the right	Hasn't the right	No opinion	Number of cases:
--	---------------	------------------	------------	------------------

WEST GERMANY
(Oct - Nov)
31-1

For participation in a European army	50%	40%	10%...100%	400
Against participation in a European army	57	25	16	194

"Suppose West Germany refuses to participate in a West European army. Do you think that in spite of this refusal the Western powers will defend West Germany or not?"

	Will defend	Will not defend	No opinion	Number of cases:
--	-------------	-----------------	------------	------------------

WEST GERMANY
(Oct - Nov)
31-1

For participation in a European army	60%	25%	15% ... 100%	400
Against participation in a European army	44	32	24	194

On the first question only a slightly greater proportion of opponents than supporters of rearmament take the position that Germany has a right to be defended despite any refusal to help. So this factor cannot be contributing very materially to differentiating the attitudes on rearmament of the two groups. But more to the point, fewer rather than more opponents of rearmament give the opinion that the Western powers would defend West Germany if Germans didn't participate - a result clearly opposed to any parasitic interpretation, if such a term might be used, of opposition to rearmament.

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But the really definitive answer in the present connection derives from a question on the bringing of Western power troop reinforcements to Germany. Obviously if opponents of German participation in a European army are largely motivated by the idea of letting the Western powers defend Germany, they should approve of bringing troop reinforcements to Germany at least as much, if not to a greater extent than do supporters of German rearmament. The actual facts, it may be seen below, are strikingly contrary.

"Are you in favor of or opposed to more troops of the Western powers being brought to West Germany?"

	In favor of	Opposed to	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY (Nov 9-10)				
For participation in a European army	77%	16%	5% ... 100%	372
Against participation in a European army	30	61	9	202

Far from greeting Western troop reinforcements with open arms as a means of allowing Germans to escape any participation in their own defense, a definite majority of the opponents of German rearmament reject such reinforcements. So whatever question this may raise about who is going to defend Germany then, the conclusion seems clear that opposition to German rearmament is not related in any major way to an inclination to let the Western powers carry the burden of German defense.

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IV. TO WHAT EXTENT IS OPPOSITION RELATED TO GREATER EVIDENCE OF AN INCLINATION TO REMAIN NEUTRAL IN THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT?

The fact that opponents to German rearmament combine their opposition to German participation in defense with majority opposition to Western troop reinforcements begins to suggest that they may not be generally thinking in terms of defense at all. That is to say a major motivation may be a desire to remain out of the present East-West conflict.

Indirect support for such an interpretation derives from the results to the question below.

"If West Germany should participate in a West European army, who do you think would, in general, have the most to gain from this in case of an attack?"

	All the Western nations	Western Europe as a whole	U.S.	Western Germany	Western Europe (without West Germany)	qualified replies	No opinion	Number of cases
WEST GERMANY (Oct-Nov) 31-1								
For participation in a European army	30%	30%	15%	10%	6%	1%	3%...100%	400
Against participation in a European army	11	11	39	3	17	3	16	194

Study of the above figures shows that opponents of German rearmament tend very considerably more than supporters to believe that countries other than Germany would gain most from German participation in a European army. A total of 70 per cent of supporters of German participation say that either all the Western nations, Western Europe as a whole or specifically West Germany has most to gain from German rearmament. Only 25 per cent of opponents of German rearmament voice such opinions. Their majority view is that America or Western Europe without West Germany has most to gain. Clearly then the implication is that among opponents of German rearmament there is a widespread feeling that German participation in the East-West struggle will mean pulling other people's chestnuts out of the fire.

But the most direct evidence on the heavy role of neutrality sentiments in determining opposition to German rearmament derives from the results to the direct question below.

"What do you believe - what would most Germans prefer in the present East-West struggle: to remain completely out of it, to side with the Western powers, or to side with Russia?"

	Prefer to stay completely out	Prefer to side with Western powers	Prefer to side with Russia	No opinion	Number of cases
US ZONE(Aug)					
For participation in a European army	27%	70%	-%	3%...100%	931
Against participation in a European army	54	41	1	4	

The results clearly show that opposition to German participation in a European army is strongly related to a desire to stay completely out of the East-West struggle. The reasonable inference is that neutrality sentiment is a major determinant of opposition to German rearmament.

* It is a well known fact in survey research that on an inquiry of this type, respondents largely give their own personal views. This is actually what is being sought. The question is put in this way to make it easier for the respondent to be candid on a delicate issue.

V. TO WHAT EXTENT IS OPPOSITION RELATED TO LACK OF
CONFIDENCE IN WESTERN RESOLVE TO DEFEND WEST GERMANY?

The findings indicate that opposition to German participation in a European army is somewhat, but not to a major extent, related to any lesser conviction that the Western powers are firm in their resolve to defend West Germany.

"Do you believe that in case of war the Western powers would try to defend West Germany or leave West Germany to itself?"

	Will try to defend West Germany	Will leave West Germany to itself	No opinion	Number of cases
US ZONE (Aug)				
For participation in a European army	50%	12%	5% ... 100%	931
Against participation in a European army	62	27	11	292

"Considering the events in Korea, are you firmly convinced that America would take a firm stand in case of Communist aggression in West Europe, or are you less or not at all convinced of that?"

	Firmly convinced	Less convinced	Not at all convinced	No opinion	Number of
US ZONE (Aug)					
For participation in a European army	54%	10%	2%	4% ... 100%	931
Against participation in a European army	69	17	7	7	292

On the questions above the definite majority sentiment among opponents of German rearmament is that the Western powers would try to defend West Germany in the event of war. So, clearly, opposition cannot be assigned in any major way to absence of such a conviction. However, lack of confidence in the West may play a minor role in engendering opposition since somewhat fewer opponents than supporters of German rearmament believe either that the Western powers would try to defend Germany in the event of a war, or that America would take a firm stand in Europe in the event of a Communist aggression.

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VI. TO WHAT EXTENT IS OPPOSITION RELATED TO A GREATER FEELING
THAT WESTERN POWERS ARE NOT DOING ENOUGH FOR GERMAN DEFENSE?

The results reveal that a somewhat larger proportion of opponents than of supporters of German rearmament believe that the Western powers are not doing everything they should to insure the security of West Germany. So the suggestion is that this factor plays some role - though not a major one - in influencing Germans who are opposed to rearmament.

Reactions to specifically French efforts to insure German security do not seem to differ materially between German supporters and opponents of participation in a European army. Among both groups the majority sentiment is dissatisfaction with French efforts, which therefore suggests that opposition to German rearmament is not significantly related to any greater dissatisfaction with French measures for West German defense.

"Do you feel that the Western powers are doing everything that they should to insure the security of West Germany?"

	Yes, do everything	No, do not do everything	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY (Oct-Nov) 31-1				
For participation in a European army	58%	32%	10%... 100%	400
Against participation in a European army	39	46	15	194

"In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with what the French are doing for the defense of Western Germany?"

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY (Oct-Nov) 31-1				
For participation in a European army	12%	69%	19% ... 100%	400
Against participation in a European army	9	60	31	194

VII. TO WHAT EXTENT IS OPPOSITION RELATED TO GREATER APPREHENSION
OF PROVOKING RUSSIAN AGGRESSION THROUGH GERMAN REARMING?

A final result of interest is an indication that a somewhat larger proportion of opponents than of supporters of German participation in a European army believe that the danger of Russian attack will be there-increased. The suggestion is then that such a belief plays a part in influencing some Germans to oppose rearmament.

"Suppose a West German army would be established in West Germany, would this, in your opinion, increase or decrease the danger of a Russian attack?"

	Increase	Decrease	No influence	Q.A.	No op.	No. of cases
US Zone (Aug)						
For participa- tion in a Euro- pean army	31%	43%	15%	1%	10%	931
Against partici- pation in a Euro- pean army	49	13	22	2	14	292

Belief that German rearmament would increase the danger of Russian aggression does not seem, however, to be a crucially important factor in influencing Germans against rearmament in that, first, less than a majority of anti-rearmament respondents make such a judgment and, second, 31 per cent of those who support German rearmament do so in spite of the feeling it may provoke the Russians.

A TEST OF READER REACTION

TO THIRD REICH ANTI-DEFEATIST ARTICLES

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OFFICE OF THE U. S. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR GERMANY

OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF

INTRODUCTION ...

In recent months West German popular magazines have exhibited an increasing tendency to publish two kinds of articles: the one, recounting the careers of Nazi leaders during the Third Reich, and the other, directed against German involvement in the East-West struggle, and by implication defeatist in tone. To measure the interpretations and impact of articles of this type, the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs, HICOG, was asked to survey readers' reactions to two articles which were considered to be typical: one was an article on the Nuremberg trial of the Nazi leaders appearing in Weltbild, and the other was an article entitled "Verraten und Verkauft" (Betrayed and Sold Out) in the magazine Revue.

A representative urban sample of 300 persons residing in US Zone cities of 25,000 or more population were interviewed. A few days before the interview, respondents were called on and given copies of the two magazines with the request that they read them prior to the forthcoming interview. In order to obviate any American sponsorship bias, a "cover" German organization was stated to be the agency conducting the survey.

Summary Appraisal of Reader Reactions to the Weltbild Article "The Last Hour Strikes!" (Die letzte Stunde schlägt!)

The magazine Weltbild is publishing a series entitled "What you do not know about Nuremberg" (Das wussten Sie nicht von Nuernberg!) The installment under consideration is called "The Last Hour Strikes!"

A. The aim of the survey was to ascertain whether the interpretation and the impact on readers of this article, which was stated to be typical of the kind now appearing so frequently, would be in line with the idea that such articles should be banned as undermining American prestige. The following generalizations can be made:

1. There is no question that the West German public is interested in topics dealing with the Third Reich in general and its leaders in particular.

The growing popularity of periodicals publishing such accounts is indicated by increased circulation figures, supplemented by findings of the survey:

- a. Predominant opinions are that covers with pictures of Nazi figures have sales appeal. The majority says the cover would attract buyers, but somewhat fewer readers say they themselves would buy the magazine for this reason.
- b. Half of the readers of the issue Weltbild would recommend the magazine to their friends and acquaintances.
- c. A majority view is that stories about the Third Reich increase sales of magazines.
- d. A large proportion of the readers of the issue had themselves read the article in entirety.

B. But the fact of the readership appeal of the article as well as others of its type does not in itself answer the question: does the article constitute a definite and serious attack on American prestige, and as such fall under the provisions of Law Number Five?

1. Careful reading of the article by members of the Reactions Analysis Staff leads to the judgment that the article would assuage feelings of national pride by the information that most of the condemned

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went to their deaths with fortitude. Whereas it could be agreed that undue emphasis is given to evidences of courage, with corresponding underemphasis on less virtuous behavior by some of the condemned in their last hours, it does not appear that the treatment of the subject distorts the record to any great extent.

Nowhere does the article directly attack the principle of the Nuremberg trials. And while it is journalistically sensational, the events, it could be said, lend themselves to such a treatment. It is the considered judgment of the Reactions Analysis Staff that the article itself does not constitute a definite and serious attack on American prestige, though other readers of course might differ with this judgment.

2. As to reactions of German readers to whom the magazine was presented a majority expressed the opinion that the article gives a factual, objective presentation of the subject, with only a minority thinking that the Nazi leaders are unfairly presented. This fact does not of course prove the objectivity of the article since prejudiced readers would undoubtedly consider a prejudiced article unbiased. But if the article were actually anti-Nuremberg, we would expect to find the largest proportion of those who considered it objective among the Germans who are critical of the Nuremberg trials. And conversely, we would expect a lesser proportion of those who agree with American policy in regard to the trials to regard the article as objective. The findings of the survey, however, are in direct contradiction of this. Supporters of the American position regarding the justice of the Nuremberg trials - who make up only about a fifth of the total population - judge more frequently than those holding the opposite view that the article is objective. Three out of four of the group which commends the Nuremberg verdicts make such a judgment.

Moreover, the article if effectively anti-Nuremberg in tone should influence readers' opinions on the justice of the trials. After reading the article, respondents should then have been more critical of the trials than prior to reading it. To check this impact, the device of a control group was used. In an independent survey done simultaneously with the Weltbild study, a similar sample was asked the question dealing with the justice of the Nuremberg trials. Replies of both groups fell into the same pattern with equal proportions of each calling the verdicts just, partially just, or unjust.

- C. One effect the article did demonstrably have that Americans might deplore but which can scarcely be construed as an attack on American policy or prestige, is that among a majority of readers it aroused a certain amount of compassion for the condemned men, and approbation of the manner in which most of them met their deaths. But very few extended this compassion to animadversions on the justice of the punishment.

Summary Appraisal of Reader Reactions to the Article in Revue "Betrayed and Sold Out!" (Verraten und Verkauft!)

As an example of another type of article, also frequently appearing in West German publications, the Reactions Analysis Staff surveyed the impact on readers of the article, "Betrayed and Sold Out," appearing in the periodical Revue. The three-page picture article was defeatist in tone, and definitely directed against German involvement in any war with the Russians. The interpretation of the impact of this article presents a different problem than that of the Nuremberg story.

- A. The magazine Revue was preferred by most readers over Weltbild, and despite the fact that it was claimed that Nazi leaders on covers sell magazines, greater preference was shown for the Revue cover, picturing an attractive girl.

But the popularity of the magazine did not appear to result from the interest in "Betrayed and Sold Out." Only a small minority volunteered that it was the article they liked best in the magazine — about as many stated they liked it least. (Most popular feature in the magazine by far was the story on the former Bavarian royal family.)

Frequently mentioned were the lightness or triviality of Revue as well as its variety, and lack of attention to politics as reasons for preferring it, which indicates that most people were not thinking of this article as a reason for preference.

About three quarters read "Betrayed and Sold Out" entirely or in part, (it was three pages long and consisted of pictures with captions). Only half thought it would influence readers, and a third said its influence would be nil.

In contrast to the Nuremberg article, the thesis of "Betrayed and Sold Out" appeared unpleasant even to those who agreed with it. Whatever its impact therefore it is not the kind of theme that attracts readers to it.

- B. As to the question: would the article itself tend to undermine American policy regarding German remilitarization? — the answer is Yes. Purporting to be a pictorial sample of German opinion, it presents no examples of any one who would resist the Russians, or in any case resist to the extent of participating in group action, military or otherwise. Nowhere does it suggest that the German people have a stake in the conflict; on the contrary, as its title indicates, emphasis is on the German people as a pawn between East and West.

The predominant opinion of readers is that a considerable number of Germans already feel "betrayed and sold out." And while there is no direct evidence that the Revue presentation won converts to defeatism, there are indications that those people already of this persuasion had their viewpoints sustained by it.

But expressions of defeatism and anti-war sentiments, whatever can be said about them, cannot be considered illegal. The article "Betrayed and Sold Out" certainly in itself acts to diminish Germans' interest in the course the U.S. would prefer them to follow, but it cannot readily be maintained that it constitutes a direct attack on American prestige. This together with the relative unpopularity of the topic of the article, suggests that suppression through the application of Law No. 5 is not the most appropriate countermeasure against propaganda of this type.

Note: In the following analysis of the findings, it is important to bear in mind that because the sample used consisted of only 300 cases, percentage differences to be statistically reliable must be 15% or more. No group differences are shown, since in no instance did the differences reach this critical limit.

CONFIDENTIAL

I. READER REACTIONS TO THE WELTBILD ARTICLE IN DETAIL

GENERAL OPINIONS ON THE NUREMBERG ARTICLE ...

As already stated the cover story in Weltbild was the second installment of a series "This You Did Not Know About Nuremberg" (Das wussten Sie nicht von Nuernberg). As the title of the present installment "The Last Hour Strikes" (Die letzte Stunde schlaegt) indicates, its subject was the final moments of the condemned Nazi leaders, whose farewell statements before mounting the gallows are quoted. The article also recounts Goering's apologia, and speculates on the source of the poison he used to end his life. The cover shows a thinned-down, enigmatically smiling Goering, holding a book jointly with a American officer. The caption states that the American captain was suspected of passing the poison to Goering along with the book, but no proof was forthcoming. A series of questions designed to obtain readers' reactions to the article was asked. The findings follow.

An indication of the popularity of the topic is the fact that the predominant opinion is that the picture on the cover would attract many buyers.

"Do you believe that this cover causes many people to buy the magazine, or some, or only a few?"

Many	59%
Some	22
Few	12
None at all	3
No opinion	4
	<u>100%</u>

... About half of the respondents (52%) believe that articles about the leaders of the Third Reich help to sell magazines. Only 17% hold that such accounts tend to reduce sales, and 19% say they have no influence one way or the other. A few (6%) express no opinion.

... Further analysis strongly suggests however that this judgment is based on the personal predilections of respondents. It is the people who have stated that they themselves prefer the Weltbild who are most certain that the Third Reich has sales value. Persons who prefer the Revue cover with its picture of an attractive woman are much less certain.

	Articles on III Reich			
	Increase Sales	Decrease Sales	No Influence	No Opinion
Cover having more Sales appeal:				
Weltbild	75%	6%	16%	3% ... 100%
Revue	47	27	20	6

... Indicative also of the popularity of the topic is the extensive readership the article obtained ... 84% of the respondents read it all or in part.

"Did you read the article 'The Last Hour Strikes'?"

Yes, completely	70%
Yes, partly	14
Not at all	11
Did not read <u>Weltbild</u>	5
	<u>100%</u>

CONTENT OF THE INSTALLMENT WELL-RECEIVED ...

Queried "Did the last words of the condemned as given in the report leave a strong, somewhat strong or no impression upon you at all?", six in ten (58%) stated they were impressed by the "last words" of the condemned men. A fourth (26%) expressed themselves as not impressed, and the remainder have no opinion, not having read the installment.

... Sympathy for the condemned was the impression largely gained. Only a few expressed unsympathetic opinions as a result of their reading. Catalogued statements follow.

"Did the last words of the condemned, as given in the report, leave a strong, somewhat strong or no impression at all in you?"

"What was your impression?" (If "strong", or "somewhat strong.")

SYMPATHETIC:

They stood up bravely right to the end: A great part of the condemned were not cowards; in spite of everything they were strong characters facing death; I was impressed that most of the condemned were mentally alert and brave; they showed a correct behavior in their situation; every single one was a true man in his own way; I was impressed by the attitude of the condemned, not by their last words; etc.

17% (11%)*

They didn't forget Germany: They thought of Germany; facing death they still thought of Germany; those were men who stood up for Germany; it touches me that nearly all of them remembered their fatherland in their last hour and died in that sense; most of them did not think of themselves but of Germany; etc.

12 (7)

They did not deserve such a death: It touched one's heart to see them die such a shameful death; in spite of many wrong and bad things done by these men they didn't deserve an end like this; they have demonstrated that they knew how to die although they were not granted an honorable death; some sentences were too severe; injustice was done to them; since they were soldiers it was a disgrace to hang them; etc.

11 (7)

They have won my sympathy and my compassion: Through that they have become more likeable to me; for a certain time I was impressed; I couldn't sleep all night, I was sorry for the condemned although they brought us misfortune; through their attitude most of the condemned became more likeable to me again; one feels more pity for the condemned; I feel pity for every single one; etc.

10 (6)

They regretted their sins and found the way back to God: Most of the defendants realized that they had done much wrong; most of them realized everything in the last minute; that the condemned felt guilty; that they regretted their sins and returned to God; one could see that these people also cried out to God; etc.

7 (4)

They were not bad people: That they were good German men; that they were good people with the exception of Streicher; the condemned were not all as bad as one believed up to now; these people were certainly not worse than today's people; one or the other might have aimed at the best and got mixed up in everything under the compulsion of that time; one or the other was attached to his cause with all his heart and did not want evil; etc.

6 (4)

They should now drop the matter - the trial was a disgrace: I am disgusted with everything, one should put an end to Nuremberg; they should drop the matter now; the last words should not be exposed to publicity; today they wouldn't to what was done in Nuremberg; the whole trial was an insult; etc.

6% (3%)*

UNSYMPATHETIC:

One doubts the truthfulness: Who was present at their last hour? I don't know if all that is according to the truth; I was deeply moved and disgusted at the same time; I thought that what they write is not quite true; I consider words like "long live Germany" an empty phrase; because it was highly theatrical; I doubt if these words were really spoken; etc.

9 (5)

They were convinced of their innocence up to the end: From their words I gathered that those people had believed they had done right; those people felt like tragic victims without any guilt; those criminals were convinced of their innocence till the last moment; I had the impression that many of the condemned were not convinced of their guilt; etc.

5 (3)

INDETERMINATE:

I was disgusted with it; not the best impression; a horrible impression; they have perhaps foreseen many things; that all is terrible; I only now fully realized what disgraceful cowards those fellows were; they were very poor spirits; etc.

14 (8)

No opinion:

$\frac{4}{102\%}$ ** $\frac{(2)}{(60\%)}^{**}$

* Figures in parentheses are based on the total sample; others on the number saying "strong" or "somewhat strong."

** Some people gave more than one reason.

ARTICLE CONSIDERED OBJECTIVE ...

Six in ten (57%) say the article gives a factual presentation of the Nazi leaders, but a fourth (24%) feel the account is incorrect. The remaining 19% make no judgment. Of the 24% who criticize the article as incorrect, 13% say it was too unfavorable, 7% too favorable, and 4% have no opinion. *

... In conformity with these views, 61% express the opinion that the aim of the writer was to give a factual account, but 19% say the intention was to picture the trials as "cruel and unjust." A fifth (20%) do not express an opinion. **

As a further measure of the impact of the article, readers were asked two questions regarding the justice of the Nuremberg trial. The aim of this line of questioning was to provide a basis for ascertaining whether or not readers' opinions of the trial had been changed as a result of reading the article. The direct approach of getting "before and after" reactions of the readers to the trial was technically undesirable***, so the device of a control group was used. In another survey, conducted simultaneously with a sample of similar design, the two questions on the trials were asked. These respondents had not been exposed to the article, of course. If the fact of reading the article had influenced opinions on the justice of the verdicts, readers' opinions should differ from those of the non-exposed. But as the table below reveals, replies of both groups fall into the same pattern which leads to the conclusion that the article had little or no influence on opinions of the trial.

"What do you personally think about the Nuremberg trial, do you consider the verdicts just, partially just or unjust?"

	Readers Sample	Non-Exposed Sample
Just	19%	17%
Only partially just	38	41
Unjust	34	34
No opinion	9	8
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

"Is it your opinion that the verdicts were too severe, or too mild?" (Asked of those who replied only partially just, or unjust)

Too severe	59%	62%
Too mild	3	2
No opinion	10	11
	<u>72%</u>	<u>75%</u>

* The questions: "Do you believe this article portrays the leaders of National Socialism as they really were, or is it your impression that the portrayal is incorrect?" If Incorrect, "Is the portrayal too favorable or too unfavorable?"

** The question: "Do you believe the main purpose of this article was to picture the Nuremberg trials as cruel and unjust, or is it your opinion that the article tries to present the facts as truthfully as possible?"

*** If interviewers had queried respondents about the trial when they first called and left the magazines, respondents would have been alerted to the purpose of the forthcoming interview which would very probably have influenced their judgments on the article.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

The questions on the Nuremberg verdicts served also to test the objectivity of the Weltbild article. Only a minority - as the above table indicates - hold the opinion that the Nuremberg verdicts were just and may therefore be said to share the U.S. position regarding the trial. The preponderant opinions that the verdicts were only partially just, at best, thus diverge from the American position.

As a working hypothesis it was assumed that if the majority critical of the Nuremberg verdicts tended much more frequently than the minority approving the judgments to consider the Weltbild article factual and fair, its objectivity would be suspect. If, on the other hand, the minority sharing the American view on the verdicts, should turn out to be the group most often judging the article to be a factual presentation, there would be more grounds for considering the treatment objective.

To test this hypothesis, related attitudes of the two groups on the two issues were analyzed with the result as shown here:

Weltbild account of Nazi leaders:

<u>Factually</u> <u>Presented</u>	<u>Incorrectly</u> <u>Presented</u>	<u>No</u> <u>Opinion</u>
--------------------------------------	--	-----------------------------

Nuremberg verdicts were:

Just	74%	21%	5% ... 100%
Only partially just	57	25	18
Unjust	53	30	17

The fact that the persons who consider the verdicts just are more frequently inclined to think the article factual than do the groups who are critical of the verdicts would support the judgment that the presentation is objective. Also lending support to the validity of this conclusion is the fact that the stronger the criticisms of the verdicts, the more likely the tendency to call the presentation incorrect. It will be recalled that the predominant view of those who criticized the presentation was that it was too unfair to the Nazi leaders.

II. GENERAL OPINIONS OF WELTBILD

Prior to specific queries on the contents of Weltbild, respondents were asked two general questions as to what they liked best in the magazine, and what they liked least.

The Nuremberg article, "The Last Hour Strikes!" was rated as the best liked feature with 25% mention. Two other stories also frequently mentioned as best liked were "The King Says Yes" - an installment of the serial by the former governess of the British royal princesses - (16%); and "There is but one God - the Husband" - an article on Indian women - (15%).*

But relatively more people (38%) volunteered that the Nuremberg article was the feature they liked least in Weltbild, than mentioned any other feature or article.

(Respondents' replies to both questions follow on the next page listed in order of frequency of mention.)

... Following specific questioning on Weltbild articles, people were asked to give their impression of the magazine. It would appear from the results that Weltbild did not rate too highly with many respondents.

"Do you have a good, fairly good, or poor impression of this magazine?"

Good	46%
Fairly good	43
Poor	8
No opinion	3
	<u>100%</u>

* As previously stated, percentage differences of less than 15% are not statistically reliable beyond chance in this study because of the size of the sample.

"What did you like best in Weltbild?"

<u>The article "The Last Hour Strikes": (Die letzte Stunde schlaegt):</u> The Goering story was most interesting; description of the Nuremberg trial; Nuremberg, because of the trial; the political articles; I would like to continue reading about it; etc.	25%
<u>The article "The King Says Yes" (Der Koenig sagt Ja):</u> The article about the British royal family; the pictures "Grace and Beauty Join Hands" (Grazie und Schoenheit reichen sich die Hand); etc.	16
<u>The article "There is But One God For a Woman" (Fuer die Frau gibt es nur einen Gott):</u> Articles about Indian women; the articles about India; the Indian report; etc.	15
<u>The article "Escape to Munich" (Die Flucht nach Muenchen):</u>	6
<u>The article "The Dictatorship of the Little Darlings" (Die Diktatur der Lieben Kleinen):</u> The children's scenes; etc.	6
<u>The article "Is Growing Old only a Disease?" (Ist das Altern nur eine Krankheit?):</u> Victory over death (because it is a scientific work); etc.	6
<u>The make-up, the picture reports, good printing, illustrations, general:</u>	6
<u>I like nothing particularly well:</u> Nothing special about it; nothing; I can't name anything; etc.	4
<u>The article "Five Years of Peace" (Fuenf Jahre Frieden):</u>	3
<u>Other opinions:</u> Novels; "The Remote-Controlled Husband" (Der ferngesteuerte Ehemann); the last cartoon page; the variety; "My Guests Wear My Dresses" (Meine Gaeste tragen meine Kleider); etc.	15
<u>No opinion and No answer:</u>	8
<u>Did not read it:</u>	3
	113%*

* Adds to more than 100 per cent because some people gave more than one answer.

"And what did you like least in the Weltbild?"

<u>The article "The Last Hour Strikes!" (Die letzte Stunde schlaegt):</u> The report of Nuremberg; the warming up of old things like here in the Nuremberg trial; articles about the Third Reich and the Nazi time and the cover; to-do about Nuremberg, should finally leave off that stuff; politics; the picture "A Tool of World History" (Ein Werkzeug der Weltgeschichte); the article about how Goering dies and the Last Hour Strikes; etc.	35%
<u>The article "Escape to Munich" (Die Flucht nach Muenchen):</u>	6
<u>The article "The Dictatorship of the Little Darlings" (Die Diktatur der Lieben Kleinen):</u>	5
<u>The cartoons:</u> The stupid Oskar-cartoons; the stupidity of the cartoons; the last cartoon page; etc.	5
<u>The article "The King Says Yes" (Der Koenig sagt Ja):</u> The to-do about the English royal princess; this English story (that is not new, always the same old record); the ever-lasting pictures of the English royal family; etc.	4
<u>The article "There is But One God for a Woman - Her Husband" (Fuer die Frau gibt es nur einen Gott - ihren Mann):</u>	3
<u>The article "My Guests Wear My Dresses" (Meine Gaeste tragen meine Kleider):</u> The fashions; etc.	3
<u>The horoscope:</u> The horoscope, stupifies the people; etc.	2
<u>There is nothing I liked least:</u> Everything that is in it is o.k.; nothing; I can't decide, I liked everything; can't name anything; etc.	11
<u>Other opinions:</u> Few factual articles; too few pictures; "Is Growing Old Only a Disease"; "Five Years of Peace"; the advertisements; the thing with the check; the type is too small; "The Remote-Controlled Husband" (Der ferngesteuerte Ehemann); the hidden chauvinism; etc.	12
<u>No answer and No opinion:</u>	16
	102%

* Adds to more than 100 per cent because some people gave more than one answer.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

III. RELATIONS TO THE REVUE ARTICLE "BETRAYED AND SOLD OUT"

The article in Revue entitled "Betrayed and Sold Out," subtitled, "The West German populace thinks realistically and without illusions," is considered to be typical of the defeatist pieces appearing with increasing frequency in German periodicals. The three-page pictorial story consists largely of pictures of individual Germans presumably representative of various population groups in Western Germany. According to the captions, these individuals without exception hold attitudes of varying degrees of disillusion and defeatism in the face of a possible Russian attack. An introductory note states that the Germans knowing so well what war means want no part in another army or another war. Most West Germans, the note concludes, feel "betrayed and sold out."

READERS' REACTIONS TO THE ARTICLE ...

About half of the respondents (53%) read the article completely, a quarter read part of it. The remainder (24%) did not read any of it. (It will be recalled that the Nuremberg trial story had more readers, even though it was a much longer article and not nearly so profusely illustrated.)

... Queried regarding the possible effect of the article on its readers, 52% expressed the opinion that it would exercise an influence on them, but 32% thought its influence would be nil, and 16% withheld judgment. (Prior to the queries on the article, all respondents were asked to look it over, so replies came from people who had not read it previously as well as those who had.)

For the most part, those who believe the presentation will influence readers, reveal, when asked to cite examples of its possible effect, that they themselves have been more or less affected by it. Typical views are that it shows what the public is thinking, it stimulates thought, increases fear of Communism, or strengthens anti-war sentiments. But as the listed replies below demonstrate, the common factor in most statements is a negative one of uneasiness and dismay over an unpleasant situation and prospects.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

"In what respect does this article "Betrayed and Sold Out" exercise an influence on the readers?" (Asked of those who said the article would influence readers)

<u>It reveals public opinion:</u> It reflects what the German people think; it stimulates the reader regarding what his fellow-men think; it is good to hear other people's opinions - one will be in a better position to judge; because what is expressed in the article is the opinion of the people; it gives the real opinion of the people; etc.	20%	(10%)*
<u>It stimulates thinking:</u> Because feelings are stirred up again; it strengthens the opinion of every single one; one makes comparisons, they think about post-war problems; everyone will give it some thought; the readers are stimulated to think about this subject; etc.	16	(8)
<u>It increases pessimism and hopelessness of the people (general):</u> It increases hopelessness in many people; the reader becomes pessimistic; only negative; the population gets even more frightened; makes people indifferent; a totally negative influence; etc.	14	(8)
<u>It increases fear of and antipathy toward the Russians and Communism:</u> This article shows what Communism does to people; because it increases the fear of the Russians; calls attention to the terror caused by the Russians; many people realize only through the reading of such articles what has happened in Germany and what we have to expect from Communism; etc.	10	(5)
<u>It strengthens attitudes against war and remilitarization:</u> They realize that none of us want war; strengthens attitude against war; a warning against war; it influences people against war; it influences people against remilitarization; etc.	9	(5)
<u>Makes one consider the future and what to do when the Russians come:</u> Everybody thinks about what he would do in case of an emergency; it makes people think how it could be in the future; it leads people to ask "what are we going to do if the Russians come?"; it is a comfort that we are all in the same boat, everybody is frightened; there are good ways how one should do it, let Russians march through; etc.	6	(3)
<u>It increases the negative attitude toward the Allies:</u> Prejudice against Allies in spite of Marshall Plan and Korea just as before; many will think "yes, that is what it's like, they haven't brought us much good"; one sees that the German soldiers have been treated unjustly and the Americans have no right to demand a new Wehrmacht; confidence in Western powers is undermined; the Americans are going to leave us in the lurch after all; it deepens the feeling of disappointment about the Americans; etc.	6	(3)
<u>It reminds one of the imminence of war:</u> The reader gets the impression that war will break out soon; one is constantly being reminded of the imminence of war; a depressing influence, fear of war is expressed; etc.	4	(2)
<u>Other opinions:</u> Because I am of the opinion that this article leaves an impression on certain people; that some people believe it won't be really so bad if the Russians come; etc.	8	(4)
No opinion:	7	(4)
	100%	(52%)

* Figures in parentheses are based on the total sample; others on the proportion saying the article would influence readers.

DO READERS ACCEPT THE THESIS OF THE ARTICLE? ...

The predominant view of respondents is that considerable numbers of the German people feel "betrayed and sold out." But only a quarter will go as far as the writer of the story in saying "most" Germans are of this frame of mind. Almost as many claim the attitude is confined to only a few.

"Do you believe that today most, fairly many,
or only a few Germans feel 'betrayed and sold out'?"

Most	26%
Many (Volunteered)	30
Fairly many	17
Few	20
No opinion	7
	<u>100%</u>

... Readers are somewhat more ready to say this attitude exists in varying proportions among the public than to say that they personally think the Germans have actually been "betrayed and sold out." Asked, "What is your personal opinion: are the Germans 'betrayed and sold out'?", replies fall this way: Yes, 43%; No, 35%; partly, 16%; No opinion, 6%.

Respondents who personally believe that the German people have been victimized are much more likely than those of the contrary view to subscribe to the article's thesis that this is the feeling of "most" Germans. The predominant opinion of the dissenting group is that only "a few" Germans hold this defeatist attitude. This is seen in the following table showing the relationship of opinions on the two questions.

	Proportion of Germans Feeling "Betrayed and Sold Out"				
	Most	Many	Fairly Many	Few	No Opinion
Personally think Germans are:					
"Betrayed and Sold Out"	45%	32%	15%	4%	4% ... 100%
Only partly "Betrayed and Sold Out"	21	35	29	4	11
Not "Betrayed and Sold Out"	9	23	17	47	4

This finding of course is an illustration of the argument *ad hominem*. It also suggests another interpretation more directly related to the impact of the article on readers — those people who are already personally defeatist find their convictions sustained by an article which agrees with their views; those not initially persuaded largely remain unconvinced. Examination of other related attitudes would appear to support this interpretation, but because of the limitations of sample size, statistical verification cannot be reliably stated..

What can be said is that though many readers are prepared personally to accept the thesis of the article completely, more would deny it entirely or in part.

IV. OPINIONS ON TWO OTHER REVUE FEATURES

Investigation of reactions to the "Betrayed and Sold Out" piece was the main purpose for selecting the issue of Revue for study. But readers were also questioned in some detail regarding their opinions on two other features whose themes are also of interest. The results are reported below.

REACTIONS TO THE WAR PICTURE, "GRAPES OF WRATH" ...

A full-page reproduction of the news photo of a chaplain blessing slain American prisoners of war shot in the back by North Korean was captioned, "Grapes of Wrath" (Fruechte des Zorns). The tenor of the caption was that such frightfulness was an accompaniment of war and that whereas there was no war in Europe yet, if one came such incidents and others of similar nature could be expected. Only by maintaining peace could such grapes of wrath be avoided.

- ... Opinions are fairly evenly divided on the desirability of publishing such pictures, with 43% pro, and 51% con. (Six per cent withheld judgment.) It is noteworthy, however, that both groups when asked to give reasons for their positions, tend to advance arguments that largely lead to the same conclusion — war is a terrible thing and should be avoided. The editors' interpretation of the picture as well as readers' reactions to it parallel quite closely some of the non-interventionist and pacifist publicity in the U.S. in the Thirties.

What do you think of the presentation "Grapes of Wrath" (Fruechte des Zorns)? Do you consider it a good idea or not to publish such pictures?

If Good Idea: "Why do you consider it a good idea?"

Serves to instruct the public: I consider it the duty of the press to publish such horrible pictures in the interest of information for the people; one can never inform the people enough about how soldiers are treated by such monsters; such crimes have to be exposed; to get a picture of what is happening there; those are facts which can't be exposed enough; the world has to be informed about things of that kind; to show the truth; etc.

39%

Serves as a warning against war: Information against war; because it demonstrates the horrible reality of war; it points to the negative side of war; to recall what happened in the last war; it is good for people to see the reality and get scared away from war; to make them lose all desire for war in general; etc.

37

Proves that such things happen also in other armies, not only in the German Wehrmacht: It is right to show that cruelties are committed also elsewhere, I believe the Americans should punish assassins of that kind the same way the Germans had to do it; because I myself have witnessed them and because the German cruelties were made public these crimes should be published in the same realistic way; thereby one can see that not only the Germans are criminals; etc.

11

Warns against Communism: Because there are still many people who think Communism a blessing for the world; to make people realize the cruel methods of fighting used by the Communists; it demonstrates the way the Communists work; etc.

9

Other opinions: People should learn to forget hatred; because it serves the Americans right to experience war against Eastern peoples and partisans, in spite of pity for the soldiers; one can see that in a war soldiers, who don't want war, are often murdered; etc.

$\frac{5}{102\%}$ *

* Percentage adds to more than 100% because some people gave more than one reason.

What do you think of the presentation "Grapes of Wrath" (Truechte des Zorns)? Do you consider it a good idea or not to publish such pictures?

If Not a good idea: "Why do you consider it not a good idea?"

We have had enough of war and don't want to see such things: Horrible, we certainly have seen enough pictures like that; we have had enough in our war; as a woman I do not want to see pictures of that kind; we have seen enough of them; they show something which many people know by experience, that should not be; I am a refugee myself and have enough of terrible murders; it is cruel, is not pleasant as a magazine should be; because I don't want to see war pictures with all the misery; such things disturb me terribly, my nerves being frail; it is not in my nature to look at things like that, I find it too cruel; because it is not particularly reverent; etc.

82%

One should not further hatred: Not to further hatred, that incites the people; out of it a certain hatred arises in the people; such cruelties don't belong in the magazine, they stir up emotions; etc.

5

Not suitable for children and young people: Because those magazines are also read by children and those pictures are not good for children; through the general brutalization the youths don't esteem human lives highly enough; etc.

7

Other opinions: It is all too much glorified; there are already enough pessimists; because thereby the Americans are boasting about their heroic deeds, cruelties were not only committed by Germans but also by the Americans marching into Germany; it increases war psychosis because such things happen on both sides; it does not suit the magazine, not suitable for the masses; etc.

7

No opinion:

1
102%

* Percentages add to more than 100% because some people gave more than one reason.

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REACTIONS TO THE "TRAGIC ROYAL HOUSE" ...

The lead article in Revue was an installment of a serial on the Wittelsbachs, the former rulers of Bavaria, authored by a member of the family, titled "Konstantin, Prince of Bavaria." The current chapter deals with Ludwig II, and except for a brief reference to U.S. soldiers, arriving at a royal palace in 1945, the account is confined to the somewhat more peaceful era of the late nineteenth century.

As will subsequently be shown, this article was most frequently cited as the item "best liked" in Revue. And when questioned more directly about it, 60% of all respondents said they found it interesting. A fifth (21%) thought it was not interesting, and the remaining 19% expressed no opinion, not having read the installment.

There is very little direct evidence of monarchist sympathies among those who said they found the chapter interesting. Historical interest is by far the most frequently cited reasons for liking the article. Closely related to this is curiosity about the personality and times of King Ludwig II. Identification with Bavaria is a third most frequently advanced cause for liking the article, which may or may not be equated with monarchical tendencies.

People who consider the story uninteresting say: they 1) do not care to hear about the past; 2) have read too much about such things already; or 3) find it boring, personally. Catalogued comments of both groups follow.

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What do you think about the article "The Tragic Royal House" (Das tragische Koenigshaus)? Do you find this article interesting or not interesting?

If Interesting: "Why do you find this article interesting?"

Interest in historical matters: I am very much interested in such historical matters; because history interests me; I like to read about former times; because one gets acquainted with the details of the happenings in German history; to revive general knowledge; one gets an impression of what took place behind the scene in former times; the stories of the kings are in themselves very interesting; etc.

46%

Interest in the personalities of Ludwig II and the historical connections: It gives information about historical connections and about the personality of Ludwig II; I never had the opportunity before to read something authentic about Ludwig II; it interests me to learn how the King of Bavaria used to live; I am a music teacher and am therefore interested in the relationship between Wagner and Ludwig II; etc.

20

Is interesting to Bavarians: It concerns the Bavarian royal house, I am a Bavarian; I come from that region and know how the people think about it; I personally know the castles and the region; my brother worked in a royal household and therefore I am especially interested in such things; I come from Bavaria and am very much attached to the royal house; etc.

16

Interest in "good old days": One reads of a quiet era, that has a relaxing effect; I myself grew up during the monarchy; that was our best time; I like to remember that time when we still had a king; etc.

7

The article seems to be factual; exciting and entertaining description: It is short and exciting; apparently also according to facts; written by a relative and therefore credible; because it is frank and honest, excitingly written; objective presentation; etc.

6

Other reasons: I have never read anything like it before and because I know now that kings are also human beings; today one can look at these events from another view point than people formerly did and that is very interesting; because it is presented differently in various magazines, as for instance in "Quick"; because in former times there were the same intrigues at the royal Courts as there are now in high policy; etc.

2

No opinion:

3
100%

CONFIDENTIAL

What do you think about the article "The Tragic Royal House" (Das tragische Koenigshaus)? Do you find this article interesting or not interesting?

If Not interesting: "Why do you find this article not interesting?"

The events are too remote: That is past history, the subject seems completely obsolete to me for the present time; the present is in general more interesting; the article deals with times long ago, that is not interesting; today I have other cares; it is obsolete, no longer real; etc.

47%

Have already heard and read too much about it: The subject has been overworked, we have read too much about it already; those reports appear too often; has been overworked, such things don't concern us today; the article hasn't shown me anything new; etc.

20

Not personally interested: Because the whole royal house does not interest me; as a non-Bavarian that hardly interests me; I have no spare time for such boring romance stuff; I don't care for the King; etc.

20

Other opinions: I don't like to be reminded of the past anymore; those things seem to me better in books than in magazines; it is so gossipy; etc.

13

No opinion:

$$\frac{2}{102\%}$$

*Percentages add to more than 100% because some people gave more than one answer.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

V. GENERAL OPINIONS OF REVUE

After leafing through the magazine with the interviewer, respondents were asked to rate their general impression of Revue. They replied as follows:

"What is your general impression of this magazine -- good, fairly good or poor?"

Good	58%
Fairly good	38
Poor	2
No opinion	2
	<u>100%</u>

It will be recalled that Weltbild was rated as good by 46%, fairly good by 43%.

As with Weltbild, respondents were also asked to state what they liked best about Revue, and what they liked least. Highest praise (25%) received by any one feature went to the article on the Wittelsbachs, the former ruling family of Bavaria, entitled the "Tragic Royal House." The diversity of content in the issue is named by the second largest group (15%) as what they like best about the magazine. Third (9%) is the article "Betrayed and Sold Out" (Verreten und Verkauft). Other features receive scattered mention.

No one feature stands out as especially disliked by readers. Indeed 16% state that they like everything. The advertisements and the picture spread "Grapes of Wrath" (Fruechte des Zorns) share first place (14% and 13% respectively) as least liked features of the issue. About as many (10%) mention the article on the former Bavarian royal family, and 5% cite "Betrayed and Sold Out" as least liked. Replies to both queries follow, each listed in order of frequency of mention.

"What do you like best in the Revue?"

The article "The Tragic Royal House" (Das tragische Koenigshaus): The historical part about King Ludwig; the Wittelsbach dynasty; etc.

28%

The variety of the magazine: Is more timely; so much variety, something of everything; political and entertaining; from the nation and from foreign countries, in pictures and in writing; brings interesting reports from all over the world; it is indeed a world illustrated, brings something of everything; the gay, lively set-up; etc.

15

The article "Betrayed and Sold Out" (Verraten und Verkauft): The personal opinions of the people in "Betrayed and Sold Out"; etc.

9

The article "Everyone was nice" (Alle waren nett): The report about the mannequin "Everyone was nice"; the picture series of the mannequin Countess Schweinitz; etc.

8

The article about Emil Jennings:

8

The serial story and the cartoons: The article "Auf der Reeperbahn nachts um halb eins" (On the Reeperbahn at night at half past twelve); the stories and the Herbert cartoons; short stories and cartoons; the article about the Reeperbahn, the cartoon page of Olaf Iversen; etc.

7

The article "Pichot is there again" (Pichot ist wieder da): Pichot is there again because it is very timely; I haven't read it but looked at the pictures, Pichot is there again; visit of the French prisoners of war; etc.

5

The format: The nice format which corresponds to German taste, the many pictures; the latest pictures of current happenings in the world; the lay-out of the pictures; the cover; the illustrations in general; etc.

5

Like nothing especially well: Nothing, the magazine contains nothing outstanding; nothing, most picture reports and articles are of a political nature or deal with subjects which are of a greater interest to young people; I like nothing particularly well; etc.

4

Other opinions: Objective presentation of present happenings and of past events; the articles are very sober; political articles looked at from a general view; the non-political attitude of the magazine; they bring good articles and attractive advertisements; articles which interest us women; I am interested in news; the thing with the two-man sub-marine; the fourth page; pictures of Korea; cosmetics; the style of the articles; advertisements; I like everything; etc.

12

Did not read it:

5

No opinion:

$$\frac{4}{110\%}$$

* Percentage adds to more than 100% because some people gave more than one answer.

- 28 -

CONFIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L

"And what do you like least in the Revue?"

<u>Too many advertisements in the Revue:</u> The awful advertisements; advertisements of mannequins, (3 pages, too extensive, one page would have been sufficient); too many ads, cigarette advertisements, etc.	14%
<u>The article "Grapes of Wrath" (Fruechte des Zorns):</u> The picture of "Grapes of Wrath"; "Grapes of Wrath," because we have seen too much in this report; war picture of Korea; etc.	13%
<u>The article "The Tragic Royal House" (Das tragische Koenigshaus):</u> The old stuff about the royal houses; the story about the Wittelsbachs; etc.	10
<u>The article "Betrayed and Sold Out" (Verraten und Verkauft):</u> The article "Betrayed and Sold Out" is too far-fetched; etc.	5
<u>The article "Everyone was nice" (Alle waren nett):</u> The fashions; let's go to Argentine; etc.	4
<u>The article about Emil Jannings:</u> The article about Emil Jannings because it re-hashes the rotten conditions of the Third Reich; etc.	2
<u>Sensational reporting:</u> The sensations which constantly dominate in the Revue; it favors sensational reports too much; superficial; etc.	2
<u>Liked everything:</u> Like everything; I liked it all; I have nothing to object to; etc.	16
<u>Other opinions:</u> The puzzles, have no time for them and no interest; the stupid Herbert cartoons; everything that deals with politics in that magazine; it depends on the articles; "Auf der Reeperbahn" (On the Reeperbahn); two men in a sub-marine; the pictures; the general standard is very low; too expensive; cosmetics; etc.	14
<u>Did not read it:</u>	5
<u>No opinion:</u>	17
	102%

* Percentage adds up to more than 100% because some people gave more than one answer.

VI. READERS' COMPARISONS OF THE TWO MAGAZINES

Respondents as stated in the introduction were presented copies of both magazines, Revue and Weltbild. Prior to going through each of the magazines, interviewers queried respondents on their relative estimates of the two issues. As will be seen in the findings reported below, Revue proves to be somewhat better received than Weltbild.

... Almost all respondents who had received the two magazines from the interviewers read both entirely or in part.

"Did you have the opportunity to read both the magazines we brought you last week?"

	<u>Revue</u>	<u>Weltbild</u>
Yes	51%	52%
Yes, partly	43	43
No	6	5
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Of the two magazines Weltbild was read first by more readers than was Revue.

- ... 50% say they read Weltbild first
- ... 38% say they read Revue first
- ... 6% cannot remember which they read first.

But the preponderance of opinion appears to favor Revue over Weltbild on two other counts:

- ... More people would recommend Revue to their friends than would recommend Weltbild; and
- ... More would buy Revue than Weltbild if their selection were based simply on the relative appeal of the covers of the two magazines.

"Would you recommend one of these two magazines to your friends?"

Yes, <u>Revue</u>	32%
Yes, <u>Weltbild</u>	20
Both	22
Neither	21
No opinion	5
	<u>100%</u>

C O N F I D E N T I A L

"Which of these two magazines would you read if you had only seen the covers at the newsstand?"

Revue	45%
Weltbild	39
Both	9
Neither	7
	<u>100%</u>

... Relevant here is the finding that people who would buy Weltbild in preference to Revue because of its cover are more likely also to say that articles about the former Nazi leaders will increase magazine sales than are those who consider the Revue cover more effective in promoting sales.

Effect on Sales of Articles
about Nazi Leaders

Increase Decrease No influence No opinion

Seeing covers only,
would read:

Revue	47%	27%	20%	6% /... 100%
Weltbild	75	6	16	3

... Three main reasons are given for preferring the Revue cover, all of which appear to reject the implications of the Weltbild cover. They are in order of frequency of mention: 1) Revue cover suggests variety and the lighter side, (28%); 2) lack of interest in Nuremberg trials, (28%); 3) Revue cover looks less political, (21%).

On the other hand the two most frequently stated reasons for finding the Weltbild cover the more attractive are definitely affirmative. They are: 1) interest in Goering and personalities of the Third Reich, (37%); and 2) interest in the Nuremberg trials, (24%).

Listed reasons for preferring each of the magazines as cited by respondents follow.

Which of these two magazines would you wish to read if you had only seen the covers at the newsstand?

If "Revue": "Why would you prefer the Revue?"

Lack of interest in Nuremberg trial (Weltbild cover):

The Goering story does not interest me; I am fed up with the to-do about the Third Reich; because I don't want to hear anymore about the Nuremberg affair, should leave out this junk about Nuremberg in Weltbild - cover of Revue is more attractive because it is non-political; we don't want to hear anymore about the old political affairs; etc.

28% (12%)*

Seems to have more variety and to be lighter: It is light, many-sided and pleasing, has nice pictures; judging from the cover Revue seems to be more pleasant and cheerful; cover of Revue is more attractive; because it is a real illustrated magazine; Revue is more factual; etc.

28% (12%)

Looks less political: It doesn't have a political cover; what the girl is doing there would interest me much more than the political affairs in Weltbild; I reject politics and pictures like the Weltbild cover; the other picture is too political; Weltbild is very political and more for men; Weltbild seems tendentious to me; etc.

21 (9)

Looks more like a women's magazine: Because it contains more interesting things for women; looking at the cover I believe there must be a lot in it about the world which interests me as a woman; it is more meant for women, the name already indicates that it is non-political; as a woman the cover picture of the Revue fascinates me more; fashion always interests me; etc.

11 (5)

Brings various articles which would interest me: Because the article "The Tragic Royal House" (Das tragische Koenigshaus) interested me very much; the story of the royal house interests me more than the Nuremberg trial; the story would interest me very much; to find a clue to happenings of former years and what took place behind the scenes, am very much interested in stories of the past and in geography; etc.

7 (3)

Already familiar with Revue: Because I know this magazine better than the other one; Weltbild was unknown to me up to now; I prefer magazines I know; because the Revue is better known; etc.

5 (2)

Other opinions: There is much about family life in it; I like the girl on the cover; because the cover of Revue is less sensational; etc.

5 (3)
106%** (46%)**

* Figures in parentheses are based on the total sample; others on those preferring Revue.

** Some people gave more than one reason.

Which of these two magazines would you wish to read if you had only seen the covers at the newsstand?"

If "Weltbild": "Why would you prefer Weltbild?"

<u>Interest in Goering and the personalities of the Third Reich:</u> I would be more interested to read what is written in the magazines about Goering; because the Goering story interested me; the cover promises real factual content; today everybody wants to know about Goering's end; Goering's head interests me; I am interested in the personalities of the Third Reich, in the report of facts; etc.	37%	(14%)*
<u>Interest in the Nuremberg trial:</u> Things about the Nuremberg trial interest me more than beautiful women; I followed the articles about the Nuremberg trials from the beginning on; I am interested in the facts as they really were in Nuremberg; etc.	24	(10)
<u>Stirs up curiosity for the contents:</u> The cover is attractive, one is curious about the contents which the cover promises; suggests interesting revelations, just lately I was released from Russian captivity; the cover made me curious about the contents of the magazine; etc.	15	(6)
<u>More factual and interesting, more solid, better articles:</u> I consider <u>Weltbild</u> more solid and serious, to judge from the cover; because it is more factual; <u>Weltbild</u> has interesting contributions from all over the world; it stresses present events more; seems to be more interesting; etc.	8	(3)
<u>Interest in political matters:</u> <u>Weltbild</u> deals more with politics - Goering being on the cover; because of the political article which the cover announces; etc.	6	(2)
<u>The make-up is better:</u> I like the gay colored cover; more obvious, better make-up; illustrations are better; better cover make-up; etc.	6	(2)
<u>Other opinions:</u> It is a new magazine which I do not know well yet; the <u>Revue</u> is more for youth and <u>Weltbild</u> is more for women; the Court stories have stirred up interest in me; that is quite another thing than these women; etc.	5	(2)
<u>No opinion:</u>	$\frac{1}{102\%}$ **	$\frac{(1)}{(40)}^{**}$

* Figures in parentheses are based on the total sample; others on those preferring Weltbild.

** Some people gave more than one reason.

GERMAN YOUTH VIEW THE AMERICAN PROGRAM

VII. Acceptance of Democratic Responsibility
and Related Political Issues

Report No. 50

Series No. 2

November 30, 1950

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PUB: Research Staff

OFFICE OF THE U. S. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR GERMANY

OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF

INTRODUCTION ...

This report dealing with attitudes and opinions of German youth regarding democratic government and related issues is the seventh in a series of reports based on an extensive survey of the attitudes of German youth toward major elements of the American program in Germany. The survey was conducted during July 1950 by the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs.

For these studies the usual random representative sample of Germans of all ages in the U.S. occupied areas was augmented by a special sample of German youth (defined as from 15 to 25 years of age). In all, the sample included approximately 1,750 youths and 1,250 adults in the U.S. Zone, 275 youths and 225 adults in West Berlin, and 200 youths and 175 adults in Bremen. Adults were interviewed in order to provide a basis for comparison of attitudes on the various issues.

As usual the interviews were conducted in the homes of respondents by trained German interviewers under the general supervision of American surveys officers.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS ...

- I. If personal interest in political affairs, willingness to assume responsibility in government and confidence in ability for self-government are accepted as criteria for an effective democracy, it is clear that the majority of German youth are currently unprepared to play a decisive role in the democratic development of their country.
 - ... Seven in ten youth disclaim personal interest in political affairs, thus outdoing even their elders, six in ten of whom would "leave politics to others." However, this bleak picture is somewhat relieved by the fact that the better educated, upper income youth - that is those who probably will become the opinion leaders - tend more frequently to claim a personal interest in political matters.
 - ... Bearing out their asserted disclaimer of interest in politics is the fact that four in ten U.S. Zone youths could not - as of July - name Dr. Adenauer as the present Chancellor of the Federal Republic.
 - ... German youth join with adults in refusing to accept one of the specific responsibilities essential to a functioning democracy - that of public office. This is the case despite the fact that the issue was put to them in very conciliatory terms - willingness to accept a local political office which they had personally been asked to take.
 - ... Confidence in the Germans' ability for self-government is also in short supply among German youth. Following much the same pattern as their elders, 46% U.S. Zone youth say Germans are currently capable of democratic government, 28% hold the negative view, and 26% withhold judgment. Shortcomings either of the German people or their political leaders are largely adduced as reasons for holding negative attitudes. Only a handful claim the presence of the occupation powers militates against the exercise of democracy among the German people.

II. Attitudes of youth on related political issues are as follows:

- ... A majority of youth find the record to date (July 1950) of the Bonn government satisfactory. In this they are somewhat less critical than adults.
- ... Those who are dissatisfied complain of Bonn's extravagance and its alleged failure to solve refugee, veteran, and unemployment problems.
- ... Youths join with adults in voting six in ten for a government offering economic security against one guaranteeing civil liberties, in case it were necessary to make such a choice.
- ... An overwhelming majority of youth and adults are of the opinion that the Bonn government works more for German interests than does the East Zone "Peoples" government.
- ... And a preponderance of both youth and adults think it would be better for the future of Germany if she were to join an alliance of European nations rather than to become a strong, independent state again; but a large minority prefers the latter.

R E S T R I C T E D

I. GERMAN YOUTH AND ATTITUDES RELATED TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

It is a truism that the ultimate success of the present West German experiment in democratic government depends in large part on the readiness and ability of German youth to carry forward and develop as adults what their elders have now begun. An integral part of the U.S. program in Germany is to foster and encourage, indirectly in the main, the education of young people along democratic lines with a view to assuring this outcome.

This study measures certain attitudes and opinions, currently held, of German youth which relate to democratic government. Three main issues form the basis of measurement. They are:

1. Personal interest in political affairs
2. Willingness to assume responsibility in government
3. Confidence in ability for self-government

The interrelationship of the three factors to a successfully functioning democracy will, it is assumed, be generally acknowledged.

For comparative purposes, attitudes and opinions of adults are shown on all issues.

PERSONAL INTEREST IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS ...

"Ohne mich" or any German equivalent of "Let George do it" largely characterizes attitudes of youth toward personal interest in political matters. Seven in ten in the U.S. Zone say they prefer to leave politics to others. In this regard they even out-do their elders who in the present survey maintain the established trend ** of voting six to four against personal interest in politics. Only in Berlin (and Bremen among adults) is greater personal interest claimed.

"Are you interested in politics or do you prefer to leave it to others?"

	Bavaria		Hesse		W-Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y*	A*	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
Interested	30%	40%	26%	33%	32%	41%	29%	38%	45%	47%	31%	49%
Leave it to others	<u>70</u>	<u>60</u>	<u>74</u>	<u>67</u>	<u>68</u>	<u>59</u>	<u>71</u>	<u>62</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>53</u>	<u>69</u>	<u>51</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

* In the above table and succeeding ones throughout the report, "Y" represents youth and "A", adults.

Teen-agers appear to be even less interested in political affairs than youth between 20 and 25 years of age. But this probably is not a phenomena confined to Germany - teen-agers generally are not noted for their devotion to politics.

US ZONE

	15-19	20-25	over 25
Interested	25%	34%	38%
Leave it to others	<u>75</u>	<u>66</u>	<u>62</u>
	100%	100%	100%

** See "Trends in German Public Opinion 1946 through 1949", Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs, HICOG, for summary of adult attitudes on this issue.

WIDE VARIATION WITHIN YOUTH POPULATION ...

This bleak picture is relieved somewhat by the fact that claimed interest in politics is higher among those young persons who can be expected to become the opinion leaders in a community - the well educated, those in the upper income brackets, and men. Over three-fourths of the group who have received their Abitur (diploma) or attended a university express an interest in politics. Also, a greater proportion of urban youth than of rural youth make a similar claim.

"Are you interested in politics, or do you prefer to leave it to others?"

	Interested	Leave it to others	No opinion
US ZONE YOUTH 15 - 25			
<u>Sex:</u>			
Men	43%	57%	- ... 100%
Women	19	81	-
<u>Education:</u>			
8 years or less	24%	76%	-
9 - 11 years	49	51	-
*12 years and more	78	22	-
<u>Income (per month):</u>			
0 - 99.99 DM	20%	80%	-
100 - 249.99 DM	26	74	-
250 - 399.99 DM	33	67	-
400 DM and more	43	57	-
<u>City Size:</u>			
Under 1.000 population	21%	79%	-
1.000 - 1.999	27	73	-
2.000 - 4.999	27	73	-
5.000 - 9.999	29	71	-
10.000 - 24.999	32	68	-
25.000 - 99.999	35	65	-
100.000 - 249.999	47	53	-
250.000 and over	39	61	-
<u>Employment Status:</u>			
Employed or apprenticed	30%	70%	-
Unemployed	35	65	-
Not employed (students, dependents)	25	75	-
<u>Religion:</u>			
Catholics	29%	71%	-
Protestants	30	70	-
<u>Origin:</u>			
Natives	29%	71%	-
Refugees	31	69	-

* Some caution should be exercised in interpreting these figures, as they are based on less than 100 cases. However, the greater interest in politics shown by the better educated youth conforms to the findings of a previous study made among university students where eight in ten claimed interest in politics. See "Attitudes of Students at Erlangen and Munich Universities," Report # 17, Series No. 2, RAS, PUB, HICOG (30 April 1950).

MANY CANNOT IDENTIFY CHANCELLOR ...

Bearing out their asserted disclaimer of interest in politics is the fact that four in ten U.S. Zone youths do not know who is the present Chancellor of the Federal Republic. In this respect, however, young people do as well on the whole as adults.*

"Can you please tell me who is the Chancellor of the West German government?"

	Bavaria		Hesse		W-Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N
Konrad Adenauer	53%	52%	72%	74%	61%	53%	59%	58%	71%	67%	72%	73%
Theodor Heuss	12	14	10	9	17	17	13	13	15	19	15	12
Don't know	35	34	18	17	22	30	28	29	14	14	13	10
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	US ZONE		
	15-19	20-25	over 25
Konrad Adenauer	57%	62%	58%
Theodor Heuss	11	14	13
Don't know	32	24	29
	100%	100%	100%

* It should be recalled that these figures were obtained in July 1950.

GROUP COMPARISONS ...

As is generally the case in information questions of this type, men, the well educated, those in the upper income brackets, and residents of large cities are better informed than their opposite groups.

	Adenauer	Heuss	Don't know
<u>Sex:</u>			
Men	73%	12%	15%
Women	49	13	38 ... 100%
<u>Education:</u>			
8 years or less	54%	13%	33%
9 - 11 years	83	10	7
12 years and more	86	12	2
<u>Income (per month):</u>			
0 - 99.99 DM	45%	7%	48%
100 - 249.99 DM	57	12	31
250 - 399.99 DM	65	14	21
400 DM and more	67	14	19
<u>City Size:</u>			
Under 1,000 population	53%	9%	38%
1,000 - 1,999	51	10	39
2,000 - 4,999	57	13	30
5,000 - 9,999	60	18	22
10,000 - 24,999	67	16	17
25,000 - 99,999	65	13	22
100,000 - 249,999	73	12	15
250,000 and over	70	14	16
<u>Employment Status:</u>			
Employed or apprenticed	60%	13%	27%
Unemployed	63	10	27
Not employed (students, dependents)	48	14	38
Housewives	55	12	33
<u>Religion:</u>			
Catholics	55%	11%	34%
Protestants	65	14	21
<u>Origin:</u>			
Natives	59%	13%	28%
Refugees	63	10	27

WILLINGNESS TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY ...

A functioning democracy depends of course on the willingness of its constituents to assume roles of responsibility - among which is that of political office. German youth agree overwhelmingly with adults in refusing this specific responsibility. This is the case despite the fact that the issue was phrased in what may only be considered the most conciliatory terms - acceptance of a local political office, which they had personally been asked to take.

"Would you be interested in taking a responsible position in the political life of your community (town) if you were asked?"

	Bavaria		Hesse		W-Baden		US Zone		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
Would be interested	19%	19%	13%	16%	14%	10%	17%	16%	23%	22%	14%	22%
Would not be interested	80	80	82	82	83	86	81	82	76	78	80	78
No opinion	1	1	5	2	3	4	2	2	1	-	6	-
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	US ZONE		
	15-19	20-25	over 25
Would be interested	18%	16%	16%
Would not be interested	79	82	82
No opinion	3	2	2
	100%	100%	100%

RESTRICTED

LITTLE DIFFERENCE AMONG YOUTH ...

Though some minor variations are apparent, strongly negative attitudes toward holding political office are the rule among all components of youthful population groups. Thus those in what may be considered the leadership groups - the better educated, the higher income and urban youth - are no more eager to consider a political career than are youth in general.

"Would you be interested in taking a responsible position in the political life of your community (town) if you were asked?"

US ZONE YOUTH 15 - 25	Would be interested	Would not be interested	No opinion
<u>Youth Group Membership:</u>			
Member of a group	22%	76%	2% ... 100%
Not a member	14	84	2
<u>Sex:</u>			
Men	24%	73%	3%
Women	11	87	2
<u>Education:</u>			
8 years or less	15%	82%	3%
9-11 years	25	74	1
12 years and more	20	80	-
<u>Income (per month):</u>			
0 - 99.99 DM	14%	83%	3%
100 - 249.99 DM	17	80	3
250 - 399.99 DM	17	81	2
400 DM and more	20	79	1
<u>City Size:</u>			
Under 1,000 population	14%	81%	2%
1,000 - 1,999	15	82	3
2,000 - 4,999	16	83	1
5,000 - 9,999	13	83	4
10,000 - 24,999	17	79	4
25,000 - 99,999	23	76	1
100,000 - 249,999	20	78	2
250,000 and over	21	76	3
<u>Employment Status:</u>			
Employed or apprenticed	17%	81%	2%
Unemployed	24	75	1
Not employed (students, dependents)	19	75	6
<u>Religion:</u>			
Catholics	18%	80%	2%
Protestants	15	82	3
All others	25	75	-
<u>Origin:</u>			
Natives	16%	82%	2%
Refugees	19	78	3

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CONFIDENCE IN ABILITY FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT ...

The third essential ingredient of democracy as measured is confidence in ability for self-government. This too according to results obtained appears to be in somewhat "short supply" as far as opinions of youth are concerned. Among U.S. Zone youth, 46% say the Germans are currently capable of governing themselves democratically, but 28% hold the negative view, and 26% have no opinion. Adults follow much the same pattern. (Berliners' opinions are somewhat more affirmative.)

"Do you believe the Germans today can really govern themselves democratically?"

	Bavaria		Hesse		W-Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y A		Y A		Y A		Y A		Y A		Y A	
Yes, can	48%	50%	41%	50%	47%	52%	46%	51%	53%	62%	39%	46%
No, cannot	27	30	27	24	29	29	28	28	42	34	29	36
No opinion	25	20	32	26	24	19	26	21	5	4	32	18
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	US ZONE		
	15-19	20-25	over 25
Yes, can	45%	47%	51%
No, cannot	23	32	23
No opinion	32	21	21
	100%	100%	100%

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There is considerable variation in the amount of confidence expressed by different segments of the youthful population on this question. The well educated, those in the top income bracket and large city dwellers have less faith in their compatriot's ability to govern themselves than do the counterpart groups. Attitudes of employed and unemployed, refugees and natives, Catholics and Protestants are essentially the same on this question, and are not shown in the table.

"Do you believe the Germans today can really govern themselves democratically?"

US ZONE YOUTH: (15-25)

	Yes, can	No, cannot	No opinion
<u>Youth Group Membership:</u>			
Member of a group	43	32%	20% ...100%
Not a member	45	25	30
<u>Education:</u>			
8 years or less	47%	23%	30%
9 - 11 years	43	45	12
12 years and more	33	60	2
<u>Income (per month):</u>			
0 - 99.99 DM	40%	21%	39%
100 - 249.99 DM	45	26	29
250 - 399.99 DM	52	27	21
400 DM and more	46	39	15
<u>City Size:</u>			
Under 1,000 population	45%	21%	34%
1,000 - 1,999	43	22	35
2,000 - 4,999	52	25	23
5,000 - 9,999	51	29	20
10,000 - 24,999	51	28	21
25,000 - 99,999	51	30	19
100,000 - 249,999	37	41	22
250,000 and over	39	43	18

REASONS FOR LACK OF CONFIDENCE ...

When asked why they thought the Germans could not really govern themselves democratically, almost everyone mentioned shortcomings either of the German people as a whole or of the German political leaders. Only a handful claimed that the presence of the occupation powers militated against German self-government.

Reasons for thinking the Germans today cannot govern themselves democratically:

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
<u>Germans still too divided:</u> There are too many opinions, too many political parties; the different interests of the political parties are much too strong; by splitting up into too many political parties; everybody to be a little God; etc.	9%	10%	14%	17%	11%	17%
<u>Germans still lack experience:</u> Germans are not yet mature enough; they have to be led too much; there are too many people who are not able to think in a democratic way; it does not work here, one man always wants to seize power in Germany; people are used to being ordered; the Germans are a people of workers and it will lead to dictatorship; etc.	6	5	12	8	8	9
<u>Too much Nazism still exists:</u> The Hitler mentality has too strong a hold on the German people; there is still too much drill and militarism; there are too many Nazis still in the foreground; etc.	4	3	6	4	4	2
<u>Government officials are inadequate:</u> I think we have not the right persons in the government; the officials think too much about party politics and not about the people; our politicians don't seem to know what democracy is; wholly incapable people are governing; they are worse dictators than before; there is too much corruption and too many job-hunters; etc.	3	5	4	1	5	7
<u>Economic difficulties prevent it:</u> When there is not enough work, we are bad democrats; they need help from the Americans and therefore depend on it; etc.	2	2	2	4	-	1
<u>Occupation powers prevent it:</u> We are subject to the Americans; we are not yet free and can't do what we want to do; etc.	2	1	-	1	2	-
<u>Fear of Communism and the East:</u> There are too many Commies; Communism would spread after withdrawal of the occupation powers; German democracy will never be able to stand against Communism; etc.	1	1	3	*	1	2
<u>Other opinions:</u> When one has lost the war, the people are not so satisfied; opinions about democracy are very different; etc.	1	1	3	2	-	*
<u>No opinion:</u>	$\frac{1}{29\%}$	$\frac{1}{29\%}$	$\frac{1}{45\%}$	$\frac{1}{38\%}$	$\frac{-}{31\%}$	$\frac{*}{38\%}$

* Less than one half of one per cent.
(Percentages add to more than number asked the question because some people gave more than one answer.)

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II. ATTITUDES OF YOUTH ON RELATED POLITICAL ISSUES

APPRAISAL OF WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT ...

The record to date of the Federal Republic is considered satisfactory by a majority of the youth and adults in West Germany*. However, a sizeable minority say they are either out and out dissatisfied or partly dissatisfied. As seen below, young people are less inclined to be critical than are their elders.

"In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the activities of the West German government to date?"

	Bavaria		Hesse		W. Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
Satisfied	61%	57%	47%	36%	65%	53%	55%	52%	74%	69%	55%	49%
Dissatisfied	20	30	21	32	14	24	19	29	11	20	11	26
Partly/partly	7	9	20	24	14	14	12	14	7	9	14	18
No opinion	12	4	12	8	7	4	11	5	8	2	20	7
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	US ZONE		
	15-19	20-25	over 25
Satisfied	65%	52%	52%
Dissatisfied	14	24	29
Partly/partly	7	16	14
No opinion	14	8	5
	100%	100%	100%

* "To date" refers to July 1950 when interviewing on the survey was done.

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GROUP COMPARISONS ...

Only within two population groups are important variations of attitudes found. Well educated youth, and the unemployed more often than the poorly educated and employed say they are displeased with the performance of the West German government.

"In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the activities of the West German government to date?"

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Partly/ partly	No opinion	
US ZONE YOUTH:					
<u>Education:</u>					
3 years or less	61%	13%	10%	11%	... 100
9 - 11 years	54	19	17	10	
12 years and more	40	36	22	2	
<u>Employment Status:</u>					
Employed or apprenticed	59%	13%	12%	11%	
Unemployed	51	31	5	13	
Not employed (students, dependents)	57	19	6	18	
Housewives	53	19	16	7	

REASONS FOR DISSATISFACTION ...

Those who are dissatisfied complain of the extravagant spending of the Bonn government, its indifference to the problem of refugees, veteran and other groups, inability to create jobs, etc.

Reasons for being dissatisfied with the activities of the Bonn government:

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
<u>Taxes too high -- extravagant spending:</u>						
Inflated government machinery; burden of taxes too high for working people, but there is enough money to raise salaries for parliament; if they had stayed in Frankfurt they would have saved a lot of money. Bundesstag is managing too well for itself; everybody works into his own pockets; the house of the president costs 175,000 DM, etc.						
	5%	10%	*	-	1%	4%
<u>Government indifferent to common people:</u>						
<u>refugees; disabled war veterans; etc.:</u>						
I am not pleased with the social insurance law; they should take more care of refugee problems; because I didn't get any help as a refugee; they are not doing enough for disabled persons; take little care of war widows and war orphans; no social measures; no just "Lastenausgleich"; the bombed out are not helped; 28 DM per month for a war widow is completely impossible; etc.						
	4	11	1	3	3	7

(cont'd on next page)

R E S T R I C T E D

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
<u>Unemployment problem unsolved:</u> They are incapable of overcoming unemployment; they do not create work; should do more against unemployment; unemployment doesn't decrease; etc.	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	7 $\frac{1}{2}$
<u>Prices too high, wages too low:</u> Living standard is too high; inadequately controlled prices hurt the common people; one cannot live adequately; no just relationship of prices and wages has been worked out; etc.	3	3	-	1	1	4
<u>Lack clear line of policy; too uncooperative:</u> They delay too many things; too inconsistent and like to postpone decisions; they quarrel about trifles and have no time for the real problems; they disagree and quarrel too much with the political parties; there is still too much bureaucracy; etc.	2	3	1	1	1	1
<u>Words, no deeds:</u> Lot of talk but nothing done; no action; they haven't carried anything through; have no success; promises are not kept; much is promised to the refugees and veterans, but nothing is to be observed; etc.	2	2	1	1	2	2
<u>Subservient to West:</u> Too much tutelage by the Allies; they are a puppet government; etc.	1	1	1	1	1	2
<u>Housing program not furthered:</u> They should build more living quarters than shops; they don't build living quarters for working people; we have no apartments; etc.	1	1	-	1	1	3
<u>Berlin's needs ignored:</u> They are not enough concerned with Berlin; the West German government considers Berlin as an Eastern country and has not enough confidence in it; they take little care of the economic situation of Berlin; they should give Berlin more financial support; Berlin is not yet taken in as the twelfth state; etc.	*	*	6	12	-	-
<u>Other opinions:</u> Adenauer gives the orders and nobody dares to counteract; the people are too old, younger people would be better; the unemployed are helped too much in their laziness; EMF funds are not used for the most important and most urgent aims; exaggerated socialization; freedom of trade should be abolished; the Nazis have so many rights; because we have to support the Jews; too much clerical influence; government acts unwisely toward the Allies and the people; reform of the school system; still no law against bad literature; etc.	$\frac{1}{23}$	$\frac{1}{35}$	$\frac{1}{12}$	$\frac{3}{24}$	$\frac{1}{13}$	$\frac{1}{31}$

* Less than one half of one per cent.

(Percentages total more than the proportion expressing dissatisfaction because some people gave more than one answer.)

WHICH IS MORE IMPORTANT - FREEDOM OR SECURITY? ...

As a measure of the value young people place on personal and political freedom, as against economic security, interviewees were asked to make an admittedly arbitrary and difficult choice: between a government offering economic security and the possibility of a good income and one guaranteeing free elections, free speech, free press and religious freedom. Six in ten of both the U.S. Zone youth and adults say they prefer security.* However, over half of the young West Berliners made their choice on the side of the freedom.

"Which of these two forms of government would you personally prefer: .

- A. A government which offers the people economic security and the possibility of a good income.
- B. A government which guarantees free elections, freedom of speech, a free press and religious freedom?"

	Bavaria		Hesse		W. Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
A. Security	64%	61%	55%	58%	59%	57%	61%	59%	45%	49%	54%	55%
B. Freedom	29	31	28	23	35	33	30	30	52	42	29	32
No opinion	7	8	17	19	6	10	9	11	3	9	17	13
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	US ZONE		
	15-19	20-25	over 25
Security	58%	63%	59%
Freedom	31	28	30
No opinion	11	9	11
	100%	100%	100%

* See, "Trend in German Public Opinion, 1946 through 1948", RAS, PUB, HICOG, for a discussion of the trend of opinions on this issue.

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There appears to be a tendency for better educated people to vote for civil liberties over security more frequently than among other population groups. On the whole, however, all segments of U.S. Zone youth would choose security, if a choice were required of them.

Would Personally Prefer:

	Security	Freedom	No opinion	
<u>Youth Group Membership:</u>				
Member of a group	58%	35%	7%	... 100%
Not a member	62	27	11	
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	57%	35%	8%	
Women	63	26	11	
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	63%	27%	10%	
9 - 11	51	43	6	
12 years and more	44	48	8	
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 99,99 DM	53%	28%	19%	
100 - 249,99 DM	62	28	10	
250 - 399,99 DM	66	29	5	
400 DM and more	55	38	7	
<u>City Size:</u>				
Under 1,000 population	55%	30%	15%	
1,000 - 1,999	57	30	13	
2,000 - 4,999	66	27	7	
5,000 - 9,999	58	36	6	
10,000 - 24,999	67	28	5	
25,000 - 99,999	73	21	6	
100,000 - 249,999	61	31	8	
250,000 and over	57	37	6	
<u>Employment Status:</u>				
Employed or apprenticed	58%	32%	10%	
Unemployed	74	22	4	
Not employed (Students, dependents)	59	29	12	
Housewives	74	20	6	
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	60%	31%	9%	
Protestants	62	28	10	
<u>Origin:</u>				
Natives	60%	31%	9%	
Refugees	64	28	8	

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WHICH GOVERNMENT WORKS MORE FOR INTEREST OF GERMANS — EAST OR WEST? ...

An overwhelming majority of both youth and adults think that the West German government, more than that in the East Zone, works for the interests of Germany. In West Berlin where the population has a better opportunity to compare the two, selection of the West is almost unanimous.

"In your opinion, which of the two governments works for the interests of Germany — the East German government or the West German government?"

	Bavaria		Hesse		W Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
West German government	80%	79%	81%	74%	84%	77%	81%	78%	94%	98%	77%	79%
East German government	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	1	1
Both the same	5	2	4	9	4	5	4	4	5	1	4	4
Undecided	14	18	14	16	11	17	14	17	-	1	19	17
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	US ZONE		
	15-19	20-25	over 25
West German government	80%	82%	78%
East German government	2	1	1
Both the same	3	5	4
No opinion	15	12	17
	100%	100%	100%

A noteworthy finding in the table above is the relatively large number of people who are unable to decide between the two governments. That this does not result mainly from a desire to withhold judgment based on information is suggested by the analysis of group differences on the following page. This shows that the undecided replies come largely from the unsophisticated, generally uninformed groups.

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GROUP COMPARISONS ...

Among all components of the youthful population, the dominant opinion is that the federal government does more for German interest than does the "People's" Republic of East Germany. But certain groups show more indecision than others - young women, the lesser educated, the lower income, and rural youths.

"In your opinion, which of the two governments works more for the interests of Germany — the East German government or the West German government?"

	West German	East German	Both the same	Undecided
US ZONE YOUTH:				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	83%	2%	5%	10% .. 10
Women	79	1	4	16
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	80%	1%	4%	15%
9 - 11 years	88	2	4	6
12 years & more	86	-	10	4
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 99,99 DM	69%	1%	4%	26%
100 - 249,99 DM	79	2	4	15
250 - 399,99 DM	87	1	5	7
400 DM and more	86	1	4	9
<u>City Size:</u>				
Under 1,000 population	76%	1%	5%	18%
1,000 - 1,999	76	1	3	20
2,000 - 4,999	80	2	4	14
5,000 - 9,999	81	2	5	12
10,000 - 24,999	83	2	4	6
25,000 - 49,999	83	-	6	6
100,000 - 249,999	81	1	6	12
250,000 and more	89	1	3	7
<u>Employment Status:</u>				
Employed or apprenticed	81%	1%	4%	14%
Unemployed	83	3	4	10
Not employed (Students, dependents)	79	-	2	19
Housewives	85	1	5	9
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	81%	1%	4%	14%
Protestants	81	1	4	14
<u>Origin:</u>				
Natives	80%	1%	5%	14%
Refugees	83	1	4	12

INDEPENDENT STRONG STATE OR EUROPEAN ALLIANCE? ...

A preponderance of both youth and adults say that they think it would be better for the future of Germany if she were to join an alliance of European nations rather than to become a strong independent state again. However, a substantial minority votes along nationalistic lines.

"What do you believe would be better for the future of Germany - to become an independent strong state again, or should she join an alliance of European nations?"

	Bavaria		Hesse		W. Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Freemen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
Independent strong state	38%	30%	26%	23%	31%	23%	33%	27%	26%	23%	24%	18%
Alliance of European nations	48	53	54	55	55	60	51	55	71	72	57	66
No opinion	14	17	20	22	14	17	16	18	3	5	19	16
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	US ZONE		
	15-19	20-25	over 25
Independent strong state	34%	33%	27%
Alliance of European nations	48	54	55
No opinion	18	13	18
	100%	100%	100%

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Youth in the leadership groups young men, the well educated, and those in the higher income brackets, are considerably more likely to favor an alliance of European states than are their counterpart groups.

"What do you believe would be better for the future of Germany - to become an independent strong state again, or should she join an alliance of European nations?"

	Independent strong state	Alliance of European nations	No opinion
US ZONE YOUTH:			
<u>Sex:</u>			
Men	31%	60%	9%
Women	35	44	21
<u>Education:</u>			
8 years or less	35%	47%	18%
9 - 11 years	26	68	6
12 years and more	24	70	6
<u>Income (per month):</u>			
0 - 99.99 DM	33%	36%	31%
100 - 249.99 DM	34	49	17
250 - 399.99 DM	34	55	11
400 DM and more	29	64	7
<u>City Size:</u>			
Under 1,000 pop.	33%	43%	24%
1,000 - 1,999	40	39	21
2,000 - 4,999	40	47	13
5,000 - 9,999	26	60	14
10,000 - 24,999	36	54	10
25,000 - 99,999	31	62	7
100,000 - 249,999	31	60	9
250,000 and over	25	65	10
<u>Religion:</u>			
Catholics	37%	46	17%
Protestants	30	56	14
<u>Origin:</u>			
Natives	34%	51%	15%
Refugees	32	49	19

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GERMANS VIEW THE REMILITARIZATION ISSUE

Pre-Election Trend and Further Findings

Report No. 51

Series No. 2

Classification changed to

CONFIDENTIAL

by ~~quilt~~ Leop. Crespi

DIR/PAC

OFFICE OF THE U. S. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR GERMANY
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REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

. INTRODUCTION

The present report is another in a series of studies being conducted by the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs, to chart developments in German thinking on the issue of German participation in European defense. Findings are based upon an urban sample of West Germany. Results were gathered on the 15 and 16th of November (immediately prior to the Hesse and Wuerttemberg-Baden Landtag elections on the 19th of November) through the operation of a 48-hour "flash" survey embracing a representative urban quota sample of 640 cases drawn from among West German cities 50,000 and over in population, and a 200 case quota sample from the three Western sectors of Berlin.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS

I. TREND ON GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN DEFENSE

- ... The latest survey findings make it evident that opposition to German participation in European defense has risen appreciably since November 1st - most sharply in the period immediately preceding the Hesse and Wuerttemberg-Baden Landtag elections. Approval still outweighs disapproval in urban West Germany as a whole, but in the US Zone, opposition has drawn up almost neck and neck with support for German participation.
- ... The drop in support in West Germany for participation in European defense has apparently had no repercussions in Berlin. Currently, as in mid-August, four out of five approve.
- ... The most obvious explanation for the sharp increase in West German and more particularly US Zone opposition in the period immediately preceding the Landtag elections, is that SPD propaganda on the remilitarization issue succeeded in shifting an appreciable proportion of Germans from approval to disapproval of participation in European defense.
- ... Analysis of group breakdowns among West German city dwellers reveals that the November drop in support for German participation has occurred in each of the various population groups examined except one - individuals of higher education. This fact may indicate that the kind of propaganda currently being used against German defense participation is more emotional than rational.
- ... Follow-up inquiries reveal that the majority of those now against German defense participation are not unconditionally opposed, but would approve of such a course if certain conditions were met by the Western powers. The most frequently stated condition for approval is equal rights in the military and political field.
- ... The best guess in interpreting the pre-election trend on the remilitarization issue is that SPD propaganda has not functioned so much to engender basic opposition to German defense participation, but rather has had the effect of shifting the emphasis in the minds of many from "Yes - but" to "No - unless".

II. GERMAN REACTIONS TO FRENCH PLANNING ON GERMANY

- ... Looking at present German-French political relations as a whole, most West German urban dwellers judge them to be "not so good" to "bad".

- b -

C O N F I D E N T I A L

- ... However, reaction to the French, as measured in this general way, does not seem to be an important differentiating factor in influencing attitudes toward German rearmament. Adverse reactions are just about as widespread among supporters of German participation in a European army as among opponents.
- ... Agreement with the Schumann Plan considerably outweighs disagreement. However, a large proportion of West German urbanites have not yet formed any judgment about the French proposal.
- ... Agreement with the Schumann Plan is somewhat greater among Germans who approve of participation in a European army, thus indicating that reactions to the French proposal may play some minor part in influencing German attitude on the participation issue.
- ... It was anticipated that few among the German rank and file would be familiar with the Eleven Plan. So instead of endeavoring to obtain specific evaluations of the plan, the respondents were asked in a more general way to indicate whether or not they felt that France was justified in attaching any conditions to German participation in a West European army. Two out of three in West Germany, say France is not justified in attaching conditions to German participation. Only one in ten take the contrary view, with the remainder expressing no opinion.
- ... Opposition to German rearmament does not seem to be traceable to any greater feeling that the French are not justified in laying down conditions for German participation in a European army. On the contrary, the figures indicate that supporters rather than opponents of German defense participation are the ones who more widely assert that establishing of conditions by the French is unjustified.

III. GERMAN REACTION TO RUSSIAN PROPOSAL FOR FOUR POWER CONFERENCE

- ... At the time of the present survey, six in ten West German urban dwellers had heard about Russia's proposal for a four power conference on German problems. Asked to assess the probable value of such a conference the large preponderance stated flatly that in their judgment such a conference would be of no advantage at all to Germany. Less than one in ten saw possible great advantage in following the Russian proposal.
- ... Opponents and supporters of German participation in European defense differ little in their reactions to the conference proposal. The dominating view in both groups was distinctly negative. This result is of considerable importance since it suggests that opposition to German rearmament does not derive in any major way from a desire to conciliate or compromise with the Russians.

IV. GERMAN REACTIONS TO OUTCOME OF AMERICAN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

- ... A majority of West German city dwellers had heard about the American congressional elections as of the time of the present survey. The largest proportion of those who had heard about the congressional elections feel that the results connote no change in the extent of American interest in Europe. Only comparatively few - particularly in Berlin - think that American interest in Europe will decline as a consequence.

therefore, that this particular factor has played no important role in differentiating German attitudes on the rearmament issue.

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V. MORE ON GERMAN THINKING ABOUT A PLEBISCITE

- ... Corroborating the findings of previous studies, opinion in West Germany continues to be strongly favorable to the idea of a plebiscite for deciding West Germany's participation in European defense.
- ... Approval of a plebiscite is substantially similar in extent among Germans who support and those who oppose participation in European defense.
- ... If a plebiscite were held in West Germany, everywhere except in Berlin the preponderant opinion is that the majority vote would be against West German participation in a European army. In the US Zone almost three times as many say that the majority would vote against as say the majority would vote for German defense participation.
- ... Considerably fewer supporters than opponents of German military participation are convinced that the majority vote would be on their side in the event of a plebiscite. This finding is interesting in view of the previously disclosed fact that approval of the plebiscite idea is just as widespread among Germans who favor German defense participation as among those who oppose such a course.
- ... In an earlier report the possibility was broached that the Communists might back a plebiscite on rearmament in West Germany in the hope of thereby furthering their cause. The results suggest that less than half the support for a plebiscite would be likely to continue if it were learned that the Communists were in back of such a proposal.
- ... Opponents of German military participation are somewhat less inclined than are supporters to give up the idea of a plebiscite in the event that Communist backing should be brought to light.

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I. TREND ON GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN DEFENSE

WHAT WERE PRE-ELECTION INDICATIONS? ...

The latest survey findings make it evident that opposition to German participation in European defense has risen appreciably since November, 1st - most sharply in the period immediately preceding the Hesse and Württemberg-Baden Landtag elections. Approval still outweighs disapproval in urban West Germany as a whole, but in the US Zone, opposition has drawn up almost neck and neck with support for German participation,

The drop in support in West Germany for participation in European defense has apparently had no repercussions in Berlin. Currently, as in mid-August, approval figures in Berlin exceed four out of five.

Several West European nations and America recently signed a defense pact, the so-called Atlantic Pact.

"Suppose West Germany would join the Atlantic Pact and be asked in connection with it to participate in a general army for the defense of West Europe. Would you then be for or against such participation in a defense army?"

	WEST GERMANY*				British Zone			
	Aug	Oct-Nov	Nov		Aug	Oct-Nov	Nov	
	15-17	31-1	9-10	15-16	15-17	31-1	9-10	15-16
For it	61%	63%	58%	51%	59%	61%	59%	51%
Against it	27	30	32	41	23	31	31	39
No opinion	12	7	10	8	12	8	10	10
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	US Zone				Berlin			
	Aug	Oct-Nov	Nov		Aug	Oct-Nov	Nov	
	15-17	31-1	9-10	15-16	15-17	31-1	9-10	15-16
For it	67%	65%	57%	48%	86%	89%	80%	85%
Against it	21	20	32	45	12	8	16	12
No opinion	12	6	11	7	2	3	4	3
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

The most obvious explanation for the sharp increase in West German and more particularly US Zone opposition in the period immediately preceding the Landtag elections, is that SPD propaganda on the remilitarization issue succeeded in shifting an appreciable proportion of Germans from approval to disapproval of participation in European defense. If this is true the suggestion is that the remilitarization issue played an important role in the SPD election gains. However, more specific information in this connection will be available from a study currently in progress.

* The West German sample used in this survey includes a proportionate allotment of respondents from French Zone cities of 50,000 or more population and from Bremen. However, the number of cases that result for these two areas are too few to permit reliable separate tabulations of their results. Hence only the British Zone with 416 cases, the US Zone with 182, and Berlin with 200 are separately tabulated for comparisons.

Analysis of group breakdowns among West German city dwellers reveals that the November drop in support for German participation has occurred in each of the various population groups examined except one - individuals of higher education. In this group there has been no statistically significant decrease in support since November 1st. This fact when viewed with the considerable drop in support that has occurred among respondents with only elementary education may indicate that the kind of propaganda currently being used against German defense participation is more emotional than rational.

Several West European nations and America recently signed a defense pact, the so-called Atlantic Pact.

"Suppose West Germany would join the Atlantic Pact and be asked in connection with it to participate in a general army for the defense of West Europe. Would you then be for or against such participation in a defense army?"

For it				Against it				No opinion			**Number of cases;
Aug.	Oct	Nov		Aug	Oct	Nov		Aug	Oct	Nov	
	Nov				Nov				Nov		
15	31	9	15	15	31	9	15	15	31	9	15
17	1	10	16	17	1	10	16	17	1	10	16

WEST GERMANY

Sex:

Men	68%	62%	64%	53%	28%	29%	31%	42%	4%	2%	5%	5%	288
Women	54	58	53	49	28	31	32	40	18	11	15	11	351

Education:

Elementary school	53%	59%	51%	43%	30%	31%	35%	46%	17%	10%	14%	11%	400
Beyond elementary school	70	67	69	64	25	29	27	33	5	4	4	3	239

Socio-economicStatus:

Lower class	55%	58%	48%	47%	29%	32%	36%	41%	16%	10%	16%	12%	322
Lower middle to upper class	66	68	68	54	26	28	27	41	8	4	5	5	317

*Income(per month):

0 - 149 DM			43%	40%			42%	43%			15%	17%	99
150 - 299 DM			52	50			34	42			14	8	274
300 DM and more			71	56			24	39			5	5	257

Age:

Under 40 years	62%	60%	58%	50%	28%	33%	24%	43%	10%	7%	18%	7%	290
40 years and over	60	64	61	51	27	28	21	40	13	8	18	9	349

Religion:

Catholics	62%	60%	57%	50%	29%	33%	30%	41%	9%	7%	13%	9%	240
Protestants	63	64	59	51	25	29	32	41	12	7	9	8	350

* Income figures were not obtained in the earlier two surveys.

** These numbers apply to the latest survey. They are approximately the same for the earlier surveys.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

IS OPPOSITION TO GERMAN DEFENSE PARTICIPATION UNCONDITIONAL? ...

Follow-up inquiries reveal that the majority of those now against German defense participation are not unconditionally opposed, but would approve of such a course if certain conditions were met by the Western powers.

"Are there any conditions which the Western powers would have to meet, before you would agree to West Germany's participation in a West European army?" (Asked of those who answered "No" to previous question.)

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Yes	23%	21%	29%	6%
No, would not agree under any conditions	14	14	15	3
No opinion	4	4	4	3
	<u>41%</u>	<u>39%</u>	<u>48%</u>	<u>12%</u>

The most frequently stated conditions for approval, it may be seen below, is equal rights in the military and political field.

"Under what conditions?" (Asked of those who said "Yes" to the question: "Are there any conditions which the Western powers would have to meet, before you would agree to West Germany's participation in a West European army?")

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
<u>Equal rights in the military and political field - sovereignty in own country: When we shall have just as much to say as we did in former times; recognition as partners with equal rights; full recognition of Germany; we should have exactly the same rights; equal rights within the Western world; it should be guaranteed that German generals are in command of German troops; sovereignty in our own country, that we should be able to decide our own fate; the Western powers should first recognize Germany's claims as justified; etc.</u>	12%	11%	13%	2%
<u>Rehabilitation of German soldiers and termination of war crimes trials: No conviction of Germans in Franco; not so-called war criminals free; rehabilitation of the German soldier, revision of war crimes trials; release convicted generals; they should take back what they have said about our soldiers; etc.</u>	3	1	6	1
<u>Signing of a peace treaty: Peace treaty with Germany; that we got a peace treaty; peace treaty with all countries; etc.</u>	3	3	3	-

(cont'd on next page)

WEST British US Zone Berlin
GERMANY Zone

Improvement of economic conditions in

Germany: They should see to it that everybody gets along in life; they should first see to it that Germany gets back to the standard of living of 1935; they should first let us live again; grant economic rights; create better conditions for Germany; elevation of unemployment; etc.

3%

2%

3%

*

Guarantee of sufficient protection against the

East: That they do everything to protect and defend us against the East; they must not leave us in the lurch in case the Russians attack, we must have the guarantee for that; guarantee of the Western powers to stop the Russians at the border; they should protect us sufficiently; give us the guarantee that the Russians don't come here; etc.

2

3

2

-

Reduction of occupation costs, withdrawal of occupation forces: Withdrawal of occupation forces; should leave Germany, occupation costs are too high; etc.

2

2

3

-

Restitution of old German border lines, return of Eastern territories: That we get our lost Eastern territories back; etc.

1

1

1

*

Return of war prisoners: They should see to it that the prisoners of war come back; etc.

1

-

1

1

Other opinions: Things like that always lead to war, Western powers should first prohibit the people's police; my dear man, we don't want war - if the people had to decide about that; we have had enough; Schumacher's conditions; etc.

 $\frac{1}{23\%}^{**}$
 $\frac{2}{25\%}^{**}$
 $\frac{*}{32\%}^{**}$
 $\frac{2}{6\%}$

* Less than one half of one per cent.

** Some people gave more than one answer.

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II. GERMAN REACTIONS TO FRENCH PLANNING ON GERMANY

HOW GOOD ARE PRESENT POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY? ...

Looking at present German-French political relations as a whole, most West German urban dwellers judge them to be "not so good" to "bad". Such adverse judgments are somewhat more frequent in the US Zone than in the British Zone or Berlin.

"In general, how do you judge the present political relations between West Germany and France: as very good, good, not so good or bad?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Very good	1%	1%	5%	1%
Good	15	15	13	25
Not so good	44	41	54	54
Bad	20	20	20	9
No opinion	20	23	13	11
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

However, reaction to the French, as measured in this general way, does not seem to be an important differentiating factor in influencing attitudes toward German rearmament. Adverse reactions are just about as widespread among supporters of German participation in a European army as among opponents.

"In general, how do you judge the present political relations between West Germany and France: as very good, good, not so good or bad?"

	Very good	Good	Not so good	Bad	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY						
For participation in a European army	1%	18%	49%	20%	12%..100%	323
Against participation in a European army	-	11	43	23	23	263

Breakdowns among urban population groups in West Germany reveal that unfavorable evaluations of present German-French political relations are more frequent among the opinion leading elements - the men, the better educated, and the more affluent.

"In general, how do you judge the present political relations between West Germany and France: as very good, good, not so good or bad?"

	Very good	Good	Not so good	Bad	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY						
<u>Sex:</u>						
Men	1%	17%	47%	26%	9%...100%	288
Women	1	13	42	16	28	351
<u>Education:</u>						
Elementary school	1%	16%	37%	19%	27%	400
Beyond elementary school	-	14	57	22	7	239
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>						
Lower class	1%	16%	36%	13%	29%	322
Lower middle to upper class	-	13	54	22	11	317
<u>Income (per month):</u>						
0 - 143 DM	1%	14%	27%	17%	41%	99
150 - 299 DM	1	17	42	18	22	274
300 DM and more	-	13	54	24	9	257
<u>Age:</u>						
Under 40 years	1%	13%	43%	19%	18%	290
40 years and over	1	15	41	21	21	349
<u>Religion:</u>						
Catholics	1%	16%	41%	21%	21%	240
Protestants	-	14	47	20	15	350

HOW DO GERMANS VIEW THE SCHUMANN PLAN? ...

Prior to assessing German reactions to the Schumann Plan respondents were asked to indicate whether they had heard or read of the proposal. Widespread awareness of the plan was disclosed though a large proportion could not name any specific provisions.

"Have you heard or read about the plan of the French minister for foreign affairs, M. Schumann, the so-called Schumann Plan? Could you name me some of the provisions contained in the plan?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Yes, consolidation of the heavy industries of France, West Germany, etc.	30%	32%	29%	26%
Economic cooperation of Western Europe	15	15	14	7
Yes, other provisions	3	3	4	4
Yes, but not familiar with provisions	38	37	38	38
No, not heard	$\frac{20}{106\%}$	$\frac{19}{106\%}$	$\frac{21}{106\%}$	$\frac{29}{104\%}$

* Some respondents gave more than one answer.

Agreement with the Schumann Plan considerably outweighs disagreement. However, a large proportion of West German urbanites have not yet formed any judgment about the French proposal.

"By and large do you agree or disagree with this plan or haven't you formed any judgment yet?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Yes, agree	39%	38%	45%	58%
No, disagree	17	18	14	9
Not formed any judgment yet	34	35	29	29
No opinion	$\frac{10}{100\%}$	$\frac{9}{100\%}$	$\frac{12}{100\%}$	$\frac{4}{100\%}$

* Respondents who did not indicate correct provisions in a preceding exploratory inquiry were told prior to this query: "The Schumann Plan is designed to consolidate the heavy industries of the West European countries, - such as France, Western Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, and England."

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Agreement with the Schumann Plan is somewhat greater among Germans who approve of participation in a European army, thus indicating that reactions to the French proposal may play some minor part in influencing German attitude on the participation issue.

"By and large do you agree or disagree with this plan (Schumann Plan) or haven't you formed any judgment yet?"

	Yes, agree	No, disagree	Not formed any judgment yet	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY					
For participation in a European army	48%	15%	29%	8%...100%	323
Against participation in a European army	32	22	38	8	263

Agreement with the Schumann Plan is more general among the opinion leadership elements than other groups. But even among these usually more informed persons considerable proportions admit that they have not as yet formed any judgment in the matter.

"By and large do you agree or disagree with this plan or haven't you formed any judgment yet?"

	Yes, agree	No, disagree	Not formed any judgment yet	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY					
<u>Sex:</u>					
Men	50%	23%	22%	5%...100%	238
Women	30	13	43	14	351
<u>Education:</u>					
Elementary school	31%	15%	39%	15%	400
Beyond elementary school	53	20	25	2	239
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>					
Lower class	30%	16%	37%	17%	322
Lower middle to upper class	49	19	30	2	317
<u>Income (per month):</u>					
0 - 149 DM	24%	11%	42%	23%	99
150 - 299 DM	36	16	36	12	274
300 DM and more	49	22	27	2	257
<u>Age:</u>					
Under 40 years	42%	16%	33%	9%	290
40 years and over	38	17	35	10	349
<u>Religion:</u>					
Catholics	39%	14%	35%	12%	240
Protestants	40	18	33	9	350

REASONS FOR DISAGREEMENT ...

The reasons advanced by the comparatively small minority who expressed disagreement with the Schumann proposal are listed below.

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
<u>West German industry and economy would depend on the decision of others and would have general disadvantages: Western Germany is only the milking cow for the other West European countries anyway; we would be outsmarted; our industries would be used for others; they want to exploit German talent and gain competitive advantage; fusion with Eleven Plan; then we will have to listen to others about everything that concerns economic procedures; would be of disadvantage to our steel and coal industries; etc.</u>	7%	7%	5%	4%
<u>France would get the better of us; We would be outsmarted by France; Germany would get the worst of the deal, because France only wants to exploit us; all French proposals are dictated by hatred; France wants to take advantage of us; we have better workers and France would profit by it; we wouldn't get anything out of it, the French would be profiteering; France thinks of herself first, we don't matter; etc.</u>	4	4	2	*
<u>We need our industry for ourselves, we can't give up any of it; We have had enough economic restrictions anyway, we must get economic freedom; we want to rebuild first, they take too much out of Germany; etc.</u>	2	1	2	2
<u>The Schumann Plan will lead to rearmament: It is the foundation for a war potential; because it only supports rearmament; backers of plan are dubious; a small clique of industrial big-shots is backing the plan; etc.</u>	1	1	1	-
<u>Other opinion: Export opportunities for the European countries would be lost; the coal and steel industry would not be under the control of neutral countries; the industries - if united anyway - should be united under international control; for the same reasons cited by Schumacher in his opposition speech; men are not idealistically inclined; etc.</u>	3	4	1	3
<u>No opinion / No answer:</u>	$\frac{*}{17\%}$	$\frac{1}{18\%}$	$\frac{1}{14\%}$	$\frac{1}{9\%}$

* Less than one half of one per cent.

HOW DO GERMANS VIEW THE FLEVEN PLAN? ...

Awareness of the Fleven Plan is comparatively limited at the present time. In urban West Germany seven out of ten could offer no indication of what the plan was about.

"France is making her agreement to West Germany's participation in a West European army dependent on certain conditions established in the so-called Fleven Plan. Do you happen to know what conditions these are?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Ber'in
West German battalions only	17%	17%	20%	30%
No West German national army	13	13	14	10
No West German minister for defense	2	1	5	2
No West German representation in the cabinet of minister for defense	3	2	5	1
Others	10	8	11	11
Don't know	$\frac{70}{115\%}$	$\frac{71}{112\%}$	$\frac{66}{121\%}$	$\frac{61}{115\%}$

* Some respondents gave more than one answer.

It was anticipated that few among the German rank and file would be familiar with the Fleven Plan. So instead of endeavoring to obtain specific evaluations of the plan, the respondents were asked in a more general way to indicate whether or not they felt that France was justified in attaching any conditions to German participation in a West European army. Two out of three in West Germany, it may be seen below, say France is not justified in attaching conditions to German participation. Only one in ten take the contrary view, with the remainder expressing no opinion.

"Do you think France is justified in making any conditions before she agrees to West Germany's participation in a West European army, or do you think such conditions are unjustified?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Justified	10%	11%	9%	18%
Not justified	67	61	76	67
No opinion	$\frac{23}{100\%}$	$\frac{28}{100\%}$	$\frac{15}{100\%}$	$\frac{15}{100\%}$

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Opposition to German rearmament does not seem to be traceable to any greater feeling that the French are not justified in laying down conditions for German participation in a European army. On the contrary, the figures below indicate that supporters rather than opponents of German defense participation are the ones who more widely assert that establishing of conditions by the French is unjustified.

"Do you think France is justified in making any conditions before she agrees to West Germany's participation in a West European army, or do you think such conditions are unjustified?"

	Justified	Not justified	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
For participation in a European army	11%	76%	13%...100%	323
Against participation in a European army	12	63	25	263

Group breakdowns among West German urban dwellers disclose that the conviction that the French are not justified in laying down conditions for German participation in European defense is more widespread among the opinion leading elements than among their counterpart groups. The latter more often express no opinion in the matter.

French Conditions:

	Justified	Not justified	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	14%	76%	10%...100%	288
Women	8	59	33	351
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	10%	60%	30%	400
Beyond elementary school	12	78	10	239
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	10%	58%	32%	322
Lower middle to upper class	11	76	13	317
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	13%	52%	35%	99
150 - 299 DM	9	63	28	274
300 DM and more	11	77	12	257
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	11%	65%	24%	200
40 years and over	10	68	22	349
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	9%	66%	25%	240
Protestants	11	67	22	350

III. GERMAN REACTION TO RUSSIAN PROPOSAL FOR FOUR POWER CONFERENCE

WOULD A FOUR POWER CONFERENCE BE ADVANTAGEOUS FOR GERMANY? ...

At the time of the present survey, six in ten West German urban dwellers had heard about Russia's proposal for a four power conference on German problems.

"Have you heard or read about Russia's proposal to summon a four power conference which is to deal with the problem of Western Germany?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Yes, have heard	61%	59%	64%	79%
No, have not heard	39%	41%	36%	21%
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Asked to assess the probable value of such a conference the large preponderance stated flatly that in their judgment such a conference would be of no advantage at all to Germany. Less than one in ten saw possible great advantage in following the Russian proposal.

"If this conference should be held do you think it likely that the conference will be of great, not so great, little or of no advantage to Germany?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Of great advantage	7%	7%	6%	5%
Of not so great an advantage	7	7	5	7
Of little advantage	18	17	13	13
Of no advantage at all	53	50	61	71
No opinion	15%	19%	10%	4%
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

*Respondents who were unaware of the Russian conference proposal were informed of it prior to putting the present question.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Opponents and supporters of German participation in European defense differ little in their reactions to the conference proposal. The dominating view in both groups was distinctly negative. This result is of considerable importance since it suggests that opposition to German rearmament does not derive in any major way from a desire to conciliate or compromise with the Russians.

"If this conference should be held do you think it likely that the conference will be of great, not so great, little or of no advantage to Germany?"

	Of great advantage	Of not so great an advantage	Of little advantage	Of no ad- vantage at all	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY						
For participation in a European army	4%	7%	20%	58%	11%..10%	323
Against participation in a European army	10	5	17	51	17	263

Breakdowns of the West German urban population show that the negative pattern of reactions to the Russian conference proposal is fairly uniform among all elements of the population.

"If this conference should be held do you think it likely that the conference will be of great, not so great, little or of no advantage to Germany?"

	Of great advantage	Of not so great an advantage	Of little advantage	Of no ad- vantage at all	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY						
<u>Sex:</u>						
Men	9%	7%	18%	57%	9%...10%	283
Women	5	6	18	50	21	351
<u>Education:</u>						
Elementary school	8%	7%	16%	50%	19%	400
Beyond elementary school	4	6	20	59	11	239
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>						
Lower class	8%	5%	16%	53%	18%	322
Lower middle to upper class	5	8	19	55	13	317
<u>Income (per month):</u>						
0 - 149 DM	7%	3%	18%	51%	21%	99
150 - 299 DM	7	7	17	53	16	274
300 DM and more	3	8	18	57	14	257
<u>Age:</u>						
Under 40 years	6%	7%	19%	53%	15%	290
40 years and over	7	6	17	54	16	349
<u>Religion:</u>						
Catholics	10%	6%	17%	48%	19%	240
Protestants	3	7	19	57	14	350

IV. GERMAN REACTIONS TO OUTCOME OF AMERICAN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

DO RESULTS SPELL DECREASE OF AMERICAN INTEREST IN EUROPE? ...

A majority of West German city dwellers had heard about the American congressional elections as of the time of the present survey.

"Have you heard about the congressional elections which recently were held in America?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Yes	57%	56%	58%	63%
No	43%	44%	42%	37%
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

The largest proportion of those who had heard about the congressional elections feel that the results connote no change in the extent of American interest in Europe. Only comparatively few - particularly in Berlin - think that American interest in Europe will decline as a consequence.

"Do you think that as a result of the elections, the interest of American policy toward Europe will increase, decrease or will it remain unchanged?" (Asked of those who answered "Yes" to informational question.)

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Increase	11%	10%	11%	19%
Decrease	8	7	8	3
Remain unchanged	25	26	28	35
No opinion	13	13	11	6
	<u>57%</u>	<u>56%</u>	<u>58%</u>	<u>63%</u>

Supporters and opponents of German military participation differ little in their evaluation of the consequences of the elections. The suggestion is, therefore, that this particular factor has played no important role in differentiating German attitudes on the rearmament issue.

"Do you think that as a result of the elections, the interest of American policy toward Europe will increase, decrease or will it remain unchanged?" (Asked of those who answered "Yes to informational question.")

	Increase	Decrease	Remain unchanged	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY					
For participation in a European army	20%	13%	48%	19% ... 100%	207
Against participation in a European army	18	15	42	25	140

The most consistent trend revealed by breakdown comparisons of West German city dwellers is that the opinion leaders do more often than others hold that U.S. elections will not affect American policy in Europe.

As a Result of the Elections U.S. Interest in Europe will:

	Increase	Decrease	Remain unchanged	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY					
<u>Sex:</u>					
Men	21%	16%	43%	15%...100%	213
Women	15	9	43	33	149
<u>Education:</u>					
Elementary school	19%	12%	40%	29%	169
Beyond elementary school	18	14	51	17	193
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>					
Lower class	25%	8%	39%	28%	126
Lower middle to upper class	15	16	50	19	236
<u>Income (per month):</u>					
0 - 149 DM	32%	7%	29%	32%	128
150 - 299 DM	20	13	42	25	126
300 DM and more	16	13	52	19	202
<u>Age:</u>					
Under 40 years	20%	7	46	27	162
40 years and over	18	18	32	32	56
<u>Religion:</u>					
Catholics	17%	14%	46%	23%	140
Protestants	20	13	45	22	194

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V. MORE ON GERMAN THINKING ABOUT A PLEBISCITE

SHOULD A PLEBISCITE BE HELD? ...

Corroborating the findings of previous studies, opinion in West Germany continues to be strongly favorable to the idea of a plebiscite for deciding West Germany's participation in European defense.

"Suppose a plebiscite should be proposed to decide about Western Germany's participation in a West European army, should such a plebiscite be held?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Should be held	80%	78%	85%	84%
Should not be held	13	13	12	13
No opinion	<u>7</u> 100%	<u>9</u> 100%	<u>3</u> 100%	<u>3</u> 100%

Approval of a plebiscite is substantially similar in extent among Germans who support and those who oppose participation in European defense.

	Should be held	Plebiscite: Should not be held	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
For participation in a European army	79%	16%	5% ... 100%	323
Against participation in a European army	84	10	6	263

A slightly greater proportion of the better educated, upper income groups, and the men in West Germany favor a plebiscite. The overwhelming opinion in all groups, however, is affirmative.

	Should be held	Plebiscite: Should not be held	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	80%	16%	4% ... 100%	288
Women	81	10	9	351
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	81%	10%	9%	400
Beyond elementary school	80	18	2	239
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	80%	9%	11%	322
Lower middle to upper class	81	16	3	317
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	77%	7%	16%	99
150 - 299 DM	83	10	7	274
300 DM and more	80	17	3	257
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	79%	14%	7%	290
40 years and over	82	12	6	349
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	77%	14%	9%	240
Protestants	83	12	5	350

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HOW WOULD THE MAJORITY VOTE? ...

If a plebiscite were held in West Germany, everywhere except in Berlin the preponderant opinion is that the majority vote would be against West German participation in a European army. In the US Zone almost three times as many say that the majority would vote against as say the majority would vote for German defense participation.

"If such a plebiscite were held in Western Germany*, would then in your opinion the majority vote for or against Western Germany's participation in a European army?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Majority for	28%	30%	21%	79%
Majority against	50	46	60	12
No opinion	22	24	19	9
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

* In Berlin the question read: "If such a plebiscite were held in Western Germany, and West Berlin,"

Earlier results on an analogous question from a complete sample of the US Zone (rural as well as urban) suggest that Germans have shifted considerably in recent weeks in their conception of public opinion on the re-militarization issue.

"What do you believe, are most Germans for or against the participation of West Germany in a European defense army?"

	US Zone	Berlin
For it	46%	79%
Against it	30	12
No opinion	24	9
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

* Findings derive from a survey conducted in the period between September 5th and October 4th, 1950.

Considerably fewer supporters than opponents of German military participation are convinced that the majority vote would be on their side in the event of a plebiscite.

"If such a plebiscite were held in Western Germany, would then in your opinion the majority vote for or against Western Germany's participation in a European army?"

	Majority for	Majority against	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
For participation in a European army	44%	33%	23%...100%	323
Against participation in a European army	12	74	14	263

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This finding is interesting in view of the previously disclosed fact that approval of the plebiscite idea is just as widespread among Germans who favor German defense participation as among those who oppose such a course.

Group breakdowns among West German urbanites disclose no consistent pattern of differences on the present issue.

"If such a plebiscite were held in Western Germany, would then in your opinion the majority vote for or against Western Germany's participation in a European army?"

	Majority for	Majority against	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	27%	55	18%...100%	288
Women	29	45	26	351
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	26%	50%	24%	400
Beyond elementary school	32	49	19	239
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	27%	49%	24%	322
Lower middle to upper class	30	50	20	317
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	33%	43%	24%	99
150 - 299 DM	24	54	22	274
300 DM and more	31	49	20	257
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	29%	53%	18%	290
40 years and over	28	47	25	349
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	26%	52%	22%	240
Protestants	30	48	22	350

SHOULD PLEBISCITE BE HELD EVEN IF COMMUNIST SUPPORTED? ...

In an earlier report* the possibility was broached that the Communists might back a plebiscite on rearmament in West Germany in the hope of thereby furthering their cause. The objective of the present inquiry was to see to what extent an indication of Communist backing of such a plebiscite would engender opposition to the idea. The results below suggest that less than half the support for a plebiscite would be likely to continue if it were learned that the Communists were in back of such a proposal.

"Suppose you would learn that the Communists are in back of the proposal to decide this question by a plebiscite, would you in this case still be for a plebiscite, or would you be inclined to oppose a plebiscite?" (Asked of those who priorly indicated approval of a plebiscite.)

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Still for a plebiscite	37%	39%	37%	25%
Inclined to oppose a plebiscite	33	29	37	54
No opinion	10	10	11	5
	80%	78%	85%	84%

Opponents of German military participation are somewhat less inclined than are supporters to give up the idea of a plebiscite in the event that Communist backing should be brought to light.

	Still for a plebiscite	Inclined to oppose a plebiscite	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
For participation in a European army	39%	52%	9%...100%	255
Against participation in a European army	56	31	13	220

The principle indication from group breakdowns of the results on the present question is that disclosure of Communist backing would have a greater effect on women than on men in reducing support for the idea of a plebiscite.

	WEST GERMANY	Still for a plebiscite	Inclined to oppose a plebiscite	No opinion	Number of cases:
<u>Sex:</u>					
Men	55%	36%	9%...100%	230	
Women	39	45	16	284	
<u>Education:</u>					
Elementary school	46%	40%	14%	324	
Beyond elementary school	46	43	11	190	
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>					
Lower class	44%	42%	14%	257	
Lower middle to upper class	48	40	12	257	
<u>Income (per month):</u>					
0 - 149 DM	41%	45%	14%	76	
150 - 299 DM	42	43	15	226	
300 DM and more	50	40	10	205	
<u>Age:</u>					
Under 40 years	47%	44%	9%	229	
40 years and over	45	39	16	285	
<u>Religion:</u>					
Catholics	43%	43%	14%	185	
Protestants	45	42	13	288	

* See Report No. 47, Series No. 2, November 18, 1950, GERMANS VIEW THE REARMAMENT ISSUE - Further Findings and Some Limitations on Majority Approval.

GERMANS VIEW THE REMILITARIZATION ISSUE

New Korean Trend and Further Analysis of Opposition

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REACTIENS ANALYSIS SECTION

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INTRODUCTION

The present report continues the series of studies being conducted by the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs, to chart developments in German thinking on the issue of German participation in European defense. Findings are based upon an urban sample of West Germany. Results were gathered on the 27th and 28th of November through the operation of a 45-hour "flash" survey embracing a representative urban quota sample of 640 cases drawn from among West German cities 50,000 and over in population, and a 200 case quota sample from the three Western sectors of Berlin.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS

I. CURRENT TREND ON GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN DEFENSE

- ... The latest survey results reveal that support for German participation in European defense has recovered sharply from the low point registered just before the Hesse and Württemberg-Baden Landtag elections. Current extent of approval matches its highest value in recent months with 64 per cent approving in urban West Germany and 26 per cent disapproving. The sharpest change in sentiment occurred in the US Zone where between November 11th and November 25th opposition registered a drop of 21 percentage points - from 45 per cent opposing down to 24 per cent.
- ... News of the stalled American offensive and of a large scale Chinese counter-offensive had already commenced prior to the latest survey, and it is possible that the upswing in support of German defense participation represents in large part the first reaction to the currently serious turn of events in Korea. Another factor which may have contributed to the post-election gains in support is that many of the people who switched from "Yes" to "No" on German participation under the SPD heavy and oftentimes highly emotionalized propaganda, probably switched back again in the light of further thinking on the issue.
- ... Group breakdowns among West German city dwellers show, 1) that the current upward trend has occurred among all the population elements, and 2) that the opinion leading elements in the West German urban population - the men, the higher educated, and the more affluent - continue now as before to favor German participation more frequently than counterpart groups. Finally, it is worth noting, amount of education continues to be the factor which is associated with the greatest differentiation in attitude on the participation issue.
- ... The approximately one in four minority in urban West Germany who opposes German participation in European defense were queried as to what alternative courses of action they had in mind for West Germany to follow. Neutralism and defeatism were the most prominent sentiments exposed among those who did not simply voice a "don't know". This result corroborates the conclusions of a more indirect analysis that was initiated in an earlier paper and which is concluded in the second section of the current report.
- ... It would be a mistake to assume that all who say "Yes" to German participation in European defense would go along under any conditions, and all who say "No" are unconditionally opposed. The actual facts prove to be that most of those who favor participation would only approve if certain conditions were met, and an appreciable proportion of those who oppose participation would relinquish their opposition if certain conditions were met. In brief, most of the yeses are "Yes - but", and many of the no's are "No - unless".

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- ... When the respondents who conditionally favored and those who conditionally opposed German defense participation were asked what conditions they had in mind, a rather similar pattern of results was obtained. Both among "Yes - but" and among "No - unless" respondents the preponderant condition for participation was a generalized demand for equal status. There is some indication (not enough to be reliably beyond chance with the limited number of cases) that "No - unless" respondents attach a greater importance to economic and social improvements in West Germany as a pre-condition of participation, and to the signing of a peace treaty.

II. THE ROLE OF NEUTRALISM AND DEFEATISM IN GERMAN OPPOSITION TO DEFENSE PARTICIPATION

- ... Earlier comparison of the associated attitudes of Germans who favor and those who oppose participation in European defense has led to the conclusion that neutralism plays a very significant role in engendering opposition.* This important conclusion is additionally substantiated in the present study by the finding that whereas nine out of ten of those who favor German participation recommend fighting in the event of an attack from the East, less than half of those opposed to participation recommend such a course.
- ... Taking the urban West German population as a whole it appears that approximately one quarter at the present time are dubious about or averse to vigorously countering Communist domination in the event of aggression from the East.
- ... That defeatism as well as neutralism is a large part of the explanation for opposition to German defense participation is indicated by the fact that very appreciably fewer opposers than supporters of German participation believe that Germans in combination with the Western powers have a good or fairly good chance to halt any Eastern attack at the borders.
- ... Among West German urban dwellers as a whole the point of view preponderates that a European defense army would have a good or fairly good chance of stopping at the borders any attack from the East.
- ... Further evidence of the important role of defeatism in engendering opposition to German participation in European defense is that a much smaller proportion of opposers than supporters of participation believe that after establishment of a European army time would be on the side of the West.
- ... Among West German city dwellers considered as a whole two out of three take the optimistic view that time is on the side of the West, once a European army were established.

* See Report No. 48, Series No. 2, November 22, 1950 - AN ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE DETERMINANTS OF OPPOSITION TO GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

I. CURRENT TREND ON GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN DEFENSE

SHARP RISE IN SUPPORT WITH CHINESE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE ...

The latest survey results reveal that support for German participation in European defense has recovered sharply from the low point registered just before the Hesse and Wuerttemberg-Baden Landtag elections. Current extent of approval matches its highest value in recent months with 64 per cent approving in urban West Germany and 26 per cent disapproving. The sharpest change in sentiment occurred in the US Zone where between November 11th and November 28th opposition registered a drop of 21 percentage points - from 45 per cent opposing down to 24 per cent.

Several West European nations and America recently signed a defense pact, the so-called Atlantic Pact.

"Suppose West Germany would join the Atlantic Pact and be asked in connection with it to participate in a general army for the defense of West Europe. Would you then be for or against such participation in a defense army?"

	WEST GERMANY					British Zone				
	Aug	Oct-Nov	Nov			Aug	Oct-Nov	Nov		
	15-17	31-1	9-10	15-16	27-28	15-17	31-1	9-10	15-16	27-28
For it	61%	63%	58%	51%	64%	59%	61%	59%	51%	65%
Against it	27	30	32	41	26	29	31	31	39	25
No opinion	12	7	10	8	10	12	8	10	10	10
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	US Zone					Berlin				
	Aug	Oct-Nov	Nov			Aug	Oct-Nov	Nov		
	15-17	31-1	9-10	15-16	27-28	15-17	31-1	9-10	15-16	27-28
For it	67%	65%	57%	48%	64%	86%	89%	80%	85%	86%
Against it	21	29	32	45	24	12	8	16	12	8
No opinion	12	6	11	7	12	2	3	4	3	6
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

News of the stalled American offensive and of a large scale Chinese counter-offensive had already commenced prior to the latest survey, and it is possible that the upswing in support of German defense participation represents in large part the first reaction to the currently serious turn of events in Korea. Another factor which may have contributed to the post-election gains in support is that many of the people who switched from "Yes" to "No" on German participation under the SPD heavy and oftentimes highly emotionalized propaganda, probably switched back again in the light of further thinking on the issue.

Group breakdowns among West German city dwellers show, 1) that the current upward trend has occurred among all the population elements, and 2) that the opinion leading elements in the West German urban population - the men, the higher educated, and the more affluent continue now as before to favor German participation more frequently than counterpart groups. Finally, it is worth noting, amount of education continues to be the factor which is associated with the greatest differentiation in attitude on the participation issue.

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Several West European nations and America recently signed a defense pact, the so-called Atlantic Pact. Suppose West Germany would join the Atlantic Pact and be asked in connection with it to participate in a general army for the defense of West Europe. Would you then be for or against such participation in a defense army?

For it		Against it		No opinion		**Number of cases:
Aug 15-17	Oct-Nov 9-10/15-16/27-28	Aug 15-17	Oct-Nov 9-10/15-16/27-28	Aug 15-17	Oct-Nov 9-10/15-16/27-28	

WEST GERMANY

Sex:		Men		Women																	
		63%	69%	64%	53%	70%	28%	29%	31%	29%	31%	42%	25%	4%	2%	5%	15%	5%	5%	287	
		54	53	53	49	58	25	31	31	28	40	23	13	11	11	14	11	11	14	353	
Education:																					
Elementary school		53%	59%	51%	43%	57%	30%	31%	31%	30%	46%	30%	17%	10%	10%	13%	14%	11%	13%	419	
Beyond elementary school		70	67	69	64	77	25	29	29	19	33	19	5	4	3	4	4	3	4	221	
Socio-economic Status:																					
Lower class		55%	53%	43%	47%	56%	29%	32%	32%	32%	41%	32%	16%	10%	10%	12%	16%	12%	12%	319	
Lower middle to upper class		66	63	63	54	71	26	23	23	21	41	21	3	4	5	8	5	5	8	321	
Income (per month):																					
0 - 149 DM		-	-	43%	40%	56%	-	-	-	42%	43%	30%	-	-	-	15%	17%	17%	14%	94	
150 - 299 DM		-	-	52	50	60	-	-	-	34	42	30	-	-	-	14	8	8	10	234	
300 DM and more		-	-	71	56	71	-	-	-	24	39	21	-	-	-	5	5	5	3	262	
Age:																					
Under 40 years		62%	60%	53%	50%	65%	25%	33%	33%	27%	43%	27%	10%	7%	7%	6%	18%	7%	6%	291	
40 years and over		60	64	61	51	63	27	28	28	21	40	25	13	8	9	12	18	9	12	349	
Religion:																					
Catholics		62%	60%	57%	50%	69%	29%	33%	33%	30%	41%	21%	9%	7%	9%	10%	13%	9%	10%	229	
Protestants		63	64	59	51	64	25	29	29	32	41	26	12	7	7	10	9	7	10	343	

* Income figures were not obtained in the earlier two surveys.
** These numbers apply to the latest survey. They are approximately the same for the earlier surveys.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

OPPOSITION'S ALTERNATIVES TO PARTICIPATION ...

The approximately one in four minority in urban West Germany who oppose German participation in European defense were asked the question below to see what alternative courses of action they had in mind for West Germany to follow. The most prominent sentiments exposed are neutralism and defeatism, among those who did not simply voice a "don't know". Those results, it will be later seen, corroborate completely the conclusions of a more indirect analysis that was initiated in an earlier paper* and which is concluded in the second section of the present report.

"If, as you think, West Germany should not participate in a West European army, what should West Germany do in regard to the present political situation?" (Asked of those who said "No" to previous question.)

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
<u>Germany should remain neutral:</u> The best thing is to remain neutral; Germany should keep out of everything, the Germans should work and show good will towards peace; remain neutral, the struggle between America and Russia is not our business; remain neutral, we can't sacrifice ourselves for others; stay out of war and oppose it; stay out of it altogether as long as possible; stay out of it, we don't want to be used as cannon fodder again; should be a mediator; remain neutral and leave the protection of the borders to the occupation powers; live in peace with everybody; etc.	9%	9%	9%	3%
<u>We can't do anything:</u> Nothing, today it is too late; we can't do anything, we are too weak; we can't do anything; to look on and put your hands in your pockets; wait and see; they wouldn't be in this situation if they had listened to Germany; we can't do anything, everything is left up to the occupation powers; Germany can't do anything but wait; etc.	4	3	4	1
<u>Eastern and Western Germany should come to a peaceful agreement:</u> Eastern and Western Germany should be united; to come to a peaceful agreement with the East; etc.	1	1	-	-
<u>Guarantee of security by the Allies:</u> To have the Allies guarantee our security; etc.	1	1	-	-
<u>Support the Western powers with manpower and armament:</u> We should support the US indirectly, armament factories; with manpower especially for West European rearmament; contribute a share in the defense; etc.		1	1	1
<u>Try to establish an independent army:</u> Try to achieve equal rights again and to establish our own army; work until we may establish an independent army; etc.	-	1	1	1
<u>Other opinions:</u> The SPD, KPD and CDU should be united, then the people will be strong; to unite with France, under no circumstances with Britain because they would shoot at us; provide for work; show strong will towards peace, so that a war is impossible; etc.	3	3	2	1
<u>Don't know:</u>	$\frac{7}{26}\%$ **	$\frac{6}{25}\%$ **	$\frac{7}{24}\%$ **	$\frac{2}{9}\%$ **

* See Report No. 48, Series No. 2, November 22, 1950, - AN ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE DETERMINANTS OF OPPOSITION TO GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE.

** Some people gave more than one answer.

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THE CONDITIONS OF GERMAN PARTICIPATION ...

It would be a mistake to assume that all who say "Yes" to German participation in European defense would go along under any conditions, and all who say "No" are unconditionally opposed. The actual facts are, as revealed below, most of those who favor participation would only approve if certain conditions were met, and an appreciable proportion of those who oppose participation would relinquish their opposition if certain conditions were met. In brief, most of the yeses are "Yes - but", and many of the no's are "No - unless".

"Are there any conditions which the Western powers would have to fulfill before you would agree to West Germany's participation in a West European army, or do such conditions not exist for you?"

	WEST GERMANY			British Zone		
	Yes, there are conditions	No, there are no conditions	No opin- ion	Yes, there are conditions	No, there are no conditions	No opin- ion
Favor par- ticipation	41%	13%	5%...64%	40%	20%	5%...65%
Oppose par- ticipation	8	10	3 ...26	3	11	6 ...25
No opinion	2	1	7 ... <u>10</u> 100%	2	1	7 ... <u>10</u> 100%
	US Zone			Berlin		
	Yes, there are conditions	No, there are no conditions	No opin- ion	Yes, there are conditions	No, there are no conditions	No opin- ion
Favor par- ticipation	46%	13%	5%...64%	36%	46%	4%...86%
Oppose par- ticipation	8	8	8 ...24	4	2	2 ... 3
No opinion	4	-	8 ... <u>12</u> 100%	-	2	4 ... <u>6</u> 100%

The additional point should not be overlooked in the above figures that only one in ten in urban West Germany is unconditionally opposed to German defense participation.

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The most prominent trend among the West German group breakdowns on this present issue is for the opinion leadership levels - among those who favor participation - to more often make their approval contingent on the satisfaction of certain conditions by the Western powers.

"Are there any conditions which the Western powers would have to fulfill before you would agree to West Germany's participation in a West European army, or do such conditions not exist for you?"

	Yes, there are conditions			No, there are no conditions			No opinion			
	Favor par- tici- pation	Oppose par- tici- pation	No opin- ion	Favor par- tici- pation	Oppose par- tici- pation	No opin- ion	Favor par- tici- pation	Oppose par- tici- pation	No opin- ion	No. of cas- ses:
WEST GERMANY										
Sex:										
Men	53%	9%	2%	15%	10%	1%	2%	5%	4%..100%	237
Women	31	7	3	20	10	2	7	10	10	353
Education:										
Elementary school	33%	9%	3%	13%	12%	1%	6%	9%	9%	419
Beyond element- ary school	57	7	2	16	6	1	3	6	2	221
Socio-economic Status:										
Lower class	30%	9%	2%	21%	12%	1%	5%	11%	9%	319
Lower middle to upper class	52	7	3	14	9	1	5	5	4	321
Income (per month):										
0 - 149 DM	27%	9%	1%	22%	10%	1%	7%	11%	12%	94
150-299 DM	36	5	2	13	12	1	6	10	7	234
300 DM and more	52	3	3	15	9	-	4	4	5	262
Age:										
Under 40 years	41%	5%	2%	16%	11%	1%	6%	8%	5%	291
40 years and over	42	5	3	17	10	1	4	7	8	349
Religion:										
Catholics	45%	6%	1%	19%	11%	1%	5%	4%	9%	229
Protest- ants	41	9	3	16	9	2	5	8	5	345

C O N F I D E N T I A L

When the respondents who conditionally favored and those who conditionally opposed German defense participation were asked what conditions they had in mind, a rather similar pattern of results was obtained. Both among "Yes - but" and among "No - unless" respondents the preponderant condition for participation was a generalized demand for equal status. There is some indication (not enough to be reliably beyond chance with the limited number of cases) that "No - unless" respondents attach a greater importance to economic and social improvements in West Germany as a pre-condition of participation, and to the signing of a peace treaty.

"Under what conditions?" (Asked of those who said "Yes" to the question: "Are there any conditions which the Western powers would have to fulfill before you would agree to West Germany's participation in a West European army, or do such conditions not exist for you?")

WEST GERMANY

Conditionally favor partici- pation ("Yes - but")	Conditionally oppose parti- cipation ("No-unless")
--	---

Status of equal rights: Complete status of equal rights; complete recognition of Germany's right to equality; they must grant us freedom of action and equal rights in all matters; equal rights for all; equal obligations; so we stand on equal grounds with the allied soldier and are not used in the front lines all the time; decent treatment; the Allies must not treat us as second class people; a German army within a West European army must have equal status; etc.

55%

42%

Peace treaty comes first: Under the condition that the Western powers sign a peace treaty with Germany; make peace with us; termination of the state of war; etc.

13

21

Prior economic and social betterment of Western Germany;
stop of dismantling: Elimination of social injustice; the unemployed must have work first; lowering of occupation costs, - less occupation troops; improvement of our living conditions; should try and solve the refugee problem first before inviting new misery; stop dismantling; etc.

13

21

Reestablishment of our sovereignty; our freedom of action; revision of occupation statute: Reestablishment of our complete sovereignty; withdrawal of occupation troops; a free hand within our own country; our government should have more freedom; we want to govern ourselves independently; we want all the rights of a free nation; etc.

12

4

Rehabilitation of our soldiers: Quit that whole humbug about the German war criminals; reestablish the honor of the German soldier; recognize the German soldier again; etc.

10

6

(cont'd on next page)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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WEST GERMANY

Conditionally favor partici- pation ("Yes - but")	Conditionally oppose partici- pation ("No - unless")
--	---

Assurance of the Western powers to help and protect us: We must have the assurance that the West will protect us in the meantime; only if there are enough troops so that we'll have the chance to defend ourselves; that the Western powers will stand by us; etc.

5%

9%

Release of the prisoners of war: At first all our prisoners of war must come home after 5 years of prisonship; release the prisoners of war; etc.

3

2

We don't want to furnish the infantry contingent only: Western Germany must not furnish the infantry alone; etc.

1

-

Other opinions: It must be prevented that the people of the East German zone have to fight us; the army must be on a voluntary basis; an agreement about the Oder-Neisse line must be reached; we must have the assurance to get our Eastern territories back; they should let us recover first; etc.

11

10

No opinion / No answer:

$\frac{1}{124^{\text{d}*}}$
(263 cases)

$\frac{6}{121^{\text{d}*}}$
(52 cases)

* Some people gave more than one answer.

II. THE ROLE OF NEUTRALISM AND DEFEATISM IN GERMAN OPPOSITION TO DEFENSE PARTICIPATION

The questions utilized in this section were raised not so much to obtain overall German opinions on the issues - though these are interesting and will be presented - but to be utilized as a basis for pushing further an earlier initiated analysis of the possible determinants of opposition to German participation in European defense.

SHOULD WEST GERMANS FIGHT IN EVENT OF EASTERN ATTACK? ...

Earlier comparison of the associated attitudes of Germans who oppose and those who approve of participation in European defense has led to the conclusion that neutralism plays a very significant role in engendering opposition.* This important conclusion is additionally substantiated in the present study by the findings on the question below.

"If you personally had to decide: what should be done in the event of an attack from the East, should one let West Germany come under the East Zone government without fighting, or should Western Germany - together with the West - fight with all means against the Communist aggressors?"

	Without a fight	Fight with all means	Undecided	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
For participation in a European army	6%	90%	4% ... 100%	407
Against participation in a European army	26	45	26	163

It is evident that whereas nine out of ten of those who favor German participation in European defense recommend fighting any Eastern attack, less than half of those opposed to participation favor such a course. Such a large difference between these two groups can only suggest that neutrality sentiments, largely defeatistic in cast, are very importantly associated with opposition to German defense participation.

Taking the urban West German population as a whole it appears that approximately one quarter at the present time are dubious about or averse to vigorously countering Communist domination in the event of aggression from the East.

"If you personally had to decide: what should be done in the event of an attack from the East, should one let West Germany come under the East zone government without fighting, or should Western Germany - together with the West - fight with all means against the Communist aggressors?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Without a fight	11%	11%	14%	1%
Fight with all means	76	77	74	94
No opinion	13	12	12	5
	100%	100%	100%	100%

* See Report No. 45, Series No. 2, November 22, 1950, - AN ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE DETERMINANTS OF OPPOSITION TO GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE.

Group differences are not prominent on this issue except for a somewhat greater readiness among the higher income levels, as compared to the lower, to recommend fighting against any Communist aggression,

"If you personally had to decide: what should be done in the event of an attack from the East, should one let West Germany come under the East Zone government without fighting, or should Western Germany - together with the West - fight with all means against the Communist aggressors?"

	Without a fight	Fight with all means	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	11%	77%	12%...100%	237
Women	12	74	14	353
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	12%	74%	14%	419
Beyond elementary school	10	79	11	221
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	13%	72%	15%	319
Lower middle to upper class	10	79	11	321
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	19%	62%	19%	94
150 - 299 DM	11	76	13	254
300 DM and more	9	51	10	262
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	12%	75%	13%	291
40 years and over	11	76	13	349
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	7%	80%	13%	229
Protestants	11	76	13	343

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WOULD EUROPEAN ARMY HAVE GOOD CHANCE OF HALTING ANY EASTERN ATTACK AT BORDERS? ...

That defeatism as well as neutralism, is a large part of the explanation for opposition to German defense participation is indicated in the following finding.

"Supposing West Germany and the Western powers were united in a West European defense army, do you think the chances to stop an attack from the East on the Eastern zonal borders are good, fairly good, not so good, or bad?"

	Good	Fairly good	Not so good	Bad	No opinion	Number of Cases:
WEST GERMANY						
For participation in a European army	33%	31%	15%	13%	8% ..100%	407
Against participation in a European army	13	15	9	30	30	168

Very appreciably fewer opposers than supporters of German defense participation, it may be seen above, believe that Germans in combination with the Western powers have a good to fairly good chance to halt any Eastern attack at the borders. So the indication is that lack of confidence in the power of the West - even with German participation - to halt Eastern aggression, is a state of mind prominently associated with opposition to German defense participation.

Among West German urban dwellers as a whole the point of view preponderates that a European defense army would have a good or fairly good chance of stopping at the borders any attack from the East.

"Supposing West Germany and the Western powers were united in a West European defense army, do you think the chances to stop an attack from the East on the Eastern zonal borders are good, fairly good, not so good or bad?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Good	26%	25%	29%	49%
Fairly good	27	28	22	22
Not so good	13	12	16	13
Bad	17	18	15	9
No opinion	17	17	18	7
	100%	100%	100%	100%

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Few group differences occur in the present connection except for a tendency for the more educated and informed levels to more often express opinions - both optimistic and pessimistic.

"Supposing West Germany and the Western powers were united in a West European defense army, do you think the chances to stop an attack from the East on the Eastern zonal borders are good, fairly good, not so good, or bad?"

Good Fairly good Not so good Bad No opinion Number of cases:

WEST GERMANY

<u>Sex:</u>						
Men	27%	27%	14%	24%	8%...100%	287
Women	25	27	13	11	24	353
<u>Education:</u>						
Elementary school	25%	26%	11%	16%	22%	419
Beyond elementary school	26	29	17	19	9	221
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>						
Lower class	26%	23%	10%	17%	24%	319
Lower middle to upper class	26	31	16	17	10	321
<u>Income (per month):</u>						
0 - 149 DM	27%	19%	10%	13%	26%	94
150 - 299 DM	24	28	12	16	20	284
300 DM and more	23	29	16	17	10	262
<u>Age:</u>						
Under 40 years	27%	23%	13%	15%	17%	291
40 years and over	25	26	13	13	18	349
<u>Religion:</u>						
Catholics	29%	30%	14%	15%	12%	229
Protestants	23	28	13	17	19	343

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IS TIME ON THE SIDE OF THE WEST? ...

Further evidence of the important role of defeatism in engendering opposition to German participation in European defense is that a much smaller proportion of opposers than supporters of participation believe that after establishment of a European army time would be on the side of the West.

"Supposing the establishment of a West European army came about in the near future, do you think that from then on the situation within the next years will develop more in favor of the East or more in favor of the West?"

	More in favor of the East	More in favor of the West	No opinion	Number of cases;
WEST GERMANY				
For participation in a European army	3%	61%	16%...100%	407
Against participation in a European army	11	43	46	163

Among West German city dwellers considered as a whole two out of three take the optimistic view that time is on the side of the West, once a European army were established.

"Supposing the establishment of a West European army came about in the near future, do you think that from then on the situation within the next years will develop more in favor of the East, or more in favor of the West?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
More in favor of the East	5%	6%	5%	1%
More in favor of the West	67	67	63	90
Both the same	-	1	-	1
No opinion	26	26	32	3
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

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Optimism on the present issue is greatest, group breakdowns reveal, among the opinion leading groups in the West German population.

"Supposing the establishment of a West European army came about in the near future, do you think that from then on the situation within the next years will develop more in favor of the East or more in favor of the West?"

	More in favor of the East	More in favor of the West	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	77%	73%	20%...100%	237
Women	4	60	36	353
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	5%	61%	34%	419
Beyond elementary school	5	76	19	221
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	7%	53%	35%	319
Lower middle to upper class	3	75	22	321
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	13%	48%	39%	94
150 - 299 DM	5	65	30	234
300 DM and more	3	74	23	262
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	4%	67%	29%	291
40 years and over	6	66	28	349
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	4%	72%	24%	229
Protestants	5	65	30	345

GERMANS VIEW THE DEMILITARIZATION ISSUE

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OFFICE OF THE U. S. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR GERMANY
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF

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INTRODUCTION

The present report continues the series of studies being conducted by the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs, to appraise developments in German thinking on the issue of West German participation in European defense. Results were gathered on fourth and fifth of December, 1950 through the operation of a "flash" survey embracing a representative urban quota sample of 640 cases drawn from among West German cities 50,000 and over in population, and a 200 case quota sample from the three Western sectors of Berlin.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS

I. CURRENT TREND ON GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN DEFENSE

- ... The latest survey discloses that support for German participation in European defense, which had risen sharply with the opening of the Chinese counter-offensive in Korea - faded appreciably between November 28th and December 5th - a period in which the UN forces in Korea were being more and more obviously overwhelmed by the weight of Chinese attackers. However, approval still preponderates over disapproval among West German city dwellers, and in the US Zone particularly does not appear to have sunk - so far at least - to the low point registered amidst the anti-rearmament propaganda of the recent Landtag elections.
- ... In contrast to the marked shifts that have recently characterized West German opinion on the participation issue, West Berliners seem to remain impervious to either propaganda or events in consistently registering about 80 per cent approval of German participation.
- ... Despite considerable fluctuation in overall opinion the general pattern of group differences among West German city dwellers has remained constant over the past several surveys, a tendency for the opinion leading elements - the men, the better educated, and the more affluent - to favor German defense participation more often than their counterpart groups.
- ... Indication that the current drop in support for German defense participation can at least in part be accounted for as a negative reaction to the present Korean situation, derives from the concomitant finding of an increase in the extent of defeatistic neutralism among West German city dwellers.
- ... The present trends on the neutrality and on the participation issue combine to produce a tie-up even closer than before between the two factors. At the present time whereas nine out of ten of those who support German defense participation advocate fighting by all means in the event of Communist aggression, only 41 per cent of those opposed to participation advocate such a course. So it becomes more clear than ever that the dominating psychology among those opposed to German defense participation is what might be termed a spirit of defeatistic neutralism.

II. PRESENT EXTENT OF WAR APPREHENSIONS

- ... Both in urban West Germany and in Berlin opinions split rather evenly as to whether or not the fact of Chinese-Communist intervention in Korea will touch off a new world conflict.
- ... Though apprehensions of a repetition of Korea in Germany have not risen in the face of the new Chinese-Communist developments, they remain at a fairly high level. Two out of three in West Germany judge the danger of such an occurrence to be great to fairly great.

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- ... The heavy majority sentiment among urban West Germans is that if the UN withdrew its troops from Korea the Communists would not be appeased but would attack again somewhere else.
- ... Considerably fewer opponents than supporters of German participation in European defense express the belief that the Communists would attack again elsewhere if they got their way in Korea. It is possible that this simply indicates more wishful thinking on the part of opponents of German defense participation, rather than any real difference in judgment.

III. PRESENT EXTENT OF CONFIDENCE IN WESTERN POWERS

- ... Though it still remains the preponderant opinion, conviction that the U.S. would take a firm stand in case of Communist aggression in Western Europe has fallen off appreciably since mid-August 1950. Particularly in the US Zone have doubts of America's firmness increased. In Berlin, however, now as in mid-August over eight in ten express confidence in American resolution.
- ... Considerably fewer opponents than supporters of German defense participation express themselves as firmly convinced that America would deal resolutely with any Communist aggression in Europe. This finding corroborates an earlier conclusion drawn on the basis of August findings in the US Zone.
- ... The unfavorable turn of events in Korea produced widespread charges in the German press that General MacArthur was not governing his military activities in accord with American and UN political decisions. The preponderant opinion among urban West Germans is opposed to such a charge, though one out of four hold that cooperation between MacArthur and his political superiors has not been good.
- ... Opponents of German defense participation are less inclined than supporters to say that cooperation has been good between MacArthur and American and UN political heads.
- ... Another theme in the German press has been concern over alleged evidence of growing disunity among the Western powers in the face of recent Korean developments. The larger proportion of West German city dwellers feel that there have been no such indications, but a substantial one out of three voice the opinion that recently there has been evidence of disunity among the Western powers.
- ... When those respondents who saw evidences of Western disunity were asked to cite instances, they focused more often upon general disagreements about Korean matters - particularly Germany - than upon any recent Korea-related divergencies.
- ... In spite of the indication of disunity among the Western powers voiced by a substantial proportion of the respondents, only a negligible few feel there is any real danger of a split among them. In Berlin, opinion is very nearly unanimous that the Western powers will continue to stand together.
- ... Opponents of German defense participation as compared to supporters are less frequently convinced of Western power unity in the future. Expectation of a split, however, is comparatively infrequent in either group.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

IV. GERMAN THINKING ON POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS

- ... Opinions split in urban West Germany on whether or not it is possible to negotiate the Korean conflict to the satisfaction of all concerned. In Berlin the preponderant opinion is that a satisfactory solution cannot be attained through such means.
- ... Somewhat more opponents than supporters of German defense participation voice confidence in the possibility of a negotiated settlement of the Korean conflict.
- ... To gauge the German temper on more generalized negotiation in the present period of East-West crisis, a question was repeated about the possible advantage to Germany of an earlier Russian proposed four power conference. The results reveal that opposition has diminished somewhat since mid-November but the preponderant opinion in urban West Germany is still that such a conference would be of no advantage at all to Germany.
- ... An earlier finding is confirmed with the present sample that opponents and supporters of German participation in European defense differ little in their reactions to the conference proposal. The importance of this finding, it might again be emphasized, lies in its suggestion that opposition to German rearmament is not bound up in any major way with a desire to conciliate or compromise with the Russians.

V. OPINIONS ON SOME POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

- ... A somewhat larger proportion in urban West Germany believe that the UN forces should carry on the fight in Korea should negotiations fail, than believe that UN forces should withdraw. Almost nine in ten in Berlin counsel the more vigorous course.
- ... Opponents of German defense participation are considerably less inclined than are supporters to recommend that UN forces carry on in Korea in the event that negotiations fail.
- ... Majority opinion in urban West Germany is definitely averse to allowing the use of the atom bomb in Korea. Only in Berlin does sentiment split on the issue.
- ... Opponents of German defense participation are slightly more prone than supporters to express opposition to the use of the atom bomb under present circumstances in Korea.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

I. CURRENT TREND ON GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN DEFENSE

SUPPORT WANES IN FACE OF CONTINUED KOREAN REVERSES ...

The latest survey discloses that support for German participation in European defense, which had risen sharply with the opening of the Chinese counter-offensive in Korea - faded appreciably between November 28th and December 5th - a period in which the UN forces in Korea were being more and more obviously overwhelmed by the weight of Chinese attackers. However, approval still preponderates over disapproval among West German city dwellers, and in the US Zone particularly does not appear to have sunk - so far at least - to the low point registered amidst the anti-remilitarization propaganda of the recent Landtag elections.

Several West European nations and America recently signed a defense pact, the so-called Atlantic Pact.

"Suppose West Germany would join the Atlantic Pact and be asked in connection with it to participate in a general army for the defense of West Europe. Would you then be for or against such participation in a defense army?"

	WEST GERMANY						British Zone					
	Aug	Oct	Nov		Dec		Aug	Oct	Nov		Dec	
		Nov						Nov				
	15	31-1	9	15	27	4-5	15	31-1	9	15	27	4-5
	17		10	16	28		17		10	16	28	
For it	61%	63%	58%	51%	64%	55%	59%	61%	59%	51%	65%	54%
Against it	27	30	32	41	26	36	29	31	31	39	25	37
No opinion	12	7	10	8	10	9	12	8	10	10	10	9
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	US Zone						Berlin					
	Aug	Oct	Nov		Dec		Aug	Oct	Nov		Dec	
		Nov						Nov				
	15	31-1	9	15	27	4-5	15	31-1	9	15	27	4-5
	17		10	16	28		17		10	16	28	
For it	67%	65%	57%	48%	64%	59%	86%	89%	80%	55%	86%	88%
Against it	21	29	32	45	24	33	12	8	16	12	8	10
No opinion	12	6	11	7	12	8	2	3	4	3	6	2
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

In contrast to the marked shifts that have recently characterized West German opinion on the participation issue, West Berliners, it should be noted above, seem to remain impervious to either propaganda or events in consistently registering about 80 per cent approval of German participation.

Despite considerable fluctuation in overall opinion the general pattern of group differences among West German city dwellers has remained constant over the past several surveys, a tendency for the opinion leading elements - the men, the better educated, and the more affluent - to favor German defense participation more often than their counterpart groups.

Several West European nations and America recently signed a defense pact, the so-called Atlantic Pact.

"Suppose West Germany would join the Atlantic Pact and be asked in connection with it to participate in a general army for the defense of West Europe. Would you then be for or against such participation in a defense army?"

	For it			Against it			No opinion			Number of cases:
	Aug 15-17	Oct-Nov 31-1	Nov 9-10/15-16/27-28	Aug 15-17	Oct-Nov 31-1	Nov 9-10/15-16/27-28	Aug 15-17	Oct-Nov 31-1	Nov 9-10/15-16/27-28	
WEST GERMANY										
Sex:										
Men	68%	69%	64%	53%	70%	62%	28%	29%	42%	25%
Women	54	58	53	49	58	50	28	31	40	23
Education:										
Elementary school	53%	59%	51%	43%	57%	50%	30%	31%	35%	30%
Beyond elementary school	70	67	69	64	77	63	25	29	27	19
Socio-economic Status:										
Lower class	55%	53%	48%	47%	56%	47%	29%	32%	36%	32%
Lower middle to upper class	66	68	68	54	71	63	26	28	27	21
*Income (per month):										
0 - 149 IM			43%	40%	56%	54%		42%	43%	30%
150 - 299 IM			52	50	60	49		34	42	30
300 IM and more			71	56	71	62		24	39	21
Age:										
Under 40 years	62%	60%	58%	50%	65%	54%	28%	33%	24%	27%
40 years and over	60	64	61	51	63	57	27	28	21	25
Religion:										
Catholics	62%	60%	57%	50%	69%	54%	29%	33%	30%	21%
Protestants	63	64	59	51	64	60	25	29	32	20

*Income figures were not obtained in the earlier two surveys.

**These numbers apply to the latest survey. They are approximately the same for the earlier surveys.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

DROP IN SUPPORT ACCOMPANIED BY RISE IN NEUTRALITY SENTIMENTS ...

Indication that the current drop in support for German defense participation can at least in part be accounted for as a negative reaction to the present Korean situation, derives from the concomitant finding of an increase in the extent of defeatistic neutralism among West German city dwellers.

"If you personally had to decide: what should be done in the event of an attack from the East, should we let West Germany come under the East zone government without fighting, or should Western Germany - together with the West - fight with all means against the Communist aggression?"

	WEST GERMANY		British Zone		US Zone		Berlin	
	Nov	Dec	Nov	Dec	Nov	Dec	Nov	Dec
	27-28	4-5	27-28	4-5	27-28	4-5	27-28	4-5
Without a fight	11%	15%	11%	15%	14%	16%	1%	4%
Fight with all means	76	69	77	66	74	74	94	97
Undecided	<u>13</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>3</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Most of the increase in neutralism, it may be seen above, occurred in the British Zone which is also the region where most of the current drop in support for German defense participation occurred.

The present trends on the neutrality and on the participation issue combine to produce a tie-up even closer than before between the two factors.

"If you personally had to decide: what should be done in the event of an attack from the East, should we let West Germany come under the East zone government without fighting, or should Western Germany - together with the West - fight with all means against the Communist aggression?"

	Without a fight		Fight with all means		Undecided		Number of cases:	
WEST GERMANY	Nov	Dec	Nov	Dec	Nov	Dec	Nov	Dec
For participation in a European army	6%	3%	90%	90%	4%	7%	407	354
Against participation in a European army	26	34	48	41	26	25	168	229

At the present time whereas nine out of ten of those who support German defense participation advocate fighting by all means in the event of Communist aggression, only 41 per cent of those opposed to participation advocate such a course. So it becomes more clear than ever that the dominating psychology among those opposed to German defense participation is what might be termed a spirit of defeatistic neutralism.

Among sub-groupings of the urban West German population advocacy of resisting any possible Communist aggression appears to be relatively more widespread among the better educated and the economically better situated.

"If you personally had to decide: what should be done in the event of an attack from the East, should we let West Germany come under the East zone government without fighting, or should Western Germany - together with the West - fight with all means against the Communist aggression?"

	Without a fight	Fight with all means	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	17%	69%	14%...100%	238
Women	13	69	18	352
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	15%	65%	20%	396
Beyond elementary school	14	76	10	243
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	16%	62%	22%	323
Lower middle to upper class	13	76	11	317
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	12%	65%	23%	112
150 - 299 DM	16	65	19	251
300 DM and more	15	74	11	276
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	15%	68%	17%	292
40 years and over	15	70	15	348
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	10%	74%	16%	231
Protestants	16	69	15	358

II. PRESENT EXTENT OF WAR APPREHENSIONS

WILL KOREA ERUPT INTO WORLD WAR THREE?, ...

Both in urban West Germany and in Berlin opinions split rather evenly as to whether or not the fact of Chinese-Communist intervention in Korea will touch off a new world conflict.

"Are you of the opinion that world war III will start with Chinese-Communist intervention in Korea or do you think the conflict will remain confined to Korea?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
World war III will start	34%	32%	38%	49%
Confined to Korean war	39	39	40	47
No opinion	27	29	22	4
	100%	100%	100%	100%

Among sub-groups of the urban West German population the most noticeable trend is for the more educated and informed groups - the men, the better educated, and the more affluent - to believe more often than do their counterpart groups that the Korean conflict is likely to remain confined.

"Are you of the opinion that world war III will start with Chinese-Communist intervention in Korea or do you think the conflict will remain confined to Korea?"

	World war III will start	Confined to Korean war	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	36%	44%	20% ... 100%	236
Women	33	34	33	352
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	34%	35%	31%	396
Beyond elementary school	35	44	21	243
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	33%	31%	36%	323
Lower middle to upper class	36	46	18	317
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	23%	37%	40%	112
150 - 299 DM	37	35	28	251
300 DM and more	36	43	21	276
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	36%	34%	30%	292
40 years and over	32	43	25	348
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	32%	39%	29%	231
Protestants	36	38	26	358

*Respondents who did not indicated an awareness of Chinese intervention in a preceding exploratory inquiry were told prior to putting the present question:

"The fact is that red-Chinese troops have intervened on the North Korean side in the battle against the UN troops".

C O N F I D E N T I A L

WHAT IS PRESENT DANGER OF ANOTHER KOREA IN GERMANY? ...

Though apprehensions of a repetition of Korea in Germany have not risen in the face of the new Chinese-Communist developments, they remain at a fairly high level. Two out of three in West Germany judge the danger of such an occurrence to be great to fairly great.

"Do you think that the danger that a conflict like the one in Korea will arise in Germany is great, fairly great, or small?"

	WEST GERMANY			British Zone			US Zone			Berlin		
	Aug 15-17	Nov 9-10	Dec 4-5	Aug 15-17	Nov 9-10	Dec 4-5	Aug 15-17	Nov 9-10	Dec 4-5	Aug 15-17	Nov 9-10	Dec 4-5
Great	41%	37%	37%	45%	38%	36%	34%	33%	42%	46%	34%	40%
Fairly great	31	27	29	31	26	32	35	29	26	30	19	27
Small	22	29	25	17	28	23	26	30	26	23	41	32
No opinion	6	7	9	6	8	9	5	8	6	1	6	1
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

There is a slight tendency for the upper economic and education levels to more often express apprehension on this score, with the lower levels more often withholding opinions.

"Do you think that the danger that conflict like the one in Korea will arise in Germany is great, fairly great, or small?"

	Great	Fairly great	Small	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY					
<u>Sex:</u>					
Men	34%	30%	31%	5% ... 100%	288
Women	39	30	20	11	352
<u>Education:</u>					
Elementary school	32%	28%	23%	11%	396
Beyond elementary school	37	32	27	4	243
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>					
Lower class	34%	29%	24%	13%	323
Lower middle to upper class	40	31	26	3	317
<u>Income (per month):</u>					
0 - 149 DM	31%	24%	27%	18%	112
150 - 299 DM	38	27	25	10	251
300 DM and more	39	34	24	3	276
<u>Age:</u>					
Under 40 years	38%	29%	24%	9%	292
40 years and over	36	30	26	8	348
<u>Religion:</u>					
Catholics	40%	27%	22%	11%	231
Protestants	36	32	25	7	358

CONFIDENTIAL

IF KOREA CEDED WOULD COMMUNISTS ATTACK AGAIN? ...

The heavy majority sentiment among urban West Germans is that if the UN withdrew its troops from Korea the Communists would not be appeased but would attack again somewhere else.

"Supposing the United Nations would withdraw their troops from Korea, will the Communist powers be satisfied with this result, or do you think they will attack again somewhere else in the world?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Be satisfied	11%	12%	3%	6%
Attack again	70	67	76	90
No opinion	19	21	16	4
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Unlike the case in the prior two questions opinions of supporters and opposers of German defense participation differ appreciably on the present issue.

"Supposing the United Nations would withdraw their troops from Korea, will the Communist powers be satisfied with this result, or do you think they will attack again somewhere else in the world?"

	Be satisfied	Attack again	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
For participation in a European army	5%	82%	13% ... 100%	354
Against participation in a European army	22	55	23	229

Considerably fewer opponents than supporters of German participation in European defense express the belief that the Communists would attack again elsewhere if they got their way in Korea. It is possible that this simply indicates more wishful thinking on the part of opponents of German defense participation, rather than any real difference in judgment.

CONFIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L

The more critical and informed levels among West German city dwellers - the men, the better educated, and the better off - are more frequently convinced than are their counterpart groups that the UN's quitting of Korea would not deter the Communists from attacking elsewhere.

"Supposing the United Nations would withdraw their troops from Korea, will the Communist powers be satisfied with this result, or do you think they will attack again somewhere else in the world?"

	Be satisfied	Attack again	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	11%	78%	11% ... 100%	238
Women	12	63	25	352
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	13%	63%	24%	396
Beyond elementary school	10	79	11	243
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	14%	62%	24%	323
Lower middle to upper class	9	77	14	317
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	12%	59%	29%	112
150 - 299 DM	13	66	21	251
300 DM and more	11	76	13	276
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	11%	70%	19%	292
40 years and over	12	69	19	348
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	10%	69%	21%	231
Protestants	12	70	18	358

III. PRESENT EXTENT OF CONFIDENCE IN WESTERN POWERS

WOULD AMERICA TAKE A FIRM STAND AGAINST COMMUNIST AGGRESSION IN EUROPE? ...

Though it still remains the preponderant opinion, conviction that the U.S. would take a firm stand in case of Communist aggression in Western Europe has fallen off appreciably since mid-August 1950. Particularly in the US Zone have doubts of America's firmness increased. In Berlin, however, now as in mid-August over eight in ten express confidence in American resolution.

"Considering the events in Korea, are you firmly convinced that America would take a firm stand in case of Communist aggression in Western Europe, or are you less or not convinced of that?"

	WEST GERMANY		British Zone		US Zone		Berlin	
	Aug	Dec	Aug	Dec	Aug	Dec	Aug	Dec
	15-17	4-5	15-17	4-5	15-17	4-5	15-17	4-5
Firmly convinced	70%	55%	70%	56%	73%	53%	89%	89%
Less convinced	15	24	15	22	14	25	8	10
Not convinced	5	11	5	10	6	14	1	1
No opinion	10	10	10	12	7	5	2	-
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Considerably fewer opponents than supporters of German defense participation express themselves as firmly convinced that America would deal resolutely with any Communist aggression in Europe. This finding corroborates an earlier conclusion drawn on the basis of August findings in the US Zone.*

"Considering the events in Korea, are you firmly convinced that America would take a firm stand in case of Communist aggression in Western Europe, or are you less or not convinced of that?"

	Firmly convinced	Less convinced	Not convinced	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY					
For participation in a European army	63%	22%	9%	6% ... 100%	354
Against participation in a European army	44	31	14	11	229

* See Report No. 43, Series No. 2, November 22, 1950 - AN ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE DETERMINANTS OF OPPOSITION TO GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Among urban West German population groups confidence in US defense resolution in Western Europe bulks largest among the opinion leading elements - the men, the better educated, and the respondents of higher economic status.

"Considering the events in Korea, are you firmly convinced that America would take a firm stand in case of Communist aggression in Western Europe, or are you less or not convinced of that?"

	Firmly convinced	Less convinced	Not convinced	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY					
<u>Sex:</u>					
Men	53%	23%	13%	6%...100%	288
Women	52	25	10	13	352
<u>Education:</u>					
Elementary school	51%	23%	13%	13%	396
Beyond elementary school	51	25	9	5	243
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>					
Lower class	47%	25%	13%	15%	323
Lower middle to upper class	62	24	9	5	317
<u>Income (per month):</u>					
0 - 140 DM	52%	21%	14%	13%	112
150 - 200 DM	47	20	11	13	251
300 DM and more	64	21	9	6	276
<u>Age:</u>					
Under 40 years	54%	27%	10%	9%	202
40 years and over	56	22	12	10	343
<u>Religion:</u>					
Catholics	59%	21%	12%	8%	231
Protestants	52	27	10	11	358

IS GENERAL MAC ARTHUR COOPERATING WITH HIS POLITICAL SUPERIORS? ...

The unfavorable turn of events in Korea produced widespread charges in the German press that General MacArthur was not governing his military activities in accord with American and UN political decisions. The preponderant opinion among urban West Germans is opposed to such a charge, though one out of four hold that cooperation between MacArthur and his political superiors has not been good.

"Do you have the impression that regarding the conduct of war in Korea there is good cooperation between the supreme commander of the UN forces, General MacArthur, and his political superiors, or is this not the case?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Good cooperation	43%	43%	46%	70%
Is not the case	23	23	26	11
No opinion	34	34	28	19
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Opponents of German defense participation are less inclined than supporters to say that cooperation has been good between MacArthur and American and UN political heads.

"Do you have the impression that regarding the conduct of war in Korea there is good cooperation between the supreme commander of the UN forces, General MacArthur, and his political superiors, or is this not the case?"

	Good cooperation	Is not the case	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
For participation in a European army	51%	21%	28%...100%	354
Against participation in a European army	33	29	3%	229

The very large amount of no opinion among the lower levels of the urban West German population reveals that the present issue - despite its currency in the press - is not one that has commanded any really widespread attention in Germany.

"Do you have the impression that regarding the conduct of war in Korea there is good cooperation between the supreme commander of the UN forces, General MacArthur, and his political superiors, or is this not the case?"

	Good cooperation	Is not the case	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	49%	33%	18% ... 100%	288
Women	38	15	47	352
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	41%	18%	41%	396
Beyond elementary school	47	30	23	243
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	39%	19%	42%	323
Lower middle to upper class	47	27	26	317
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	26%	21%	53%	112
150 - 299 DM	43	22	35	251
300 DM and more	49	25	26	276
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	39%	25%	36%	292
40 years and over	46	21	33	348
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	41%	24%	35%	231
Protestants	45	20	35	358

ARE THERE INDICATIONS OF DISUNITY AMONG THE WESTERN POWERS? ...

Another theme in the German press has been concern over alleged evidence of growing disunity among the Western powers in the face of recent Korean developments. The larger proportion of West German city dwellers feel that there have been no such indications, but a substantial one out of three voice the opinion that recently there has been evidence of disunity among the Western powers.

"Do you have the impression that there are indications of disunity among the Western powers?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Yes, there are	34%	30%	41%	25%
No, there are none	46	47	45	67
No opinion	20	23	14	8
	100%	100%	100%	100%

When those respondents who saw evidences of Western disunity were asked to cite instances, they focused more often upon general disagreements about European matters - particularly Germany - than upon any recent Korea-related divergencies.

"Do you have the impression that there are indications of disunity among the Western powers?"

If "Yes, there are": "Which indications do you have in mind?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
<u>Disagreement about the German rearmament problem:</u>				
Considerable difference of opinions exist among the Allies concerning the rearmament of Germany; the European defense question - differences in the attitude of England and France towards Germany; disagreement of the U.S. with England and France concerning German rearmament; attitude towards remilitarization of Western Germany; French conditions about West German rearmament; etc.	10%	10%	10%	4%
<u>Disagreement of the Western powers on general questions: Disagreement between England and France; England-France versus the U.S.; England and France are afraid to take any risk; those egg-heads have never agreed yet; they are jealous of each other, only the common danger makes them stick together; Americans and English don't agree on certain subjects; England and America pursue different interests, they are not on very good terms, the English are dependent on the Americans and America takes advantage of that politically; the tendency in England is to get independent of the U.S.; etc.</u>	8	7	10	9

(cont'd on next page)

WEST British US Berlin
GERMANY Zone Zone

Disagreement about the handling of German problems:
Disagreement between the U.S. and France about the German question and the Korean problem; disagreement concerning the German problem - France for continuation of dismantling, America opposed to it; disunity of France and England concerning the German problem; America wants to be lenient with Germany, the other West European nations disagree; the Western powers so far only agreed to the point of destroying Germany - some of them want the Germans for cannon fodder, the others are afraid that in case Germany was rearmed she would join the opposite camp; because little love for Germany is general and a reason for disagreement, especially the attitude of France towards Germany; etc.

5% 4% 6% 3%

Disagreement about the handling of the Korean conflict: Continuation of the Korean war - America is for it, England opposed; England will withdraw her troops in case the U.S. make use of the atom bomb and thus will wash her hands of American policy; the Americans want to assist Korea, England and France refuse; the English oppose UN policy and are against continuation of the Korean war; because the other nations don't assist the U.S. in Korea, MacArthur is driven to a halt, which is much criticized; France and England are planning a retreat from Korea; etc.

4 4 5 4

Disagreement on the use of the atom bomb: About the doubts concerning the use of the atom bomb; they all fear the use of the atom bomb, except the USA; on the question of the atom bomb; etc.

3 3 5 2

Disagreement about the Far Eastern policy: The Americans didn't recognize the Chinese-Communist government, the English did and have trade relations with them; etc.

3 2 6 3

Disagreement of the Western powers concerning the Schumann Plan and other attempts at unification in Europe: A European union; differences about the Schumann Plan; France always meddles; England opposes the Schumann Plan - does not want to give up any of her national interests - unification of Europe if possible under British leadership, otherwise her participation is questionable; etc.

3 2 6 1

Disagreement of the Western powers concerning the military question and the defense of Europe (except Germany): France and England are pressed by the U.S., they don't want to contribute troop contingents, they fear the war; the European powers want to prevent war, America intends war; because they can't seem to reach an agreement on certain questions, i.e. the military; etc.

2 1 3 3

Other opinions:

1 1 - -

No opinion:

2 2 2 1
41% 36% 53% 30%

* Some people gave more than one answer.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

The opinion leading groups among West German urban dwellers - the men, the better educated, and the more affluent - hold appreciably more widely than do their counterparts that there are indications of disunity among the Western powers.

"Do you have the impression that there are indications of disunity among the Western powers?"

	Yes, there are	No, there are none	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	46%	46%	8% ... 100%	235
Women	24	47	29	352
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	28%	47%	25%	396
Beyond elementary school	43	45	12	243
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	27%	46%	27%	323
Lower middle to upper class	40	47	13	317
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	23%	44%	33%	112
150 - 299 DM	30	43	22	251
300 DM and more	41	46	13	276
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	33%	46%	21%	292
40 years and over	34	47	19	343
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	31%	49%	20%	231
Protestants	33	46	21	358

C O N F I D E N T I A L

WILL THE WESTERN POWERS REMAIN UNITED? ...

In spite of the indication of disunity among the Western powers voiced by a substantial proportion of the respondents, only a negligible few feel there is any real danger of a split among them. In Berlin, opinion is very nearly unanimous that the Western powers will continue to stand together.

"Are you more inclined to think that the Western powers will stand together, or do you rather think they will split?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Stand together	80%	79%	83%	98%
Split	6	6	8	1
No opinion	14	15	9	1
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Opponents of German defense participation as compared to supporters are less frequently convinced of Western power unity in the future. Expectation of a split, however, is comparatively infrequent in either group.

"Are you more inclined to think that the Western powers will stand together, or do you rather think they will split?"

	Stand together	Split	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
For participation in a European army	89%	3%	8% ... 100%	354
Against participation in a European army	70	11	19	229

The more informed levels of the West German population tend more often than their less informed counterparts to believe that the Western powers will remain united in spite of current adversities.

"Are you more inclined to think that the Western powers will stand together, or do you rather think they will split?"

	Stand together	Split	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	83%	8%	9% ... 100%	288
Women	78	4	18	352
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	77%	7%	16%	396
Beyond elementary school	85	5	10	243
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	74	7	19%	323
Lower middle to upper class	86	5	9	317
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	70%	6%	24%	112
150 - 299 DM	79	7	14	251
300 DM and more	85	5	10	276
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	82	4	14	292
40 years and over	73	8	14	348
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	81%	4%	15%	231
Protestants	81	6	13	358

IV. GERMAN THINKING ON POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS

CAN KOREA BE SOLVED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS? ...

Opinions split in urban West Germany on whether or not it is possible to negotiate the Korean conflict to the satisfaction of all concerned. In Berlin the preponderant opinion is that a satisfactory solution cannot be attained through such means.

"Do you think it possible that the Korean conflict can be solved by negotiations to the satisfaction of all involved, or don't you believe in such a possibility?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Yes, is possible	46%	45%	47%	35%
No, is not possible	38	36	43	61
No opinion	16	19	10	4
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Somewhat more opponents than supporters of German defense participation voice confidence in the possibility of a negotiated settlement of the Korean conflict.

"Do you think it possible that the Korean conflict can be solved by negotiations to the satisfaction of all involved, or don't you believe in such a possibility?"

	Yes, is possible	No, is not possible	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
For participation in a European army	41%	46%	13% ... 100%	354
Against participation in a European army	55	31	14	229

Group comparisons on the present issue reveal little other than the fact that more informed levels have more opinions - both pro and con - than their less informed counterparts.

"Do you think it possible that the Korean conflict can be solved by negotiations to the satisfaction of all involved, or don't you believe in such a possibility?"

	Yes, is possible	No, is not possible	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	45%	49%	6% ... 100%	288
Women	47	30	23	352
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	43%	37%	20%	396
Beyond elementary school	51	41	8	243
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	43%	34%	23%	323
Lower middle to upper class	49	43	8	317
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	37%	31%	32%	112
150 - 299 DM	45	38	17	251
300 DM and more	50	42	8	276
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	45%	39%	16%	292
40 years and over	47	38	15	348
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	44%	39%	16%	231
Protestants	48	38	14	358

WOULD THE RUSSIAN PROPOSED FOUR POWER CONFERENCE BE ADVANTAGEOUS FOR GERMANY? ...

To gauge the German temper on more generalized negotiation in the present period of East-West crisis, a question was repeated about the possible advantage to Germany of an earlier Russian proposed four power conference. The results reveal that opposition has diminished somewhat since mid-November, but the preponderant opinion in urban West Germany is still that such a conference would be of no advantage at all to Germany.

"If this conference should be held, do you think it likely that the conference will be of great, not so great, little or no advantage to Germany?"

	WEST GERMANY		British Zone		US Zone		Berlin	
	Nov 15-16	Dec 4-5	Nov 15-16	Dec 4-5	Nov 15-16	Dec 4-5	Nov 15-16	Dec 4-5
Of great advantage	7%	9%	7%	11%	6%	7%	5%	7%
Of not so great an advantage	7	9	7	9	5	10	7	5
Of little advantage	13	25	17	24	13	26	13	14
Of no advantage	53	40	50	33	61	45	71	69
No opinion	15	17	19	13	10	12	4	5
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

*Respondents who were unaware of the Russian conference proposal were informed of it prior to putting the present question.

An earlier finding** is confirmed with the present sample that opponents and supporters of German participation in European defense differ little in their reactions to the conference proposal. The importance of this finding, it might again be emphasized, lies in its suggestion that opposition to German rearmament is not bound up in any major way with a desire to conciliate or compromise with the Russians.

"If this conference should be held, do you think it likely that the conference will be of great, not so great, little or no advantage to Germany?"

	Of great advantage	Of not so great an advantage	Of little advantage	Of no advantage	No opinion	No. of cases
WEST GERMANY						
For participation in a European army	7%	11%	30%	41%	11%	100% 354
Against participation in a European army	12	3	22	41	17	229

**See Report No. 51, Series No. 2, December 1, 1950 - GERMANS VIEW THE REMILITARIZATION ISSUE - Pre-Election Trends and Further Findings.

The current status of group differences on the present issue appears to be a greater tendency for the opinion leading elements - the men, the better schooled and the more affluent - to consider the conference proposal as of little or no advantage to Germany.

"If this conference should be held, do you think it likely that the conference will be of great, not so great, little or no advantage to Germany?"

	Of great advantage	Of not so great an advantage	Of little advantage	Of no advantage	No opinion	No. of cases
WEST GERMANY						
<u>Sex:</u>						
Men	10%	9%	25%	43%	3%...100%	288
Women	8	10	25	33	24	352
<u>Education:</u>						
Elementary school	11%	9%	20%	38%	22%	396
Beyond elementary school	6	10	33	43	8	243
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>						
Lower class	11%	8%	21%	37%	23%	323
Lower middle to upper class	7	11	29	43	10	317
<u>Income (per month):</u>						
0 - 149 DM	11%	4%	13%	40%	32%	112
150 - 299 DM	9	10	27	35	19	251
300 DM and more	8	12	28	44	8	276
<u>Age:</u>						
Under 40 years	7%	13%	23%	36%	16%	292
40 years and over	10	7	23	43	17	348
<u>Religion:</u>						
Catholics	8%	6%	27%	42%	17%	231
Protestants	9	12	25	38	16	358

* Respondents who were unaware of the Russian conference proposal were informed of it prior to putting the present question.

V. OPINIONS ON SOME POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

SHOULD UN FORCES WITHDRAW FROM KOREA? ...

A somewhat larger proportion in urban West Germany believe that the UN forces should carry on the fight in Korea should negotiations fail, than believe that UN forces should withdraw. Almost nine in ten in Berlin council the more vigorous course.

"If negotiations failed, should the United Nations then withdraw their troops from Korea, or should they try to bring the battle of Korea to a successful conclusion?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Withdraw their troops	34%	29%	42%	8%
Carry on the battle	45	47	43	87
No opinion	21	24	15	5
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Opponents of German defense participation are considerably less inclined than are supporters to recommend that UN forces carry on in Korea in the event that negotiations fail.

"If negotiations failed, should the United Nations then withdraw their troops from Korea, or should they try to bring the battle of Korea to a successful conclusion?"

	Withdraw their troops	Carry on the battle	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
For participation in a European army	24%	59%	17%...100%	354
Against participation in a European army	51	29	20	229

The more educated and informed levels among West German city dwellers are more inclined than their counterpart groups to recommend that the UN forces in Korea make an effort to bring the battle to a successful conclusion.

"If negotiations failed, should the United Nations then withdraw their troops from Korea, or should they try to bring the battle of Korea to a successful conclusion?"

	Withdraw their troops	Carry on the battle	No opinion	Number of cases
WEST GERMANY				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	35%	56%	9% ... 100%	268
Women	33	36	31	352
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	35%	40%	25%	396
Beyond elementary school	33	52	15	243
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	35%	39%	26%	323
Lower middle to upper class	33	51	16	317
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	33%	35%	32%	112
150 - 299 DM	36	40	24	251
300 DM and more	32	54	14	276
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	33%	43%	24%	292
40 years and over	34	47	19	348
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	37%	39%	24%	231
Protestants	31	49	20	358

SHOULD USE OF ATOM BOMB BE ALLOWED IN KOREA? ...

Majority opinion in urban West Germany is definitely averse to allowing the use of the atom bomb in Korea. Only in Berlin does sentiment split on the issue.

"Considering the present situation in Korea, would you favor or oppose that the United Nations permit use of the atom bomb?" *Re*

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Favor	12%	14%	10%	46%
Oppose	79	76	82	49
No opinion	<u>9</u> 100%	<u>10</u> 100%	<u>8</u> 100%	<u>3</u> 100%

Opponents of German defense participation are slightly more prone than supporters to express opposition to the use of the atom bomb under present circumstances in Korea.

"Considering the present situation in Korea, would you favor or oppose that the United Nations permit use of the atom bomb?"

	In favor of	Opposed to	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
For participation in a European army	16%	74%	10% ... 100%	354
Against participation in a European army	8	83	4	229

Group differences are lacking on the present issue except for a slightly greater tendency for women as compared to men to oppose the use of the atom bomb.

"Considering the present situation in Korea, would you favor or oppose that the United Nations permit use of the atom bomb? "

	In favor of	Opposed to	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	17%	73%	10%...100%	286
Women	7	83	10	352
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	11%	79%	10%	396
Beyond elementary school	14	77	9	243
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	11%	79%	10%	323
Lower middle to upper class	13	76	9	317
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	12%	73%	15%	112
150 - 299 DM	11	83	6	251
300 DM and more	12	76	10	276
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	12%	79%	9%	292
40 years and over	11	79	10	276
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	10%	83%	7%	231
Protestants	13	76	11	353

GERMAN YOUTH VIEW THE FOUR HORSE SYSTEM
~~Classification cancelled~~
by authority of Leo P. Crespi
PUB/RAS.

Report No. 54
Series No. 2
December 21, 1950

R E S T R I C T E D

OFFICE OF THE U. S. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR GERMANY
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF

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INTRODUCTION ...

At the request of the Education and Cultural Relations Division, Office of Public Affairs, a study of participation in the Folk High School (Volkshochschule) system among German youth (19 - 25 years) and their elders was conducted by RAS, PUB, during August 1950. The special concern of E&CR was to ascertain the reasons for non-attendance, particularly on the part of young people, and whether the subject matter of the Folk High School courses should be altered to better meet the need.

Adult education has existed in Germany for the last century, but was formalized into the Folk High School system in 1913. Abolished in 1933 by the Nazi regime, it was reconstituted in 1945 and there are now 400 such schools in the U.S. Zone. These schools are all in urban areas, but since the war branches have been established in rural areas too, and there are now 200 of these in the U.S. Zone. The schools offer both vocational training and general cultural courses, but give no credit or certificate of achievement. They are open equally to all, and are tuition free.

For this study the usual random representative sample of Germans of all ages in the U.S. occupied areas was supplemented with a special augmented sample of German youth (defined as from 15 through 25 years of age). In toto the sampling included approximately 1,750 youths in the U.S. Zone and 1,250 adults, 275 youths in Berlin and 225 adults, and 200 youths in Bremen with 175 adults. The purpose of the adult cases on the same issues was to provide the opportunity for youth-adult comparisons where such were desirable.

As usual the interviews were obtained from randomly selected respondents by a trained German staff under the general supervision of American survey officers. Detailed description of the sampling methods employed is available upon request. The analysis and interpretation of the data has been performed by the professional survey staff of the Office of Public Affairs.

HIGHLIGHTS ...

1. Reasons for non-attendance of Folk High Schools are based largely on the social and economic conditions of present-day Germany, rather than on the limits of the curricula of the schools, the present survey shows.

2. Thus, one cannot anticipate an appreciable increase in attendance through a change in the curricula. Probably an increase would occur only as economic and social conditions in Western Germany change.

3. The one in ten U.S. Zone residents who participate in Folk High School programs are largely the urban, upper educational, and upper income levels of the population.

In toto the sampling included approximately 1,750 youths in the U.S. Zone and 1,250 adults, 275 youths in Berlin and 225 adults, and 200 youths in Bremen with 175 adults. The purpose of the adult cases on the same issues was to provide the opportunity for youth-adult comparisons where such were desirable.

As usual the interviews were obtained from randomly selected respondents by a trained German staff under the general supervision of American survey officers. Detailed description of the sampling methods employed is available upon request. The analysis and interpretation of the data has been performed by the professional survey staff of the Office of Public Affairs.

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R E S T R I C T E D

ATTENDANCE IS LARGELY URBAN ...

About one in ten youth and their elders in the U.S. Zone attend the free voluntary Folk High Schools. Because most of the schools are in urban areas, rural participation is very limited and about half of the residents of the U.S. Zone claim either that facilities are unavailable in their community or that they are unaware of such facilities. (In Wuerttemberg-Baden, where the rural extension program is strongest, only a third claim unawareness or unavailability.) In the urban center of Berlin, one quarter (27%) of the city youth attend the schools, although less than half as many of their elders have ever taken part. Only 7% of Berlin youth, and twice as many of their elders are unaware of the Folk High School facilities. Twenty per cent of Bremen youth and 6% of those over 25 take part in the courses offered.

Comparative attendance and awareness figures are shown below, for the three Länder of the U.S. Zone, and West Berlin and Bremen.

"Have you ever attended lectures or courses at a Folk High School?"

	Youth			Adults		
	Yes	No	Haven't heard of or unavailable	Yes	No	Haven't heard of or unavailable
Total U.S. Zone:	8%	42%	50%	6%	43%	51%
Bavaria	7	39	54	5	37	58
Hesse	7	45	48	5	47	48
W-Baden	11	49	40	8	55	37
Berlin	27	66	7	12	76	12
Bremen	20	73	7	6	80	14

DIFFERENCES IN PARTICIPATION WITHIN YOUTH POPULATION GROUPS ...

Attendance at the Folk High Schools ranges from 2% of U.S. Zone youth in villages under 1,000 to between 15% and 20% in cities with over 10,000 population. In addition, many more young people in the higher education levels participate than do those with elementary (Volksschule) education only. Although more than eight in ten U.S. Zone youth leave school at fourteen, only 4% of this group attempt to further their education through the Folk High Schools, compared with 25% participation by the upper education groups. Attendance is also greater in the upper income brackets than in the lower. (Because of the informal nature of the Folk High School system, attendance figures shown are undoubtedly inflated by those who claim participation by virtue of attendance at a single lecture.)

"Have you ever attended lectures or courses at a Volkshochschule?"

	<u>Have attended</u>	<u>Have not attended</u>	<u>Have not heard of or unavailable</u>	
US Zone Youth (15 - 25)				
<u>In City Size Groups:</u>				
Under 1,000 population	24	25	73	... 100
1,000 - 1,999	3	22	75	
2,000 - 4,999	5	34	61	
5,000 - 9,999	9	42	49	
10,000 - 24,999	16	50	34	
25,000 - 99,999	14	70	16	
100,000 - 249,999	18	73	9	
250,000 and over	14	71	15	
<u>In Educational Groups:</u>				
8 years or less	44	39	57	
Over 8 years	25	58	17	
<u>In Sex Groups:</u>				
Men	10	43	47	
Women	7	42	51	
<u>In Employment Status Groups:</u>				
Employed or apprenticed	8	43	49	
Unemployed	7	37	56	
Not employed (student, dependent)*	8	35	57	
Housewife	3	46	51	
<u>In Income Groups:</u>				
Under 99,99 DM	3	32	65	
100 - 249,99 DM	6	38	56	
250 - 399,99 DM	6	49	45	
400 DM and more	20	54	26	
<u>In Place of Origin Groups:</u>				
Native residents	9	42	49	
Refugees	6	39	55	
<u>In Religious Groups:</u>				
Catholic	7	36	57	
Protestant	9	50	41	
<u>In Age Groups:</u>				
15 - 19 years	8	43	49	
20 - 25 "	7	37	56	

* The number of cases in this group is too low to yield reliable figures. The figures are therefore presented for their suggestive value only.

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REASONS FOR NON-PARTICIPATION ...

To ascertain the reasons for non-attendance, respondents who haven't taken advantage of the Folk High School facilities, although available, were asked whether the courses were unsatisfactory or whether they had other reasons for not attending. Negligible numbers affirmed that they didn't like the courses, whereas the largest single reason given for not attending was lack of time, because of the demands of one's work, professional studies or house-work. Other main reasons listed were lack of interest, and lack of opportunity because of transportation and other inconveniences.

"Haven't you liked the courses offered, or are there other reasons for your not attending?" (Asked of those non-participants who had not mentioned unawareness or non-availability as their reason.)

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y*	A*	Y	A	Y	A
<u>Didn't like the courses offered:</u>	14	**	21	-4	44	21
<u>Lack of time; full time required for professional studies or household:</u> I have to work on the farm all day; professional studies, therefore no time; my profession doesn't allow it; I have a job as a waitress; I come home late at night and then I'm tired; my working hours are too irregular; I never had time; too much work in my household; I'm too tired at night to visit courses in Bamberg; I'm going to the university and have enough to do with that; I can't leave my children alone; I'm too exhausted in the evening; too heavy physical work; no time, have to pass my examination as journeyman; etc.	23	25	35	46	33	38
<u>No interest:</u> I don't need that for my profession, a technical education would be more necessary for me; I have other interests; what we have to know we know already; I don't see any reason for it; I don't want to go to school anymore; I never was interested; probably out of laziness; etc.	9	8	20	13	17	18
<u>No opportunity; transportation and other inconveniences:</u> Is too far away; because the courses are held in the evenings in Bamberg and it would be too late for me to get home; because there was no possibility yet to visit it; no Volks-hochschule here; great interest but I cannot drive to town; too inconvenient from the suburbs; bad train connections; etc.	8	6	2	2	6	3

(cont'd on next page)

R E S T R I C T E D

	US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen	
	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
<u>School expenses or travel expenses too high:</u> Unemployment, no money; that would have cost me 18 DM a month; that's too expensive for me; lack of time and money; can't take part because the ride to Munich requires expense; etc.	3%	3%	5%	6%	5%	3%
<u>Insufficient information:</u> Nobody explained to me yet what can be learned there; I don't know where to get information; it was not brought to my attention before; heard too little about it; did not know that everybody could take part; etc.	1	**	3	1	1	1
<u>Too young or too old; health reasons:</u> Too young; too old; I'm too old for such a thing; no interest anymore at 48 years; because I'm still going to school; sickness; I'm almost blind; I've been sick a long time; I'm suffering from the after-effects of infantile paralysis; I'm too sick; etc.	1	6	1	1	2	18
<u>Other reasons:</u> I'm against the academic caste since they are concoited; is merely a palliative for the people, the common worker should have the same possibilities as the others who go to universities; I didn't have anybody to go with me; things are exaggerated often; I have sufficient stimulations of this kind in my occupation; etc.	1	1	1	**	2	1
<u>No answer/No opinion:</u>	**	-	-	-	2	1
	47%+49%+	69%+83%+	77%+85%+			

* Y designates Youth, A adults in this table.

** Less than one half of one per cent.

+ Percentages add to more than the number asked because some gave more than one reason.

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RESPONDENT'S SUGGESTIONS FOR NEW COURSES ...

Respondent's suggestions for new Folk High School courses in which they would be interested cover a wide range. However, no field was mentioned with sufficient frequency to warrant a judgment that such a course, if offered, would induce any appreciably larger proportion of the population to attend Folk High Schools.

The question, with the categories of answers which received some little support (in all cases ranging between less than 1% and 2% of the total population) are listed below.

"Can you tell me any arrangements, events or courses which you would be interested in but were not yet included in the program of the Volkshochschule?" (Asked of those who said "Yes, did take part" or "Didn't like the courses offered" to previous questions.)

Political discussions and lectures; civics: Discussion groups about actual problems like Korea; lectures in education on cosmopolitanism; courses about the development of the German state; political general training; discussions about general interesting political problems; etc.

Technical courses: Technic; electrical engineering, architecture; etc.

Linguistic courses; Literature: Courses in Germanistic; Esperanto; etc.

Courses in Natural Science: Research on natural science; more physical sciences; etc.

Commercial courses: Training in settling of business accounts; courses in typewriting; etc.

Courses in sewing and modeling: Courses for seamstresses; courses in modeling; etc.

Drawing courses: General training in drawing; architectural drawing; etc.

Journalistic courses: Journalism; etc.

Pedagogic courses: Child care and child education; etc.

Physical training: Training in all kinds of sports; e.g. swimming, rowing and sailing; etc.

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GERMANS VIEW THE REMILITARIZATION ISSUE

Year-end, 1949, Present Status of Neutralism

Classification changed to
 Official use only
 by authority of Leo P. Crespi
 PUB/RAS.

Report No. 55
 Series No. 2
 December 23, 1950

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 RETURN TO DR. CRESPI

OFFICE OF THE U.S. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR GERMANY
 OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
 REACTIONS ANALYSIS STAFF

~~C. O. N. F. I. D. E. N. T.~~

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INTRODUCTION

The present report continues the series of studies being conducted by the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs, to cover developments in German thinking on the issue of West German participation in European defense. Results were gathered on the 19th and 20th of December, 1950 through the operation of a "flash" survey embracing a representative urban quota sample of 640 cases drawn from among West German cities 50,000 and over in population, and a 200 cases quota sample from the three Western sectors of Berlin.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS

I. PRESENT EXTENT OF NEUTRALISM AND DEFEATISM

- ... The serious finding emerges from the present survey that under present conditions the American policy objective of a Western Germany integrated with the West competes no better than even in the German mind with the idea of a united Germany neutral between East and West. Only in Berlin does a majority hold that the better policy for West Germany to try to follow is to join the West politically and militarily.
- ... The significance of these figures becomes even more pointed in the light of the fact that the choice of integrating with the West was posed on a basis of complete equality for West Germany. It would thus appear that present world conditions are such that offering West Germany complete equality is apparently not enough to insure even a bare majority of urban West Germans lining up psychologically with the West. The suggestion cannot be avoided that in combination with German war-weariness the reverses in Korea and the current Communist campaign of West German intimidation have influenced German judgment to the point where 'Gleichberechtigung' in a West Alliance is competing no better than even with neutralism.
- ... The implications of the present results for any four power conference on Germany should not be overlooked. If the Russians come up with the proposal - as well they might - of a neutral united Germany, it is now apparent that the idea will compete very strongly in the West German mind with the policy of integrating West Germany politically and militarily with the West.
- ... Comparison of the attitudes on the present issue of supporters and opponents of German defense participation discloses that neutrality sentiments play a heavy role in the thinking of those opposed to German participation.
- ... Group breakdowns of West German urban dwellers reveal support for integration with the West is greater among the more educated and informed levels - the men, the better schooled, and the more affluent. Votes for neutrality preponderate among the lesser educated and the less well off.
- ... Since the rural group which is not sampled in the present study tends on the average to be less educated and informed than urban residents, the pattern of group differences suggests that a complete sampling would increase the extent of support for neutralism in the overall figures.
- ... Despite the widespread judgment that it would be best for West Germany to try to pursue a neutral course between East and West, two out of three among West German city dwellers do not believe that it really will be possible for Germany to keep out altogether of a conflict between East and West.

- ... This finding both exposes the fact that much of the neutrality sentiment is wishful thinking, and provides a lever for remedying the situation. Western propaganda must concentrate on the thesis that neutrality, however much it may be desired, is impossible and that therefore the only realistic alternative to Communist domination is West Germany's casting its lot politically and militarily with the West.
- ... As might be anticipated, opponents of German defense participation are far less convinced than are supporters of the impossibility of Germany remaining out of the East-West conflict.
- ... Though majority opinion is still that West Germans should fight rather than acquiesce in the event of Eastern attack, defeatism has exhibited a steady growth through the past month.
- ... In view of the almost unanimous West German antipathy to Communism that prior studies have disclosed, the present trend of results can only suggest that the pressures of fear and hopelessness are becoming very considerable in West Germany at the present time.
- ... Breakdowns of supporters versus opponents of German defense participation reveal that it is in the latter group that an increasing majority - now almost two out of three - indicate that they are dubious about or averse to resisting possible Communist aggression.

II. PRESENT EXTENT OF CONFIDENCE IN AMERICAN RESOLUTION

- ... Though it still remains the preponderant opinion, conviction that the U.S. would take a firm stand in case of Communist aggression in Western Europe continues to decline. Confidence in American resolution appears to be less in the US Zone than in the British Zone of occupation.
- ... Though confidence in America continues to remain comparatively high in Berlin, it is notable that it fell off 12 per cent between the first and the third weeks of December.
- ... Comparisons of the reactions of supporters versus opponents of German defense participation indicate that the most recent drop in confidence is confined to those opposed to German defense participation.

III. CURRENT THINKING ON GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN DEFENSE

- ... During the second and third weeks of December, overall support among West German city dwellers for German defense participation has not so far appreciably trailed downward from the lower level to which it dropped when the real seriousness of the Chinese counter-offensive in Korea began to show. Still in evidence is a preponderance of approval over disapproval.
- ... In spite of Korean reverses, West Berliners continue to register the four out of five approval of German defense participation that they have without exception manifested since mid-August.
- ... Though overall support for German defense participation has approximately maintained itself throughout December, sex breakdown of the returns reveals that with the last survey there has occurred a definite drop in support among the men. The other group comparisons among West German city dwellers reveal again what has come to be the usual pattern of more widespread support for German defense participation among the more educated and informed segments of the population.

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- ... Frequent statements in the West German press that the Western powers had agreed that certain limitations were to be imposed on a West German army prompted an exploratory inquiry to ascertain how Germans might react to such conditions - were they in fact proposed. Clearly indicated is that few Germans would agree to join a European army under the conditions elaborated in the question, with the preponderance strongly disagreeing. Least disapproved among the conditions was the establishment of German brigades instead of divisions. Most disapproved was the idea of equipping German outfits with light weapons only. In each case, however, the most frequent opinion was that all the conditions were equally objectionable.
- ... The strongest disagreement with the proposed conditions, group breakdowns reveal, comes from the opinion leading elements among urban West Germans - the men, the better educated, and respondents with higher incomes.
- ... The latest survey confirms a finding touched on before, that West Germans are far from unanimous about the desirability of bringing Western power troop reinforcements to Germany. Moreover, fewer West German city dwellers now support such a course than did so in early November.
- ... When asked why they oppose Western troop reinforcements, respondents divide in their opinions between financial and housing burdens and disagreement with the military value of such a course.
- ... But the large role of neutralism and defeatism in prompting opposition to Western troop reinforcements becomes clearly evident when attitudes on the reinforcement issue are cross-tabulated against answers the respondents have made to other questions. The majority of those who oppose reinforcements favor a neutral Germany instead of one integrated with the West, and are dubious about or averse to fighting Communist aggression in the event of attack from the East.
- ... Currently the preponderant view in urban West Germany is that German military preparations would increase rather than decrease the danger of a Russian aggression. For whatever reasons this viewpoint is considerably more prevalent in the US Zone than in the British Zone.
- ... However, comparison of supporters and opponents of German defense participation reveals that opinion in the present connection is only one of the considerations influencing judgments on the participation issue. One third of those who favor German defense participation do so in spite of the feeling that such a course will increase the danger of Russian aggression. So obviously other considerations are outweighing the point. Secondly, 45 per cent of those who oppose German defense participation do so without expressing the opinion that such a course will increase danger. So in this case, also, other considerations are playing a part.

IV. GERMAN REACTIONS TO THE GROTEWOHL LETTER

- ... As of the date of the latest survey (December 19th and 20th) the preponderance of West German city dwellers had heard about the letter from Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl of the East German People's Republic to Chancellor Adenauer inviting negotiations on unification. Even in Berlin however, no more than one out of three respondents were sufficiently informed about the letter to indicate what it was about.
- ... The preponderant opinion among West German city dwellers is that Chancellor Adenauer should accept Grotewohl's proposal for discussions on unity. Only in Berlin is the preponderant sentiment opposed. Pro-acceptance sentiment reaches its maximum in the US Zone where two out of three espouse such a course.

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- ... The significance of these results should not be overlooked. They would seem to suggest rather strongly that West German interest in German unity and in a possible neutral Germany, are sufficient to outweigh whatever objections many Germans may have to dealing with Communism in general and with the dubiously "elected" representatives of the East Zone People's Republic in particular. However, the results do not mean that any appreciable number of West Germans are interested in a Germany united under Communism.
- ... It is notable that among supporters as well as among opponents of German defense participation the preponderant opinion is in favor of Adenauer's acceptance of Grotewohl's proposal.
- ... Food for thought lies also in the fact that it is the more educated and informed segments of the urban West German population, not the less informed, who more widely favor acceptance of the Grotewohl proposal.
- ... Not as many as espouse unity discussions are hopeful that they are likely to achieve their purpose. A substantial minority in urban West Germany, however, - around half in the US Zone - believe that the conference proposed by Grotewohl would promote the unification of Germany.
- ... Whatever else may be its implications, the widespread West German willingness to discuss with East Zone representatives the unification of Germany does not mean that any appreciable proportion would choose unification under Communism. On the contrary, four out of five West German city dwellers definitely express a preference for the present disunited situation as against a united Germany under a Communist government.
- ... Even among opponents of German defense participation there are few who express a choice for unification at the price of Communism.
- ... The considerable West German interest in unity negotiations despite a disinclination to accept a Germany united under Communism, ceases to be a puzzle in the light of the finding that the preponderant opinion in urban West Germany is that West Zone democratic elements would be likely to exert a stronger influence than Communism in any unified government. So it becomes evident that however much West Germans fear Russia and Communism, they don't fear East Germans, and think well of their chances of exerting a stronger influence in any unified setup.
- ... Supporters and opponents of German defense participation do not differ appreciably in their pattern of reactions on the present issue.
- ... The opinion leading elements of the urban West German population are somewhat less inclined than are their counterpart groups to see superior democratic influence in any unified government for Germany. Notwithstanding, however, the preponderant opinion among all groups is that democratic influences would be the stronger.
- ... Obviously the considerable German interest in unity discussions and in the goal of a neutral united Germany implies support for withdrawal of the four occupying powers. But that West Germans are not making any precipitate recommendations in this matter is evident from a three out of four opposition to such a move in the present situation.
- ... Even among West Germans opposed to participation in European defense the majority sentiment is that four power withdrawal would be unwise under present conditions.

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V. TREND IN REACTIONS TO A FOUR POWER CONFERENCE

- ... The preponderant opinion among West German city dwellers is still that a four power conference would be of no advantage at all to Germany. However, since mid-November adverse judgments on such a conference have been steadily decreasing.
- ... Unlikelihood of coming to any agreement is the reason most often advanced by those who see little or no advantage for Germany in a four power conference. However, a small group feels that there might be agreement - but only at the expense of Germany.

VI. SOME ADDITIONAL REACTIONS TO CURRENT KOREAN SITUATION

- ... As of the time of the present survey, just as large a proportion of West German city dwellers disagree with the present UN measures in Korea as agree with them. Only in Berlin does agreement outweigh disagreement, and there by a limited margin.
- ... Though disagreement with present UN measures in Korea bulks largest among respondents who oppose German participation in European defense, it is very nearly as extensive as agreement among supporters of defense participation.
- ... Various criticisms are offered by those who disagree with the UN's conduct of the Korean campaign, with the major emphasis on the need for better preparation and halting at the 38th parallel.
- ... In urban West Germany as a whole, sentiment for withdrawal from Korea in the event that negotiations fail has not increased appreciably between the first and second weeks of December. During this period, however, there has been some increase in this point of view in the British Zone and in Berlin.

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I. PRESENT EXTENT OF NEUTRALISM AND DEFEATISM

SHOULD WEST GERMANY SEEK NEUTRALITY OR INTEGRATION WITH THE WEST? ...

The serious finding emerges from the present survey that under present conditions the American policy objective of a Western Germany integrated with the West competes no better than even in the German mind with the idea of a united Germany neutral between East and West. Only in Berlin does a majority hold that the better policy for West Germany to try to follow is to join the West politically and militarily.

"What would, in your opinion, be better for West Germany?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
To try to join the West politically and militarily as a free and equal nation	44%	45%	41%	71%
To try to unite with East Germany and as a neutral nation to keep out of a conflict between East and West	41	38	50	16
No opinion	$\frac{15}{100\%}$	$\frac{17}{100\%}$	$\frac{9}{100\%}$	$\frac{13}{100\%}$

The significance of these figures becomes even more pointed in the light of the fact that the choice of integrating with the West was posed on a basis of complete equality for West Germany. It would thus appear that present world conditions are such that offering West Germany complete equality is apparently not enough to insure even a bare majority of urban West Germans lining up psychologically with the West. The suggestion cannot be avoided that in combination with German war-weariness the reverses in Korea and the current Communist campaign of West German intimidation have influenced German judgment to the point where 'Gleichberechtigung' in a West Alliance is competing no better than even with neutralism.

The present sampling is confined to urban residents in West Germany, but the direction of group differences is such - it will be shortly indicated - that in a complete sampling the likelihood would be even greater support for neutrality.

The implications of the present results for any four power conference on Germany should not be overlooked. If the Russians come up with the proposal - as well they might - of a neutral united Germany, the idea, it must now be appreciated, will compete very strongly in the West German mind with the policy of integrating West Germany politically and militarily with the West.

* Alternatives were presented on a card to respondents.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

The heavy role neutralism plays in the thinking of those who oppose German participation in European defense is graphically pointed up in the comparison below of the attitudes on the present issue of supporters and opponents of German defense participation.

"What would, in your opinion, be better for West Germany?"

To try to join the West politically and militarily as a free and equal nation	To try to unite with East Germany and as a neutral nation to keep out of a conflict between East and West	No opinion	No. of ca- ses:
---	---	---------------	--------------------------

WEST GERMANY

For participation in a European army	65%	23%	7%...100%	341
Against participation in a European army	13	62	20	229

Group breakdowns of West German urban dwellers reveal support for integration with the West is greater among the more educated and informed levels - the men, the better schooled, and the more affluent. Votes for neutrality preponderate among the lesser educated and the less well off.

Since the rural group which is not sampled in the present study tends on the average to be less educated and informed than urban residents, the pattern of group differences suggests that a complete sampling would increase the extent of support for neutralism in the overall figures.

"What would, in your opinion, be better for West Germany?"

To try to join the West politically and militarily as a free and equal nation	To try to unite with East Germany and as a neutral nation to keep out of a conflict between East and West	No opinion	No. of ca- ses:
---	---	---------------	--------------------------

WEST GERMANY

<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	51%	39%	10%...100%	287
Women	37	43	20	252
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	35%	45%	2%	387
Beyond elementary school	56	36	8	251
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	33%	47%	2%	323
Lower middle to upper class	55	35	10	316
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	30%	39%	31%	102
150 - 299 DM	35	50	15	255
300 DM and more	56	34	10	279
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	45%	43%	12%	286
40 years and over	43	40	17	353
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	43%	41%	16%	235
Protestants	43	41	16	348

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IS NEUTRALITY REALLY POSSIBLE FOR GERMANY?

Despite the widespread judgment that it would be best for West Germany to try to pursue a neutral course between East and West, two out of three among West German city dwellers do not believe that it really will be possible for Germany to keep out altogether of a conflict between East and West.

"Do you think that it will really be possible for Germany to keep out altogether of a conflict between East and West?"

WEST GERMANY British Zone US Zone Berlin

Yes	21%	21%	2nd	16%
No	66	65	67	76
No opinion	13	14	13	8
	100%	100%	100%	100%

This finding both exposes the fact that much of the neutrality sentiment is wishful thinking, and provides a lever for remedying the situation. Western propaganda must concentrate on the thesis that neutrality, however much it may be desired, is impossible and that therefore the only realistic alternative to Communist domination is West Germany's casting its lot politically and militarily with the West.

As might be anticipated, opponents of German defense participation are far less convinced than are supporters, of the impossibility of Germany remaining out of the East-West conflict.

"Do you think that it will really be possible for Germany to keep out altogether of a conflict between East and West?"

	Yes	No	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
For participation in a European army	13%	81%	6% ... 100%	341
Against participation in a European army	33	49	18	229

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

Among West German urban population groups, the elements better able to come to reasoned and informed judgments - the men, the better educated, and those with higher incomes - tend considerably more frequently than their counterpart groups to voice the impossibility of complete neutrality.

"Do you think that it will really be possible for Germany to keep out altogether of a conflict between East and West?"

	Yes.	No	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	18%	73%	9% ... 100%	287
Women	23	60	17	352
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	25%	53%	17%	387
Beyond elementary school	14	78	8	251
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	26%	56%	18%	323
Lower middle to upper class	15	76	9	316
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	22%	59%	19%	102
150 - 299 DM	23	60	17	255
300 DM and more	17	74	9	279
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	18%	69%	13%	236
40 years and over	22	64	14	353
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	23%	64%	13%	235
Protestants	17	67	16	348

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SHOULD WEST GERMANS FIGHT OR ACQUIESCE IN EVENT OF EASTERN ATTACK? ...

Though majority opinion is still that West Germans should fight rather than acquiesce in the event of Eastern attack, defeatism has exhibited a steady growth through the past month.

"If you personally had to decide what should be done in the event of an attack from the East: should we let West Germany come under the East Zone government without fighting, or should West Germany - together with the West - fight with all means against Communist aggression?"

	WEST GERMANY			British Zone		
	Nov 27-28	Dec 4-5	Dec 19-20	Nov 27-28	Dec 4-5	Dec 19-20
Without a fight	11%	15%	18%	11%	15%	17%
Fight with all means	76	69	62	77	66	61
Undecided	<u>13</u> 100%	<u>16</u> 100%	<u>20</u> 100%	<u>12</u> 100%	<u>19</u> 100%	<u>22</u> 100%
	US Zone			Berlin		
	Nov 27-28	Dec 4-5	Dec 19-20	Nov 27-28	Dec 4-5	Dec 19-20
Without a fight	14%	16%	21%	15	14	31
Fight with all means	74	74	62	94	97	90
Undecided	<u>12</u> 100%	<u>10</u> 100%	<u>17</u> 100%	<u>5</u> 100%	<u>3</u> 100%	<u>7</u> 100%

In view of the almost unanimous West German antipathy to Communism that prior studies have disclosed, the present trend of results can only suggest that the pressures of fear and hopelessness are becoming very considerable in West Germany at the present time.

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Breakdowns of supporters versus opponents of German defense participation reveal that it is in the latter group that an increasing majority - now almost two out of three - indicate that they are dubious about or averse to resisting possible Communist aggression.

"If you personally had to decide what should be done in the event of an attack from the East: should we let West Germany come under the East Zone government without fighting, or should Western Germany - together with the West - fight with all means against Communist aggression?"

	Without a fight			Fight with all means			Undecided			Number of cases: *
	Nov	Dec	Dec	Nov	Dec	Dec	Nov	Dec	Dec	
	27	45	19	27	45	19	27	45	19	
	28		20	28		20	28		20	
WEST GERMANY										
For participation in a European army	6%	3%	6%	90%	90%	85%	4%	7%	9%	341
Against participation in a European army	26	34	37	48	41	37	26	25	26	229

Group comparisons among West German city dwellers show that support for all out resistance to any possible Communist aggression has shaded downward among all groups rather than the drop being confined to particular ones. Now as before, however, such support tends to be somewhat more widespread among the opinion leading elements of the population.

	Without a fight		Fight with all means		No opinion		Number of cases: *
	December	December	December	December	December	December	
	45	19-20	45	19-20	45	19-20	
WEST GERMANY							
Sex:							
Men	17%	19%	69%	66%	14%	15%...100%	287
Women	13	17	69	59	13	24	352
Education:							
Elementary school	15%	13%	65%	59%	20%	23%	387
Beyond elementary school	14	17	76	68	10	15	251
Socio-economic Status:							
Lower class	16%	19%	62%	59%	22%	22%	323
Lower middle to upper class	13	13	76	65	11	17	316
Income (per month):							
0 - 149 DM	12%	20%	65%	59%	23%	21%	102
150 - 299 DM	16	20	65	58	19	22	255
300 DM and more	15	15	74	68	11	17	279
Age:							
Under 40 years	15%	17%	68%	64%	17%	19%	286
40 years and over	15	18	70	61	15	21	353
Religion:							
Catholics	10%	18%	74%	64%	16%	18%	235
Protestants	16	16	69	62	15	22	348

*In this and other trend tables only the numbers of cases are presented for the latest survey. Earlier numbers are approximately the same.

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II. PRESENT EXTENT OF CONFIDENCE IN AMERICAN RESOLUTION

WILL AMERICA STAND FIRM IN EUROPE IN EVENT OF COMMUNIST AGGRESSION? ...

Though it still remains the preponderant opinion, conviction that the U.S. would take a firm stand in case of Communist aggression in Western Europe continues to decline. Confidence in American resolution appears to be less in the US Zone than in the British Zone of occupation.

"Considering the events in Korea, are you firmly convinced that America would take a firm stand in case of Communist aggression in Western Europe, are you less convinced of it or not convinced at all?"

	WEST GERMANY			British Zone		
	Aug 15-17	Dec 4-5	Dec 19-20	Aug 15-17	Dec 4-5	Dec 19-20
Firmly convinced	70%	55%	52%	70%	56%	53%
Less convinced	15	24	24	15	22	21
Not convinced	5	11	13	5	10	12
No opinion	10	10	11	10	12	14
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	US Zone			Berlin		
	Aug 15-17	Dec 4-5	Dec 19-20	Aug 15-17	Dec 4-5	Dec 19-20
Firmly convinced	73%	53%	49%	89%	89%	77%
Less convinced	14	28	29	8	10	15
Not convinced	6	14	18	1	1	4
No opinion	7	5	4	2	-	4
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Though confidence in America continues to remain comparatively high in Berlin, it is notable that it fell off 12 per cent between the first and the third weeks of December.

Comparisons of the reactions of supporters versus opponents of German defense participation indicate that the most recent drop in confidence is confined to those opposed to German defense participation.

"Considering the events in Korea, are you firmly convinced that America would take a firm stand in case of Communist aggression in Western Europe, are you less convinced of it, or not convinced at all?"

Firmly convinced	Less convinced	Not convinced	No opinion	Number of cases
Dec	Dec	Dec	Dec	
<u>4-5/19-20</u>	<u>4-5/19-20</u>	<u>4-5/19-20</u>	<u>4-5/19-20</u>	

WEST GERMANY

For participation
in a European
army

63% 65% 22% 22% 3% 7% 6% 6% 341

Against partici-
pation in a
European army

44 37 31 26 14 19 11 18 229

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Conviction that America would take a firm stand in Europe in the event of Communist aggression continues to be greater among the opinion leading groups of urban West Germany.

"Considering the events in Korea, are you firmly convinced that America would take a firm stand in case of Communist aggression in Western Europe, are you less convinced of it, or not convinced at all?"

	Firmly convinced Dec <u>4-5/19-20</u>		Less convinced Dec <u>4-5/19-20</u>		Not convinced Dec <u>4-5/19-20</u>		No opinion Dec <u>4-5/19-20</u>		Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY									
<u>Sex:</u>									
Men	58%	56%	23%	25%	13%	13%	6%	6%..100%	287
Women	52	49	25	22	10	13	13	16	352
<u>Education:</u>									
Elementary school	51%	46%	23%	25%	13%	14%	13%	15%	387
Beyond elementary school	61	60	25	22	9	12	5	6	251
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>									
Lower class	47%	43%	25%	26%	13%	15%	15%	16%	323
Lower middle to upper class	62	62	24	21	9	11	5	6	316
<u>Income (per month):</u>									
0 - 149 DM	52%	40%	21%	25%	14%	13%	13%	22%	102
150 - 299 DM	47	49	29	25	11	15	13	11	255
300 DM and more	64	59	21	21	9	12	6	8	279
<u>Age:</u>									
Under 40 years	54%	52%	27%	26%	10%	13%	9%	9%	286
40 years and over	56	53	22	21	12	13	10	13	353
<u>Religion:</u>									
Catholics	59%	47%	21%	24%	12%	14%	8%	15%	235
Protestants	52	57	27	23	10	11	11	9	348

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III. CURRENT THINKING ON GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN DEFENSE

LATEST TREND ON THE PARTICIPATION ISSUE ...

During the second and third weeks of December, overall support among West German city dwellers for German defense participation has not so far appreciably trailed downward from the lower level to which it dropped when the real seriousness of the Chinese counter-offensive in Korea began to show. Still in evidence is a preponderance of approval over disapproval.

Several West European nations and America recently signed a defense pact, the so-called Atlantic Pact.

"Suppose West Germany would join the Atlantic Pact and be asked in connection with it to participate in a general army for the defense of West Europe. Would you then be for or against such participation in a defense army?"

	WEST GERMANY							
	Aug	Oct-Nov		November		December		
	15-17	31-1	9-10	15-16	27-28	4-5	11-12	19-20
For it	61%	63%	58%	51%	64%	55%	56%	53%
Against it	27	30	32	41	26	36	35	36
No opinion	12	7	10	8	10	9	9	11
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	British Zone							
	Aug	Oct-Nov		November		December		
	15-17	31-1	9-10	15-16	27-28	4-5	11-12	19-20
For it	59%	61%	59%	51%	65%	54%	57%	53%
Against it	29	31	31	39	25	37	33	35
No opinion	12	8	10	10	10	9	10	12
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	US Zone							
	Aug	Oct-Nov		November		December		
	15-17	31-1	9-10	15-16	27-28	4-5	11-12	19-20
For it	67%	65%	57%	43%	64%	59%	53%	53%
Against it	21	29	32	45	24	33	41	38
No opinion	12	6	11	7	12	8	6	9
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	Berlin							
	Aug	Oct-Nov		November		December		
	15-17	31-1	9-10	15-16	27-28	4-5	11-12	19-20
For it	86%	89%	80%	85%	86%	88%	82%	84%
Against it	12	8	16	12	8	10	14	12
No opinion	2	3	4	3	6	2	4	4
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

In spite of Korean reverses, it should be noted above, West Berliners continue to register the four out of five approval of German defense participation that they have without exception manifested since mid-August.

Though overall support for German defense participation has approximately maintained itself throughout December, sex breakdown of the returns reveals that with the last survey there has occurred a definite drop in support among the men. The other group comparisons among West German city dwellers reveal again what has come to be the usual pattern of more widespread support for German defense participation among the more educated and informed segments of the population.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Several West European nations and America recently signed a defense pact, the so-called Atlantic Pact.

"Suppose West Germany would join the Atlantic Pact and be asked in connection with it to participate in a European army for the defense of West Europe. Would you then be for or against such participation in a defense army?"

		For it		Against it		No opinion		No. of ca-ses:
Aug	Oct	Nov	Dec	Aug	Oct	Nov	Dec	
15	21	9	15	27	4-5	11	19	
17	1	10	16	28	12	20	20	

WEST GERMANY

Sex

Men	68%	69%	64%	53%	70%	62%	63%	55%	28%	29%	31%	31%	42%	25%	34%	33%	38%	44%	24%	54%	54%	54%	44%	44%	74%	287
Women	54%	58%	53%	49%	58%	50%	50%	51%	28%	31%	32%	40%	28%	37%	37%	33%	33%	44%	21%	11%	11%	14%	13%	13%	16%	352

Education:

Elementary school	53%	59%	51%	43%	57%	50%	49%	45%	30%	31%	35%	46%	30%	39%	40%	42%	17%	10%	14%	11%	13%	11%	11%	13%	387
Beyond elementary school	70%	67%	69%	64%	77%	63%	68%	67%	25%	29%	27%	33%	19%	31%	27%	26%	5%	4%	4%	3%	4%	6%	5%	7%	251

Socio-economic Status:

Lower class	55%	58%	48%	47%	56%	47%	47%	43%	29%	32%	36%	41%	32%	41%	40%	41%	16%	10%	16%	12%	12%	12%	13%	16%	323
Lower middle to upper class	66%	63%	68%	54%	71%	63%	65%	63%	26%	23%	27%	41%	21%	31%	30%	31%	8%	4%	5%	5%	8%	6%	5%	6%	316

*Income (per month):

0 - 149 DM	43%	40%	56%	54%	37%	44%	42%	30%	32%	37%	40%	15%	17%	14%	14%	26%	16%	102
150 - 299 DM	52	50	60	49	49	46	34	30	43	44	40	14	5	10	8	7	14	255
300 DM and more	71	56	71	62	70	64	24	39	21	25	31	5	5	3	7	5	5	279

Age:

Under 40 years	62%	60%	53%	50%	65%	54%	28%	33%	24%	43%	27%	38%	35%	35%	35%	10%	7%	16%	7%	8%	8%	10%	11%	286
40 years and over	60%	64%	61%	51%	63%	57%	54%	53%	27%	28%	21%	40%	25%	34%	35%	36%	13%	8%	18%	9%	12%	9%	11%	353

Religion:

Catholics	62%	60%	57%	50%	69%	54%	29%	33%	30%	41%	21%	38%	35%	39%	9%	7%	13%	9%	9%	10%	8%	9%	10%	235
Protestants	63%	64%	59%	51%	64%	60%	57%	55%	25%	29%	32%	41%	28%	31%	34%	32%	12%	7%	9%	8%	10%	9%	13%	348

* Income figures were not obtained in the earlier two surveys.

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GERMAN REACTIONS TO SOME POSSIBLE CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION ...

Frequent statements in the German press that the Western powers had agreed that certain limitations were to be imposed on a West German army, if one were established, prompted an exploratory inquiry, in the December 11th and 12th survey, to estimate how West Germans might react to such conditions were they in fact proposed. It may be seen below that few Germans would agree to join a European army under the conditions elaborated in the question, with the preponderance strongly disagreeing. Least disapproved among the conditions was the establishment of German brigades instead of divisions. Most disapproved was the idea of equipping German outfits with light weapons only. In each case, however, the most frequent opinion was that all the conditions were equally objectionable.

"In case the Western powers ask Western Germany to participate in the West European defense army under the following conditions, would you agree or disagree with it?"

- A. Establishment of German brigades, but not divisions.
- B. Equipping of German outfits with light, but not heavy weapons.
- C. No West German ministry of defense and no general staff.

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
(Dec 11-12)				
Agree	12%	12%	9%	23%
Disagree	24	26	19	21
Strongly disagree	48	46	53	45
No opinion	16	16	14	8
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

"Which of these three points do you approve of the least?" (Asked of those who answered "Disagree" or "Strongly disagree" to previous question.)

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
(Dec 11-12)				
A.	4%	4%	4%	7%
B.	17	17	18	22
C.	11	11	12	20
All the same	36	35	33	16
No opinion	5	5	5	4
	<u>73%*</u>	<u>72%</u>	<u>77%</u>	<u>69%</u>

* Some people gave more than one answer.

"Which of these three points do you approve of the most?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
(Dec 11-12)				
A.	14%	12%	19%	21%
B.	3	3	2	4
C.	8	7	10	15
With none	42	43	42	25
No opinion	6	7	4	4
	<u>73%*</u>	<u>72%</u>	<u>77%</u>	<u>69%</u>

* Some people gave more than one answer.

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The strongest disagreement with the proposed conditions, group breakdowns reveal, comes from the opinion leading elements among urban West Germans - the men, the better educated, and respondents with higher incomes.

"In case the Western powers ask Western Germany to participate in the West European defense army under the following conditions, would you agree or disagree with it?"

- A. Establishment of German brigades, but not divisions.
- B. Equipping of German outfits with light, but not heavy weapons.
- C. No West German ministry of defense and no general staff.

	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY (Dec 11-12)					
<u>Sex:</u>					
Men	10%	24%	62%	4%...100%	287
Women	13	25	38	24	353
<u>Education:</u>					
Elementary school	13%	23%	45%	19%	393
Beyond elementary school	10	27	55	8	242
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>					
Lower class	13%	21%	45%	21%	326
Lower middle to upper class	10	27	52	11	314
<u>Income (per month):</u>					
0 - 149 DM	9%	20%	38%	33%	84
150 - 299 DM	13	22	47	18	276
300 DM and more	11	23	53	8	275
<u>Age:</u>					
Under 40 years	14%	24%	46%	16%	238
40 years and over	9	24	51	16	352
<u>Religion:</u>					
Catholics	9%	25%	50%	16%	254
Protestants	15	24	46	15	340

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GERMAN REACTIONS TO PROPOSED WESTERN POWER TROOP REINFORCEMENTS ...

The latest survey confirms a finding touched on before, that West Germans are far from unanimous about the desirability of bringing Western power troop reinforcements to Germany. Moreover, it will be noted in the trend results below, fewer West German city dwellers now support such a course than did so in early November.

"Are you in favor of or opposed to more troops of the Western powers being brought to West Germany?"

	WEST GERMANY		British Zone		US Zone		Berlin	
	Nov	Dec	Nov	Dec	Nov	Dec	Nov	Dec
	9-10	19-20	9-10	19-20	9-10	19-20	9-10	19-20
In favor of	59%	53%	59%	54%	56%	47%	85%	85%
Opposed to	31	34	29	32	36	43	14	12
No opinion	10	13	12	14	8	10	1	3
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

As might be anticipated, opponents of German defense participation as compared to supporters are considerably more opposed to bringing additional Western troops to West Germany.

"Are you in favor of or opposed to more troops of the Western powers being brought to West Germany?"

	Favor of	Opposed to	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
For participation in a European army	71%	22%	7% ... 100%	341
Against participation in a European army	30	55	15	229

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Approval of troop reinforcements bulks somewhat more largely, group comparisons show, among the opinion leading elements of the urban West German population.

"Are you in favor of or opposed to more troops of the Western powers being brought to West Germany?"

	Favor of	Opposed to	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	57%	36%	7%... 100%	267
Women	49	33	18	352
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	47%	38%	15%	367
Beyond elementary school	62	30	8	251
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	45%	33%	17%	323
Lower middle to upper class	60	31	9	316
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	41%	38%	21%	102
150 - 299 DM	51	34	15	255
300 DM and more	59	33	8	279
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	54%	31%	15%	266
40 years and over	52	37	11	353
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	47%	37%	16%	235
Protestants	55	33	12	343

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When asked why they oppose Western troop reinforcements, respondents divide in their opinions between financial and housing burdens and disagreement with the military value of such a course.

"Are you in favor of or opposed to more troops of the Western . ers
being brought to West Germany?"

If "Opposed": "Why are you opposed to it?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
<u>Financial burden too great:</u> We would have to pay for it for sure; taxes would increase; more troops mean a greater financial burden to the population; our taxes would be too high; everything will get even more expensive; the occupation costs would rise; that would only cost money - except in case of war, then more troops would be necessary; would only cost money to the poor; etc.	14%	13%	19%	2%
<u>Increases the danger of war (opposition to the military):</u> They'll start a war; the Western powers would provoke the Russians by that; it indicates the aggressiveness of imperialism; the Russians will start to attack sooner; because then the Russians will reinforce their troops too and it'll come to a war one of these days; Germany would become the battle-ground; the more military forces are in readiness, the more they talk about a war, they should negotiate more; I am fed up with war and more troops will lead to it; I spent five years at the front and five years in prison - I don't want to see soldiers anymore; it would be an act of aggression against the Russian - he will consider it an affront; I don't want war and I'm am afraid of all those soldiers; etc.	8	7	12	4%
<u>Housing shortage would increase:</u> Housing will get scarce; the Americans still occupy our house; there would be new requisitioning of housing; etc.	4	3	6	1
<u>The standard of their soldiers is not high enough:</u> Because they are not real combat troops yet; I doubt whether they are good soldiers with some backbone to them; the Americans won't help us anyway; they are not capable of halting an attack, that has been proved in Korea - they should stay at home; they would live off our country and won't help us anyway; etc.	3	2	5	-
<u>Establishment of a German army would be preferable:</u> It would be better to build a German army - then the unemployed would be taken care of; because the money could be used to build up a strong and ready German army; because I want German troops, not not foreigners; etc.	2	2	2	2

(cont'd on next page)

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	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
<u>The military forces will not suffice to fend off an attack: Won't be of much use in case of an attack anyway; because they can't bring enough soldiers over here - the whole situation is hopeless in case of Russian aggression; the Western powers are not able to put up that many troops - they should at least try to hold one place and that is Korea at the moment; etc.</u>	1%	1%	1%	1%
<u>Present troops are sufficient: Because there are enough over here; we have enough troops already; etc.</u>	1	-	1	1
<u>Russia will not attack (there will be no war): Because I don't think Russia is in a position to attack Europe and the whole world; because I don't think the Russians will attack; because we don't need the troops, there won't be a war; etc.</u>	1	1	2	1
<u>We can take care of ourselves: Because we can manage by ourselves; because we'd get further if left alone; etc.</u>	1	-	-	-
<u>Other opinions: They have no business here; in the first place they should give military training to all the Americans over here, including the DP's who do nothing but black-marketing; I feel restrained in some way by the occupation soldiers; because it would affect the present political situation; in case Germany would be unified it is senseless - would only annoy the Russians; everybody should remain in his own country, it only makes trouble; we'll be able to master the situation, even politically; etc.</u>	3	4	2	2
<u>No opinion / No answer:</u>	38%	33%	50%	12%

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But the large role of neutralism and defeatism in prompting opposition to Western troop reinforcements becomes clearly evident when attitudes on the reinforcement issue are cross-tabulated against answers the respondents have made to other questions. The majority of those who oppose reinforcements favor a neutral Germany instead of one integrated with the West, and are dubious about or averse to fighting Communist aggression in the event of attack from the East.

"What would, in your opinion, be better for West Germany?"

- a. To try to join the West politically and militarily as a free and equal nation
- b. To try to unite with East Germany and as a neutral nation to keep out of a conflict between East and West

	Join the West	Neutral nation	No opinion	
WEST GERMANY				
Favor troop reinforcements	59%	3%	11%	... 100%
Oppose troop reinforcements	27	59	14	

"If you personally had to decide what should be done in the event of an attack from the East: should we let West Germany come under the East Zone government without fighting, or should Western Germany - together with the West - fight with all means against Communist aggression?"

	Without a fight	Fight with all means	No opinion	
WEST GERMANY				
Favor troop reinforcements	8%	78%	14%	... 100%
Oppose troop reinforcements	36	43	21	

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WILL GERMAN DEFENSE PARTICIPATION INCREASE DANGER OF RUSSIAN AGGRESSION? ...

Currently the preponderant view in urban West Germany is that German military preparations would increase rather than decrease the danger of a Russian aggression. For whatever reasons this viewpoint is considerably more prevalent in the US Zone than in the British Zone.

"Supposing a German army were established in West Germany, would that, in your opinion, increase or decrease the danger of Russian aggression?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Increase	41%	34%	54%	30%
Decrease	22	24	19	44
No influence	20	22	17	16
No opinion	17	20	10	8
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

However, comparison of supporters and opponents of German defense participation reveals that opinion in the present connection is only one of the considerations influencing judgments on the participation issue. One third of those who favor German defense participation do so in spite of the feeling that such a course will increase the danger of Russian aggression. So obviously other considerations are outweighing the point. Secondly, 45 per cent of those who oppose German defense participation do so without expressing the opinion that such a course will increase danger. So in this case, also, other considerations are playing a part.

"Supposing a German army were established in West Germany, would that, in your opinion, increase or decrease the danger of Russian aggression?"

	Increase	Decrease	No influence	No opinion	No. of cases
WEST GERMANY					
For participation in a European army	33%	32%	24%	11%...100%	341
Against participation in a European army	55	8	18	19	229

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Group comparisons among the urban West German population yield no particular pattern on the present issue.

"Supposing a German army were established in West Germany, would that, in your opinion, increase or decrease the danger of Russian aggression?"

	Increase	Decrease	No influence	No opinion	Number of cases
WEST GERMANY					
<u>Sex:</u>					
Men	46%	22%	24%	8%...100%	287
Women	36	22	17	25	352
<u>Education:</u>					
Elementary school	42%	20%	17%	21%	387
Beyond elementary school	38	25	26	11	251
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>					
Lower class	40%	21%	17%	22%	323
Lower middle to upper class	42	23	24	11	316
<u>Income (per month):</u>					
0 - 149 DM	31%	24%	17%	23%	102
150 - 299 DM	42	22	18	18	255
300 DM and more	42	22	24	12	279
<u>Age:</u>					
Under 40 years	36%	24%	21%	19%	286
40 years and over	44	20	20	16	353
<u>Religion:</u>					
Catholics	44%	20%	16%	20%	235
Protestants	38	23	23	16	348

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IV. GERMAN REACTIONS TO THE GROTEWOHL LETTER

EXTENT OF FAMILIARITY WITH THE PROPOSAL ...

As of the date of the latest survey (December 19th and 20th) the preponderance of West German city dwellers had heard about the letter from Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl of the East German People's Republic to Chancellor Adenauer inviting negotiations on unification. Even in Berlin however, no more than one out of three respondents were sufficiently informed about the letter to indicate what it was about.

"Have you read or heard of the letter recently sent by the East German Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl to Federal Chancellor Adenauer?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Yes	55%	55%	58%	69%
No	$\frac{44}{100\%}$	$\frac{45}{100\%}$	$\frac{42}{100\%}$	$\frac{31}{100\%}$

"Could you perhaps remember the main point of the letter?" (Asked of those who answered "Yes" to previous question.)

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Yes, (invitation to a discussion about the unification of Germany and specific proposals)	29%	29%	29%	33%
Other answers	4	3	5	5
No	$\frac{23}{56\%}$	$\frac{23}{55\%}$	$\frac{24}{58\%}$	$\frac{31}{69\%}$

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Group comparisons among Western German urban residents follow the usual pattern among information inquiries: more widespread awareness among the opinion leading elements - the men, the better schooled, and the economically better situated.

"Have you read or heard of the letter recently sent by the East German Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl to Federal Chancellor Adenauer?"

	Yes	No	Number of cases:
<u>WEST GERMANY</u>			
<u>Sex:</u>			
Men	73%	22% ... 100%	287
Women	39	61	352
<u>Education:</u>			
Elementary school	47%	53%	337
Beyond elementary school	70	30	251
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>			
Lower class	41%	59%	323
Lower middle to upper class	72	28	316
<u>Income (per month):</u>			
0 - 149 DM	34%	66%	102
150 - 299 DM	47	53	255
300 DM and more	73	27	279
<u>Age:</u>			
Under 40 years	55%	45%	286
40 years and over	57	43	353
<u>Religion:</u>			
Catholics	56%	44%	235
Protestants	54	46	348

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SHOULD ADENAUER ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL? ...

The predominant opinion among West German city dwellers is that Chancellor Adenauer should accept Grotewohl's proposal for discussions on unity. Only in Berlin is the preponderant sentiment opposed. Pro-acceptance sentiment, it should be noted, reaches its maximum in the US Zone where two out of three espouse such a course.

"Should Dr. Adenauer, in your opinion, accept or refuse this proposal?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Accept	53%	48%	67%	37%
Refuse	29	31	23	52
No opinion	18	21	10	11
	100%	100%	100%	100%

* Prior to asking the present question, respondents who were not informed about the Grotewohl letter were apprised of it in these terms:

"Grotewohl proposed in his letter a conference between six representatives each from West and East Germany to discuss the unification of Germany."

The significance of these results should not be overlooked. They would seem to suggest rather strongly that West German interest in German unity and, as has been shown, in a possible neutral Germany, are sufficient to outweigh whatever objections many Germans may have to dealing with Communism in general and with the dubiously "elected" representatives of the East Zone People's Republic in particular. However, it will shortly be seen, the results do not mean that any appreciable number of West Germans are interested in a Germany united under Communism.

It is notable that among supporters as well as among opponents of German defense participation the preponderant opinion is in favor of Adenauer's acceptance of Grotewohl's proposal.

"Should Dr. Adenauer, in your opinion, accept or refuse this proposal?"

	Accept	Refuse	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
For participation in a European army	50%	39%	11% ... 100%	341
Against participation in a European army	61	20	19	229

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Food for thought lies also in the fact that it is the more educated and informed segments of the urban West German population, not the less informed, who more widely favor acceptance of the Grotewohl proposal.

"Should Dr. Adenauer, in your opinion, accept or refuse this proposal?"

WEST GERMANY	Accept	Refuse	No opinion	Number of cases:
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	54%	38%	8% ... 100%	287
Women	52	22	26	352
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	48%	23%	24%	387
Beyond elementary school	61	30	9	251
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	48%	27%	25%	323
Lower middle to upper class	58	31	11	316
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	40%	23%	32%	102
150 - 299 DM	57	24	19	255
300 DM and more	54	34	12	279
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	55%	26%	19%	286
40 years and over	51	32	17	353
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	49%	31%	20%	235
Protestants	55	27	18	348

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WOULD THE PROPOSED CONFERENCE PROMOTE THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY? ...

Not as many as espouse unity discussions are hopeful that they are likely to achieve their purpose. A substantial minority in urban West Germany, however, - around half in the US Zone - believe that the conference proposed by Grotewohl would promote the unification of Germany.

"Do you believe that such a conference would promote the unification of Germany or do you think it would not?"

WEST GERMANY British Zone US Zone Berlin

Promote	38%	32%	53%	28%
Not promote	43	46	34	64
No opinion	19	22	13	8
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

A somewhat lesser proportion of supporters than opponents of German defense participation express the belief that such a conference would promote German unification.

"Do you believe that such a conference would promote the unification of Germany or do you think it would not?"

Promote	Not promote	No opinion	Number of cases:
---------	-------------	------------	------------------

WEST GERMANY

For participation in a European army	33%	52%	15% ... 100%	341
Against participation in a European army	46	33	21	229

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The more educated and informed levels among West German city dwellers are appreciably more dubious than are their counterpart groups of the chances of such a conference aiding the unification of Germany. Notwithstanding, it should be remembered, they are the same groups who are the more willing to try.

"Do you believe that such a conference would promote the unification of Germany or do you think it would not?"

	Promote	Not promote	No opinion	Number of cases:
<u>WEST GERMANY</u>				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	37%	52%	11% ... 100%	237
Women	39	35	26	352
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	39%	37%	24%	357
Beyond elementary school	37	51	12	251
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	42%	34%	24%	323
Lower middle to upper class	34	52	14	316
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	36%	35%	29%	102
150 - 299 DM	42	36	22	255
300 DM and more	35	51	14	279
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	40%	42%	18%	256
40 years and over	36	44	20	353
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	39%	40%	21%	235
Protestants	33	42	20	348

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IS PRESENT GERMAN DISUNITY PREFERABLE TO A GERMANY UNITED UNDER COMMUNISM? ...

Whatever else may be its implications, the widespread West German willingness to discuss with East Zone representatives the unification of Germany does not mean that any appreciable proportion would choose unification under Communism. On the contrary, four out of five West German city dwellers definitely express a preference for the present dis-united situation as against a united Germany under a Communist government.

"If you had to choose between a united Germany under a Communist government or the continuation of the present situation with the East and West governments, what would be your choice?"

WEST GERMANY British Zone US Zone Berlin

Unification	84	94	74	34
Continuation of present situation	79	76	84	88
No opinion	$\frac{13}{100\%}$	$\frac{15}{100\%}$	$\frac{9}{100\%}$	$\frac{9}{100\%}$

Even among opponents of German defense participation there are few who express a choice for unification at the price of Communism.

"If you had to choose between a united Germany under a Communist government or the continuation of the present situation with the East and West governments, what would be your choice?"

	Unification	Continuation of present situation	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
For participation in a European army	54	90	54...100	341
Against participation in a European army	13	69	18	229

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Preference for the present situation over a Germany united under Communism is somewhat more widespread among the better schooled and the more affluent than among their counterpart groups.

"If you had to choose between a united Germany under a Communist government or the continuation of the present situation with the East and West governments, what would be your choice?"

	Unification	Continuation of present situation	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	10%	75%	15%...100%	237
Women	6	80	14	352
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	9%	76%	15%	357
Beyond elementary school	6	84	10	251
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	11%	72%	17%	323
Lower middle to upper class	6	86	8	316
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	10%	69%	21%	102
150 - 299 DM	10	77	13	255
300 DM and more	6	85	9	279
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	8%	80%	12%	266
40 years and over	3	78	14	353
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	10%	77%	13%	235
Protestants	6	81	13	343

WOULD COMMUNIST OR DEMOCRATIC INFLUENCE BE STRONGER IN A UNITED GERMANY? ...

The considerable West German interest in unity negotiations despite a disinclination to accept a Germany united under Communism, ceases to be a puzzle in the light of the finding that the preponderant opinion in urban West Germany is that West Zone democratic elements would be likely to exert a stronger influence than Communism in any unified government. So it becomes evident that however much West Germans fear Russia and Communism, they don't fear East Germans, and think well of their chances of exerting a stronger influence in any unified setup.

"Supposing East and West Germany would together form a unified German government: what would likely be the stronger influence in this newly formed government, the democratic or the communist influence?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Democratic influence	44%	40%	50%	65%
Communist influence	26	26	23	20
Both the same	11	11	9	3
qualified replies	4	4	5	4
No opinion	15	19	8	8
	100%	100%	100%	100%

Among West Berliners, many are obviously being swayed by other considerations, since though they are the most widely confident of democratic superiority in any unified government, they were revealed to be the least interested in accepting the Grotewohl proposal for unity negotiations.

Supporters and opponents of German defense participation do not differ appreciably in their pattern of reactions on the present issue.

"Supposing East and West Germany would together form a unified German government: what would likely be the stronger influence in this newly formed government, the democratic or the communist influence?"

	Democratic influence	Communist influence	Both the same	qualified replies	No opinion	Number of cases
WEST GERMANY						
For participation in a European army	46%	29%	10%	5%	10%..100%	341
Against participation in a European army	42	23	12	4	19	229

The opinion leading elements of the urban West German population are somewhat less inclined than are their counterpart groups to see superior democratic influence in any unified government for Germany. Notwithstanding, however, the preponderant opinion among all groups is that democratic influences would be the stronger.

"Supposing East and West Germany would together form a unified German government: what would likely be the stronger influence in this newly formed government, the democratic or the communist influence?"

	Democratic influence	Communist influence	Both the same	Quali- fied replies	No opinion	No. of re- sponses
WEST GERMANY						
Sex:						
Men	44%	30%	9%	7%	10%..100%	237
Women	43	23	12	2	20	352
Education:						
Elementary school	44%	22%	12%	3%	19%	387
Beyond elementary school	43	33	8	7	9	251
Socio-economic Status:						
Lower class	45%	20%	13%	2%	20%	323
Lower middle to upper class	43	32	8	7	10	316
Income (per month):						
0 - 149 DM	39%	10%	16%	4%	25%	102
150 - 299 DM	46	27	10	2	15	255
300 DM and more	43	30	10	6	11	279
Age:						
Under 40 years	44%	29%	10%	3%	14%	286
40 years and over	44	23	11	5	17	353
Religion:						
Catholics	43%	25%	10%	4%	15%	235
Protestants	44	28	9	4	15	348

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WOULD FOUR POWER WITHDRAWAL BE WISE UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES? ...

Obviously the considerable German interest in unity discussions and in the goal of a neutral united Germany implies support for withdrawal of the four occupying powers. But that West Germans are not making any precipitate recommendations in this matter is evident from a three out of four opposition to such a move in the present situation.

"The Russians have repeatedly suggested that all four occupying powers should leave Germany. Would you consider it to be wise or unwise if the Western occupation powers would now agree to the proposal that all four occupying powers leave Germany?"

WEST GERMANY British Zone US Zone Berlin

Wise	16%	15%	17%	7%
Not wise	73	71	77	88
No opinion	11	14	6	5
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Even among West Germans opposed to participation in European defense the majority sentiment is that four power withdrawal would be unwise under present conditions.

Wise Unwise No opinion Number of cases:

WEST GERMANY

For participation in a European army	10%	86%	4% ... 100%	341
Against participation in a European army	24	62	14	229

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Doubts as to the wisdom of four power withdrawal at the present time though preponderating in all groups, are relatively more frequent among more educated and informed respondents.

"The Russians have repeatedly suggested that all four occupying powers should leave Germany. Would you consider it to be wise or unwise if the Western occupation powers would now agree to the proposal that all four occupying powers leave Germany?"

	Wise	Unwise	No opinion	Number of cases
WEST GERMANY				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	16%	77%	7% ... 100%	237
Women	15	70	15	352
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	20%	65%	15%	387
Beyond elementary school	9	86	5	251
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	20%	64%	16%	323
Lower middle to upper class	11	83	6	316
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	17%	51%	22%	102
150 - 299 DM	16	70	12	255
300 DM and more	13	81	6	279
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	15%	73%	12%	286
40 years and over	15	74	11	353
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	20%	70%	10%	235
Protestants	11	77	12	348

V. TRENDS IN REACTIONS TO A FOUR POWER CONFERENCE

WOULD A FOUR POWER CONFERENCE BE LIKELY TO BE OF GREAT ADVANTAGE FOR GERMANY? ...

The preponderant opinion among West German city dwellers is still that a four power conference would be of no advantage at all to Germany. However, since mid-November adverse judgments on such a conference have been steadily decreasing.

Some time ago the Russians proposed a four power conference on Germany.

"If this conference should be held, do you think it likely that the conference will be of great, not so great, little or no advantage to Germany?"

	WEST GERMANY			British Zone		
	Nov 15-16	Dec 4-5	Dec 19-20	Nov 15-16	Dec 4-5	Dec 19-20
Of great advantage	7%	9%	9%	7%	11%	7%
Of not so great an advantage	7	9	17	7	9	15
Of little advantage	18	25	18	17	24	19
Of no advantage at all	53	40	32	50	33	32
No opinion	<u>15</u> 100%	<u>17</u> 100%	<u>24</u> 100%	<u>19</u> 100%	<u>18</u> 100%	<u>27</u> 100%

	US Zone			Berlin		
	Nov 15-16	Dec 4-5	Dec 19-20	Nov 15-16	Dec 4-5	Dec 19-20
Of great advantage	6%	7%	13%	5%	7%	12%
Of not so great an advantage	5	10	22	7	5	5
Of little advantage	18	26	17	13	14	24
Of no advantage at all	61	45	29	71	69	51
No opinion	<u>10</u> 100%	<u>12</u> 100%	<u>19</u> 100%	<u>4</u> 100%	<u>5</u> 100%	<u>8</u> 100%

Currently, as in prior surveys, supporters and opponents of German defense participation continue to manifest a fairly similar pattern of replies on this issue.

	Of great advantage	Of not so great an advantage	Of little advantage	Of no advantage at all	No opinion	No. of cases
WEST GERMANY						
For participation in a European army	7%	20%	21%	36%	16%...100%	341
Against participation in a European army	14	17	15	31	23	229

The more educated and informed levels of the urban West German population are more inclined than their counterpart groups to foresee little or no advantage for Germany emanating from a four power conference.

Some time ago the Russians proposed a four power conference on Germany.

"If this conference should be held, do you think it likely that the conference will be of great, not so great, little or no advantage to Germany?"

	Of great advantage	Of not so great an advantage	Of little advantage	Of no advantage at all	No opinion	No. of cases
WEST GERMANY						
<u>Sex:</u>						
Men	12%	19%	18%	35%	13%...100%	257
Women	6	15	13	27	34	352
<u>Education:</u>						
Elementary school	10%	16%	13%	30%	31%	367
Beyond elementary school	8	13	25	36	13	251
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>						
Lower class	11%	16%	13%	25%	35%	323
Lower middle to upper class	7	13	23	39	13	316
<u>Income (per month):</u>						
0 - 149 DM	10%	11%	12%	31%	36%	102
150 - 299 DM	10	15	19	26	30	255
300 DM and more	9	21	19	37	14	279
<u>Age:</u>						
Under 40 years	3%	10%	18%	33%	22%	266
40 years and over	10	15	13	31	26	353
<u>Religion:</u>						
Catholics	5%	15%	14%	34%	26%	235
Protestants	5	17	20	32	23	346

Unlikelihood of coming to any agreement is the reason most often advanced by those who see little or no advantage for Germany in a four power conference. However, a small group feels that there might be agreement - but only at the expense of Germany.

Some time ago the Russians proposed a four power conference on Germany.

"If this conference should be held, do you think it likely that the conference will be of great, not so great, little or no advantage to Germany?"

If "Of little advantage" or "Of no advantage at all": "Why would this conference be of (little) or (no advantage at all) for Germany?"

WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
-----------------	-----------------	------------	--------

The Russian would only pursue his own aims and not cooperate on anything else: The Russian would never stay until the end of a conference if it doesn't go according to his will; the Russian can't be negotiated with, he'll always say "No" to everything; the entire attitude of the Communists prevents any agreement in the sense of democracy; because the Russian is the eternal negator - that's why nothing would come of it; because the Russians will veto everything again; because the Russians would dictate the terms, there won't be any advantage in it; because the Russians won't ever deviate from their aim; etc.

20%	22%	17%	46%
-----	-----	-----	-----

The four powers will not come to any agreement: Because all the previous conferences proved that they can't reach an agreement; because an agreement between East and West is not possible; their ways will stay as before - exactly as at the other conferences - they won't come to an agreement because they can't agree - none of them will give in an inch; because nothing ever came of it during the past five years; no peaceful agreement is possible between those Four (powers), they just can't agree; so far they have never reached an agreement - their ideologies differ too much from one another; etc.

16	16	15	17
----	----	----	----

The Four Powers would not consider German interests - consequently there would only be disadvantages for Germany: The German interest won't be considered nor represented; in this conference the German interest would be neglected; because we won't have any say and are not respected; they don't want the welfare of Germany; they won't give us any freedom, we have been sold out and nothing can be done about it; none of the nations is interested in us and they all want to exploit us; because we will always be oppressed, nothing good would come of it; we still have no peace treaty, so all Four of them won't be very considerate of us; because the Four Powers would only barter for their own advantages; an agreement of the Four Powers would only be at the expense of Germany; etc.

8	7	10	3
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(cont'd. on next page)

WEST
GERMANY

British
Zone

US
Zone

Berlin

The Russian proposal is only bluff: It's im-
possible to believe the Russians, they are
just bluffing; the Russian won't keep any of
his promises; the Russian uses conferences
only to fish in troubled waters; etc.

3% 3% 3% 7%

Other opinions: Because none of them would
keep a promise; because the Germans are only a
means to the end, and have to defend their
Fatherland; etc.

2 2 2 1

No opinion / No answer:

$\frac{1}{50\%}$ $\frac{2}{52\%}$ $\frac{-}{47\%}$ $\frac{2}{75\%}$

VI. SOME ADDITIONAL REACTIONS TO CURRENT KOREAN SITUATION

EXTENT OF AGREEMENT WITH CURRENT UN MEASURES IN KOREA ...

As of the time of the present survey, just as large a proportion of West German city dwellers disagree with the present UN measures in Korea as agree with them. Only in Berlin does agreement outweigh disagreement, and there by a limited margin.

"In general, do you agree with the present measures of the United Nations in Korea, or should the United Nations have taken a different stand?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Agree	35%	34%	35%	43%
Different stand	39	40	42	36
No opinion	26	26	23	16
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Though disagreement with present UN measures in Korea bulks largest among respondents who oppose German participation in European defense, it is very nearly as extensive as agreement among supporters of defense participation.

"In general, do you agree with the present measures of the United Nations in Korea, or should the United Nations have taken a different stand?"

	Agree	Should have taken a different stand	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
For participation in a European army	43%	37%	20% ... 100%	358
Against participation in a European army	24	51	25	224

No opinion answers are quite extensive among the less educated and informed segments of the urban West German population as to whether or not the UN is utilizing the proper measures in Korea. The result is that the more informed groups tend more often to both agree and disagree with present UN measures.

"In general, do you agree with the present measures of the United Nations in Korea, or should the United Nations have taken a different stand?"

	Agree	Should have taken a different stand	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	36%	50%	14% ... 100%	287
Women	32	30	38	353
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	31%	38%	31%	396
Beyond elementary school	39	46	15	242
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	25%	35%	34%	326
Lower middle to upper class	42	42	16	314
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	25%	29%	46%	34
150 - 299 DM	31	39	30	276
300 DM and more	40	43	17	275
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	33%	39%	23%	265
40 years and over	33	41	26	352
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	37%	38%	25%	254
Protestants	37	40	23	340

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Various criticisms are offered by those who disagree with the UN's conduct of the Korean campaign, with the major emphasis on better preparation and halting at the 38th parallel.

"In general, do you agree with the present measures of the United Nations in Korea, or should the United Nations have taken a different stand?"

If "Should have taken a different stand": "How should the United Nations have acted?"

WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
-----------------	-----------------	------------	--------

Should have stopped at the 38th parallel
(no attack on North Korea): Should not have gone across the 38th parallel into North Korea; never marched into North Korea; merely rushed as far as the 38th parallel; they should have negotiated after reaching the 38th parallel or at least been prepared to negotiate; they should have stopped their September-offensive at the 38th parallel; etc.

11%	11%	14%	5%
-----	-----	-----	----

Should have better prepared and managed the situation (Chinese intervention was to be expected): Everything was prepared carelessly, they should have had a larger number of troops in readiness; should transport more troops and material to the scene - should take German volunteers, otherwise they join the Foreign Legion; should have attacked in full force at the beginning, regardless of consequences; should have taken more radical measures, because they should have foreseen Chinese intervention; should have taken the Chinese threats more seriously; should have sent more troops, Chinese intervention is the fault of the Americans, they should have foreseen that in time; should have acted according to their principles and prevented with all means the Chinese onslaught - throw the atom bomb for all I care; should never have let the Chinese take them by surprise; should have bombed Chinese troop concentrations in time; etc.

10	11	11	23
----	----	----	----

Should not have interfered in Korea: Korea to the Koreans; the decisions should have been left to the Koreans themselves; should never have interfered in Korea, it's an Asiatic matter; should have kept their hands off; should have kept out of it altogether; the Americans should never have meddled in Korea; etc.

9	10	9	2
---	----	---	---

Should have ended the war by negotiations: Should have come to terms peacefully; should have made peace; negotiations with Peking in time; immediate cessation of hostilities and taking up of diplomatic negotiations, even if they have to lose some of their prestige; perhaps on diplomatic grounds; more skilful handling of the political issue; etc.

5	4	4	2
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(cont'd on next page).

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
-----------------	-----------------	------------	--------

Should not have advanced as far as the Manchurian border; They should never have carried the offensive to the Manchurian border with the numerically inferior forces at their disposal; they should have established a buffer-zone in North Korea; they should perhaps not have advanced to the Manchurian border; it was not necessary to go into China; they shouldn't have started the attack; etc.

2%	2%	3%	-4%
----	----	----	-----

Should have admitted Communist China to the United Nations; They should have admitted Red-China to the UN immediately, then they would have had somebody to negotiate with and the worst could have been prevented; should have admitted Red-China to the UN; etc.

1	*	*	*
---	---	---	---

Other opinions: Should make quick decisions for the defense; should not have opened their mouth so loud but trained better soldiers; should have defeated the Russians from the beginning; rearm the Japanese; etc.

1	2	-	3
---	---	---	---

No opinion / No answer:

$\frac{1}{40}^{**}$	$\frac{1}{41}^{**}$	$\frac{1}{42}$	$\frac{2}{37}^{**}$
---------------------	---------------------	----------------	---------------------

* Less than one half of one per cent.
** Some respondents gave more than one answer.

SHOULD UN TROOPS WITHDRAW IN EVENT NEGOTIATIONS FAIL? ...

In urban West Germany as a whole, sentiment for withdrawal from Korea in the event that negotiations fail has not increased appreciably between the first and second weeks of December. During this period, however, there has been some increase in this point of view in the British Zone and in Berlin.

"If negotiations fail should the United Nations then withdraw their troops from Korea, or should they try to bring the battle of Korea to a successful conclusion?"

	WEST GERMANY		British Zone		US Zone		Berlin	
	Dec 4-5	Dec 11-12	Dec 4-5	Dec 11-12	Dec 4-5	Dec 11-12	Dec 4-5	Dec 11-12
Withdraw their troops	34%	38%	29%	35%	42%	40%	8%	20%
Carry on the battle	45	44	47	44	43	46	87	71
No opinion	21	18	24	18	15	14	5	9
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Sentiment for UN troops withdrawal is appreciably greater among opponents than among supporters of German participation in European defense.

"If negotiations fail should the United Nations then withdraw their troops from Korea, or should they try to bring the battle of Korea to a successful conclusion?"

	Withdraw their troops	Carry on the battle	No opinion	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
For participation in a European army	30%	54%	16% ... 100%	354
Against participation in a European army	52	35	13	224

WEST GERMAN OPINIONS ON POLITICAL PARTIES AND
ELECTION ISSUES

Report No. 56
Series No. 2
Classification cancelled
by author 29 Feb 1950 P. Crespi
PUB RAS
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OFFICE OF THE U.S. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR GERMANY
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
REACTIONS ANALYSIS STATE

INTRODUCTION ...

This report measuring West German urban opinions on political party trends and issues is based on findings obtained in a "flash" survey made December 11-12 using a representative urban quota sample of 640 cases drawn from West German cities 50000 and over in population, and a 200 case quota sample from the three Western sectors of Berlin.

SOME GENERALIZATIONS ...

Contrary to much of the commentary on the significance of the trend toward the Social Democrats in the recent Landtag elections, the issue of German participation in West European defense appears not to be the compelling factor in the voters' choice of political parties. This is indicated by what U.S. Zone urban voters themselves give as their main reasons for their choice in the Landtag elections. It is further supported by the statements of West German city residents on why they would vote for a given party if a new Bundestag were to be elected. Added confirmation that the defense issue is not paramount in voters' minds is shown by analysis of the inter-relationship of attitudes.

All the above is not to say that the stand taken by SPD or CDU on West Germany's part in Western defense is without influence on the voters' choice, but simply that it apparently plays a secondary role. Main findings are summarized as follows:

I. REASONS FOR VOTERS' CHOICE OF PARTY IN THE RECENT LANDTAG ELECTIONS.

- ... In the recent U.S. Zone Landtag elections, eight in ten SPD voters say they cast their ballots because they liked the social and economic policy of SPD or out of conviction or tradition. Two in ten regard their choice of SPD as a vote against rearmament.
- ... No SPD voters in the Berlin municipal elections mention the defense issue as a reason for their choice.
- ... Only one in ten CDU voters gave the defense issue as a reason for their ballots. Religious affiliation was named by the largest single group of CDU adherents.
- ... In Berlin almost a quarter of CDU voters say they voted as they did in protest against SPD.
- ... Supporting the view that the stand of SPD on defense was not an important reason for its gains, is the fact that almost half of the U.S. Zone urban voters are not even aware, according to their own statements, of the main arguments of the SPD campaign. Informed respondents mention defense more frequently than any other single argument, but SPD voters are no more likely than CDU voters and less likely than those who voted for other parties to do so.

II. POSSIBLE PARTY COMPOSITION OF A NEW BUNDESTAG.

- ... As a further measure of political trends in West Germany urban voters were asked to name the party they would vote for if a new Bundestag were to be elected. It appears that if elections were held now, SPD would garner more urban votes than any other single party.
- ... Again demonstrating that preference for SPD does not arise mainly from opposition to participation in West European defense is the fact that somewhat more of the persons favoring such participation appear to prefer SPD than either CDU or FDP. However, opponents of German defense participation do tend to favor SPD more frequently.
- ... Prospective voters by their own statements also seem not to consider the army and defense issue as a deciding factor in choice of parties in a Bundestag election. Again, as for the Landtag elections, they cite the customary and traditional reasons for preferring the Social Democrats or the Christian Democrats.
- ... Only about a quarter of West German city dwellers feel SPD is unconditionally opposed to a West German role in European defense. The predominant view is that SPD support is conditional. Nor do all people believe that CDU is unconditionally for Germany's participation. And the same conditions are mentioned as being demanded by each party.
- ... The expressed preference for SPD on the part of many urban voters does not apparently extend itself sufficiently for them to view a new election with much enthusiasm. About half of West Germany's city residents feel elections for a new Bundestag are not necessary at present. Only a quarter would like the opportunity to vote for new representatives, and as many have not made up their minds. Not even among the people who oppose German participation in the West European defense system does the predominant opinion favor new elections.
- ... And only a few of the fraction which considers new elections necessary mention the Adenauer government's stand on defense as a basis of dissatisfaction with it.

III. RELATIVE CONFIDENCE IN CDU AND SPD.

- ... In a series of questions designed to measure degrees of confidence in CDU and SPD, two general findings emerged. One: taking the urban public as a whole, neither of the two parties or their leaders, Adenauer and Schumacher, appear to be recipients of any outstandingly marked degree of confidence. Two: SPD receives greater confidence in the U.S. Zone than in the British Zone. Perhaps the band-wagon effect of the recent Landtag elections is operating in the U.S. Zone.
- ... More specifically, dissatisfaction with the CDU government of Western Germany predominates over satisfaction. But if CDU should come into power again, following new elections, four in ten would want Adenauer as Chancellor. About the same number would prefer Schumacher, if SPD should win. Few who would want Schumacher to head the government mention his stand on military matters as a reason. His independence, capabilities, and stand on social issues are the leading reasons cited.

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- ... In West Germany as a whole, SPD is considered somewhat more likely than CDU to effect a solution of West Germany's economic problems as well as the problem of defense, though CDU is believed to be better able to deal with the Western powers. Berliners give CDU the edge on all three issues and British Zone residents tend more frequently than those in the U.S. Zone to repose greater confidence in CDU.
- ... Attitudes on all these measures of confidence are closely related to party preferences. Indeed party preference is a much more influential factor apparently than attitudes pro and con defense, though proponents of German defense participation have greater confidence in CDU than do the opponents.

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R E S T R I C T E D

I. US ZONE LANDTAG ELECTIONS

When urban voters in the US Zone went to the polls in the recent Landtag elections, relatively few of them apparently cast their ballots on the issue of West German participation in a European defense army. People who voted for the Social Democrats did so largely out of habit or conviction or because they thought the party was for the workers and so on, much more frequently presumably than because they wished to signify their approval of the campaign stand of SPD leaders regarding the defense issue. Nor did those who chose the Christian Democrats or the Free Democrats appear to do so because they wished to be counted among the partisans of West European defense. Ballots for both of these parties were cast, according to voters' statements, for reasons that can only be considered the traditional ones, e.g. SPD was the choice because of its social and political program; CDU was selected because the voter was Catholic, or because he liked its social policy, or economic policy; FDP because of its sympathy to the professional and business groups; and so on.

Stated reasons for party choices are listed in order of frequency of mention.

STATED REASONS FOR VOTING FOR SPD ...

Four in ten had various personal and political considerations:

- "I am fundamentally in favor of SPD."
- "I am a convinced member of SPD, I lost my job in 1933 because I belonged to SPD."
- "Disunity makes no sense, SPD is the strongest political party."
- "My dad always voted for SPD, that's why I did."
- "Maybe they'll do a better job."

Four in ten named economic considerations:

- "SPD works for the benefit of workers and pensioners."
- "It provides for social security."
- "My experience with SPD has been good - I've got a job and enough to eat."

Two in ten* were against German defense participation:

- "SPD is against the rearmament of Germany."

In Berlin, half of the SPD voters listed personal and political considerations; a fourth, economic considerations; and a fifth, the work of SPD in furthering reconstruction (in Berlin). No one there mentioned defense policy.

* In order to give respondents every opportunity voluntarily to mention the defense issue if it was a factor in their choice of parties, all voters who did not bring up the issue as a factor in this initial question were further asked: "Were there also any other important reasons for your vote for (SPD) (CDU) (FDP)?" Three SPD voters thereupon mentioned the army and defense issue, and are included in the above reckoning. No CDU or FDP voters made any mention of it in replying to the second question.

R E S T R I C T E D

STATED REASONS FOR VOTING CDU/CSU...

Three in ten voted out of religious considerations:

"I'm a good Catholic."

"I'm a Catholic and for that reason the CDU is the only party for me."

"The CDU takes a Christian position."

Two in ten liked CDU in general:

"It seems best to me."

"CDU has the best program."

"They've supported me (unemployment relief)."

"Adenauer's policies are good."

"They've tried their best so far."

One in ten voted for the defense policy:

"Because of their positive policy on the issue of German participation in European defense."

"The CDU actively advocates German participation in a West European army."

One in ten liked the social program:

"So far I agree with their policy on social issues in Bavaria."

"I do not like SPD's school reform."

"It's the only party at the moment actively supporting social and cultural issues."

One in ten liked its middle class views:

"So the liberal middle class attitude will be represented in the government."

"CDU represents the middle class."

"CDU opposes the mob on the street as well as attempts at socialization."

Two in ten gave miscellaneous reasons:

"They're the party which has the support of voters from all classes."

"I'm not satisfied with them but I vote rightist on principle."

"I did what my husband told me to do."

Berliners gave much the same reasons with two exceptions. No one there mentioned CDU defense policy as a reason, and almost a quarter say they voted CDU in protest against SPD.

R E S T R I C T E D

STATED REASONS FOR VOTING FDP ...

One in four voted for professional and business considerations:

"As an independent business man I believe in improving economic conditions."

"They stand up for the professional class."

"I was one of those executives who was 'disciplined' by the Nazis."

"They represent my interests as a civil servant."

One in four were protesting against SPD and CDU:

"Because CDU is for the Church."

"I disagreed with SPD and did not want to vote for the little parties."

"I don't like SPD and consider CDU too pro-Catholic."

"The SPD and CDU in Western Germany have proved to be failures."

One in ten voted because FDP was democratic:

"To me it is the epitome of democracy."

"I wanted a democratic government so I could only vote for FDP or CDU to prevent SPD from getting stronger (Berlin)."

One in ten liked its attitude towards former Nazis:

"It's the only party that at least puts an end to defaming former FG's."

Three in ten gave miscellaneous reasons:

"We hope these people will do better."

"We want a coalition because that would be good for the people - SPD is too autocratic."

"They stand for order and discipline."

The reasons for the urban voters' choice as listed above suggest that people when not voting merely to "throw the rascals out," were voting largely according to their traditional social and economic interests. This is borne out further in the following table which shows the socio-economic composition of voters for the three main parties. The smallness of the sample precludes any definitive interpretation of these findings, but they are presented, nevertheless, as furnishing clues to the voting pattern.* It will be seen that SPD appears to have drawn its votes most heavily from trade union affiliates, the lower income and lesser educated groups - that is from those groups which traditionally have been the bulwark of the European Socialist movement.

* A forthcoming large-scale study, will provide sufficient cases for a more definitive analysis of the US Zone voting pattern.

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"Would you mind telling me which political party you voted for?"

	SPD	CDU	FDP	All others	Number of cases:
US ZONE					
<u>Sex:</u>					
Men	42%	11%	16%	31% ... 100%	64
Women	39	16	13	32	71
<u>Education:</u>					
Elementary school	57%	10%	2%	31%	81
Beyond elementary school	17	19	31	33	54
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>					
Lower	57%	6%	5%	32%	68
Lower middle to upper	24	21	24	31	67
<u>Income (per month):</u>					
0 - 149 DM	60%	7%	5%	33%	15
150 - 299 DM	53	5	5	37	62
300 DM and more	22	24	23	26	58
<u>Age:</u>					
Under 40 years	43%	16%	10%	31%	58%
40 years and over	39	12	17	32	77
<u>Religion:</u>					
Catholics	32%	22%	7%	39%	59
Protestants	46	6	20	25	69
<u>Trade Union Membership:</u>					
Yes, myself	50%	15%	4%	23%	26
Yes, member of family	56	9	-	35	23
No, neither/nor	32	14	20	34	68

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THE SPD ELECTION CAMPAIGN ...

Supporting the view that the stand of SPD on defense was not an important reason for its gains in the US Zone Landtag elections is the fact that almost half (46%) of all US Zone city dwellers were not even aware according to their own statements of the main arguments of the SPD election campaign. It is true that those who are informed mention defense more frequently than any other single argument. But SPD voters are no more likely than those who voted for CDU to know what SPD campaigners thought about the defense issue. Though sample size again precludes definite confirmation of the meaning of this finding, the relationship between knowledge of campaign arguments and party choice in the recent Landtag elections is shown as suggestive of the voting trend:

	Voted for:			Total
	SPD	CDU	FDP	US Zone
<u>Main Lines of SPD</u>				
<u>Electoral Campaign were:</u>				
Defense issue	31%	33%	50%	<u>38%</u>
Issues other than				
defense	39	29	66	37
Don't know	34	43	19	37
	<u>104%</u>	<u>105%</u>	<u>135%</u>	<u>112%</u>

(Percentages total more than 100% because some people gave more than one reason.)

Presented below are the replies listed in detail for all of West Germany stating respondents' opinions of the main lines of the SPD election campaign. It will be noted that about half of the groups mentioning defense as a campaign issue are of the opinion that SPD did not argue against participation but for conditions under which Germany should take part.

"Could you tell me which was the main point in the propaganda of the SPD in the election campaign preceding the recent Landtag election in the US Zone?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
<u>Opposition to defense participation:</u>				
Opposition to the military; to avoid that Germany will be the battle-ground; complete opposition to the question of remilitarization; the SPD is opposed to rearmament; the SPD does not want a German participation in a West European army; the refusal of military service; the thing Carlo Schmitt mentioned: "Better to have people in homes than cripples in caverns"; etc,	15%	14%	17%	9%

(cont'd on next page)

WEST British US Berlin
GERMANY Zone Zone

Conditions for defense participation: The re-militarization; rearmament, militarization, etc.; the SPD does not want a West German army without the status of equal political rights with France; the SPD wants to get more rights for us if Germany joins the Atlantic Pact; the rearmament of Germany under the provisions Schumacher mentioned; establishment of a German army only under the condition that the troops of the Western powers guarantee sufficient protection; the provisions are complete equal rights in order to eliminate any attempts of misuse; etc.

13% 11% 17% 8%

Criticism of the Bonn government: The economic policies of Erhard, the whole attitude of the Bonn government (especially Adenauer) toward the problem of protection from the East; Adenauer's governmental policy; SPD accuses the government, especially Adenauer, of dictatorial methods; etc.

8 7 9 5

The SPD promised a better social and economic policy (for the benefit of the worker): They give the people hope for work and the "Lastenausgleich" (equalization of burdens), they promote a better economic policy; better wages for the worker, - socialization of big industries; solution of the social problem; they want to raise pensions and they want the worker to earn more money and to have a higher living standard; the SPD wants to build more homes and create more opportunities for work; etc.

7 4 13 4

Reduction of occupation costs: Reduction of occupation costs; stronger stand toward the occupying powers; etc.

- 1 1 -

Problem of coal shortage: Production of more coal through reduction of coal exports; coal problem; the whole business of coal shortage; etc.

2 2 2 -

Other opinions: A sober explanation of all present problems; a united Germany with Berlin as capital; return of the Eastern territories; the SPD claims she is the only hope of salvation for Germany; etc.

3 3 3 4

No opinion, no answer:

$\frac{58}{106\%}$ $\frac{62}{104\%}$ $\frac{46}{108\%}$ $\frac{72}{102\%}$

* Adds up to more than 100 per cent because some people gave more than one reason.

R E S T R I C T E D

II. POSSIBLE PARTY COMPOSITION OF A NEW BUNDESTAG

As a further measure of possible political trends in West Germany, city residents of all of West Germany were asked to name the party they would vote for if a new Bundestag were to be elected. Results show that if such an election were held in West Germany now, it appears likely that the Social Democrats would have a larger share of the urban vote than any other party, thus repeating their recent success in the US Zone Landtag elections.

This is the way urban people with opinions say they would vote when asked:
 "Supposing new elections for the Bundestag were held now in Western Germany, which political party would you vote for?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
SPD	45%	43%	50%	41%
CDU	26	30	18	24
FDP	16	15	20	32
Bavarian party	2	-	6	-
KPD	3	4	-	-
Others	8	8	6	3
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

The above figures are not, however, in any sense predictive. For one thing, they are, as stated, for the urban population only, where the Socialist strength is likely to be greater than in rural regions. Also, the figures above omit the people who did not wish to make a choice at this time - approximately a fifth of the total sample.

Again demonstrating that preference for SPD does not arise mainly from opposition to German participation in West European defense is the fact that somewhat more of the persons who favor such participation appear to prefer SPD than CDU or FDP. However, opponents of German defense participation do tend to prefer SPD more frequently.

"Supposing new elections for the Bundestag were held now in Western Germany, which political party would you vote for?"

	SPD	CDU	FDP	BP	KPD	Others
WEST GERMANY	-	-	-	-	-	-
For participation in a European army	38%	33%	20%	1%	-	8% ... 100%
Against partici- pation in a European army	56	15	11	2	8	8
No opinion	61	25	-	8	-	6

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Inspection of group breakdown figures reveals a pattern similar to that of the US Zone Landtag elections. Again, preference for SPD is more frequently expressed by people who belong to trade unions, are in the lower income groups, the lesser educated, and lower socio-economic level.

"Supposing new elections for the Bundestag were held now in Western Germany, which political party would you vote for?"

	SPD	CDU	FDP	Others	Number of cases:
WEST GERMANY					
<u>Sex:</u>					
Men	49%	22%	16%	13% ... 100%	237
Women	39	31	13	12	353
<u>Education:</u>					
Elementary school	53%	21%	8%	13%	398
Beyond elementary school	16	39	31	12	242
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>					
Lower	63%	18%	6%	13%	326
Lower middle to upper	26	37	26	11	314
<u>Income (per month):</u>					
0 - 149 DM	64%	15%	2%	19%	84
150 - 299 DM	53	20	10	12	276
300 DM and more	27	33	24	11	275
<u>Age:</u>					
Under 40 years	46%	26%	16%	12%	253
40 years and over	43	27	16	14	352
<u>Religion:</u>					
Catholics	37%	42%	11%	10%	254
Protestants	43	16	21	13	340
<u>Trade Union Membership:</u>					
Yes, self	63%	16%	6%	13%	133
Yes, member of family	56	22	7	13	115
No, neither/nor	34	32	22	12	406

RESTRICTED

Prospective voters, by their own statements also appear not to consider the army and defense issue as a deciding factor in choice of parties. Again, as with the recent US Zone elections, they cite the customary and traditional reasons for preferring the Social Democrats or the Christian Democrats. This is demonstrated in their statements listed below.

"Supposing new elections for the Bundestag were held now in Western Germany, which political party would you vote for?"

If "SPD": "What would be the main reason for your vote for the SPD?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
<u>It is the working class party:</u> It has always been the party for the working class; because they represent the interests of the working class; it is the only party for the simple people; I am an employee and couldn't vote for another party; they stand behind the workers and stand up in the present crisis; etc.	14%	12%	16%	11%
<u>It is the best party:</u> It is the most sincere party; they have the soundest opinions; the party has helped me; because the SPD proved to be worth-while; etc.	6	6	8	3
<u>The other parties don't suit me:</u> We do not like the policy of the CDU; it is the second strongest party and I am not quite satisfied with the CDU; the CDU is Catholic, the FDI is capitalistic, the little parties are uninteresting, so only the SPD remains; etc.	4	5	3	6
<u>Custom:</u> I voted for the SPD in the past, they want the best for our people; because I voted for it before; etc.	4	5	2	5
<u>It is a socialist party:</u> It is the only socialist party; it is the most socialist party; they care for social welfare; etc.	4	4	4	3
<u>They are against rearmament:</u> Because they are against a rearmament of Western Germany; the SPD talks most against rearmament; because they are against war; etc.	4	3	4	1
<u>They plead for a status of equal rights for Western Germany:</u> Because they stand up for equal rights and concessions on the part of the Western powers; the firm stand of the SPD towards the Western powers; equality of rights within Europe; etc.	2	2	3	2
<u>Schumacher is the man:</u> Schumacher simply is the man who suits me; because I believe that Schumacher will get his plans through; I have confidence in Schumacher; etc.	1	-	3	-
<u>The masses of the population voted for it:</u> Because the masses voted for the SPD; because the SPD is the strongest party and splinter-parties are useless; etc.	1	1	2	1
<u>Other opinions:</u> The working class and the middle class should come together; etc.	2	2	3	5
<u>No opinion / No answer:</u>	3 45%	3 43%	2 50%	4 41%

RESTRICTED

If "CDU": "What would be the main reason for your vote for the CDU?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
<u>It is the party for Christians:</u> The CDU acts according to my faith; I am a Catholic; because I am a Christian and plead for the maintenance of Christianity; because of my Christian attitude; they have high religious motives and their policy is according to that; because it is a Christian party; etc.	9%	10%	5%	2%
<u>CDU generally satisfactory:</u> I agree with their policy; they were quite successful so far; etc.	9	10	3	8
<u>The other parties do not suit me:</u> Because SPD is for the socialization which I oppose; because I oppose other parties; the other parties disappointed us, they don't care anymore for their first promise - welfare support at Christmas; etc.	2	2	2	6
<u>They are against Marxism:</u> CDU gives the best guarantee that Marxism won't infiltrate Germany; etc.	1	1	2	1
<u>Custom:</u> It is the party for which I have always voted; we always vote for CDU; etc.	1	1	1	-
<u>Adenauer is the man:</u> At the moment Adenauer is the man in whom we can have confidence, he does his utmost to get us out of the lurch; etc.	1	1	1	3
<u>They want peace and equal rights:</u> They really do something for peace; etc.	-	1	-	-
<u>They are for rearmament:</u> Because they are for remilitarization; etc.	-	-	-	1
<u>Other opinions:</u>	1	1	1	2
<u>No opinion / No answer:</u>	$\frac{2}{26\%}$	$\frac{3}{30\%}$	$\frac{-}{13\%}$	$\frac{1}{24\%}$

RESTRICTED

If "FDP": "What would be the main reason for your vote for the FDP?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
<u>Their policy in general:</u> The FDP is an objective and progressive party; most intelligent people belong to FDP; they are fair because they represent the middle class; adopts a good middle course, no extremes; I like the program of FDP; etc.	7%	7%	7%	12%
<u>The other parties don't suit me:</u> Because the CDU proved to be a failure; because the other parties are out of question; the SPD does not suit me, the CDU is too pro-Catholic; CDU is too one-sided, I conform with FDP; SPD and CDU are too much tied down by their party dogmas; etc.	4	3	7	8
<u>For economic reasons:</u> Economic reasons; because they are for free economy; their economic policy is alright; the FDP represents my interests; etc.	2	2	2	8
<u>Custom:</u> I used to vote for FDP before; I vote for the party my husband votes for; etc.	1	1	2	-
<u>Other opinions:</u>	1	-	2	2
<u>No opinion / No answer:</u>	$\frac{1}{16\%}$	$\frac{2}{15\%}$	$\frac{-}{20\%}$	$\frac{2}{32\%}$

RESTRICTED

SPD NOT CONSIDERED UNALTERABLY OPPOSED TO A WEST GERMAN ARMY ...

Also a noteworthy finding in an analysis of voting trends is that only about a quarter (27%) of West German city dwellers feel that the Social Democrats are entirely opposed to a West German role in European defense. The preponderant view is that SPD demands certain conditions be met before agreeing to take part. Most frequently stated condition is that of equality. The questions and replies follow.

"Would you say that the SPD is in favor of or opposed to a West German participation in a West European army or is approval of the SPD dependent upon certain conditions?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
In favor of	12%	14%	7%	21%
Opposed to	27	29	23	15
Dependent upon conditions	38	35	43	41
No opinion	23	22	27	23
	100%	100%	100%	100%

If "Dependent upon certain conditions": "What are, in your opinion, these conditions?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
<u>Equal rights for Western Germany regarding politics, military and economy: Full status of equal rights; equal rights for Germany concerning economy and politics; equal rights on the whole line; equal rights among the other Western powers; conditions of absolute independence of all nations; member with equal rights in the Atlantic Pact; status of equal rights concerning the military and economy; that we should have the same rights as others; etc.</u>	26%	34%	31%	28%
<u>Military security for Western Germany by strong armed forces of the Western powers and all other nations: First the Western powers should contribute their share in the defense and then they can start talking about a German share; first there should be a sufficient contingent of security guards by the Western powers; that the West provides a sufficient troop contingent so that Germany doesn't become a battle-ground again; that all nations participate who are interested in it; that the Allies send strong armed forces to Western Germany in order to build up a German army; all other nations should put up a certain contingent of troops strong enough to prevent the Russians from an attack; etc.</u>	3	2	7	4
<u>Peace treaty for Western Germany: A peace treaty and equal rights among other nations; first we should get a peace treaty; etc.</u>	1	-	1	1

(cont'd on next page)

R E S T R I C T E D

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
<u>Establishment of an independent Western German army:</u> Establishment of an independent army; an independent German army not directly connected with the West European army, but only used for German interests; etc.	1%	1%	2%	2%
<u>Rehabilitation of the German soldiers:</u> Re-establishment of the honor of a soldier and a strong West European army that is able to become aggressive towards the East; first the rehabilitation of the German Wehrmacht; complete rehabilitation of the German soldiers and a peace treaty; etc.	1	-	1	1
<u>Plebiscite about the question of German Re-armament:</u> Ask the people whether they agree to it; make the participation depend upon a plebiscite in the Bundestag; etc.	1	1	-	-
<u>Reduction of occupation costs:</u>	1	1	-	-
<u>Other opinions:</u> That we have the peacetime production of arms, etc., in our own hands; to get the unemployed off the street; that we can have our troops in preparation; etc.	2	2	1	3
<u>No opinion and no answer:</u>	$\frac{5}{42\%}$	$\frac{6}{38\%}$	$\frac{4}{49\%}$	$\frac{7}{46\%}$

* Some people gave more than one answer.

THE POSITION OF CDU ON DEFENSE ...

Nor do all West German respondents believe that the Christian Democrats are unconditionally for Germany's taking part in the West European defense system. It is also interesting to note that the fraction which mentions conditions has opinions very similar to those cited for SPD.

"Would you say that the CDU is in favor of or opposed to a West German participation in a West European army or is the approval of the CDU dependent upon certain conditions?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
In favor of	59%	60%	56%	59%
Opposed to	6	7	5	5
Dependent upon conditions	12	11	14	11
No opinion	$\frac{23}{100\%}$	$\frac{22}{100\%}$	$\frac{25}{100\%}$	$\frac{25}{100\%}$

RESTRICTED

Those who answered "Dependent on certain conditions" were asked:

"What are these conditions?"

(CDU agreement to a Western German army)

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
<u>Equal rights:</u> Full status of equal rights for Germany; equal rights; mainly equality of rights in the economic field; she also demands equal rights like the SPD; complete equality of rights, removal of the gulf between East and West; the European Union; negation of collective guilt, complete equality of rights; etc.	4%	4%	6%	5%
<u>So we will not stand alone:</u> That the Allies stand by us in everything; with guaranteeing treaties, that the Germans won't stand alone; etc.	2	2	-	1
<u>The same conditions as the SPD:</u> (not so abrupt): The same conditions as demanded by the SPD, only the CDU doesn't try to reach its goal quite so radically; not in as outspoken a way as the SPD; etc.	1	1	1	-
<u>The CDU will only agree if this army will prevent a war:</u>	1	*	1	1
<u>Peace treaty:</u> A peace treaty for Germany;	*	*	-	-
<u>Other opinions:</u> The Western powers should provide for the armament and the general staff (high command); there must not be a civil war in Germany; own divisions; the occupation costs will be reduced or eliminated; etc.	1	1	3	1
<u>No answer and no opinion:</u>	$\frac{3}{12\%}$	$\frac{3}{11\%}$	$\frac{3}{14\%}$	$\frac{4}{12\%}$

RESTRICTED

ARE NEW BUNDESTAG ELECTIONS NECESSARY? ...

But the expressed preference for SPD on the part of many urban voters does not apparently extend itself sufficiently for them to view a new election with much enthusiasm. About half of West Germany's city residents feel elections for a new Bundestag are not necessary at present. Only a quarter would like the opportunity to vote for new representatives, and as many have not made up their minds. Not even among the people who oppose German participation in the West European defense system does the predominant opinion favor new elections.

"Do you consider new elections for the West German "Bundestag" necessary at this time, or not?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Necessary	25%	24%	29%	22%
Not necessary	51	52	49	52
No opinion	$\frac{24}{100\%}$	$\frac{24}{100\%}$	$\frac{22}{100\%}$	$\frac{26}{100\%}$

	For German participation in a European army	Against participation in a European army	Undecided
Elections necessary	20%	36%	12%
Not necessary	63	40	24
No opinion	$\frac{17}{100\%}$	$\frac{24}{100\%}$	$\frac{64}{100\%}$

RESTRICTED

R E S T R I C T E D

Relatively few advocates of new elections base their desires on dissatisfaction with the present governments stand on defense which bears out the relationship between attitudes on the issue already noted. However, this stand though not an expressed source of dissatisfaction, may of course be a factor in the other animadversions cast against the government by those who want a new election.

"Do you consider now elections for the West German Bundestag necessary at this time, or not?"

If "Necessary": "Why are you of this opinion?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
<u>Discontent with activities of the government:</u>				
The government does nothing for the workers; it seems as if our representatives have forgotten us; we refugees want to come into our own again; that not only businessmen are provided for, they have everything and we have nothing; the CDU is ruined; etc.	6%	6%	7%	3%
<u>The Bundestag can't decide on remilitarization (the people themselves must do it by new Bundestag elections):</u> The Bundestag is subject to the CDU, approves of rearmament; to recognize people's opinions on remilitarization, in order to let the people decide on remilitarization; what guarantee do the people have that the majority (in the Bundestag) is not obtained by bribery; etc.	5	4	4	2
<u>Organization of the Bundestag does not correspond to the actual political situation:</u> To get a new balance of power among the political parties, there is no opposition at the moment; political parties are represented in the Bundestag which would lose votes in case of new elections; there would be a different representation in case of new elections; etc.	5	4	8	9
<u>Government (Adenauer) does not have the confidence of the people anymore (general):</u> It is a matter of the future and the CDU does not have the confidence of the people anymore; the people are dissatisfied with the Federal government; too much blame put on Adenauer; those gentlemen provide for themselves only, "Adolf" should come back; that we get rid of these ragamuffins; that Adenauer will get out of the way; etc.	4	4	5	1
<u>SPD has the present majority among the people:</u> I believe the SPD will win new elections, that would be good; today the people are more inclined to the SPD; SPD got more votes; etc.	2	1	3	4
<u>Other opinions:</u> Because the will of the people can be determined so they agree; etc.	2	3	2	2
<u>No opinion / No answer:</u>	$\frac{1}{25\%}$	$\frac{2}{24\%}$	$\frac{-}{29\%}$	$\frac{2}{23\%}$

* Some people gave more than one answer.

RESTRICTED

GROUP DIFFERENCES ...

Only among prospective SPD voters and trade union members does the view that new elections are necessary predominate, but even among them, large minorities feel they are not now necessary.

"Do you consider new elections for the West German Bundestag necessary at this time, or not?"

WEST GERMANY	Necessary	Not necessary	No opinion	No. of cases:
SPD	47%	32%	21%	177
CDU	6	80	14	103
FDP	17	69	14	64
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	36%	58%	6%	287
Women	16	46	33	353
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	26%	45%	29%	398
Beyond elementary school	23	61	16	242
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>				
Lower class	29%	40%	31%	326
Lower middle to upper class	21	63	16	314
<u>Income (Per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	19%	46%	35%	84
150 - 299 DM	27	43	30	276
300 DM and more	24	63	13	275
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	24%	48%	23%	238
40 years and over	26	54	20	352
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	21%	57%	22%	254
Protestants	26	48	26	340
<u>Trade Union Membership:</u>				
Yes, myself	43%	41%	16%	133
Yes, member of family	21	41	36	115
No, neither-nor	21	57	22	406

R E S T R I C T E D

III. RELATIVE CONFIDENCE IN CDU AND SPD

A series of questions designed to measure more specifically degrees of confidence in CDU and SPD was also asked of city respondents. Two general findings emerge from this line of inquiry: (1) taking the urban public as a whole, neither of the two parties or their leaders - Adenauer and Schumacher appear to be recipients of any outstandingly marked degree of confidence; (2) SPD receives greater confidence in the US Zone than in the British Zone. (Perhaps the band-wagon effect of the recent Landtag elections plays a certain role in US Zone results.)

The series of questions with overall results follow:

"Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the activities of the CDU government in Western Germany up to now?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Satisfied	39%	41%	31%	52%
Dissatisfied	48	46	56	28
No opinion	13	13	13	20
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

"Supposing the CDU came to power again after new Bundestag elections, would you then rather see Adenauer as Federal Chancellor or some other CDU politician?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Adenauer	40%	41%	35%	51%
Another	26	24	33	21
No opinion	34	35	32	28
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Ten per cent of the urban dwellers who do not want Adenauer as Chancellor in reply to further inquiry named Arnold (3%), Erhard (2%), Kaiser (2%), Reimann (1%). Erhard, Heuss, and v. Brentano were named by less than one half of one per cent each.

"If the SPD came to power after new Bundestag elections, would you then rather see Schumacher as Federal Chancellor or some other SPD politician?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
Schumacher	40%	38%	43%	41%
Another	27	30	22	40
No opinion	33	32	35	19
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Dr. Carlo Schmidt is the choice of 7% who do not want Schumacher if the SPD should come into power. About one per cent each name v. Knoeringen, Noelting and Boeckler.

R E S T R I C T E D

REASONS FOR PREFERRING SCHUMACHER ...

In order to test the influence of Dr. Schumacher's personal role in the defense issue respondents who would like to see him Chancellor if SPD took over control of a new Bundestag were asked to give their reasons. As will be noted in the catalogued statements below very few mentioned his stand on military matters. Most frequently cited reasons were his independence, capabilities, and his stand on social issues.

"If the SPD came to power after new Bundestag elections would you then rather see Schumacher as Federal Chancellor or some other SPD politician?"
If "Schumacher": Why?

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
<u>He is the most capable:</u> He is well versed on every subject; he is the most capable man in his party; because he is superior in knowledge to the others; I consider him capable enough to be the leading man in the government; I consider him the right man for that; etc.	8%	8%	8%	12%
<u>He is independent:</u> He stands for right and justice and dares to tell the Allies about the mistakes they make in Germany; because he is an idealist and stands by his opinion; he is the man who does not always say yes to everything; because he speaks openly what he thinks and is not taken in by the Western Powers; I consider him courageous; he stands up for his opinion; he at least opens his mouth; etc.	7	7	7	7
<u>He represents the interests of the people and knows the social problems:</u> He knows the social problems; represents the interests of the people; knows about the misery of the working class; because he is a good man who does something for us workmen; because he represents the people; etc.	6	5	9	6
<u>He belongs to the SPD and I agree with his policy:</u> Because he belongs to the SPD and that is my party; because of his political attitude; because I fully agree with his policy; because he is the leading man of the SPD; etc.	4	4	5	3
<u>He wants to keep Germany out of war and to save us from militarism:</u> Because Schumacher takes the strongest stand for peace; by all means Schumacher wants to spare the Germans a new war; he is against remilitarization; etc.	3	2	3	1

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	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
<u>He is well known and his speeches are convincing:</u> He is well known and his speeches in meetings can not altogether be opposed; his speeches suit me; I have heard him speak more than once and don't know the others well enough; his goals are made clear in his speeches; etc.	3%	2%	4%	5%
<u>He should be given the chance to show what he is capable of:</u> He should be given a chance; he also should prove what he can do; he should prove that he can do better; etc.	2	2	3	-
<u>Other Opinions:</u> Because his view-points can be supported; because his character is better than Adenauer's; because only Schumacher is known to me; etc.	3	3	3	3
<u>No Answer and No Opinion:</u>	$\frac{5}{41\%*}$	$\frac{6}{39\%*}$	$\frac{2}{44\%*}$	$\frac{5}{42\%*}$

* Some respondents gave more than one reason.

R E S T R I C T E D

Dr. Schumacher's alleged radicalism or over-aggressiveness is by far the most frequently mentioned argument of those who would prefer another SPD leader as Chancellor of the Republic. No one cited his defense policy, except that a very few accused him of war-mongering.

"If the SPD came into power after new elections to the Bundestag would you then rather see Schumacher as Federal Chancellor or some other SPD politician?"
If "Some other": Why?

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
<u>He is too radical (aggressive, extreme, fanatical, uncontrolled):</u> Schumacher is too radical and not diplomatic enough; his views are too extreme; he is opposed to the Federal Government and has recently taken such a crass attitude on important issues; because Schumacher is too imperious as a person and sometimes uncontrolled; he is too aggressive and thoughtless; etc.	14%	15%	11%	23%
<u>General disapproval of his ideas and policy:</u> I don't like the whole policy of Schumacher; I listened to him once and I don't like his ideas; I don't think his attitude very sympathetic; etc.	4	5	2	5
<u>He is too dictatorial:</u> Because his rule would be as autocratic as Adenauer's; Schumacher wants to do things according to his own convictions; because he has too many leadership complexes; etc.	3	3	2	2
<u>He is too old and sick:</u> We should have a younger person; he is too old, does everything head on, won't get anywhere; Schumacher is too old, we need younger people; because he is a sick man; etc.	1	1	1	3
<u>He is a militarist and war-monger:</u> Schumacher is a war-monger and a secret Nazi; I don't like Schumacher, he is just an old militarist; etc.	1	1	1	-
<u>Other Opinions:</u> He is too boring, too much of a lawyer, not popular; because Kaiser would represent the interests of the SPD much better than Schumacher; he is not representative of the German people; etc.	4	3	5	6
<u>No Answer, No Opinion:</u>	$\frac{1}{28\%*}$	$\frac{3}{31\%*}$	$\frac{1}{23\%*}$	$\frac{2}{41\%*}$

* Some respondents gave more than one reason.

R E S T R I C T E D

R E S T R I C T E D

WHICH PARTY MORE CAPABLE — CDU OR SPD ? ...

As a further measure of confidence, West German urban residents were asked to weigh the relative competence of the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats on three pressing problems. The results listed below indicate that in West Germany SPD is considered somewhat more likely than CDU to effect a solution to West Germany's economic problems as well as its defense problems, though CDU is believed to be better able to deal with the Western powers. Berliners give the edge to CDU on all three issues. It will also be noted that people in the British Zone tend more frequently than U.S. Zone residents to have greater confidence in CDU.

"Which political party would be more capable of solving the economic problems of Western Germany, the CDU or the SPD?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
CDU	25%	28%	19%	43%
SPD	32	28	43	28
Neither	16	14	17	5
Both equally well	6	7	4	4
No opinion	21	23	17	20
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

"And which political party would more satisfactorily solve the problem of the defense of Western Germany, the CDU or the SPD?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
CDU	23%	27%	16%	42%
SPD	30	25	41	31
Neither	12	11	14	3
Both equally well	8	10	6	3
No opinion	27	27	23	21
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

"And who would negotiate with the Western powers more satisfactorily, the CDU or the SPD?"

	WEST GERMANY	British Zone	US Zone	Berlin
CDU	34%	40%	23%	52%
SPD	26	22	37	28
Neither	7	5	8	-
Both equally well	9	9	7	4
No opinion	24	24	25	16
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

R E S T R I C T E D

Respondent's attitudes on all of these measures of confidence are closely related to party preference. Indeed as shown in comparative findings below, party preference appears to be a much more influential factor than attitudes pro and con German defense participation, though people who favor a West German army also have more confidence in CDU and Adenauer than do opponents of participation. Large majorities of CDU adherents express satisfaction with the CDU government, want Adenauer as Chancellor, feel CDU is more capable of solving economic and defense problems, and is best able to negotiate with the Western powers. Those who would vote for the Social Democrats are as equally convinced that SPD could do a better job, and of course are less frequently satisfied with the Adenauer government. It is noteworthy that those who prefer the Free Democratic Party, the party which presumably would hold the balance of power if new elections should occur, tend to voice greater confidence in CDU than in SPD.

"Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the activities of the CDU government in Western Germany up to now?"

Satisfied Dissatisfied No opinion

WEST GERMANY

In Bundestag elections, would vote for:

SPD	15%	75%	10%	... 100%
CDU	35	9	6	
FDP	36	55	9	

Satisfied Dissatisfied No opinion

For participation in a European army

52% 38% 10% ... 100%

Against participation in a European army

19 66 15

"Supposing the CDU came to power again after new "Bundestag" elections, would you then rather see Adenauer as Federal Chancellor or some other CDU politician?"

Adenauer Another No opinion

In Bundestag election, would vote for:

SPD	25%	42%	33%	... 100%
CDU	80	10	10	
FDP	48	28	24	

Adenauer Another No opinion

For participation in a European army

52% 22% 26% ... 100%

Against participation in a European army

24 35 41

RESTRICTED

"If the SPD came to power after new Bundestag elections, would you then rather see Schumacher as Federal Chancellor or some other SPD politician?"

In Bundestag election, would vote for:	Schumacher	Another	No opinion	
SPD	70%	13%	3%	... 100%
CDU	26	47	27	
FDP	28	49	23	

For participation in a European army	40%	35%	25%
Against participation in a European army	41	20	39

"Which political party would be more capable of solving the economic problems of Western Germany, the CDU or the SPD?"

In Bundestag election, would vote for:	CDU	SPD	Neither Nor	Both equally well	No opinion	
SPD	5%	74%	4%	4%	13%	... 100%
CDU	70	2	8	10	10	
FDP	42	24	14	6	14	

For participation in a European army	34%	28%	13%	7%	18%
Against participation in a European army	12	43	23	4	18

"And which political party would more satisfactorily solve the problem of the defense of Western Germany, the CDU or the SPD?"

In Bundestag election, would vote for:	CDU	SPD	Neither Nor	Both equally well	No opinion	
SPD	8%	63%	3%	6%	15%	... 100%
CDU	63	5	4	10	18	
FDP	37	25	11	9	18	

For participation in a European army	33%	26%	10%	11%	20%
Against participation in a European army	13	38	19	4	26

"And who would negotiate with the Western powers more satisfactorily, the CDU or the SPD?"

In Bundestag election, would vote for:	CDU	SPD	Neither Nor	Both equally well	No opinion	
SPD	11%	64%	2%	7%	16%	... 100%
CDU	77	3	3	7	10	
FDP	53	14	6	10	17	

For participation in a European army	44%	23%	6%	10%	17%
Against participation in a European army	23	35	8	6	28

On the following pages, tables of group differences on the questions measuring the relative confidence in the two parties are given. The breakdown figures on these issues show a familiar pattern. Those groups in the urban population which tend to express preference for SPD - the lesser educated, the lower socio-economic levels, and trade union affiliates - more frequently state that the Socialists could do a better job. Those in the upper income brackets and with more than average schooling feel CDU or FDP would do better.

"Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the activities of the CDU government in Western Germany up to now?"

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	No opinion	No. of cases
WEST GERMANY				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	35%	55%	10%	287
Women	42	42	16	353
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	33%	54%	13%	398
Beyond elementary school	49	38	13	242
<u>Socio-Economic Status:</u>				
Lower	30%	56%	14%	326
Lower middle to upper	48	39	13	314
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	23%	55%	17%	84
150 - 299 DM	32	55	13	276
300 DM and more	49	42	11	275
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	30%	43%	13%	288
40 years and over	39	52	9	352
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	51%	39%	10%	254
Protestants	33	51	16	342
<u>Trade Union Affiliation:</u>				
Member	25%	64%	11%	133
Member in family	40	45	15	115
No affiliation	43	44	13	426

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"Supposing the CDU came to power again after new "Bundestag" elections, would you then rather see Adenauer as Federal Chancellor or some other CDU politicians?"

	Adenauer	Another	No opinion	No. of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	42%	31%	27%	237
Women	38	22	40	353
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	35%	25%	40%	398
Beyond elementary school	43	29	23	242
<u>Socio-Economic Status:</u>				
Lower	34%	27%	39%	326
Lower middle to upper	46	26	28	314
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	31%	26%	43%	84
150 - 299 DM	33	29	33	276
300 DM and more	48	24	27	275
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	39%	23%	33%	288
40 years and over	40	25	35	352
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	47%	24%	29%	254
Protestants	36	27	37	340
<u>Trade Union Affiliation:</u>				
Member	30%	35%	35%	133
Member in family	36	23	41	115
No affiliation	43	25	32	406

"If the SPD came to power after new Bundestag elections would you then rather see Schumacher as Federal Chancellor or some other SPD politician?"

	Schumacher	Another	No opinion	No. of cases:
WEST GERMANY				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	44%	37%	19%	287
Women	37	19	44	353
<u>Education:</u>				
Elementary school	46%	18%	35%	398
Beyond elementary school	30	42	28	242
<u>Socio-Economic Status:</u>				
Lower	43%	15%	37%	326
Lower middle to upper	32	40	28	314
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	39%	13%	46%	84
150 - 299 DM	47	18	35	276
300 DM and more	34	40	26	275
<u>Age:</u>				
Under 40 years	40%	27%	33%	288
40 years and over	40	27	33	352
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	38%	30%	32%	254
Protestants	42	25	33	340
<u>Trade Union Affiliation:</u>				
Member	54%	25%	21%	133
Member in family	51	18	31	115
No affiliation	33	30	37	406

RESTRICTED

"Which political party would be more capable of solving the economic problems of Western Germany, the CDU or the SPD?"

	CDU	SPD	Neither	Both equally well	No opinion	No. of cases:
WEST GERMANY						
<u>Sex:</u>						
Men	28%	36%	20%	7%	9% ... 100%	287
Women	22	29	13	5	31	353
<u>Education:</u>						
Elementary school	16%	39%	14%	7%	24%	398
Beyond elementary school	16%	39%	14%	7%	24%	398
	38	21	20	5	16	242
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>						
Lower	15%	42%	13%	6%	24%	326
Lower middle to upper	34	23	19	6	18	314
<u>Income (per month):</u>						
0 - 149 DM	17%	34%	13%	2%	34%	84
150 - 299 DM	15	39	17	5	24	276
300 DM and more	36	25	16	3	15	275
<u>Age:</u>						
Under 40 years	25%	31%	15%	4%	25%	283
40 years and over	24	33	17	8	18	352
<u>Religion:</u>						
Catholics	31%	30%	13%	7%	19%	254
Protestants	21	33	15	6	25	340
<u>Trade Union Affiliation:</u>						
Member	19%	56%	10%	5%	10%	133
Member in family	16	36	15	4	29	115
No affiliation	28	25	18	7	22	406

RESTRICTED

"And which political party would more satisfactorily solve the problem of the defense of Western Germany, the CDU or the SPD?"

	CDU	SPD	None of both	Both equally well	No opinion	No. of cases:
WEST GERMANY						
<u>Sex:</u>						
Men	25%	34%	16%	9%	16%...100%	237
Women	22	26	9	8	35	353
<u>Education:</u>						
Elementary school	17%	35%	11%	7%	30%	398
Beyond elementary school	35	21	15	10	19	242
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>						
Lower	16%	36%	11%	6	31	326
Lower middle to upper	32	23	14	10	21	314
<u>Income (per month):</u>						
0 - 149 DM	15%	31%	7%	5%	42%	34
150 - 299 DM	17	35	13	7	28	276
300 DM and more	33	24	13	10	20	275
<u>Age:</u>						
Catholics	32%	27%	10%	3%	23%	254
Protestants	19	31	12	9	29	340
<u>Trade Union Affiliation:</u>						
Member	16%	43%	13%	9%	19%	133
Member in family	16	36	9	4	35	115
No affiliation	28	25	13	8	26	406

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

"And who would negotiate with the Western powers more satisfactorily, the CDU or the SPD?"

	CDU	SPD	None of both	Both equally well	No opinion	No. of cases
WEST GERMANY						
<u>Sex:</u>						
Men	37%	34%	10%	8%	11% .. 100%	287
Women	32	20	4	9	35	353
<u>Education:</u>						
Elementary school	25%	30%	7%	9%	29%	398
Beyond elementary school	50	20	6	8	16	242
<u>Socio-economic Status:</u>						
Lower	21%	32%	7%	9%	31%	326
Lower middle to upper	47	21	7	8	17	314
<u>Income (per month):</u>						
0 - 149 DM	17%	30%	7%	6%	40%	84
150 - 299 DM	27	29	7	10	27	276
300 DM and more	47	22	7	8	16	275
<u>Age:</u>						
Under 40 years	35%	25%	8%	7%	25%	288
40 years and over	33	27	6	11	23	352
<u>Religion:</u>						
Catholics	44%	23%	5%	7%	21%	251
Protestants	29	29	6	10	26	340
<u>Trade Union Affiliation:</u>						
Member	26%	48%	5%	6%	15%	132
Member in family	24	24	8	8	36	111
No affiliation	39	21	7	10	23	400

~~Classified~~ ~~MEMORANDUM~~ ~~VIEW THE~~ ~~REACTIVATION~~ ~~ISSUE~~
by ~~Has Western Policy Changed on German Militarism? -~~
PUB/RAS. ~~With Present-Day Attitudes on Nuremberg~~

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R E S T R I C T E D

OFFICE OF THE U. S. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR GERMANY
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
REACTIONS ANALYSIS STATE

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R E S T R I C T E D

INTRODUCTION

Among the problems raised by the present Western policy on German participation in European defense is whether or not the German people feel that Western approval of such participation constitutes a negation of the long standing remilitarization program and of the principles of the Nuremberg trials. The present survey explores this area with particular attention to current German attitudes toward the initial Nuremberg trials. Information in this connection is of considerable present relevance in view of the renewed attention that will be focused on the Nuremberg trials when the results of the reconsideration of the sentences of the Landsberg prisoners are publicly released in the near future.

The present findings derive from a survey conducted in the US occupied areas of Germany in the period between Oct 9th to November 17th, 1950. Interviewed in the study was a representative random sample of approximately 1,500 cases in the US Zone, 300 in Berlin, and 200 in Bremen. As usual the interviews were obtained from randomly selected respondents by a trained German staff under the general supervision of American officers. Detailed description of the sampling methods employed is available upon request. The analysis and interpretation of the data has been performed by the professional survey staff of the Office of Public Affairs.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS

I. DO GERMANS BELIEVE WESTERN POLICY HAS SHIFTED ON GERMAN MILITARISM?

- ... Whatever have been the effects of German wartime experiences or the program of the Western powers in demilitarization, the result has not been to convert any large proportion of Germans to the out and out pacifist position that anything military is an evil in itself.
- ... Appreciably more opponents than supporters of German defense participation give evidence of a pacifist orientation toward things military. So convictions of this type may play some role in engendering opposition. However, the strongly preponderant position both among supporters and opponents is that the good or evil of military institutions depends on the uses to which they are put.
- ... Defense is most often cited as illustrative of legitimate purposes of military institutions. A sizable proportion of the West Germans sampled also believe that training of the young is one of the proper and desirable functions of the military.
- ... The preponderant view in the US Zone - the majority viewpoint in Berlin and Bremen - is that support for German participation in European defense does not mean that the Western powers have changed their policy with respect to German militarism. However, an appreciable minority feel otherwise and believe that in supporting German defense participation the Western powers have indicated that they no longer disapprove of the excesses of German militarism.
- ... Interestingly enough supporters and opponents of German defense participation have rather similar views regarding Western policy toward German militarism. The suggestion is therefore that this consideration has not played an important role in differentiating attitudes on the participation issue.
- ... US Zone group breakdowns reveal that the more educated and informed levels much more widely express the view that Western support of German defense participation does not indicate any lessened disapproval of the excesses of German militarism.

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R E S T R I C T E D

- ... A considerable number of German press reports have in varying ways expressed the thesis that German participation in European defense is impossible unless the Western powers clear the honor of the German soldiers, which allegedly was impugned by indictment of the military as such. Some indication that the German public does not support such a view lies in the present finding that two out of three in the US Zone - almost 9 in 10 in Berlin - hold that the German generals were indicted by the Western powers, not because they were soldiers, but only because they had committed certain crimes during the war.
- ... Opponents of German defense participation show little more inclination than supporters to express the view that the German generals were indicted simply because they were soldiers. This of course suggests that opposition does not derive in any primary way from dissatisfaction over alleged violations of German military honor.

II. DO GERMANS BELIEVE DEFENSE PARTICIPATION WILL FOSTER NAZISM?

- ... The preponderant opinion in the US Zone and in Berlin is that with the rearming of West Germany it is probable that leading personalities of the Third Reich would gain considerable influence. Almost as large a proportion, however, express the contrary opinion.
- ... Somewhat more opponents than supporters of German defense participation take the view that rearming West Germany would in all probability strengthen the influence of former Nazis.
- ... Opinions split in the US Zone on whether or not a threat would be posed to West Germany if former Nazis gained influence through German defense participation. Those who judge such a gain in influence to be probable, are somewhat less likely to evaluate it as a threat.
- ... Somewhat more opponents than supporters of German defense participation express the opinion that a rearmament-associated gain in influence of former Nazis would pose a threat to West Germany. The difference is not large enough, however, to mark such a consideration as a major differentiating factor on the participation issue.
- ... Those who see no threat in any rearmament-associated gain in influence by former Nazis offer a variety of reasons for their views, with no particular argument overshadowing the others.

III. HAVE GERMAN ATTITUDES CHANGED ON THE NUREMBERG TRIALS?

- ... The results of the present survey indicate that the four year trend in opinion on the fairness of the initial Nuremberg trial marks one of the largest shifts in viewpoint yet recorded by the Reactions Analysis Staff. Whereas in October of 1946 78 per cent among US Zone Germans expressed the judgment that the initial Nuremberg trial was conducted on a fair basis, only 38 per cent voiced such an opinion in the present survey of October 1950. In Berlin the shift has not been so marked, but still a 21 per cent drop in favorable judgment has occurred.
- ... Whatever the reasons for such a marked drop in the prestige of the Nuremberg trials the suggestion is strong that the Germans have gone far in what might be termed retrospective rehabilitation of their status in regard to the trials.

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- ... The most immediate practical implication of these findings is that, in conjunction with the results of the following question, it can only be surmised that there are likely to be extensive negative reactions in West Germany when the Nuremberg trials are brought back into public attention through the airing of the appeal results of the Landsberg prisoners.
- ... Opponents of German defense participation are less inclined than supporters to believe the trials were conducted on a fair basis. The difference, however, is not very great.
- ... The most prominent disclosure of group comparisons over a four year period is that the drop in favorable evaluations of the Nuremberg trials has occurred among all elements of the US Zone population, rather than being confined to particular segments. Another indication of importance is that the rise in adverse judgments has been considerably greater among more educated respondents than among their less educated counterparts.
- ... Just as in public judgment of the fairness of the trials in general, evaluations of the appropriateness of the sentences have markedly shifted since October of 1946. Then only one in ten in the US Zone expressed the opinion that the verdicts were too severe, now four times as many do so, making this the preponderant standpoint. Only in Berlin is the preponderant opinion that the verdicts were fair.
- ... The preponderant opinion among Germans who will make a judgment is that the population today approves of the war crime trials to a lesser extent than they did at the time of the trials. Only a negligible proportion judge that approval is greater at the present time.
- ... The most frequent reasons advanced by those who feel that Nuremberg has lost prestige in German eyes is that similar crimes were committed by others without punishment and are still being committed today.
- ... The very small proportion who believe that the Germans now approve of the war crime trials to a greater extent than before argue mainly that people have come to realize the magnitude of the injustice committed during the Nazi period.

I. DO GERMANS BELIEVE WESTERN POLICY HAS SHIFTED ON GERMAN MILITARISM?

HAS DEMILITARIZATION MADE PACIFISTS OF THE GERMANS?

Whatever have been the effects of German wartime experiences or the program of the Western powers on demilitarization, the result has not been to convert any large proportion of Germans to the cut and out pacifist position that anything military is an evil in itself.

"Do you believe the military to be an evil in itself, or does that depend, in your opinion, on the purposes for which a nation uses her military forces?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Evil in itself	9%	10%	16%	11%	8%	13%
Depends on purposes	61	79	73	79	91	72
No opinion	$\frac{10}{100\%}$	$\frac{11}{100\%}$	$\frac{11}{100\%}$	$\frac{10}{100\%}$	$\frac{1}{100\%}$	$\frac{10}{100\%}$

Appreciably more opponents than supporters of German defense participation give evidence of a pacifist orientation toward things military. So convictions of this type may play some role in engendering opposition. However, the strongly preponderant position both among supporters and opponents is that the good or evil of military institutions depends on the uses to which they are put.

"Do you believe the military to be an evil in itself, or does that depend, in your opinion, on the purposes for which a nation uses her military forces?"

	Evil in itself	Depends on purposes	No opinion	Number of cases:
US ZONE				
For participation in a European army	6%	63%	6% ... 100%	965
Against participation in a European army	27	63	5	327

R E S T R I C T E D

Though pacifist trends are very minor among all segments of the US Zone population, they are least among the most educated and informed levels - the men, the better schooled, the economically better situated, and the urban dwelling.

"Do you believe the military to be an evil in itself, or does that depend, in your opinion, on the purposes for which a nation uses her military forces?"

	Evil in itself	Depends on purposes	No opinion	Number of cases:
US ZONE				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	12%	84%	4% ... 100%	706
Women	11	73	16	783
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	11%	77%	12%	1235
9 years and more	10	87	3	259
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	11%	73%	16%	357
150 - 299 DM	12	78	10	657
300 DM and more	10	84	6	429
<u>City Size:</u>				
Under 2,000 pop.	10%	75%	15%	564
2,000 - 24,999	12	78	10	473
25,000 and over	11	84	5	437
<u>Age:</u>				
15 - 24 years	9%	74%	17%	214
25 - 59 years	12	80	8	1043
60 years and over	8	77	15	257
<u>Party Preference:</u>				
SPD	13%	81%	6%	363
CDU/CSU	7	81	12	328
FDP/LDP/DVP/EDV	6	91	3	99
BP	8	87	5	83
None of them	17	74	9	299
No opinion	9	71	20	271
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	10%	79%	11%	794
Protestants	12	79	9	641
<u>Origin:</u>				
Natives	12%	78%	10%	1225
Refugees	7	80	13	261

Defense is most often cited as illustrative of legitimate purposes of military institutions. A sizable proportion of the West Germans sampled also believe that training of the young is one of the proper and desirable functions of the military.

"Do you believe the military to be an evil in itself or does that depend, in your opinion, on the purposes for which a nation uses her military forces?"

If "Depends on purposes": "Which uses would show, in your opinion, that the military is not an evil?"

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

<u>For defensive, protective, and security purposes:</u> For the defense of the Fatherland; to fend off any menace that threatens our country; only as a security guard and defense army; because every nation needs an army for protection against any kind of aggression; if the interests of a people are threatened and they are forced for that reason to defend themselves; if an army is needed for the defense against the Russians; etc.	50%	67%	50%
<u>To educate and train the young:</u> As a means of education for the young; only to educate the young - yet must never lead to war; if it serves as physical training; so the young will get some training, that has never harmed anybody yet; so the young men get some sort of training in peacetime and we get a feeling of security without having to fear another war; etc.	20	16	12
<u>Against disturbances within the country:</u> To keep up order within the country; as long as it guarantees peace and order within the country I don't consider it an evil; to quell riots and to keep down Communist agitation; etc.	10	13	6
<u>To provide work and boost the economy:</u> So the unemployed will have work; it would boost industries - the soldiers must be outfitted - unemployment would decrease and the young would learn some discipline and order; etc.	3	6	1
<u>For peaceful purposes only:</u> As a sort of voluntary working service (Arbeitsdienst) within the country, i.e. for seasonal help to the farmers or similar peaceful purposes; for peaceful purposes - I personally liked my military training period, though I didn't want to have anything to do with war; for peaceful purposes, i.e. commercialized airlines; etc.	2	1	1
<u>Other opinions:</u> Only if the army doesn't have to fight against the East zone Germans; if Germany has a well trained army, every other nation would respect Western Germany - then it won't be an evil; only if it is a professional army without political ideas; at the present period it is imperative to have an army; etc.	1	3	3
<u>No opinion / No answer:</u>	$\frac{6}{92\%}$	$\frac{2}{108\%}$	$\frac{5}{78\%}$

* Some people gave more than one answer.

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The small minority who hold that the military is an evil in itself focus mainly in their reasoning on the thesis that military forces always lead to war.

"Do you believe the military to be an evil in itself or does that depend, in your opinion, on the purposes for which a nation uses her military forces?"

If "Evil in itself": "What are your reasons for this opinion?"

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

<u>Military forces mean war:</u> If a government, as the one of Switzerland, is for peace only, no military force or only a very small contingent is needed; military forces always make the situation more tense; the nations should be able to keep peace without having military forces, it always leads to war; I don't want to see soldiers anymore, they always want to fight and start a war; because it is only possible to start a war with military forces; etc. .	6%	6%	10%
<u>War and the military resulted in enough suffering:</u> Because so far the military brought only disadvantages; we are still fed up from the last war; in the past we never had any advantages from the military; I don't want to be a POW again and be punished for deeds against which there were no laws in our country; etc.	2	-	2
<u>Upkeep of military forces is expensive:</u> The soldier is an unproductive person and lives at the expense of the government; because we, the people, have to pay for the whole blasted works; from outward appearances the people could only stand to lose through rearmament and possible war; etc.	1	*	1
<u>Objection to the military on moral and religious grounds:</u> People should not be trained towards violence; because the military trains people to murder; because God says: "Thou shalt not kill"; etc.	1	-	1
<u>The military leads to misuse:</u> The government will always use the military for its own purposes, no matter whether they are right or wrong; because only with military forces a government is able to misuse its power; because I had experience as a soldier - a soldier is only a puppet in the hands of the government; the soldier only exists to protect capital - they can beat each other up without our help; etc.	1	1	1
<u>The military means restriction of personal freedom:</u> Everything connected with force and restriction of personal freedom is an evil in my opinion; if I have to join the army I'll be nothing but a slave and won't be able to use my own free will; I hate Prussian discipline; etc.	1	1	1
<u>Other opinions:</u> The Western powers can gather enough troops without us; etc.	*	*	2
<u>No opinion / No answer:</u>	12%**	5%	15%

* Less than one half of one per cent.

** Some people gave more than one answer.

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DO GERMANS BELIEVE THAT WESTERN SUPPORT OF GERMAN DEFENSE PARTICIPATION REVEALS A SHIFT OF GROUND ON MILITARISM? ...

The preponderant view in the US Zone - the majority viewpoint in Berlin and Bremen - is that support for German participation in European defense does not mean that the Western powers have changed their policy with respect to German militarism. However, an appreciable minority feel otherwise and believe that in supporting German defense participation the Western powers have indicated that they no longer disapprove of the excesses of German militarism.*

"In case the Western powers agree to a West German participation in a common European defense army, would that show, in your opinion, that the Western powers no longer disapprove of the excesses of German militarism, or do you believe that the Western powers now as before disapprove of the excesses of German militarism?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W. Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
No longer disapprove	24%	20%	24%	23%	26%	11%
Disapprove now as before	42	43	44	43	65	64
No opinion	$\frac{34}{100\%}$	$\frac{37}{100\%}$	$\frac{32}{100\%}$	$\frac{34}{100\%}$	$\frac{9}{100\%}$	$\frac{25}{100\%}$

* It should be mentioned that it proved to be very difficult to devise an adequate wording for this question. That which was finally utilized is not entirely satisfactory in that some people may feel that Western policy toward German militarism has changed somewhat, but not so far as to condone what are stated to be "excesses". For this reason the results should be interpreted as indicating the proportion of West Germans who feel that Western policy on German military has markedly switched.

Interestingly enough supporters and opponents of German defense participation have rather similar views regarding Western policy toward German militarism. The suggestion is therefore that this consideration has not played an important role in differentiating attitudes on the participation issue.

"In case the Western powers agree to a West German participation in a common European defense army, would that show, in your opinion, that the Western powers no longer disapprove of the excesses of German militarism, or do you believe that the Western powers now as before disapprove of the excesses of German militarism?"

	No longer disapprove	Disapprove now as before	No opinion	Number of cases:
US ZONE				
For participation in a European army	26%	50%	24% ... 100%	965
Against participation in a European army	25	42	33	327

US Zone group breakdowns reveal that the more educated and informed levels much more widely express the view that Western support of German defense participation does not indicate any lessened disapproval of the excesses of German militarism.

	No longer disapprove	Disapprove now as before	No opinion	Number of cases:
US ZONE				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	26%	55%	15% ... 100%	706
Women	21	29	50	788
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	25%	37%	33%	1235
9 years and more	13	73	14	258
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	20%	34%	46%	357
150 - 299 DM	27	41	32	657
300 DM and more	21	55	24	429
<u>City Size:</u>				
Under 2,000 pop.	25%	33%	42%	584
2,000 - 24,999	21	44	35	472
25,000 and over	23	55	22	438
<u>Age:</u>				
15 - 24 years	32%	35%	33%	214
25 - 59 years	23	44	33	1043
60 years and over	17	44	39	237
<u>Party Preference:</u>				
SPD	26%	50%	24%	363
CDU/CSU	24	40	36	328
FDP/LDP/DVP/BDV	21	63	16	99
BP	31	36	33	83
None of them	23	45	32	299
No opinion	17	30	53	271
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	21%	43%	36%	794
Protestants	26	41	33	641
<u>Origin:</u>				
Natives	23%	43%	34%	1228
Refugees	24	42	34	261

RESTRICTED

DID THE WESTERN POWERS INDICT THE GERMAN MILITARY AS SUCH? ...

A considerable number of German press reports have in varying ways expressed the thesis that German participation in European defense is impossible unless the Western powers clear the honor of the German soldiers, which allegedly was impugned by indictment of the military as such. Some indication that the German public does not support such a view lies in the present finding that two out of three in the US Zone - almost 9 in 10 in Berlin - hold that the German generals were indicted by the Western powers, not because they were soldiers, but only because they had committed certain crimes during the war.

"Do you think German generals were indicted by the Western powers only because they were soldiers, or only because they committed certain crimes during the war?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Because they were soldiers	9%	11%	12%	10%	3%	12%
Because of crimes	71	63	67	63	83	63
Qualified replies	4	8	6	5	6	4
No opinion	16	13	15	17	3	16
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Opponents of German defense participation show little more inclination than supporters to express the view that the German generals were indicted simply because they were soldiers. This of course suggests that opposition does not derive in any primary way from dissatisfaction over alleged violations of German military honor.

"Do you think German generals were indicted by the Western powers only because they were soldiers, or only because they committed certain crimes during the war?"

	Because they were soldiers	Because of crimes	Qualified replies	No opinion	Number of cases:
US ZONE					
For participation in a European army	10%	76%	5%	9%...100%	965
Against participation in a European army	14	65	3	13	327

Group breakdowns reveal no unitary trend on this issue. The opinion leading elements tend more often to express opinions of either kind, with the less educated and informed more often indicating no opinion.

"Do you think German generals were indicted by the Western powers only because they were soldiers, or only because they committed certain crimes during the war?"

US ZONE	Because they were soldiers	Because of crimes	qualified replies	No opinion	Number of cases:
<u>Sex:</u>					
Men	14%	69%	8%	9%...100%	706
Women	7	66	4	23	787
<u>Education:</u>					
8 years or less	9%	69%	4%	18%	1234
9 years and more	15	65	13	7	258
<u>Income (per month):</u>					
0 - 149 DM	9%	64%	4%	23%	357
150 - 299 DM	9	71	5	15	657
300 DM and more	14	71	6	9	428
<u>City Size:</u>					
Under 2,000 pop.	10%	62%	5%	23%	583
2,000 - 24,999	9	70	6	15	473
25,000 and over	11	75	6	8	437
<u>Age:</u>					
15 - 24 years	8%	75%	1%	16%	214
25 - 59 years	10	69	6	15	1042
60 years and over	11	61	6	22	237
<u>Party Preference:</u>					
SPD	8%	79%	7%	6%	363
CDU/CSU	7	73	5	15	327
FDP/LDP/DVP/BDV	19	62	9	10	99
BP	6	79	5	10	83
None of them	16	62	6	16	299
No opinion	8	54	3	35	271
<u>Religion:</u>					
Catholics	8%	70%	5%	17%	793
Protestants	12	66	6	16	641
<u>Origin:</u>					
Natives	10%	69%	5%	16%	1227
Refugees	12	66	6	16	261

R E S T R I C T E D

II. DO GERMANS BELIEVE DEFENSE PARTICIPATION WILL FOSTER NAZISM?

WOULD FORMER NAZIS REGAIN INFLUENCE IF GERMANY REARMED? ...

The preponderant opinion in the US Zone and in Berlin is that with the rearming of West Germany it is probable that leading personalities of the third Reich would gain considerable influence. Almost as large a proportion, however, express the contrary opinion.

"In case Western Germany were rearmed, do you think it probable or not that leading personalities of the third Reich would gain considerable influence in Western Germany? "

	Bavaria	Hesse	W. Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Probable	48%	43%	46%	47%	52%	41%
Not probable	37	39	37	37	43	45
No opinion	15	18	15	16	5	14
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Somewhat more opponents than supporters of German defense participation take the view that rearming West Germany would in all probability strengthen the influence of former Nazis.

"In case Western Germany were rearmed, do you think it probable or not that leading personalities of the third Reich would gain considerable influence in Western Germany? "

	Probable	Not probable	No opinion	Number of cases:
US ZONE				
For participation in a European army	49%	43%	8% ... 100%	965
Against participation in a European army	58	32	10	327

R E S T R I C T E D

US Zone breakdowns on the issue show only that the more educated and informed levels tend to more frequently express both judgments, with the less informed groups more often voicing no opinion.

"In case Western Germany were rearmad, do you think it probable or not that leading personalities of the third Reich would gain considerable influence in Western Germany?"

	Probable	Not probable	No opinion	Number of cases:
US ZONE				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	55%	33%	7% ... 100%	704
Women	40	36	24	788
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	47%	35%	18%	1233
9 years and more	50	46	4	258
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	41%	35%	24%	356
150 - 299 DM	49	35	16	656
300 DM and more	50	43	7	429
<u>City Size:</u>				
Under 2,000 pop.	42%	35%	23%	564
2,000 - 24,999	50	37	13	472
25,000 and over	51	40	9	436
<u>Age:</u>				
15 - 24 years	44%	38%	18%	214
25 - 59 years	49	37	14	1042
60 years and over	41	35	24	236
<u>Party Preference:</u>				
SPD	54%	37%	9%	363
CDU/CSU	43	43	14	328
FDP/LDP/DVP/BDV	41	55	4	99
BP	57	38	5	83
None of them	52	32	16	298
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	43%	36%	16%	793
Protestants	45	38	17	640
<u>Origin:</u>				
Natives	45%	37%	15%	1227
Refugees	44	37	19	260

R E S T R I C T E D

WOULD FORMER NAZIS REGAINING ANY INFLUENCE POSE A THREAT TO GERMANY? ...

Opinions split in the US Zone on whether or not a threat would be posed to West Germany if former Nazis gained influence through German defense participation. Those who judge such a gain in influence to be probable, are somewhat less likely to evaluate it as a threat.

"If leading personalities of the third Reich gained considerable influence, would that, in your opinion, be a threat to Western Germany or not?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Threat	41%	35%	42%	40%	54%	35%
No threat	41	38	40	40	41	39
No opinion	18	27	18	20	5	26
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	Threat	No threat	No opinion	Number of cases:
US ZONE				
Probable in case of German rearmament	42%	50%	8% ... 100%	598
Not probable in case of German rearmament	48	40	12	599

Somewhat more opponents than supporters of German defense participation express the opinion that a rearmament-associated gain in influence of former Nazis would pose a threat to West Germany. The difference is not large enough, however, to mark such a consideration as a major differentiating factor on the participation issue.

"If leading personalities of the third Reich gained considerable influence, would that, in your opinion, be a threat to Western Germany or not?"

	Threat	No threat	No opinion	Number of cases:
US ZONE				
For participation in a European army	40%	47%	13% ... 100%	965
Against participation in a European army	51	34	15	327

R E S T R I C T E D

Again US Zone group breakdowns reveal no unitary trend except the usual more widespread no opinion among the less educated and informed.

"If leading personalities of the third Reich gained considerable influence, would that, in your opinion, be a threat to Western Germany?"

	Threat	No threat	No opinion	Number of cases:
<u>US ZONE</u>				
<u>Sex:</u>				
Men	40%	48%	12% ... 100%	703
Women	40	33	27	788
<u>Education:</u>				
8 years or less	40%	39%	21%	1232
9 years and less	42	46	12	258
<u>Income (per month):</u>				
0 - 149 DM	38%	32%	30%	357
150 - 299 DM	38	43	19	654
300 DM and more	46	42	12	429
<u>City Size:</u>				
Under 2,000 pop.	35%	41%	24%	583
2,000 - 24,999	40	41	19	472
25,000 and over	47	39	14	436
<u>Age:</u>				
15 - 24 years	43%	36%	21%	214
25 - 59 years	40	43	17	1041
60 years and over	39	33	28	236
<u>Party Preference:</u>				
SPD	49%	35%	16%	363
CDU/CSU	41	42	17	328
FDP/LDP/DVP/ADP	33	60	7	99
BP	44	42	14	83
None of them	41	40	19	297
No opinion	28	35	37	271
<u>Religion:</u>				
Catholics	42%	39%	19%	792
Protestants	38	41	21	640
<u>Origin:</u>				
Natives	41%	40%	19%	1226
Refugees	37	41	22	260

Those who see no threat in any rearmament-associated gain in influence by former Nazis offer a variety of reasons for their views, with no particular argument overshadowing the others.

"If leading personalities of the third Reich gained considerable influence, would that, in your opinion, be a threat to Western Germany?"

If "No threat": "For what reasons?"

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

They have learned from their mistakes in the past and have come to reason: These people won't repeat their mistakes - they have learned from the past; they probably wised up after those two years - they are fed up too; because everybody is fed up with National Socialism, even the former big shots; those men learned their lesson from the destruction of the third Reich; a mistake is only made once in life, the former Nazis realized that too; I don't believe that the personalities of the third Reich would repeat the same mistake or retrace their steps; the situation today is quite different and those people will act accordingly; etc.

8% 12% 9%

They were always good Germans and wanted the best for Germany: They only wanted the best for Germany and will do so again; because the former Nazis only fought for their Fatherland and wanted the best - they would do the same today; they only adhered to the system, yet in spite of that there were many decent people among them; I had confidence in the gentlemen of the third Reich; because many of those people were not Nazis; those who were dangerous are not there anymore and the others are generally decent and capable; they would work in the interest of the people and their Fatherland; etc.

7 4 3

Because they are under constant control by the Western powers: If the Western powers come to an agreement with West Germany, it could not be a danger; they would be under the constant supervision of the Western military; these people would be careful not to repeat their mistakes - besides the Western powers are still there and would have something to say; etc.

5 5 3

Generals and military men were decent people who only performed their duties, were not concerned with politics and would be very useful to us today: That would be the generals who do not present a danger politically; those people performed their duties as soldiers and will do so again; it would only concern military men and not politicians; because at least 90% of the generals and admirals were decent Germans; the generals are our leading brains and these excellent military leaders could only be an advantage to the German army; etc.

5 5 8

(cont'd on next page)

R E S T R I C T E D

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

The German people will watch that they do not become a threat again - they do not have the power anymore: Because every German will take care that these people won't get back to the top; if they should regain influence they could not exercise it, because the population would resist and not fall for their line a second time; the government would take care that the Hitler crowd would not get high and mighty again; they can't do as they please anymore as during the third Reich; etc.

4% 9% 8%

Because capable thinkers are needed in Germany: Because we had capable people among them and we could use them; the Americans themselves employed many of them already; they know more about what's up than those amateurs that are now heading the government; they are needed by all means - I don't see any threat in that since today the same things are done as those people did in the past; etc.

3 2 2

There are hardly any left and the few that are have no power: They can't do anything anymore - they are glad to be left in peace; most of these personalities are not alive and the few Nazis left are not dangerous anymore; etc.

3 2 4

Because they oppose Communism: If we march against Russia, they will go along too; because they are not Communists and always were opposed to Russia; because they are a bulwark against Communism; they would see to it that Germany regained her honor - actually they were always opposed to Communism; etc.

2 2 -

Other opinions: Germany can't defend herself alone but must side with the Americans; because all of them would work for Western interests; the new ones would have the same bad influence - the German always remains the same, no matter who is on top; because a lot of things were good during the third Reich, i.e. no unemployment - besides many of them are in high positions again; etc.

2 1 1

No opinion / No answer:

$$\frac{3}{42\%*} \quad \frac{1}{43\%*} \quad \frac{2}{40\%*}$$

* Some people gave more than one answer.

R E S T R I C T E D

III. HAVE GERMAN ATTITUDES CHANGED ON THE NUREMBERG TRIALS?

TREND IN ATTITUDE ON FAIRNESS OF TRIALS ...

The results of the present survey indicate that the four year trend in opinion on the fairness of the initial Nueremberg trial marks one of the largest shifts in viewpoint yet recorded by the Reactions Analysis Staff. Whereas in October of 1946 78 per cent among US Zone Germans expressed the judgment that the initial Nueremberg trial was conducted on a fair basis, only 38 per cent voiced such an opinion in the present survey of October 1950. In Berlin the shift has not been so marked, but still a 21 per cent drop in favorable judgments has occurred.

We have now some questions concerning the first Nueremberg trials, in which among Goering, Hess, Keitel, etc. were tried.
"Do you believe that the trials were conducted on a fair basis?"

	Bavaria		Hesse		W-Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen
	Oct '46	Oct '50	Oct '46	Oct '50	Oct '46	Oct '50	Oct '46	Oct '50	Oct '46	Oct '50	Oct '50
Yes	81%	41%	74%	31%	71%	39%	78%	38%	88%	57%	34%
No	6	28	6	35	6	29	6	30	8	19	46
No opinion	13	31	20	34	23	32	16	32	4	14	20
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Whatever the reasons for such a marked drop in the prestige of the Nueremberg trials the suggestion is strong that the Germans have gone far in what might be termed retrospective rehabilitation of their status in regard to the trials.

The most immediate practical implication of these findings is that, in conjunction with the results of the following question, it can only be surmized that there are likely to be extensive negative reactions in West Germany when the Nueremberg trials are brought back into public attention through the airing of the appeal results of the Landsberg prisoners.

Opponents of German defense participation are less inclined than supporters to believe the trials were conducted on a fair basis. The difference, however, is not very great.

"Do you believe that the trials were conducted on a fair basis?"

	Yes	No	No opinion	Number of cases:
US ZONE				
For participation in a European army	44%	32%	24% ... 100%	965
Against participation in a European army	33	36	31	327

* 1946 figures are not available for Bremen.

The most prominent disclosure of group comparisons over a four year period is that the drop in favorable evaluations of the Nueremberg trials has occurred among all elements of the US Zone population, rather than being confined to particular segments. Another indication of importance is that the rise in adverse judgments has been considerably greater among more educated respondents than among their less educated counterparts.

We have now some questions concerning the first Nueremberg trials, in which among others Goering, Hess, Keitel, etc. were tried.
 "Do you believe that the trials were conducted on a fair basis?"

	Yes		No		No opinion		Number of cases:	
	Oct	Oct	Oct	Oct	Oct	Oct	Oct	Oct
	'46	'50	'46	'50	'46	'50	'46	'50
US ZONE								
<u>Sex:</u>								
Men	84%	42%	6%	35%	10%	23%	1319	706
Women	72	35	6	25	22	40	1653	787
<u>Education:</u>								
8 years or less	77%	39%	5%	27%	18%	34%	2405	1233
9 years and more	81	35	9	43	10	22	570	258
<u>*Income (per month):</u>								
0 - 149 DM	-	34%	-	25%	-	41%	-	357
150 - 299 DM	-	39	-	30	-	31	-	657
300 DM and more	-	43	-	33	-	24	-	428
<u>*City Size:</u>								
Under 2,000 pop.	-	31%	-	28%	-	41%	-	583
2,000 - 24,999	-	42	-	31	-	27	-	473
25,000 and over	-	44	-	31	-	25	-	437
<u>Age:</u>								
15 - 24 years	72%	40%	8%	26%	20%	34%	339	214
25 - 59 years	79	38	5	32	16	30	2199	1043
60 years and over	75	36	5	24	20	40	445	236
<u>Party Preference:</u>								
SPD	85%	47%	6%	32%	9%	21%	757	363
CDU/CSU	83	40	4	25	13	35	895	327
FDP/LDP/DVP/BDV	74	28	13	53	13	19	119	99
*BP	-	45	-	31	-	24	-	83
None of them	68	34	7	35	25	31	733	299
No opinion	57	27	5	20	38	53	239	271
<u>Religion:</u>								
Catholics	79%	40%	5%	25%	16%	34%	1603	739
Protestants	74	34	7	34	19	32	1296	641
<u>*Origin:</u>								
Natives	-	39%	-	29%	-	32%	-	1227
Refugees	-	31	-	34	-	35	-	261

* Comparative figures not available on these indices.

TREND IN ATTITUDES IN SEVERITY OF SENTENCES ...

Just as in public judgment of the fairness of the trials in general, evaluations of the appropriateness of the sentences have markedly shifted since October of 1946. Then only one in ten in the US Zone expressed the opinion that the verdicts were too severe, now four times as many do so, making this the preponderant standpoint. Only in Berlin is the preponderant opinion that the verdicts were fair.

"Do you consider the verdicts too severe or too mild?"

	Bavaria		Hesse		W-Baden		US ZONE		Berlin		Bremen*
	Oct '46	Oct '50	Oct '46	Oct '50	Oct '46	Oct '50	Oct '46	Oct '50	Oct '46	Oct '50	Oct '50
Too severe	7%	38%	13%	42%	10%	41%	9%	40%	8%	22%	52%
Too mild	22	7	18	3	21	8	21	6	44	18	1
Fair	59	32	51	22	51	31	55	30	46	51	29
No opinion	12	23	18	33	18	20	15	24	2	9	18
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Opponents and supporters of German defense participation do not differ from one another in their patterns of reactions on this issue.

"Do you consider the verdicts too severe or too mild?"

	Too severe	Too mild	Fair	No opinion	Number of cases:
US ZONE					
For participation in a European army	44%	6%	31%	19%...100%	965
Against participation in a European army	44	6	29	21	327

* 1946 figures not available for Bremen.

As in the prior question it is seen that changes in judgment have occurred generally among US Zone population groups. The opinion leading elements, it is to be noted, more often than their counterparts judge the verdicts to have been too severe.

"Do you consider the verdicts too severe or too mild?"

	Too severe		Too mild		Fair		No opinion		Number of cases:	
	Oct '46	Oct '50	Oct '46	Oct '50	Oct '46	Oct '50	Oct '46	Oct '50	Oct '46	Oct '50
US ZONE										
<u>Sex:</u>										
Men	8%	46%	26%	6%	57%	31%	9%	17%	1319	706
Women	10	34	16	5	54	29	20	32	1653	787
<u>Education:</u>										
8 years or less	7%	36%	21%	7%	56%	31%	16%	26%	2405	1233
9 years and more	17	56	19	3	53	22	11	19	570	258
<u>*Income(per month):</u>										
0 - 149 DM	-	34%	-	8%	-	29%	-	29%	-	356
150 - 299 DM	-	39	-	6	-	30	-	25	-	657
300 DM and more	-	46	-	4	-	32	-	18	-	429
<u>*City Size:</u>										
Under 2,000 pop.	-	35%	-	6%	-	27%	-	32%	-	584
2,000 - 24,999	-	42	-	6	-	30	-	22	-	472
25,000 and over	-	43	-	6	-	33	-	18	-	437
<u>Age:</u>										
15-24 years	14%	38%	16%	9%	55%	28%	15%	25%	339	215
25-59 years	9	41	22	6	54	30	15	23	2199	1041
60 years and over	5	34	19	6	59	29	17	31	445	237
<u>Party Preference:</u>										
SPD	6%	40%	29%	8%	57%	38%	8%	14%	757	362
CDU/CSU	8	37	17	6	62	32	13	25	895	327
FDP/LDP/DVP/BDV	21	69	16	2	55	19	8	10	119	98
*BP	-	35	-	8	-	38	-	19	-	83
None of them	11	46	18	6	49	23	22	25	733	299
No opinion	11	26	10	5	48	22	31	47	239	270
<u>Religion:</u>										
Catholics	6%	34%	22%	8%	58%	32%	14%	26%	1603	793
Protestants	11	46	19	4	54	26	16	24	1296	641
<u>*Origin:</u>										
Natives	-	39	-	6%	-	31%	-	24%	-	1227
Refugees	-	43	-	3	-	23	-	31	-	261

* Comparative figures not available on these indices.

ARE GERMANS AWARE OF THE CHANGE IN PUBLIC ATTITUDE TOWARD NUEREMBERG? ...

The preponderant opinion among Germans who will make a judgment is that the population today approves of the war crime trials to a lesser extent than they did at the time of the trials. Only a negligible proportion judge that approval is greater at the present time.

"And now two more questions about the war crime trials in general. We do not mean the denazification system.

How, in your opinion, does the population think today about the war crime trials. Does the population in general approve of these trials to a larger or lesser extent than at the time of the trials?"

	Bavaria	Hesse	W-Baden	US ZONE	Berlin	Bremen
Larger extent	7%	3%	7%	6%	13%	1%
Lesser extent	35	38	39	36	30	39
The same	20	29	22	23	34	30
No opinion	38	30	32	35	23	30
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

The view that public approval has declined is considerably more frequent among the more educated and informed segments of the US Zone population.

	Larger extent	Lesser extent	The same	No opinion	Number of cases:
US ZONE					
<u>Sex:</u>					
Men	7%	48%	23%	22%	100% 706
Women	5	26	23	46	787
<u>Education:</u>					
8 years or less	7%	32%	23%	38%	1234
9 years and more	1	56	22	21	258
<u>Income(per month):</u>					
0 - 149 DM	7%	25%	20%	48%	357
150 - 299 DM	6	36	26	32	657
300 DM and more	6	49	21	24	428
<u>City Size:</u>					
Under 2,000 pop.	7%	29%	19%	45%	583
2,000 - 24,999	6	38	26	30	473
25,000 and over	6	44	24	26	437
<u>Age:</u>					
15 - 24 years	10%	34%	19%	37%	214
25 - 59 years	5	39	24	32	1043
60 years and over	6	25	23	46	236
<u>Party Preference:</u>					
SPD	8%	43%	23%	26%	364
CDU/CSU	5	32	25	38	327
FDP/LDP/DVP/BDV	2	54	23	21	98
BP	15	31	29	25	83
None of them	3	41	25	31	299
No opinion	7	21	16	56	271
<u>Religion:</u>					
Catholics	7%	33%	24%	36%	793
Protestants	4	41	22	33	641
<u>Origin:</u>					
Natives	6%	36%	24%	34%	1227
Refugees	6	38	19	37	261

The most frequent reasons advanced by those who feel that Nueremberg has lost prestige in German eyes is that similar crimes were committed by others without punishment and are still being committed today.

"How, in your opinion, does the population think today about the war crime trials. Does the population in general approve of them? Or to a larger or smaller extent than at the time of the trials?"
If "Less than at the time": "For what reasons does the population approve less of these trials?"

US ZONE Berlin Bremen

Because the same war crimes were committed by others, were unpunished, and are still being committed today:
Because the population has seen that other nations do the same in case of war; because another war is in progress that is not led by Germans and the same things are happening there as did here during the last war; the same people who prosecuted us and talked of war crimes all the time are now busily at it to get another war started; because today more than at the time, the population has come to the conclusion that the Russians, the French and the Czechs committed the same kind of crimes, if not worse ones, during the war as well as afterwards, on the German POW's and these nations are not punished for it; because of the events in Korea - the same things are happening there as they did here in the past; because the leaders of the Western powers are confronted with the same issues in Korea; because the Russians are war criminals as well and yet they too were the judges at the war crime trials; because the same crimes continue to be committed in the East Zone and nothing is done to stop it; because the population considers the bombardments of our cities and the killing of the people as war crimes too; etc.

15% 10% 20%

Because the German people are more objective now and the hatred of the Nazis has subsided: Right after the war the hatred of the Nazis was more intense - today the Russian is the enemy No. 1; because the population has come to reason and is not afraid anymore to speak up; because the people are more objective now and realized that nothing has been improved so far; what's past is forgotten, that could be the present attitude of the population; at the time everything was confused - today the greatest hatred has subsided - it was not necessary to use as strict measures as that - it's never happened before; etc.

7 9 6

It has been realized that many of the verdicts were too severe - mere show trials inspired by revenge: Because the people realized more and more that they were show trials, because the population has heard that many of the accusations proved to be lies; because today, after careful investigation it turns out that not all of it was just and many of the verdicts were too severe; because all of them were tried on an unfair basis; the people are more convinced that many verdicts were mistakes, that was proved by facts and revisions of verdicts by the Western powers; because it reached the public that they were mere show trials inspired by revenge; etc.

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Because these people performed their duties and wanted the welfare of Germany: Because more and more people believe that they did nothing but their duty; because the years have shown that many of these people acted rightly; because it is said today that these people are not the only ones guilty of everything - most of them did their duty as soldiers; it is impossible to accuse a professional soldier who defended his fatherland of war-crimes; because of a feeling of identity with the defendants who are Germans after all - besides it is possible today to speak openly about it which was not true at the time; etc.

2% 2% 1%

Because their experience could be of use to us and the military men are needed for the defense against the East: Because at first the Western powers looked down on the German soldier, today they want German soldiers again; because of the remilitarization issue - at the trials our people were treated as war-criminals and today they want us to cooperate; because we are threatened by the East - the generals who would have had the experience necessary for the defense are gone now; because some of the convicted were good organizers who are now needed in the government, i.e. economists, - they would never tolerate this increase in prices; etc.

2 1 2

The verdicts were not enough of a warning: Because those persons should work and not live at our expense; because it wasn't done the way people expected - the criminals are set free and get back into their old positions; because today many of the war criminals are free again - the public does not understand that and doubts the seriousness of the trials; the people are afraid that Nazi groups could reorganize because the verdicts were not a severe enough warning; etc.

1 2 -

Because the trials lasted too long: They should never have lasted that long; they should have been terminated long ago - though the population is for a just punishment of the guilty, they are intolerant of the long duration of the trials; etc.

* 1 1

Other opinions: Because now we see what the Americans really want; because many people do not approve of the present government; because we are not better off than during the "3. Reich"; because the generals were executed in disgrace; because now they accept us as friends again, which is inconsistent considering the verdicts; etc. 3

- 1

No opinion / No answer:

$$\frac{3}{39\%}^{**} \quad \frac{1}{30\%} \quad \frac{2}{39\%}$$

* Less than one half of one per cent.

** Adds up to more than proportion saying Yes in prior question because some respondents gave more than one answer.

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The very small proportion who believe that the Germans now approve of the war crime trials to a greater extent than before argue mainly that people have come to realize the magnitude of the injustice committed during the Nazi period.

"How, in your opinion, does the population think today about the war crime trials. Does the population in general approve of these trials to a larger or a smaller extent than at the time of the trials?

If "More than at the time": "For what reasons?"

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The population has realized the injustices committed during the Nazi period: Because the full significance of the injustices committed by these people is realized now; the reports on the period contribute to the fact that the population now approves of these kinds of trials against KZ criminals to a larger extent than before, the people know today that they murdered their own fellow country-men; because the people read and heard more about these crimes through broadcasts and newspapers; the population only now realizes who brought all the misery to them; because the people know now that Goebbels and his followers had no faith and opposed religion; because it has come to light how the workers were cheated; because the population has grown more objective; because time has shown the meaning of democracy - everybody realizes the difference from dictatorship; from the many reports in newspapers and magazines the understanding of the population for the necessity of these trials is growing; etc.

4% 9% 1%

Other opinions: Because the population will never forgive them, - that they didn't surrender in time; because we still suffer the consequences of their doings; because many of those Nazis try to get on top again; etc.

1 3 -

No opinion / No answer:

$\frac{1}{6\%}$ $\frac{1}{13\%}$ $\frac{-}{1\%}$

CONTINUED ON

REEL NUMBER

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